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ABSTRACT
The main objective of this dissertation is to inquire into public 
enterprise systems of the Third World in order to understand their actual 
behaviour of the policy processes related to public enterprises. This 
research project is a comparative study and the area selected for the case 
study concerns the country members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand.
The study is divided into four parts: (1) the introductory, which
reviews the previous literature in this field and questions whether concepts 
and theories of public enterprise originated in the West are applicable to 
the Third World environment and conditions; (2) the country studies, which 
provide administrative development, organisational structure and processes, 
and the profile of policy makers in each public enterprise system; (3) the 
case studies, each with various aspects of public enterprises, namely 
decisions, and motivations for public or private enterprises, the internal 
management, and the expansion of the public enterprise sector, and corrup­
tion; (4) the conclusion, which summarises the findings and attempts to 
formulate some generalisations in regard to public enterprises in the Third 
World.
It was found that all public enterprise policy issues, particularly 
those traditionally debated by earlier writers (such as reasons for public 
enterprises, their institutional frameworks and processes, and their 
autonomy vs control), cannot be viewed in isolation from their specific 
national and organisational environments. The major weakness of previous 
concepts and theories of public enterprise, usually emphasising
iii
structural aspects, arise from their failure to recognise the significance 
of such variables and their impact on public policy content and outcomes. 
Thus, in many respects these theories are not relevant of the Third World 
environment and conditions which sharply differ from those of the 
Industrialised West where such theories originated.
Public enterprise can be viewed as an integrated subsystem of the 
whole political and socio-economic system and a complete system in itself 
with a number of subsystems, in which policy participants convert inputs of 
various resources into outputs. The most important variables in a public 
enterprise system are political and socio-economic contexts, formal institu­
tions and processes, and policy participants, each of which relates to the 
others and to public enterprise policy, but their type and degree of influ­
ence are different.
The real motivations for public enterprises are often related to 
politics, i.e. the manoeuvre to gain political and economic control or to 
balance power, not other publicly stated reasons dealing with social and 
economic development. Ideologies affect the proliferation of public 
enterprises in some countries, but their impact has been increasingly 
insignificant. In contrast, political systems appear to be unrelated to the 
size of the public enterprise sector, but they greatly affect policy content 
and outcomes of all policy issues, including types and scope of activities, 
institutional forms and processes.
Legal arrangements, according to the previous theories, are designed to 
create efficiency and effectiveness: public enterprises are to be efficient
and effective only if they are out of politics and if a balance between 
autonomy and control is created. It was found that such arrangements are 
very much influenced by political considerations. Further, the actual
iv
practice tends to depend on the degree of influence each individual and 
group possesses and exercises because legal forms and processes are not 
institutionalised. Nevertheless, the performance of Third World public 
enterprises is not as deleterious as claimed. Despite excessive political 
interference in the management, they still manage to maintain some degree of 
flexibility, profitability and public accountability, largely because of 
some political arrangements, i.e. intra-ruling group fighting, foreign 
influences, and the need for mass support.
The term national profitability is suggested to replace the ambitious 
goals of efficiency and effectiveness because it includes economic efficiency, 
social profitability and "political profitability", the last of which is 
significant in the Third World environment.
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PART I: THE INTRODUCTORY PART
1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In most countries politics and the national economy are becoming 
increasingly interdependent. In some countries those who control the 
economy control political power, and the ones who control political power 
without economic support are more vulnerable to be challenged than those 
who control both. To keep themselves in power, incumbent politicians have 
no. other choice but to actively engage in economic activities either 
through their own business empire, if they come from the property-owning 
group, or through state intervention such as enacting regulations and/or 
establishing public enterprises. The strategy and degree of such inter­
ference varies from country to country and from time to time, depending on 
several socio-economic and political factors. The present trend, however, 
appears to be toward greater state entrepreneurship, no matter what form of 
government, what style of leadership, or what stage of economic development.
In more economically advanced countries, one sees the transition from 
the "managed economy" to the "new political economy" in which massive 
governmental intervention is growing in all phases of economic and social 
life and the demarcation line between the public and private sectors 
becomes increasingly blurred.'^ Even in the United States where its people 
by nature and by ideology are against state entrepreneurship, the degree of 
intervention now goes beyond regulating the conditions of economic 
activities. Indeed, the changing environment of the post cold war period, , 
arising from the growth of "consumerism", technological and scientific 
progress, and the emergence of transnational corporations (TNCs), 
contributes to the proliferation of public enterprise. On one hand, 
popular demands and expectations compel governments to expand their
2functions into non-conventional areas previously reserved for public
enterprises. On the other hand, the expansion of the public sector is
influenced by political reasons - private enterprise has grown so huge
and in many cases has escaped political control through the device of TNCs,
2that the state is in need of a new assertion of its powers.
Socio economic problems in Third World nations make policy making in 
regard to public enterprises more complicated. Almost all of these count­
ries are new nations having recently gained political but not yet economic 
independence as their economies have usually been tied up with those of 
former colinialists. In addition, many of them adopted the developmental 
model of the West, with emphasis on the role of private entrepreneur which 
is usually either almost non-existent or already dominated by members of 
the power elite group or by the minority groups. Therefore, not only do 
such models fail to satisfy local needs, they also bring these countries 
under the domination of international financing institutions and TNCs. 
Meanwhile, some other countries select another extreme, using the socialist 
model of development, but the progress has also been slow. In fact, many 
of them are socialists only by name. Then comes the third alternative - 
the middle way between the two extremes, the employment of public 
enterprises and/or mixed enterprises.
The public enterprise approach, which was severely criticised by some 
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund a few 
decades earlier, proliferated, apparently with support from such institu­
tions, this together with the concepts of economic development planning 
and political stability. It is aimed at promoting, stimulating and 
supplementing private business, as well as serving social objectives such 
as promoting more equal income distribution, generating employment and 
raising the socio economic status of underprivileged groups. It is not
3surprising to see the rapid growth of public enterprise in these Third 
World countries even in some of the most resolutely non socialist or in 
fact anti-socialist.
In the ASEAN region alone, there are hundreds of public enterprises:
over 300 in Malaysia, 151 in the Philippines, 78 in Thailand, 118 in
Singapore, and 217 in Indonesia. Their activities are diverse, covering
almost all areas of economic activity from multi-million dollar development
loans to a few state-run pawnshops, from giant state oil companies to small
retail shops. In Thailand, the total assets in 1973 of all public enter-
3prises amounted to 110 billion baht. This was about four fifths of GDP; 
and their employees numbered 250,000 - almost equal to half of the total 
civil service. In Malaysia the public investment in public enterprises was 
M$427.3 million in the economic development plan period 1956-1960, which 
increased to M$697.3 million in 1966-1970 then further increasing to
4M$1,382.5 million for 1971-1975. Still, more nublic enterprises are to 
be established.
But the rapid growth of public enterprise does not imply its true 
story. Experience in many countries reveals the failure of these types of 
governmental instrumentalities: nepotism, favouritism, poor management,
low economic efficiency, low quality of products and services, and negative 
attitudes toward innovation. A study of public enterprises in Carribbean 
countries found that powerful interest groups had access to governmental 
subsidies and "milked off" funds for their own benefits.“’ A similar story 
occurs in the Philippines where public enterprises become involved in the 
political process "in terms of power distribution and balancing, the 
electoral process, the spoils and reward system as well as the current 
development strategies of governing elites (or some groups of the elite),
4particularly in attaining increased control and influence over an important 
area of economic activity".
Much of the discussion on public enterprise in the West has been 
centred around the balance between the autonomy of public enterprise and 
political control, the situation which many earlier theorists believed 
would result in "efficiency" and "effectiveness".
In the United States, for example, Professor L.D. Musolf has claimed 
that the government has achieved a reasonable balance between control and 
autonomy.^ Such a situation has never happened in the Third World. And if 
the equilibrium between the two extremes is really the prerequisite for 
"efficiency and effectiveness", it is doubtful when and how public 
enterprises in these countries would reach this point.
This dissertation aims at analysing the public enterprise system in 
order to understand the actual behaviour of this type of governmental 
instrumentality in the Third World. With such knowledge, theories of 
public enterprise can be advanced and become more universal
Definition of Public Enterprise
Confusion over public enterprise issues begin with the definition. In 
Britain, for example, for the general public, the term "public enterprise" 
usually means "public corporations" or "nationalised industries". There 
are of course some state wholly or partially-owned companies, including 
well-known enterprises such as Rolls-Royce, British Petroleum, and British 
Sugar Corporation, but their relationship with the state is not generally 
known to the public. In the United States, public corporation can mean 
anything from municipalities, regulatory, advisory, enquiry, and
5adjudicatory authorities, universities, and public enterprises. In recent 
years, the US government created many organisations along the lines of >The 
Communications Sattelite Corporation (COMSAT), a privately-owned and 
•financed public utility subject to government regulation and with 
government appointed directors. These COMSAT type bodies are primarily to 
escape from the sphere of the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 
but the conclusion about their status is yet to be reached. In many 
countries there is no legislation directly governing this type of govern­
mental machinery, but in some others, there are several Acts providing 
conflicting legal definitions. In the latter case, such Acts are not 
guaranteed to cover all types of public enterprises.
According to the 1973 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica, "public 
enterprise" denotes:
"an organisation operating ... on commercial principles, 
wholly or partly owned and effectively controlled by a 
public authority. An enterprise of this'kind may be a 
new creation or owe its existence to the nationalisation 
of a privately owned concern. It may have as its main 
function the provision of some 'infrastructural' service 
..., the direct manufacture of a commodity, or the 
extension of certain forms of assistance to enterprises in 
the private sector ... it normally needs to be organised 
and controlled in ways that are different from those 
applicable to ordinary, non-commercial government agencies.
In particular it requires a certain measure of operational 
freedom and an immunity from persistent governmental
Q
intervention in its current decision-making processes".
In the 1968 edition, it specifies that public enterprises are owned by
either a national, state, or local government, but there is no such state-
9ment in the more recent 1973 edition. In addition, the 1973 edition does
6not mention "departmental" enterprises which have been previously named in 
the former edition."^
The above definition was contributed by the late Professor Hanson who 
shared similar ideas with his contemporary theorists such as D.N. Chester, 
W. Friedmann, and W.A. Robson, etc.^ Meanwhile, newer theorists, N.S. 
Carey-Jones and associates, define public enterprise as a government 
activity with these following characterists:
"(a) the government was dealing with the public as a 
businessman rather than a sovereign;
(b) users, rather than the general tax payer were to pay 
for the costs of goods and services;
(c) expenditure necessarily fluctuated with consumer 
demand and could not be predicted accurately or kept 
realistically within annual limitations;
(d) expenditure to meet increased demand should not, in 
the long run, increase the net outlay from the 
treasury; and
(e) operations were being conducted within areas in 
which there were well-established business 
practices".^
The definition has much validity but still there are some points to be 
questioned. Firstly, it is doubtful whether a state assumes the single 
role of businessman rather than a sovereign because there is no clear 
demarcation line between the two roles. In fact, a state plays several 
roles at the same time: a sovereign, a protector, a tax collector, a
social welfare worker, a profit-maker, to name a few. Secondly, it is true 
that expenditure fluctuates with consumer demand but it still can be 
budgeted annually or even projected in a long term plan like any type of 
government or business agency. Thirdly, in regard to subsidy, it is 
doubtful whether a government will stop providing financial subsidy to
7public utility enterprises or social enterprises which in their nature 
cannot be expected to break even financially. The failure to subsidise 
these organisations would result in serious political repercussion. Lastly, 
the operations of public enterprise do not always follow "well-established 
business practices" because they still form a part of the government and 
are obligated to act according to some government regulations.
William G. Shepherd suggests six criteria defining public enterprises 
as follows:^
(1) Degree of Subsidy
- From total subsidy to, to generation of large 
profits by, the enterprise
- Current
- Capital
(2) Degree of Public Control
- From nil to complete
(3) Ownership
- From nil to complete public
(4) Management
- From wholly private to wholly public
(5) Degree of monopoly
- From nil to pure monopoly
(6) Geographical scope
- From local to national.
These criteria are too ambitious, particularly in regard to ownership 
and management. It is true that many public enterprises in the United 
States contract all or part of their management to private units (such as 
the uranium enrichment plants), and in contrast, many privately-owned 
enterprises are managed by official appointees, but these types of enter­
prises are uncommon in other countries.
8Shepherd states that public cost and control exhibits the publicness 
of public enterprise. This is also questionable because in practice many 
governments heavily subsidise private enterprises and exert strict control 
over them. Table 1.1 is modified from Shepherd’s criteria but stresses on 
the sources of authority which provide public enterprise legitimacy and 
publicness.
First of all, public enterprises are wholly owned by the government 
and/or partnerships which government owns at least 50 percent of the equity 
capital and/or partnerships which government owns the majority of the 
shares. Such capital participation implies the degree of managerial 
participation and other types of control of the government.
Secondly, public control is through the legislation creating and 
regulating public enterprises, particularly through provisions concerning 
personnel and financial management. However, this is closely related to 
the first element. For instance, the COMSAT type enterprises or Singapore 
Bus Service Company, are not classified as public enterprises because the 
government is not the main shareholder.
Two other elements, management and finance, also help to define a
public enterprise. But the possible range of variety in them is too wide:
from start to finish or from wholly private to wholly public. Apart from
the increasing popularity of contracting private enterprise to operate all
or part of some governmental activities, at least one writer observes the
ever-increasing entry of professional men and women from the private
sector into public enterprises, even in the countries with the strictly
closed civil service system, and the flow of public funds to private 
14entities. Indeed, millions of dollars of public funds were spent to 
rescue some well-known private enterprises such as Penn Central, Lockhead,
9and Rolls-Royce. Also, there is a tendency for administrators of public 
enterprises to search for a new form of organisation that enables them to 
escape the excessive governmental control, as in the case of COMSAT.
In regard to the geographical scope of public enterprise, inter­
national public corporations, such as those in East Africa and South 
America, which are likely to expand their role in the near future, are also 
included.
Perhaps the legal classification of public enterprises developed by 
earlier theorists three decades ago still provides the most useful 
description of each type of these enterprises. Friedmann was one of the 
first to classify public enterprises into three classical forms: 
"departmental enterprise", the joint stock company" controlled 
completely or partly by public authority, and the "public corporation" 
p r o p e r . I n  this study, however, the public enterprise sector includes 
"departmental" enterprises, public corporations, and state companies 
including those wholly and mainly owned by the government. Figure 1.1 
illustrates these three types of public enterprise in comparison with other 
governmental and business organisations. The first group, "departmental 
enterprises" are a number of ministerial departments performing business­
like functions and some of them contribute to the state a substantial part 
of the state revenue other than taxes and duties. The post offices, 
airports, and railways, are good examples of this category. However, there 
is a tendency for these establishments to be transformed into the public 
corporation status. Secondly, public corporation is defined by Friedmann 
as:
"an institution operating a service of an economic or social 
character on behalf of the government, but as an independent 
legal entity, largely autonomous in its management, though
10
TABLE 1.1 CRITERIA DEFINING PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
Condition Range of Variation
1. Ownership - From at least 50.00 percent in the case 
of mixed enterprise to complete public 
in the cases of state company, public 
corporation, and "departmental" 
enterprise.
2. Source of Authority - From general company law, local
government's or state's or provincial 
ordinance, to special Acts of Parliament 
or Executive Orders
3. Management - From wholly private (in the case of the 
management contracts) to wholly public
4. Finance - From nil to complete
- budgetary control
- subsidy
- audit control
5. Geographical Scope - From local to state (or provincial)
national and international
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responsible to the public, through government and 
parliament and subject to some direction by the 
government, equipped on the one hand the independent 
and separate funds of its own and the legal and
16commercial attributes of a commercial enterprise".
Normally, public corporations are created by special laws of 
Parliament but in some countries they can be created by either special laws 
or by the general corporation law. Also in all but a few cases, these 
public corporations are non-stock, wholly-owned by government. In some 
countries, public corporations are separated into two groups: "proprietary" 
and "governmental". in recent developments, some public corporations have 
become holding organisations owning a group of wholly owned companies or 
joint ventures with private investors. These subsidiaries are public 
enterprises under the third category if the government owns the majority of 
the shares.
The company form has been widely used throughout the world with the 
exception of Britain which prefers the public corporation."^ It is also 
utilised as an ideal device for public-private entrepreneurial action. 
Furthermore, it has recently become an alternative to top technical know­
how and capital from TNCs, since more and more TNCs became partners with 
the government in public enterprises. Daniel L. Spencer calls this type of 
joint ventures "composite enterprise" as different from "mixed enterprise" 
which is a partnership between domestic public and domestic private. 
However, at present, there are very few "joint enterprises", a type of 
joint-venture between foreign public and domestic public, as defined by 
Spencer:
"Joint enterprise Foreign private - Domestic private
Foreign public - Domestic public
13
"Composite enter>r:.se Foreign public - Domestic private
Foreign private - Domestic public 
Foreign public - Foreign private - 
Domestic public
Foreign private - Domestic public 
Domestic private
18Mixed enterprise Domestic public - Domestic private".
Purposes of the Stud}
Though public ertcrprises have proliferated throughout the world in 
the last few decades, the progress made toward understanding of their 
actual behaviour has been slow. In fact, the "discipline" of public 
enterprise is by no means new to scholars but is one which has suffered 
neglect. There is also a surprising abundance of studies but a universally 
accepted "theory" of public enterprise is yet to be developed. Below are 
some reasons for the slow progress.
Firstly, no set of institutions, public or private, have ever
developed so rapidly in this century as has public enterprise; scholars
have been unable to keep abreast of the evolution. Indeed, they have been
one or two decades behind the progress of this type of governmental
machinery. An American writer, W.F. Willoughby, described his ideal form
of public enterprise 13 years after the creation of the first modern
19government-owned corporation, the Panama Railroad Company. In Britain,
Professor William A. Robson edited the first book concerning public
enterprises in that country three decades after the establishment of the
20Port of London Authority. ' The last decade also saw the ever increasing 
number of public enterprises and their expanding role; in contrast, 
surprisingly, there are disproportionately small academic contributions to
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this field. The more exclusively public enterprise is used, the greater 
seems to be the confusion about its characters and its effects. At 
present, there are already many forms and types of public enterprises and 
their activities are very diverse. It is not an easy task to follow the 
development of them.
Secondly, the standard text books at present (such as A.H. Hanson,
Public Enterprise and Economic Development, and W.A. Robson, Nationalized
21Industry and Public Ownership), are a generation old. And in fact many 
conclusions in such contributions were drawn from the experience in the 
pre-war period (see the literature survey in Chapter II). This cannot keep 
pace with the changing environment in any country.
Thirdly, the imbalance among disciplines has drastically limited the 
growth of this field of study. Most of the previous studies, if not all, 
were undertaken largely within the framework of either economics, public 
administration, or law. They were concerned with pricing, the role of 
public enterprises in national development, or the legal aspects of public 
enterprises. In the last few decades, public enterprise has increasingly 
been recognised as an independent area of study with multi disciplinary 
perspectives, but the advancement in the construction of multidiscipline 
theories has been very slow.
Last, but not least, most of the work on public enterprise is 
concerned with individual Western countries, rather than Third World 
countries where public enterprises are being widely used. There is, of ' 
course, some analysis of public enterprises in the Third World, but the 
majority of the writing is’devoted to the ones in South Asia. Above all, 
many studies have used the experience in the West, by either Western 
scholars or Western-trained local writers without considering the
15
significance of various environmental factors. Thus their universality and 
pragmatism is questionable.
The main objective of this dissertation is to help eliminate some of 
these shortcomings. It is to critically examine the patterns of politics 
and management of public enterprises in the Third World as well as their 
underlying conditions. More specifically, this is an attempt to define the 
structure of policy making, policy making processes, and the behaviour of 
the participants in the making and implementing of policies concerning 
public enterprises. The search for improved policy process and better 
managerial practices rests upon a knowledge of how public enterprises are 
formed and how they operate in their political and economical environment.
It is also an attempt to employ some recently developed theories and 
approaches in related fields to understanding the actual behaviour of 
public enterprises in the Third World. Organisation theory, comparative 
politics, and public policy are to be blended into this comparative study 
of public enterprise policy.
Equally important, this study is to investigate the applicability of 
the classical concepts of public enterprises into the Third World 
environments. These concepts are products of the West, drawing conclusions 
from experiences and thoughts of some economically advanced countries in 
that part of the world where environmental variables are sharply different 
from those in the Third World.
The first questions to be raised in this dissertation are concerned 
with the orientation of public enterprises in the Third World* what are 
the underlying factors that shape public enterprise policy? Earlier 
theorists point to a large number of reasons for creating public enter­
prises mainly concerned with socio economic elements and pragmatism but
16
they did not relate such factors to other aspects of public enterprise 
administration. In this study, political imperatives are stressed because 
of the assumption that public enterprises are created by politicians in 
power primarily for political purposes, regardless of political systems and 
stages of political development in any respective country. Thus, it is 
almost impossible to eliminate nolitical intervention in all phases of 
policy formulation and implementation.
It is essential to understand the orientation of an organisation 
because it is to direct all efforts in that organisation toward 
organisational goals. It also frames behaviour of individuals who make 
decisions and implement them into "outcomes". But more than anything else, 
it provides a means to evaluate the performance of such organisations, in 
one way or the other.
As C. Argyris states, the nature, policy and fulfilment of 
"dispositions" (orientation) are influenced by the "organisational
22context", various facets of public enterprises in general are discussed. 
This includes the examination of the existing models of public enterprises 
to understand the relationships between such variable elements and their 
effects on behaviour in each respective model.
Lastly, the dissertation discusses the controversial issue of the 
equilibrium between the autonomy of public enterprise and political 
control. Earlier theorists have long emphasised such a point as an 
essential requirement for "efficiency and effectiveness" of public 
enterprises. Practitioners also find difficulties in reaching this ideal 
situation, arguing for their own interest, like a tug-of-war. In this 
study, it states that such a phenomena is not uncommon in all types of 
organisations, public or private alike, because all organisations are
17
political bodies to a certain extent, and individuals and groups which form 
a sub system in organisations are struggling for power among themselves and 
with other organisations. The equilibrium is therefore'expressed here as 
•political processes which affect performance but is no way concerned with 
so-called "efficiency and effectiveness".
The ASEAN Case
This research project is a comparative study and the area selected for 
the case study is the country members of the ASEAN (Association of South- 
East Asian Nations) including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand and Singapore.
The ASEAN area, because of its significant variations, in many ways 
represents the Third World. All except Thailand experienced Western 
domination.until recently - either American, British, Spanish or the Dutch: 
their administrative structures and processes have been influenced signifi­
cantly by their former mother countries. They also differ from each other 
in such factors as racial, religion and cultural heterogeneity, with 
disparities in size, stage of economic development, wealth and influence.
In other senses, the ASEAN countries may not be representative of Third 
World countries because of their similarities in the present political 
processes and ideologies: all of them are ruled by either military
dominated governments or one dominant party or individual, and they all 
profess the free enterprise system. They also have a long history of well 
established bureaucracies, even in Indonesia where only three decades ago 
there were very few top local born high ranking officials.
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Perhaps the most significant feature of the area is the experience of 
public enterprises which have been assigned a wide range of unorthodox 
activities to achieve socio economic and political objectives set by the 
ruling elites. Some of them have been so successful that their names 
become well-known around the region, whereas many have not been so fortu­
nate. Many more public enterprises are still being created in the 
region and their part in the economy is of increasing significance.
Furthermore, despite their loose socio-political-economic precon­
ditions for regional economic integration, the ASEAN has progressed to a 
certain extent and there are prospects for more regional economic 
cooperation. One among such projects is the proposed setting up of 
transnational public corporations (TPC) to compete with foreign TNCs which 
have long exploited the wealth of this area. This similar type of 
cooperation is not an ASEAN invention for there have been some experiments 
and failures in the Andean nations and in East Africa. But such failures 
are not necessarily to be repeated in this region. The knowledge learnt 
from this study may help in predicting the outcome of the proposal.
Format of the Dissertation
The order of this dissertation follows the issues previously stated. 
The first three introductory chapters provide an introduction to the 
research including a literature survey of previous findings and a research 
framework and methodology. Chapter II which surveys the previous 
literature in this field from the beginning, the three most controversial 
issues of public enterprises, namely the reasons for public enterprises, 
their forms, and the concept of autonomy versus control, are examined 
regarding their applicability to the Third World environment. A public
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enterprise system with three important elements; the socio-economic and 
political contexts, legal structures and processes, and individuals and 
groups, are proposed as a research framework in Chapter III. This chapter 
also outlines the research methodology. In Part II, the main content, is 
six chapters, with Chapter IV providing an overview of public enterprises 
in regard to their relationship with three such underlying factors that 
shape public enterprise policy in the whole ASEAN region. The other five 
chapters analyse public enterprises in each respective ASEAN country.
Part III provides five case studies, each with various aspects of public 
enterprises: the onfe airline policy (public or private enterprise), the
PAL case (politics and public enterprises), the profitable Railways (the 
internal management of public enterprises), public enterprises for the 
masses? (reasons for public enterprises), the Pertamina case (the expansion 
of the public enterprise sector, the new form, and corruption in public 
enterprises). Part IV is an attempt to formulate some generalisations in 
regard to public enterprises in the Third World from the findings in 
previous chapters. New directions of public enterprises in the area are 
predicted and questions for further study are also raised.
20
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CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND THEIR APPLICABILITY 
TO THE THIRD WORLD
Public enterprise is not a new innovation in its form and its nature. 
Its corporate form, with a multi-member board at the top (in the cases of 
the public corporation and the state company), and with some degree of 
managerial autonomy, was developed in Britain centuries ago. The adminis­
trative reform of the nineteenth century under the strong influence of the 
Benthamite teachings' and of the success of the American single-headed 
departmental pattern replaced the old system of unaccountable administrative 
boards with the accountable form: a group of "representative and
responsible" ministers heading ministerial departments with the central 
budgeting and personnel system at the national level and the elected 
councils at the local level. By the turn of the last century, however, the 
pendulum between "centralisation" and "decentralisation" began swinging back 
in favour of the latter. With increasing changing functions of the state 
from those of "regulatory state" to the "welfare state", ministerial 
departments and local councils were no longer able to cope with the ever- 
expanding role of the government in national economy. The search for newer 
governmental organisational forms which provided a greater degree of 
managerial flexibility, reputed to be a precondition for "efficiency and 
effectiveness", led to the creation of three legal forms of public 
enterprise ("departmental" enterprise, public corporation, and state 
company). Then, the pendulum moved back toward the pole of centralisation 
and many attempts were made to bring public enterprises back under the 
central control. The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 in the 
United States and the Canadian Financial Administration Act of 1951 were
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good examples. This brought about the birth of newer administrative forms 
such as the recent American innovated COMSAT-type bodies, mixed enterprises, 
and the German Anstalten, all of which are designed to escape from the 
control net."*“
The literature under review in this Chapter covers an evolution of 
over half a century of this type of governmental instrumentality. Most of 
the writers in this field are from Britain or English speaking countries 
because the modern forms of public enterprise were popular in these 
countries before any other areas. Earlier contributors such as W.F. 
Willoughby, H. Van Dorn, W.A. Robson, J. Thruston, Lord Morrison, F.W. 
Eggleston, C. Herman Pritchett and M.E. Dimock, mainly observed the 
development of existing public corporations and the ways they operated.
One of them, Thurston, provided a very useful comparative study of 
enterprises in English speaking countries while some other writers 
attempted to draw generalisations from the early experience. Such attempts 
were further developed soon after the Second World War when public 
enterprises proliferated throughout the world, not only in the industria­
lised West but also in Third World countries, almost all of which had just 
become independent and were seeking proper developmental agencies.
The second group of writers, including those in the disciplines of 
law, political science and economics, such as A.H. Hanson, W. Friedmann, 
R.L. Weltenhall, V.V. Ramanadham, L.D. Musolf and H. Seidman, often dealt 
with strutural, functional and legal aspects of public enterprise. 
Nevertheless, though their work has been vastly utilised by students, their 
shortcomings have recently been criticised by some contemporary writers for 
being inadequate in providing an understanding of actual behaviour of 
working public enterprises.
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The critics have promised to fill the gap by- 
utilising newly developed knowledge of public policy, organisation theory, 
development administration, and development economics, into the study of 
public enterprise. Members of this group, comprising W.G. Shepherd, J.B. 
Sheahan, N.S. Carey-Jones and his associates, L. Peres, etc., have already 
challenged the validity of many of the previous theories.
The "new approach" to the study of public enterprise seems to be more 
universalistic and realistic than the previous ones. Public enterprise is 
the product of the West and is now universally utilised. Nevertheless, it 
does not mean that public enterprises in the Third World function and are 
managed in the same way as their counterparts in the West. Scholars in 
comparative administration and development administration have long been 
interested in the problems arising from the importation of Western adminis­
trative systems into the different environment of the Third World. But, 
unfortunately, the management of public enterprises of the Third World has 
been left almost untouched. There has of course been increasing contri­
butions on the issue, among which Indian and Pakistani public enterprises 
receive the most attention. But still almost all of them have been 
observed with the Western experience in mind, which is hardly relevant to 
the local environment. Thus, it is interesting to learn how this Western 
innovation can be applicable to the Third World environment.
This Chapter reviews previous contributions on the three controversial 
issues: (1) reasons for public enterprises, (2) the forms of these organi­
sations, and (3) control versus autonomy. It also discusses experiences 
from some Western countries where theories of public enterprise were born. 
Then an inquiry is made to find out the applicability of such theories in
the Third World environment.
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ORIENTATION: REASONS FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
There are numerous reasons for the establishment of a public enter­
prise: political, ideological, practical, strategic, economic and social
reasons, to name a few. Yet the actual motivations are not necessarily 
officially stated.
Previous theorists often started with centuries-old ideological 
arguments concerning the ownership of property. Adam Smith, Lord Keynes 
and the Fabians are quoted for pro and con. Nevertheless, all seem to agree 
that a state has the right to be involved in some types of entrepreneurial 
activities. Even Adam Smith, the father of the free enterprise philosophy, 
does not restrict the role of government to keep "the ring clear for 
private individual to fight in", as mentioned by some of his followers. 
According to Smith, the state has three main functions:
"... firstly, the duty of protecting the society from 
violence and invasion of other independent societies; 
secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, 
every member of the society from the injustice or 
oppression of every other member of it; and thirdly, 
the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public 
works and certain public institutions, which it can 
never be for the interest of any individual or small 
number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because 
the profit could never repay the expenses to any 
individual or small number of individuals, though it 
may frequently do much more than repay it to a great 
society...."^
The third function concerning the social versus private cost benefit 
principle was very similar to the view expressed by Lord Keynes who recog­
nised the need in 1926 for state intervention in activities considered
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"technically social", particularly those for the control of savings and 
investment, the business cycle, and the development of a national 
population policy. His general view was, however, for private enterprise.
"The most important. Agenda of the State relate not to 
those activities which private individuals are clearly 
fulfilling, but to those functions which fall outside 
the sphere of individuals, to those decisions which 
are made by no one if the state does not make them.
The important thing for Government is not to do things 
which individuals are doing already and do them a
little better or a little worse; but to do things
' 3which at present are not done at all".
Keynes found his supporters elsewhere, particularly from development 
economists in Third World countries, who stressed the necessity for 
expanding the government's role in national economic development processes. 
W.A. Lewis, for example, saw the state as an alternative or a substitute 
mechanism to the free market, whereas W.J. Boumol emphasised that the state 
only supplemented the market.^ Professor A.H. Hanson also dreamed of "the 
spirit of complimentality" between the public and private sectors.^ 
Influenced by Hanson's contribution, the United Nations, in its two 
separate publications, expressed that the role of the public sector in 
relation to private enterprise is as stimulation, supplementation, 
participation, competition (to bring about yardstick competition), and 
displacement (of private enterprise in some cases).
Economic development involves a choice of whether the processes to be 
relied upon will be the public or private sectors; a choice which (among 
other factors) is influenced by ideologies professed by the ruling 
governments. According to the Time Magazine, "socialists" rule 53 of
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sovereign states controlling 39 percent of the world's territory and 42 
percent of its population.^
Marxism-Leninism preaches for the necessity of class welfare, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, the supremacy of the tightly structured 
communist party which is supposed to be the vanguard of the masses, and the 
state ownership of the means of production and distribution. Countries 
with this' system claim that total economic controls or central planning 
always lead to increased output, more equitable distribution of wealth and 
a concentration of resources in socially useful production. The Soviet 
Union and China, for example, have transformed from war-shattered societies 
into military and economic super powers.
Nevertheless, though communist countries claim that they have 
abolished unemployment, they confront serious problems of overstaffing and 
low productivity. Strict central bureaucratic controls cripple efficiency, 
effectiveness and innovation. To avoid such problems, many countries, 
including West Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and the 
Netherlands, which are ruled by left-wing political parties, have adopted 
social democracy, the most liberal version of socialism. This doctrine 
aims at reaching socialist goals by gradual and peaceful means through a 
multi-party system and mixed economy with a combination of state ownership 
of key industries and free enterprise competition.
The last group is the so-called Third World socialism with a great 
variety of forms, such as the "Islamic socialism", the "Baathist socialism", 
the "ujamaa socialism", the "African socialism", and the "cooperative 
societies", etc. Some of these countries call themselves socialists just 
because the term "socialism" is more attractive than capitalism. To quote 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman, "(For many) socialism
28
implies egalitarianism and that people are living for society, while 
capitalism has been given the connotation of materialism, 'greedy',
g
'selfish', 'self-serving', and so on". They also reject capitalism
because of their experience with colonialism, imperialism and exploitation
which for them are almost synonymous. To another writer, "the socialism of
the developing countries is ... to be directed at the establishment of a
society based on justice rather than profit, national planning rather than
the blind operation of the market, and forced economic growth and
industrialisation as opposed to the orientation of the economy to the
9production of raw materials for the profit of foreign enterprises". 
Therefore, many Third World countries pursue policies aimed at decreasing 
the role of private enterprise and curbing foreign investment.
It should be noted that many Third World countries set up public 
enterprises not merely for ideological reasons. As noted by Abu Sharaf 
H.K. Sadique:
"A number of (Asian) countries profess socialist ideals 
in some forms, akin to democratic socialism.... It is 
obvious that ... governments cannot be expected to depend 
fully upon the private sector to achieve their social and 
political goals. However, the prevailing ideology in 
these countries aims more at controlling private enterprise 
rather than rejecting it altogether, as is evident from the 
fact that none of these countries accept the more orthodox 
socialist ideology in which all the means of production are 
owned and controlled by the state".^
Also, the number of public enterprises in a country cannot be used as 
an indication for socialism. Capitalist countries, such as the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, operate more public enterprises than
many socialist countries.
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In Hanson’s view the establishment of public enterprises has not
usually been the direct consequences of an ideological position but rather
the result of some special historical circumstances such as, first, the
Great Depression, then the Second World War, and then inflation.
Furthermore, with some exceptions, nationalisation is not a common general
characteristic because the main emphasis has been on the creation of new
public enterprises, many of which provide stimulation and promotion for
the private entrepreneur.'*'"*' More recently, Bruce L.R. Smith suggests that
the older socialist doctrine of controlling the "commanding heights” of the
economy is out of touch with the modern realities and public enterprise has
demonstrated great desirability as an institutional form. Indeed, a
blend of ideological (or "political" in Friedmann's term) and practical
13reasoning is the determining motive.
This view is similar to that of Seidman who sees the growth of public 
enterprise as a matter of "convenient" or managerial reasons. He states 
that such establishment is "a way to escape 'the civil service mentality', 
salary limitations and personnel ceiling, statutory and constitutional 
limits on public borrowing and central audit and management controls; to 
reduce the size of the budget and to finance government programmes outside 
the budget by earmarking taxes and mortgaging future revenues; and to 
minimise interference by the responsible political authorities". The 
managerial advantages of public enterprises over regular ministerial 
departments is also quoted in the Fulton Report which recommends that 
whenever there is a difficulty in creating a clear line of delegation of 
authority in the Civil Service, such operations should be "hived off" to 
independent boards. The famous management guru, Peter Drucker, also 
recommends the use of "reprivatisation", a system in which non-governmental
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institutions (such as the COMSAT type bodies) are utilised for "the actual 
doing". ^
Many writers stress the importance of public enterprises in economic 
development, Friedmann mentioned the need for economic development as one 
of the most widely accepted and frequent motives of public enterprises. He 
gave examples of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa where 
governments were forced to invest in public utilities and public services 
because of their vast area and small population.1  ^ Professor Benjamin 
Higgins confirmed this statement on his study that:
"... the tendency for Australians to look to their 
government to provide both development and welfare, 
and the greater willingness on the part of Canadians 
than of Americans to accord such responsibilities to 
their government, is a reflection of the nature of the 
frontier.
"From the beginning social overhead capital had to 
be provided by public enterprise (in Australia); the 
land in the interior could not even be given away.
There was no chance of building railroads through 
private enterprise and land grants as in the United
States. Even water had to be provided by public
_ . „ 18 enterprise .
In the case of the United States, however, as stated by C. Pertin, the 
early experience of public enterprise was a total failure due to bad 
management, poor business, and "political sabotage".19 This confirmed the 
laissez-faire myth and by 1870 most states were out of such ventures in 
banking and railways. In fact, laissez-faire was reinstated to a more 
respectable position than before. However, World I, the Depression of the 
1930s, and World War II, led the US government into a profusion of defence
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industries, many of which directly competed with private enterprises. In 
addition, the world famous Tennessee Valley Authority was created in 1933 
to carry out the regional conservation and flood-control programmes. This 
project has been praised as a good example of public enterprise’s role in 
economic development.
Equally significant is the economic success in Japan during the Meiji 
Restoration and the post-war periods, in which public enterprises provided 
a major contribution. In the years immediately following the Restoration 
(1867), the government took the lead in introducing modern industry to 
Japan, by creating a large number of public enterprises such as military 
engineering, mining, railways, ship-building, forestry, communications and 
textiles. There was no ideological conviction that modernisation should be 
achieved by state capitalism or socialism. Rather, it was a matter of 
pragmatism: inadequacy of private incentives, insufficiency of private
capital for capital intensive industries, and technical and organisational 
difficulties. Nevertheless, the policy of state-ownership changed suddenly 
in 1880 and all non-strategic public enterprises were sold to private 
investors, mainly Zaibutsu groups, at prices at par or below par. After 
the Second World War, a large number of public enterprises established 
between the Depression and the war period were abolished as a result of the 
economic democratisation policy. But it was during this period that public 
corporations, in the modern form, were set up for tue first time to 
monopolise some activities. Many more public enterprises were also 
established around the country, particularly at the provincial and local 
levels.20
In the past two decades, tiere has been a proliferation of public 
enterprises in the United States. Even some very unconventional bodies
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were set up, such as the Post Office, the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and the Rural
Telephone Bank. Smith explains the expansion as a part of the transition
in the "post-industrial societies" from the "managed economy" to the "new
political economy". This new economic order features massive government
intervention in all phases of social and economic life; "public-private
line blured; loose interest group; the growing influence of 'military-
industrial complex'; environmental lobby; weakening of political parties;
permeable civil service drawing as professional energies outside of
governmental; preoccupation with quality of life; 'universal entitlement';
'Spaceship Earth'; price stability and 'delicate tinkering' with economy"
21(consumer policies) . He also suggests the inability of the private
sector to perform many desired social functions and the growth of
transnational corporations which often escape national jurisdiction.
Smith concludes that there has been growing belief that the government
can and should direct "the process of social change, feed the economy, and
22provide an unparalleled range of services".
In the Third World countries on "pre-industrial societies", the role 
of government in the economy is even more important. Noted a United 
Nations publication:
"While these developed countries ... look upon private
enterprise as the main source of economic growth and
many of these regard the principal tasks of the
government as ensuring economic stability and providing
a favourable economic climate for the private sector,
the under-developed countries have generally viewed the
public sector as the key instrument for securing
23economic development".
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According to Hanson, the common phenomena in Third World countries are 
a chronic lack of private capital, the serious shortage of people with 
managerial experience and technical skill outside the Civil Service, and 
the inadequacy of economic infrastructure upon which industry depends.
Thus, in order to reach objectives of economic development, governments of 
Third World countries have no other choice but to intervene into national 
economy. In his words:
"To ask how much the state should contribute to 
economic development is therefore meaningless. The 
forces of development are not waiting to be unleashed, 
they have to be created, and then - at the very least 
- fostered and guided. Only the public authorities 
have or can acquire,, the resources and the power 
adequate for this task. Hence the whole process of
2 Adevelopment might be described as public enterprises".
Nevertheless, Hanson later accepts that public enterprises had been
common phenomena long before the concept of economic development became
popular and that some governments are still not developed-oriented. As a
result, public enterprises are utilised for other purposes such as "raising
revenue to the state, providing a favourable display, or as locals for„ 25patronage appointments .
It should be noted that the term "development" in the Third World can 
mean anything. It is ill defined and subject to the values of the 
authority trying to define it. Thus, so often have such terms been 
interpreted for the benefit of the ruling elite: it usually conveys the
meaning of some top-priority political oriented projects and unlimited 
budget with little or without proper checking in the spending.
Public enterprises in the Third World are often involved in 
development projects. But, as Fred W. Riggs states, they can become an
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means of economic development only if there are two prerequisites:
political institutions capable of controlling bureaucracy, and officials
26who efficiently manage public capital. In the majority of Third World 
countries, these two underlying factors are virtually unknown because top 
bureaucrats themselves form a dominant part in the ruling elites whose any 
potential political rival is likely to be eliminated. Irregularities and 
malpractices are also common because there is no effective political 
control.
Furthermore, public enterprises in Third World countries are more
politically oriented than their counterparts in the West because of their
direct involvement in power struggles. They are used to centralise power
and authority and, thus, to further the interests of the ruling elites.
As stated by Carey-Jones and his associates, the political system and
leadership in such countries are usually threatened by the property-
owning group and, if those in power are not part of it nor allied with it,
the national leaders are likely to diminish or destroy such countervailing 
27power. The decision to create, to nationalise, or to abolish public
enterprises is usually influenced by such factors. As a result, public
enterprises are politically sensitive and are primarily utilised for
political purposes, such as power distribution and balancing, the spoils
28and reward system, and the electoral process.
It should also be noted that governments normally undertake certain 
types of defence and strategic industries, such as arms and ammunition 
production. In many Third World countries where the military is in power 
a wider area is classified as defence and security activities which are to 
be operated by military men. Interestingly, these types of activities, 
such as telecommunication, broadcasting, transportation, etc., are always 
given top priority to be taken over in the case of coup d ’etat.
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Many writers also argue both negatively and positively on the
increasing role of mixed enterprise. Riggs notes that public enterprises
cannot be a proper alternative for the inability of private enterprise to
29achieve economic growth but he does not give any other alternative.
Meanwhile- Musolf sees mixed enterprise as a "handy device" for public-
private entrepreneurial cooperation accomplished through the sharing of
30capital and assigning seats on the board of directors. Jan Tinbergen
states: "Mixed ownership may sometimes afford a means of combining private
31efficiency with the desirable direct public control". On the contrary, 
Frank P. Sherwood remarks that mixed enterprise may pose even more of a 
problem. "A bastardised organ which can neither optimise self-interest nor 
fully serve the public interest may turn out to represent the worst of all 
worlds".^
One of the most crucial problems seldom mentioned by scholars is that 
private shareholders representing the private sector in mixed enterprise 
usually come from the ruling elites or the property-owning group of TNCS, 
all of which are totally undesirable.
It is worthwhile to state that a few decades ago, many reports
published by international institutions such as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund,
recommended that some Third World governments abolish their existing
public enterprises and to dispose of them to private entrepreneurs.^ The
pendulum now turns around: they now relate public enterprises with
national planning. In fact, public enterprise has become part of a
popular economic development model in which a politically stable government,
central economic and social planning, and the enterprises are underlying
preconditions for a given Third World country to reach the point of
34economic "take off". However, there are some problems to be solved.
36
First, it is hoped that public enterprise strictly follow the government's
direction which is stated in the national plan. In practice, as mentioned
by Musolf and Hanson, governments often lose their control over public
enterprises and thus, in some cases, are unable to force them to follow the
plans. The problem is more serious if the enterprises are under the
directorship of influential politicans. Some public enterprises are by
35statute autonomous and beyond government control. Second, with a few
exceptions, national planning has been a failure, mainly because of lack of 
recognition from politicians who have long been in the "pork parcel" system. 
In many Third World countries, a large amount of money is invested in some 
unprofitable political "showcase" projects. Third, there has been 
confusion over the term "stability". To many writers, the stability of a 
government (or of a group of the ruling elites) is identifiable with that 
of a nation. There has also been a tendency for the governing elites to 
monopolise power in order to "stabilise" their authority, and any loss in 
power is usually interpreted as "instability".
C. Partin listed some activities a government may intervene for 
control of allocation of resources and for national development:
"1. State ownership and operation of the so-called
'natural monopolies': public utilities owned and
operated from outright total ownership to all degree 
of control. This has prevented the possibility of 
wasteful duplication of facilities and 'cut throat' 
competition in which all lose.
2. State ownership and/or operation or control of 
'potential monopolies'.
3. State action to prevent collusion, concentration of 
ownership and control is unreasonable restraint of 
trade, or 'trust busting' as it is called.
4. The state enters business in direct competition with 
private enterprise. Its intention is either to
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furnish or have the capacity to furnish the marginal 
amount that determines market price. Governments have 
used this to protect consumers as well as to furnish 
for themselves services peculiar to government 
(government the only customer) but which private 
enterprise, for one reason or another, charges a 
monopoly price, or does not furnish a sufficient 
quantity reasonably priced.
5. Governments have gone fully into many businesses that 
have national emergency importance, or whose continuity 
or secrecy or supply are essential particularly for 
defense or war purposes. Such essential service poten­
tially subject to such disruption as civil or labour 
strife have been entered by government as a precautionary 
measure.
6. Government has entered in competition with or completely 
taken over industries for which private enterprise has 
some essential incompetence or ineptness ...
7. Governments have either taken over industries from 
private enterprise or developed them from the beginning, 
disallowing private interests to enter, because they are 
improper for private exploitation, either for moral, 
political or other reasons. Industries in point are the 
liquor business, atomic energy.
10, Governments have taken the lead in underdeveloped 
countries to assemble the basic complementary capital 
complex ....
11. Governments have entered industries other than the 
'natural monopolies' to prevent duplication and waste of 
competition".^
Carey-Jones and his associates termed "accidential public enterprises"
to describe those unintentionally acquired by the government through a
deliberate nationalisation policy or as a result of "salvaging" private
enterprises which were in financial difficulty and whose collpase were
likely to bring large political repercussions. 37
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There are many other stated reasons for public enterprises. The
establishment of Trans Canada Air Lines and Canadian Radio Broadcasting
Commission (predecessor of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) was for the 
38"Canadian unity". Defence and strategic factors have also been widely 
quoted. So are managerial and technical reasons.
To conclude this part, it is worthwhile to quote Wettenhall's view on 
the reasons for the departure from the departmental norms to the corporate 
form:
"1. When the state becomes involved in commercial or 
industrial-type activities, especially though not 
only when we expect such activities to be 
financially self-supporting;
2. when it becomes necessary for the state to engage in 
informational, opinion-forming and research activities 
where impartiality is at a premium and close association 
with any political party undesirable;
3. when it is deemed desirable to include representatives 
of particular interest groups in management by seating 
them around the decision-making board tables (e.g. 
commodity marketing and professional registration 
bodies); and
4. when two or more governments combine to organise and
operate some public project, so that the collegial
board-table is an imperative and responsibility directed
39only to a single government an impossibility".
THE MODELS
The first Chapter classifies public enterprises into three main legal 
forms: the "departmental" enterprise, public corporation, and state
company, each of which has several versions in various countries. The
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Canadian Financial Administration Act of 1951 makes distinctions between
departments proper, departmental corporations (financed by appropriations),
agency corporations (usually given controlled "revolving" funds), and
proprietary corporations (financed by sales). In practice, there are a
number of Crown companies where the shares are held by appointed directors
and endorsed over the minister. In Japan, public enterprises can be
classified into: (i) Special Accounts or Departments with Special Accounts
(Tokubestu Kaikei), (ii) Public Corporations with a wide range of legal
status (Kösha, Ködany Ginko, Köko, Kinko, Jigyödan, Kikan), and (iii) Mixed
Enterprise (Tokushu Gaisha). In the United States, at the federal level,
the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 classifies government
corporations into two categories, "wholly-owned" and "mixed ownership".
Later, some "government-sponsored private corporations" are established to
escape governmental control. These corporations often known as COMSAT
typed organisations are private corporations with a number of directors
40appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.
Most of the earlier literature primarily deals with the public
corporation form, reputed by one observer to be "the most important
41government institutional innovation" of this century. This is probably 
because much of the contribution to this field has been the work of British 
(or British-trained scholars) whose country is known for the preference of 
the public corporation form for the operation of "nationalised industries".
However, it is an American scholar, W.F. Willoughby, who is honoured
to be the first writer to use the term "public corporation" and who first
42laid the foundation of this corporate device. Impressed with the 
performance of the British colonial administration that gave substantial 
administrative and financial autonomy to the territories and with the 
establishment of the Panama Railroad Company, he proposed in 1917 to make
40
Congress a holding corporation with revenue-producing agencies functioning
as its subsidiaries. Such corporations were to be given "complete
financial autonomy" so that it would be possible for them to be
"determine(d) accurately to the extent to which the service is paying its
A 3way, producing a profit or running up a deficit". In brief, Willoughby's 
public corporation model can be characterised as follows:
"... each such service will be given a legal, 
administrative, and financial autonomy. Each will 
have its organic act, or charter, providing for its 
creation and defining its jurisdiction, powers and 
duties; its board of directors; its directing staff 
and subordinate personnel; its own plant, equipment 
and other property which it will process in its own 
name; its own revenue and expenditure system, its 
distinct accounting and reporting system from that 
of the general government; its own well defined 
sphere of activities. Each in a word will have all 
the characteristics of a public corporation".^
The weakness of Willoughby's proposal is that Congress is still to 
make all major policies and that the President possessed no administrative 
authority over public corporations.
A few years later in Britain, Professor A.C. Pigou suggested the 
public corporation form (a semi-autonomous type of commission) for 
operating enterprises of a monopolistic character because traditional 
political institutions (i.e., municipal and national representative 
assemblies) were set up for other purposes, and, thus, were handicapped to 
operate public business undertakings of such nature. The public 
corporation, with appointed qualified members of the governing board, who 
were to be in office for a specified period, was hoped to overcome problems
41
arising from political and electoral pressures always found in the
A 3traditional bodies.
The inter-war period saw the proliferation of public corporations in
Britain and other countries around the World. In Britain, despite the
warning from the Haldane Report of the weakening safeguard of ministerial
responsibilities, this administrative device rapidly gained recognition
from all important political parties. More than ten important public
corporations were established before the Second World War, including the
British Broadcasting Corporation (1926), Central Electricity Board (1926),
and London Passenger Transport Board (1934). In the United States, despite
public hostility against state entrepreneurship, there emerged many public
corporations at both the Federal and State levels, including the well-known
Tennessee Valley Authority (1933). Experience from these working
enterprises helped writers like Dimock, Robson, Thurston, Van Dorn and Lord
Morrison to develop theories of public corporations more systematically.
Perhaps the most significant comment of them all was that of President F.D.
Roosevelt whose classical phrase in 1933 outlined the characteristic of a
public corporation: "... a corporation clothed with the power of
government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of private 
46enterprise". Fifteen years later, President Henry S. Truman added that,
"... experience indicates that the corporate form of organisation is
particularly adapted to the administration of governmental programmes which
are predominantly of a commercial character - those which are revenue
producing, are at least potentially self-sustaining and involve a large
47number of business-type transactions with the public".
Robson observed in 1937 that the earlier modern public corporations in
Britain "evolved in a haphazard and empirical manner": they were not based
48on any clearly defined principle. There were, however, some similar
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s t a t u t o r y  t e n d e n c i e s :  t h e  d i v o r c e  o f  t h e  management  o f  b u s i n e s s - l i k e
a c t i v i t i e s  f rom o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  gove rnm en t ,  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
f i n a n c e s  o f  t h e s e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  from th e  n a t i o n a l  e xc heque r  and a s u b s t a n ­
t i a l  measure  o f  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  autonomy,  t h e  e n l a r g e m e n t  o f  the  a r e a  o f  
o p e r a t i o n  to  a n a t i o n a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  b a s i s  i n  o r d e r  to  b r i n g  t h e  a d m i n i s ­
t r a t i v e  u n i t  i n t o  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t e c h n i c a l  n e e d s ,  and t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
a monopoly,  i n  f a c t  i f  no t  on ly  i n  law.
E a r l i e r  t h e o r i s t s  s p e n t  much o f  t h e i r  t im e  d i s c ü s s i n g  s t a t u t o r y  i s s u e s
such  as  t h e  t e c h n i c a l i t y  o f  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  a c t s ,  the  s i n g l e - h e a d e d  v e r s u s
m u l t i - h e a d e d  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  b o a rd  and th e  C h ie f
E x e c u t i v e .  Dimock, f o r  example,  found t h a t  t h e r e  were t h r e e  l e g a l  s o u r c e s :
a s p e c i a l  a c t  o f  C o n g re s s ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  law s  o f  t h e  D i s t r i c t  o f  Columbia,
and t h e  laws o f  S t a t e s .  There was no g e n e r a l  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  a c t  o f  the
F e d e r a l  government  t h a t  r e s u l t e d  i n  w a s t e  i n  t im e  and e f f o r t  to  be s p e n t  i n
49d i r e c t  i n c o r p o r a t i o n .  As e a r l y  as 1935,  O l i v e r  P.  F i e l d  s u g g e s t e d  f o r  
t h e  s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  of  t h e  fu n d a m e n ta l s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n  i n  t h e  
form o f  "a  c a r e f u l l y  drawn s t a t u t e  unde r  which  a l l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  f e d e r a l l y  
owned and o p e r a t e d  s h o u ld  be i n c o r p o r a t e d . ^
In  r e g a r d  to  t h e  i s s u e  of  the  s i n g l e - h e a d e d  v e r s u s  m u l t i - h e a d e d
o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  T h u r s to n  found t h a t  o n ly  two o p e r a t i n g  unde r  a s i n g l e  head ,
one i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and the  o t h e r  i n  A u s t r a l i a . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e r e
were some s u p p o r t e r s  o f  the  s in g le -m ember  commiss ion p a t t e r n ,  such as  Van
52Dorn,  Seidman,  t h e  Hoover  Commission and t h e  B rook ings  I n s t i t u t i o n .
Dimock went  f u r t h e r  to  deve lo p  h i s  model  o f  " c a p a b l e  and a c t i v e
b o a r d " ,  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  p r o p e r  s i z e  o f  t h e  b o a r d ,  t h e  r e c r u i t m e n t  o f  i t s
53members , and r e n u m e r a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  members.  E q u a l ly  i m p o r t a n t  was t h e  
c o n c e p t  d e v e lo p e d  by Robson a d v o c a t i n g  t h e  f i x e d  t e n u r e  and i r r e m o v a b i l i t y
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of these members. Robson also stressed the importance of the selection
f
process of the chairman of the baord on account of his ability, not on
political favouritism or sectoral interest. He strongly opposed what he
called "salaries de luxe" for top officials of public enterprises whose
responsibilities were as' equal as or even less than those of Permanent
54Heads of regular departments who received much lower salaries.
In contrast to Van Dorn, who preferred functions of the board of 
directors to be nothing more than advisory, Dimock considered that the 
success of a public corporation depended on the business acumen of the 
board and the chief executive. Thus, "... the corporation should be left 
alone once the legislature has determined the undertaking's fundamental 
powers and limitations ... (the board of directors) should confine its 
attention to policy and control and not attempt itself to administer .... 
The responsibility and initiative of the general manager should be 
unrestricted so long as he stays within the general limits laid down by the 
legislature and the board of directors".
It should be noted that most of the literature regarding public 
corporations was written before or soon after the Second World War and no 
radical changes in the content were made in the past three decades. R.J. 
Arora concludes essential characteristics of the public corporation as 
follows:
1. The public corporation is created by or under the authority 
of an act of the legislature.
2. It is an artificial being and a juristic creation of law.
Its powers, duties, immunities, form of management and its 
relationship to the government and with other established 
institutions, are fixed by its creating legislation.
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3. It is a separate entity for legal purposes, enabling 
it to sue or to be sued, to enter into contract and to 
acquire property in its own name.
4. The whole nation is, in a symbolic sense, the share­
holder and is represented by the government and Parliament.
5. In order to keep a public corporation free from political 
pressures and government interference, its management is 
entrusted to a board of directors who are appointed according 
to the provisions in the creating Act. The board of 
directors is not expected to interfere in the day-to-day 
management which is left for the chief executive.
6. The public corporation should have freedom from Treasury 
controls. Usually public corporations are given the rights 
to use subscribed capital, to raise new capital, to utilise 
operating revenues, to defray operating expenses, to provide 
working capital, and to build up reserves.
7. It should not be subject to the Civil Service Rules. Its 
personnel system should be strictly according to efficient 
business practices.
8. The public corporation is exempted from most of the 
regulatory statutes applicable to the expenditure of public 
funds.
9. Each corporation has its own accounting system, normally 
following private commercial practice, in accordance with 
standards prescribed by the government.
10. The accounts of the public corporation are audited by some 
competent authority or prescribed in their governing
statutes.
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11. Although public corporations are separate legal entities, 
they are accountable to the public through the government 
and Parliament according to the rules laid down in their 
governing legislations.
An alternative to the public corporation is the state company form. 
State companies, wholly or partially owned by the State, are established 
under the Companies Law (sometimes embodied in the Civil and Commercial 
Code) which also governs ordinary joint-stock companies. After the 
companies are registered with the Registrar of Companies, the management is 
set up according to' the provisions in the memorandum and articles of 
association under such legislation; the chairman and the managing director, 
as well as other directors in the board, are then appointed by the govern­
ment and in the cases of mixed enterprises, by other shareholders.
In general, the governmental control over state companies is less 
rigid than the one over the other forms of public enterprises, because 
state companies, by their nature and purposes, need a greater degree of 
managerial freedom and flexibility, according to many writers. ^  For them, 
state companies normally operate profit-oriented businesses and compete 
with private enterprise. Nevertheless, at present, more and more state 
companies have been created to operate public utilities and public services 
previously dominated by public corporations, many of which are non- 
profitable, including research, mass communication, recreation and culture.
The state company is not of course a recent innovation, as it has been 
widely used for more than a century, but, with changing purposes and 
functions, its structure has gradually been changed. Many countries have 
set up developmental institutions or holding companies to spearhead their 
economic development programmes. Such institutions or holding companies
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usually have many tiers of operations, the model patterned after the famous
5 8Italian L'Istitulo per la Ricostruzione Industriale.
The main aim of IRI was for reconstruction and development.
Originally, it was set up to operate three nationalised banks and their 
holdings, as a measure to rescue the country from financial crisis in 1933,
7
and it was to disinvest as soon as the economic situation sufficiently 
improved. However, the institution was retained and was expanded to become 
Italy's largest enterprise with over 140 subsidised companies. At present, 
IRI is no longer the only holding institution in Italy, as some more have 
recently been established, among which are L'Ente Nazionale per 1 energia 
Elettrica, Ente pertecipazioni 1 finanziamento industria manifatturiera, 
and Ente autonomo d'Gestione per le aziende de Minerarie e Metalliurgiche.
Structurally, IRI is a three-level organisation: at the top is IRI
itself, as a pure holding company, wholly owned by the government; the 
second level comprises six different areas namely (1) Finsider for the 
steel and cement industry and other related areas, (2) Finmeccanica for 
engineering including automobile manufacturing, (3) Stet for telephone 
manufacturing, (4) Finmare for shipping, (5) Fincantieri for shipbuilding, 
and (6) SMI - Societa Meridionale Finanziara mainly for food processing and 
distribution; the third level comprises 140 subsidised companies wholly or 
partially owned by the above six holding companies. The most striking 
feature of the holding institution is that they enjoy a high degree of 
managerial autonomy and that their interpretation with the private sector 
is close.
As early as 1937 Thurston mentioned "the mixed corporation" as "a 
combination of government and private representation in the management of 
corporation" which tended to "diminish the evils of either private
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management alone or government operation alone". However, he preferred 
public corporations to state companies because of some problems arising 
from conflicts between the government and private shareholders whose main 
aims were to make profits. Thurston’s view was of course in line with the 
practice in some English speaking countries where his research was carried 
out. In the continental Europe, however, the state company device was very 
popular, particularly in the cases where the companies still retained their 
legal forms after the government take-over or where the government wished 
to attract private capital and skill.
A recent United Nations publication considered the changing structure 
as a matter of supervision. As the public enterprise sector expands, apart 
from the multiplication of production ministries, there has been a tendency 
for the addition of another tier of supervision imposed between public 
enterprises and the supervising minister, apparently as an attempt to cope 
with an ever increasing degree of autonomy of these enterprises. This new 
level takes different forms including: "(a) the industry-wide board, a
non-operating public corporation supervising multiple operating units; (b) 
several versions of the holding companies ranging from the conglomerate 
diversified type, to the one-branch type, to a pyramid of both; (c) 
sectoral wide corporations; (d) several varieties emerging from the 
experience of centrally-planned economics, such as the trust, the branch 
organisation, enterprise associations, or at times, a leading enterprise;
(e) a suborganisation of an agency of the minister for discharging the 
supervisory responsibility".^
On the positive side, according to this publication, such multi-tier 
organisations may help insulate public enterprises from political pressures, 
enhance the possibilities of inter-enterprise cooperation, improve the 
chances of rationalising the structure of a whole industry, help diffuse
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the best practices, expand the export promotion capability, provide for
certain common services like research and development and consultancy. On
the negative side, this new level of supervision may increase the degree of
implicit monopoly power and reduce inter-enterprise competition. They may
also be inclined to foster cross-subsidisation practices and may expand
their activities more out of an empire-building motiviation than on
6 Ximproving the performance of ongoing public enterprises.
The last form, "departmental enterprise", needs only a few lines to 
describe. It is the oldest form of public enterprise and is still popular 
for operating some types of activities. "Departmental enterprises" in some 
countries are immune from regular governmental personnel and financial 
regulations but their counterparts in many other countries are not equipped 
with such privileges. Many regular departments also operate "revolving 
funds", the term with many meanings in different countries, but usually 
with less budgeting control.
In Australia, Wettenhall states some problems of such classification
6 2and stresses the need for clarification. In Third World countries, the 
problems are even more serious. Indeed, any legal classification in these 
countires must be treated with*'great caution. In countries such as 
Indonesia and Thailand, members of the governing elites build up their own 
empires in order to strengthen their political power. As a result, some 
military and civilian units own and operate a wide range of commercial 
activities from broadcasting, trading, transport, etc. Most of them have 
never been legally classified as public enterprises.
Perhaps one of the most striking contributions of the contemporary 
scholars in this field is that of Carey-Jones and associates who questioned
the validity of classical legal classification of public enterprises. They
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conclude that, apart from reasons of experience, there is little reason of
principle to prefer one form to another. "It seemed, therefore, that a
study could not usefully be founded on legal forms as a- classification of
enterprises. The arguments about form concern mainly (i) the degree of
centralisation and decentralisation and (ii) the related problem of public 
6 3accountability". These are the issues to be closely examined in the 
succeeding part. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Carey-Jones and 
associates have not stated an alternative of the classification.
Equally significant is the work of Leon Peres who attempts to apply 
organisation theory'to a study of Australian public corporation. He 
clearly states that in organisation theories, "there is no difference 
between a corporation and a department. They fit the same definition of 
’organisation’; they are susceptible of the same analytical techniques".^ 
This is very interesting because in many Third World countries public 
enterprises usually adopt Civil Service regulations and practices and only 
their legal status makes them distinctive to other regular ministerial 
departments. Of course, there are different degrees of flexibility among 
them but such factor does not necessarily affect their performance.
AUTONOMY VS PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
The terms "autonomy", "public accountability", "control", 
"flexibility" and "efficiency and effectiveness" lie at the very heart of 
the most crucial issue of public enterprise. Many theorists in this field 
have often hypothesised that such terms are interdependent: public
enterprises in the forms other than the "departmental enterprise" are 
established to escape from the strict governmental control which often 
hampers their flexibility and thus reduces their "efficiency and
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effectiveness". But "political control" is still necessary, for without it 
public enterprises are no longer "public" in the sense of "public 
accountability" which is considered an important process in any democratic 
society. The significance of the balance between "autonomy" and "control", 
or of the ideal mid-way point between the two extremes, which supposes to 
bring about "efficiency and effectiveness", is therefore stressed.
The philosophy behind the establishment of any public enterprise is 
that a state business-like activity should be operated in the way private 
enterprise does because business management is believed to be more 
"efficient" than public administration. Thus, the autonomy concept of 
public enterprise has developed from the experience of successful private 
enterprise that the ownership should be made distinctive from the manage­
ment and that the management should be given managerial autonomy in the 
day-to-day operations without interference from the shareholders. The 
owners or the shareholders still make top policies through the share­
holders’ meetings and through their representatives on the board of 
directors.
With arrangements that make public enterprises different in their 
organisational forms and practices from those of regular ministerial 
departments, state business-like activities are to be managed without 
political interference from ministers who are under electoral pressures.
In his earliest publication, Dimock mentions the freedom from 
governmental interference as one of the greatest advantages of public 
enterprises over regular departments. Since it is removed from the 
politcal arena and from influence of the legislature and the financial 
authorities, the public corporation is given "elasticity of management" 
which according to him means "that the directing officials must be free to
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make quick decisions relative to the corporations’ affairs, that if one
policy does not work another one may be easily and speedily substituted,
that experimentation and risk taking should not only be'possible but should
be actually encouraged, and that the administrative organisation may be
reorganised from within from time to time without the difficulties and
6 5delays of securing permission from a superior authority". Dimock
suggests that "the management should be autonomous and that the reins of
authority should be held firmly in the hands of the chief.executive of the
corporation", and that "the board of directors should really function as a
policy-forming and controlling unit.. . . " ^  Civil Service regulations as a
whole should not be taken over (only "the best features of the Civil
Service" should be absorbed) as well as financial practices ("financial
reserves should be built up ... modern business accounting methods should
be adopted ... commercial audits should be employed ... the freedom of
6 7private purchasing methods should be retained...."). In regard to
"political control", Dimock concludes that internal control is more likely
to bring about effective public control and successful management than are
6 8meticulous regulations imposed from outside. At the same time, Dimock 
stresses the importance of the incorporating Charter and the organisational 
form which together make the public corporation effectively accountable to 
the public. To such an aim, the incorporation should take place "preferably 
by direct action of Congress itself" and the scope of the corporation 
should be "large enough to prevent duplication and to guarantee effective 
management, but not so large as to cause over-expansion and vagueness of 
limitations".^
Perhaps the most interesting contributions on this issue are the two 
articles written by Dimock in 1949. He states that the two fundamental 
characteristics of the public corporation are: (1) "autonomy of
52
management"; and (2) "unity of management". For him, autonomy is the chief 
virtue of this type of governmental device - greater than corporate 
personality, limited liabiility, or perpetuity. The term "autonomy of 
Management" means, "the internal management placed under a single 
coordinated leadership under which all elements needed for success are 
combined in a manner conducive to efficiency and flexibility".^ He also 
states ten factors which produce "unity of management":^
1. A clear division of area and personnel as between the 
determination of policy and .its execution.
2. A single executive with adequate authority to direct and 
coordinate all parts of the internal organisation.
3. Opportunity for the chief executive to present his plans 
for consideration and clearance by the policy board.
4. A clear definition of major and related objectives, from 
top to the bottom of the organisation.
5. The formulation of policies related to and designed to 
carry out the stated objectives.
6. Accurate analysis of what each person in every position is 
expected to accomplish.
7. An organisation scheme divided logically into functional 
areas, but so interrelated as to secure coordinated effort.
8. Concentration at the top in planning, direction, and 
control, together with the deconcentration of execution as 
far down the line as possible.
9. Area decentralisation to accompany administrative delegations 
of authority, thus working toward initiative and flexibility 
at the periphery where most of the actual service is
rendered.
10. Freedom from outside "interference" with personnel, 
purchasing, accounting methods, and the like, which 
force the management into a rigid mould and deprive 
it of freedom to experiment, adapt, and excel.
Closely related to. managerial autonomy are financial and personnel 
autonomies. Dimock stresses that financial autonomy is the most important 
of them all. The public corporation should have its own business-typed 
budget which is to be separate from the national annual budget. It should 
have its own financial regulations, as distinct from general governmental 
regulations. The auditing and accounting methods should be according to 
business practices. In regard to personnel policies, Dimock remarks that 
public corporations should adopt business-like methods and incentives. He 
concludes chat, "If government corporations are to be deprived of their 
legal, organisational, managerial, financial and personnel freedoms, they 
might better be abolished and their programmes taken over by ordinary 
bureaus".^
In Britain, a prominent labour backbencher, Herbert Morrison (later
Lord Morrison), emphasises the personnel aspect and notes that any public
corporation should be free from political interference and from workers’
control (e.g. the direct representation of works on the board) in order to
enable the corporation to be self-supporting and economically successful.
The staff and employees of a public corporation should not be civil
servants but appointees of that corporation and their salaries should be
free from Treasury control. In addition, the board, whose membership is to
be selected on the criterion of competence and loyalty to public interest,
73should have autonomy and freedom of business management. These views are
maintained and elaborated in his later writings after the Second World 
74War.
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Significantly, four years before the enactment of,the Government 
Corporation Control Act in the United States in 1945 which marked the 
change toward the unification pole, C. Herman Pritchett evaluates the 
growth of public enterprise in both theory and practice since 1900 with the 
conclusion that this type of governmental instrumentality is loosing its 
important characteristics, freedom and autonomy, "like the Cheshire cat", 
because of intervention from the Executive departments, Congress and the 
Supreme Court.^
V.O. Key, Jr. supports this by noting that the freedom from civil
service rules is rapidly disappearing. Moreover, the financial autonomy,
considered the most significant privilege enjoyed by a full-fledge public
7 6corporation, has been narrowed down by the Executive.
The literature of the post-war period emphasises the control and
public accountability aspects. Wettenhall divides political control into
two aspects, structural and operational. The structural aspects dealt with
three elements involved in the construction of corporations, namely
organisational types, the selection of people to manage the corporation,
and basic financial arrangements. The operational aspects meanwhile
77involve some techniques of ministerial supervision. Musolf, in his
study of Canadian public enterprises, emphasises the roles of supervising
ministers ("the supervisors", the board of directors ("the pilo.ts") and
7 8Parliament ("the ultimate guardian"). The most significant contribution 
on the control of public enterprise is perhaps the study of Indian 
experience by Professor V.V. Ramanadham. He classifies public control into 
six methods:^
(a) Availability of Information: Information may be available
from 1) richly prepared annual reports, 2) efficient public
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elations departments, 3) occasional issues of informative 
pamphlets on major policies, 4) a generous offer of data 
to study teams and researchers.
(b) Control by the Statute and Rules.
(c) Control by the Government: This may be exercices in three
ways: 1) control through the constitution of the
corporation, 2) control as permitted by the provisions of 
the Act of Rules and 3) informal control.
(d) Control by the Minister: this may be exercised in three
ways; 1) control through the medium of the department,
2) control through directions, and 3) informal control.
(e) Control by Parliament: this is possible in many ways:
1) parliamentary question, 2) debates and resolutions,
3) examination by the Public Accounts Committee, 4) 
scrutiny by the Estimates Committee, and 5) enquiries by 
special committees of Parliament.
(f) Control through Special Agencies: Examples are; 1) audit
by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, 2) regulation by 
specific control agencies such as the Air Transport Council,
3) criticism and advice from consumer counsils and advisory 
agencies, 4) continuous scrutiny by a central Public 
Enterprise Commission, and 5) investigation by ad hoc 
committees from time to time.
Ramanadham also points out the content of control with some major
 ^ , 80 aspects below:
(a) Staffing, including senior appointments and promotion.
(b) Operational matters, including cost control, training, and
provisions against corruptions, etc.
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(c) Expansion, including the magnitude and timing of 
investments.
(d) Financial Policies.
In the 1960s the pendulum again appeared to. be changing direction.
The proliferation of public enterprises, particularly in Third World 
nations, signified the trend toward the pole of diversity. Wettenhall 
notes that:
"... many ... leaders are again accepting that the cause 
of progress and efficiency requires positive steps to be 
taken to develop in managers a sense of enterprise, the 
use of initiative and the acceptance of responsibility, 
and to develop in workers a sense of dedication to 
particular purposes - that of the state as a whole being 
too vague and generalised to have any real incentive 
effect". ^
He also quotes Eggleston that "the clumsiness or selfish intent of
sectional pressures on ministers" which results in ministerial pressures on
public enterprises do not bring about conditions for the successful
8 2operation of such state services. But, public enterprises "are vital to
national economy and cannot possibly be left as islands of administrative
independence", and need to be coordinated. Thus, the two views,
control and autonomy, should be compatible, even though they looked
8 3different in the light of present control arrangements.
Carey-Jones and his colleagues prefer to use the terms "centralisation" 
and "decentralisation" to "control" and "autonomy" respectively. They 
insist that there is no case for full autonomy for public enterprises 
(autonomy is classified into general autonomy and specific autonomies). In 
fact, there is no direct relation between efficiency and autonomy, though 
there is between efficient and delegation. Meanwhile, public
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accountability which is a part of the centralisation/decentralisation 
conflict, is conducive to centralisation and can also be conducive to 
efficiency.^
Such a view is contradictory to previous theories which emphasise the 
importance of the equilibrium between the two extremes. In fact, the 
earlier theorists stress the significance of autonomy as a precondition for 
efficiency in public enterprises. Then they realised that corporate 
flexibility also led to irresponsibility and such balance between autonomy 
and control was needed.
It should also be noted that newer theorists accept that the terms
"efficiency" and "effectiveness" are difficult to define. Such terms have
been broadly defined as high profits for a business firm and as the
production of demanded goods or services at the lowest cost for the
government. In practice, public enterprises often have a combination of
objectives, depending on their respective statutes or memorandums or the
government directions, and it is difficult, if possible, to evaluate their
performance quantitatively. As pointed out by Carey-Jones and his
associates, "the achievement of efficiency is ... a more complicated thing
8 5than the production of a single kind of good and service at lowest cost".
Public enterprises are not necessarily profit-making organisations.
In many countries, their scope of activities is restricted to a certain 
extent, under pressures from various sectors, and thus they are unable to 
reduce the overall costs per unit of product. Costs of production of 
public enterprises are also high because of some policies imposed upon 
them by the government. Some public enterprises are compelled to employ 
more people than their counterparts in the private sector whereas the 
others have to expand their activities into unprofitable areas, in which no
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private company would take the risk. In some other cases, public enterprise
are operating social and cultural activities and are not expected to make
revenues in order to cover their costs. Indeed, social efficiency is
0/1
difficult to evaluate.
Significantly, Carey-Jones and his associates place parliaments highly 
for the outcome of the conflict between centralisation and decentralisation. 
In their words:
"... where parliaments are concerned about it, the conflict 
will continue and swing this way and that, as circumstances 
change. Where'parliaments are not concerned about it there 
is likely to be , excessive decentralisation to ministers, 
but not necessarily any further, greater secrecy over large 
areas of public business and greater opportunites for 
corruption .... Harm occurs when one side in the conflict 
is successful, when enterprises (and/or ministers) become 
irresponsible, or when centralised controls make the
8 7efficient operation of public enterprises impossible".
This emphasis is similar to that of Wettenhall and Musolf who have stressed
the importance of "political control". Equally significantly, Carey-Jones
and his associates also mention another vital variable - "personal good" or
the presence at the top "of some one who is concerned with efficiency and
is in a position to demand it and to ensure thtat he get it on, alterna-
88tively able to motivate his staff so that they achieve it". In their
words, "The leadership ... provides the good; the ultimate good being the
minister, who is himself goaded by the public accountability, public
89pressures, etc." Meanwhile, the minister delegates responsibilities over 
a particular organisation to an outsider or civil servant who is answerable 
to him. The ministers themselves are not often chosen for their 
administrative abilities and they have other interests and other roles 
to play. Therefore, public enterprises usually depend on the quality of
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civil servants, and in the case where the civil service is inefficient and 
where it is possible to recruit qualified outsiders, there will be a strong 
case for setting up separate organs outside the service.
Carey-Jones and associates, thus, suggests that there should be a 
clear line of responsibility from parliament through the minister down the 
line to the individual enterprises, "with the minimum diffusion of 
responsibilities, but fairly clear and large delegations of responsibility 
by ministers, while securing ultimate control". But how such arrangements 
would work "would need to be worked out.in each case".
In contrast, Peres remarks that very little attention has been paid to
policy, "for this was regarded as one of the 'givens', properly the
91function of the parliament or the minister, not the corporation". He
states that autonomy is no longer considered as the condition of efficiency
but as the condition for "eliciting, activities from potentially important
contributions and as the means of preserving corporation character. Such
suggestion is related to major contributions of two organisation theorists,
92Chester I. Barnard and Philip Selznick. However, Peres agrees with 
Carey-Jones and associates that the matter of organisational survival 
depends on the competence and the courage of the man chosen to lead the 
corporations.
This comes to the most crucial point of this Chapter: whether
theories of public enterprise are applicable to the Third World? There 
are, of course, many problems obstructing the effective use of public 
enterprises in these countries but the most serious ones are always concerned 
with the human factor at both the national and organisational levels. At 
the national level, political institutions other than the Executive (and 
the Bureaucracy) are so weak and are incapable of controlling the
60
Bureaucracy which in practice monpolises the most parts of policy- 
formulation, policy-implementation, and policy evaluation. Therefore, the 
outcome of the policy processes almost entirely depends'on the political 
leadership. But as the political leadership also depends on other members 
of the ruling elites or supporters of the leadership, this small group of 
people, rather than the outsiders, greatly affect policy-making processes 
of public enterprises. In effect, these enterprises are always involved in 
the power struggle within the power elite group. At the organisational 
level, the men who lead the organisations, the chairman, members of the 
governing board, and the chief executive of public enterprises, particularly 
those highly politically sensitive, are closely linked with the leadership 
and are often personally handpicked for these positions. Their main 
responsibility is undoubtedly to serve the interest of the governing 
elites, rather than to the masses which have nothing to do with their 
rewards or punishment. This happens because there is no real ’’public 
accountability" in these countries.
Given this situation, some writers propose that the best way is to
provide more autonomy for the individual enterprise. In Hanson's words,
"the problem is usually to give them adequate freedom rather than to bring
93them under closer supervision". Shepherd also adds, "This is not because
autonomy is ideal per se but because the quality of supervision in
developing countries is likely to be low, and the costs of intervention in
94terms of manpower and management time is likely to be high".
These views are also expressed by officials in public enterprises but 
are always contrasted with those of practitioners in the governments. In 
practice, more autonomy and less control can lead to malpractices and 
irregularities. Commenting on Latin American public enterprises, noted
Seidman:
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"The autonomies corporation has been seized upon as a 
panacea for inefficient or even corrupt government.
However, the proliferation ... has ... served to 
aggravate a chaotic administrative system. Autonomy 
has been carried to the extreme.... In some parts of 
Latin America, public corporations can be said literally 
to constitute a headless and irresponsible fourth branch 
of government".^
There is no conclusion for such arguments. But a question can be 
raised: are there really three branches in a given Third World government?
Unless such three branches of government are balanced and are able to check 
each other, it is useless to discuss "control and autonomy" and "public 
accountability".
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The theories of public enterprise, particularly those developed by the 
first and second groups, concentrate on three classical issues: (1) the
motivations for the expansion of state entrepreneurship; (2) the forms of 
public enterprise; and (3) the factors affecting "efficiency and effecitve- 
ness" of a given public enterprise. These three issues, for these writers, 
are related to each other: public enterprises with their commercial nature
can be operated efficiently and effectively only if they are provided with 
autonomous corporate forms which bring them "out of politics" and which 
give them managerial flexibility and freedom from the strict bureaucratic 
control normally applied to all ministerial departments and other govern­
mental agencies. In other words, they attempt to find the ideal point 
between the two extremes, autonomy and control on decentralisation and
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centralisation, which would result in "efficiency and effectiveness" in the 
operation of any public enterprise.
These traditional issues still dominate the contemporary contributions 
in this field, though the interpretation begins to depart from earlier 
thinking. Such centuries old arguments as to the extent a state should 
involve itself in the national economy, or whether a state should operate a 
certain type of industrial and commercial activity, are still alive. 
Nevertheless, there now seems to be more consensus among theorists and 
practitioners that a state can, if not should, involve itself in some types 
of entrepreneurial activities which are important for national development. 
Some other writers also argue that many factors, not organisational forms 
alone, contribute to "efficiency and effectiveness" of an enterprise, and 
that the problems of "autonomy" and "control" are a common issue in public 
administration, not only in the management of public enterprises. More 
significantly, many newer theorists tend to consider a public enterprise as 
any other human organisation, and as a result, they provide less descrip­
tion of an "ideal" public enterprise but rather attempt to explain the 
actual behaviour of a working public enterprise.
This new approach seems to move toward the right direction because the 
theories of public enterprise need to be universalistic, realistic, and 
pragmatic. The previous theories are of course useful but they have some 
limitations, particularly their irrelevancy to the Third World environment 
in many respects as mentioned in this Chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
All three topics discussed in the preceding chapter are public policy 
issues: they are concerned with what governments decide to do, why they do
so, and what results from their implementation.'*' The major weakness of 
previous studies was that they tended to discuss the institutional frame­
work and activities of public enterprises without seriously considering the 
influences of environmental and organisational factors, and without linking 
these elements with public enterprise policy. Therefore their universality 
is very much in doubt, as questioned in the earlier attempts to apply the 
theories to the Third World environment.
This chapter is to identify variables which are likely to affect 
public enterprise policy making and implementation in any context: socio­
economic and political environments, formal structures and processes, 
participants (individuals, and groups) in the policy process. These 
variables are incorporated into a tentative model of public enterprise 
system which will serve as a basic research framework for the study of 
public enterprises in the ASEAN countries. This chapter also discusses the 
reserach design and methodology and outlines the sources of data used in 
this study.
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
As stated in the introductory chapter, the main objective of this 
research is to inquire into the public enterprise systems of the Third 
World in order to understand their actual behaviour and the policy 
processes related to public enterprises. The main task in this chapter is
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to identify the major elements that are likely to shape the patterns of 
behaviour of individual groups in this type of government instrumentality, 
which in turn affect the content of public enterprise policy. A tentative 
model of public enterprise system is built here in the attempt to identify 
variables and to understand their relationship amongst each other and with 
public policy.
The Public Enterprise System
Public enterprise can be viewed as a system in which the "authority"
(the government for instance) converts "inputs" of various resources into
2"outputs" of policies, decisions, and actions. It can also be viewed as 
both an integrated subsystem of the whole political and socio-economic 
system and a complete system in itself with a number of subsystems (human,
technical, information, financial, etc.) in which "everything is related to
.3 .everything else".
A public enterprise system then can be distinguished into two levels: 
macro and micro. At the macro level is the public enterprise sector, 
comprised of all public enterprises in a country, which forms a part of the 
governmental system where general policies, usually in forms of laws, 
regulations, national plans, policy guidelines, are determined to apply for 
the whole or part of the sector. At the micro level, on the other hand, 
are individual public enterprises where policies and decisions are made and 
implemented. The impact of such policies and decisions at this level is 
usually les.s significant than those at the macro level.
The nature and inter-relationship of various features of the public 
enterprise system are presented in Figure 3.1.
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The main emphasis of this reserach is given to the first two phases of 
the policy process: inputs and the conversion process, but not to the
neglect of' the others. Throughout this dissertation putputs, impact and 
feedback of the policy process are assessed, particularly in the case 
studies. Admittedly, to understand the sum of public enterprise policy 
outcomes, one needs to undertake a more comprehensive project with more 
comprehensive data which is extremely difficult to obtain in the present 
Third Woild situation.
More importantly, the major objective of this research is limited to 
inquiring into factors which shape public enterprise policy. And it seems 
to be adequate to concentrate on the first two phases of the policy process.
The discussion in Chapter 2 reveals the significant impact of socio­
economic and political factors on policy concerning the establishment of a 
public enterprise. But, in fact, such environmental factors are known to 
have an impact on the whole policy process because they interact with the 
public enterprise system. By the term "system" is meant a group of inter­
related structure and processes as shaped by laws and regulations and human 
behaviour within the organisation. These three variables are interrelated 
with each other and public policy. Figure 3.2 illustrates such 
interrelationships.
FIGURE 3.2
The Interrelationship of Public Enterprise Policy and Various Variables
Public Enterprise Policy
Individual and Groups
Socio-economic/Political Contexts
Legal Institutional 
Framework and Processes
I
74
The Political and Socio-economic Contexts
Public enterprise is part of a political and socio-economic system: 
it is owned and controlled by the state and operates in the socio-economic 
environment. The impact of political socio-economic conditions on public 
enterprise policy has long attracted many writers, particularly concerning 
the reasons for the establishment of an enterprise (Hanson, Robson, 
Friedmann, etc.) and the.degree of controls (Carey-Jones and others). But 
for writers in public policy, political and socio-economic factors are 
important determinants in policy outcomes (though there are still disagree­
ments over the degree of influence).^  Ira Shakansky, in his comparative 
study of Australian and Israeli public enterprises, mentioned the two sets 
of variables affecting the policy process: dependent variables (cultural,
governmental, and economic aspects) and other variables of a particular 
enterprise. His latter context is called organisational environment here.
Politically, public enterprise policy is conducted in a political 
system within a particular cultural environment and often within the 
context of ideological viewpoints. Students of comparative politics and 
comparative administration recognise the significance of political culture 
and socialisation in shaping political behavioural patterns which in turn 
affect administrative behaviour. Therefore, several attempts have been 
made to classify various political systems in the Third World. Ferrel 
Heady, for example, comes up with 6 categories: (1) traditional-autocratic
systems; (2) bureaucratic elite systems, civil and military; (3) polyarchal 
competitive systems; (4) dominant-party semi-competitive systems; (5) 
dominant-party mobilisation systems; and (6) communist totalitarian 
systems.“7 But Heady himself accepts that it is difficult to fit every 
Third World country into one category because a country can be classified
into several systems.
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A great deal of literature on public enterprise discusses the 
ideological impact on the establishment of a public enterprise. But 
political ideology forms only a part of the political culture in one 
country and thus ideologies should not be examined as a separate context. 
This contrasts with the view expressed by Geoffrey Hawker and others that 
there is a danger if discussion is broadened into political culture because
g
"it explains too much".
Public enterprises are operated in a socio-economic environment and 
such factors as private vs public, competition and monopoly, marketing, 
pricing, "social profitability" and economic "efficiency", etc., greatly 
affect the policy process.
Economic and social development is often quoted as one of the major
reasons for establishing public enterprises and in turn public enterprises
are related to the socio-economic development planning. Hanson states
various difficiencies that hinder the working of the free enterprise system
in the Third World, and which also become justification for establishing or
9expanding public enterprises. But he also warns that public enterprises 
were born before the development planning concept became popular and that 
not all governments were development oriented and it was likely for these 
enterprises to be used for other p u r p o s e s . I t  should also be added that 
the term "economic and social development" has many meanings depending on 
who defines it, for what purposes, and for whom.
There seems to be a consensus amongst writers that public enterprises 
should be engaged in industries with natural monopolies or ones which 
provide social and economic overhead such as public utilities, transporta­
tion and communications, development banking, or regional development.
They may even engage in some manufacturing industries related to defense
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and national security, or in other areas which help to redress socio­
economic imbalance among regions, races, or between the rural and urban 
areas.
Many writers also state that the operations of public enterprises 
usually go beyond purely economic conditions. "Social profitability" are 
often mentioned together with "economic" efficiency: public enterprises
are not to seek profits alone but should provide social services as well. 
Therefore, their pricing and employment policies are usually complicated by 
political and social considerations. Shakansky and Dresang, in a study of 
Kenyan public enterprises, reveal that political factors are so influential 
that public enterprises often sacrifice commercial performance for 
political goals.^
There have been arguments on the degree of impact of political and
socio-economic factors . This is particularly interesting because political
scientists and economists have long been competing with each other for
supremacy in this discipline. Thomas R. Dye, for example, states that the
degree of economic development is an important determinant of overall
levels of government taxing, spending and service ("wealth, as measured by
per capita ... income, is the single most important environment variable")
and that the characteristics of political systems are not so important as
12environmental (mainly economic) variables. In contrast, Shakansky and
Lineberry point out that economic influences appear to be strongest in the
local policy processes and weakest at the state and national levels and
that political influences may lessen the significance of economic 
13factors. Nevertheless, R.A. Dahl notes that political scientists and
economists may both study the same institution but often with different
14 15views. Such views are in fact complimentary to each other.
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Institutions and Processes
The study of public enterprise traditionally devoted much attention to
the legal aspect. According to Dye the structural approach is not
necessarily an unproductive one, nor does it need to be narrow or 
16descriptive. The legal arrangements of a public enterprise system
provide a basic research framework for the understanding of formal
establishments and processes which is essential for any study of public
organisations. This approach, however, will be more useful if the legal
structures and processes are examined within the environmental contexts and
with the pattern of behaviour of individuals and groups in such 
„ 17arrangements.
As stated in Chapter 1, there are three basic legal forms of public 
enterprises (though there are attempts to create many more): . (i) the
departmental enterprise; (ii) the public corporation; and (iii) the state 
and semi-state company. Each of these can be created by an Act of 
Parliament (or Presidential Order or the Revolutionary Council's Order, 
etc., as the case may be), or by a general public enterprise Act, or under 
the Companies Law, and all can provide an enterprise with legal status, 
structure, objectives, authorities and responsibilities. As a part of the 
government's public enterprises they are under the jurisdiction of, or are 
influenced by, various legislations and regulations, varying from the 
national constitution, civil service, and financial law and regulations. 
Such arrangements affect the policy process of public enterprises in 
different degrees, depending on political and socio-economic conditions and 
organisational behaviour of a particular enterprise. But, in turn, public 
enterprise policy also influences the forms of these enterprises (such as 
the creation of new forms).
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As stated before, Carey-Jones and others state that there are few
reasons of principle to prefer one form, apart from the reasons of 
18expediency. Such a statement is arguable. Public enterprises in Britain 
are mostly in the public corporation forms, not only because of the reasons 
of expediency but also because of the political development. Meanwhile 
Singapore, a former British colony where the British influence in the 
administrative system is still prevalent, prefers the state and semi-state 
company form for several socio-economic reasons. Furthermore, the forms 
should fit the main types of activities of an enterprise: it would not be
appropriate, for instance, for a governmental department to run a commercial 
airline or a semi-state company to perform regulatory functions. These 
guidelines are well explained by many theories.
Again, the forms do not only reflect the degree of centralisation or
decentralisation of the government over public enterprises or the related
problem of public accountability, as pointed out by Carey-Jones and others,
19but affect all public enterprise policy issues. According to Dye
institutions structure the patterns of behaviour of individuals and groups
20which subsequently affect the policy outcomes. But this does not 
necessarily mean that the structural change may bring changes in public
i • 21policy.
Individuals and Groups
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of previous studies in public 
enterprise concerns their failure to recognise the significance of the 
human factor in organisations and in the policy process. So far there has
been no serious attempt to investigate patterns of behaviour of individuals
and groups in public enterprises (with the exception of Rigg’s study on
Thai politicians’ involvement in governing boards in the 1950s). 22
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Indeed, individuals and groups are one of the most important determinants 
of the policy content, particularly in the Third World where political 
institutions are not so developed.
The impact of individuals and groups on public enterprise policy is 
significant at both levels of the public enterprise system. There is no 
doubt that policy outcomes are the result of a bargaining process which 
compromises the interests of the power elite groups (bureaucratic,
[military and civilian, including technocratic], business, and political, 
for instance). In countries where bureaucratic polity characterises the 
political system the struggle appears among factions of the groups (the 
military and civilian bureaucracy).
Influential elites exercise power through their presence in both a 
single important board (such as State Lottery Bureau or Thailand Tobacco 
Monopoly in Thailand and Pertamina in Indonesia, etc.) or in several boards 
at the same time. In some countries the practice of interlocking director­
ships signifies the degree of their power.
The policy process, particularly at the macro level, is greatly 
influenced by the struggle among controlling governmental bodies, and 
between these bodies and political institutions (or individuals and groups 
within such agencies) and individual public enterprises and their agencies. 
The public enterprise policy outcomes usually reflect the degree of power 
each of these bodies possess.
All in all, as mentioned earlier, the public enterprise policy process 
is indeed a political process in which powers are distributed and balanced 
through the electoral process, the spoils and reward system, and current 
development strategies of the governing elite groups, in order to gain
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control and influence over national economy. Therefore, a study of elite 
roles in the public enterprise system is very important but should not be 
carried out in isolation from other variables that affect policy content.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
To understand the interrelationship among variables and between these 
variables and public enterprise policy, this research is designed to 
collect and analyse data in the following aspects: (i) political and
socio-economic development and the evolution of the public enterprise 
system; (ii) the patterns of relationship between the public enterprise 
system and other systems, as ascribed by laws and regulations, and (iii) 
the interactions amongst participants in the public enterprise system.
In the first aspect the extensiveness of the public enterprise sector, 
as indicated by number, size, types and scope of activities, etc., reflects 
the public enterprise policy content in a particular period signified by 
some major political and socio-economic events such as coup d ’etat, riot, 
change of government, etc. In this study the period under review spans the 
three decades since the ASEAN countries became independent or self-governed 
(Indonesia - 1945, Malaysia - 1957, the Philippines - 1945, Singapore - 
1959) or came under the constitutional rule (Thailand - 1932). During this 
period there were several events in each country which often affected public 
enterprise policy. For example, when Pibul took power in Thailand just 
before the Second World War, public enterprises were rapidly expanded but 
many were abolished when Pibul lost power. Then after the coup d ’etat of 
1947 public enterprises again proliferated until another coup d ’etat in
1957.
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Lack of a comprehensive study of public enterprises in this region 
posed a serious problem for an inquiry into the extensiveness of public 
enterprises. A list of public enterprises in most ASEAN countries has 
never been published. Therefore, a preliminary task for this study was to 
identify public enterprises from various sources and compile a list with 
information, if available, such as: (i) year of incorporation; (ii) legal
form; (iii) main type of activities; (iv) total assets and financial 
performance; (v) composition of the governing board; and (vi) number of 
employees. Then each of these public enterprises was individually studied 
to trace its development during particular events. Some important economic 
indications, such as GNP, GDP, per capita income, and public spending on 
public enterprises, were also collected.
The extensiveness of the public enterprise sector was consequently 
examined together with policy statements in a particular period correspond­
ing to major political and socio-economic events. It was also possible to 
inquire into other environmental factors including political patterns, 
ideologies, stages of economic development, etc., that were likely to shape 
public enterprise policy in each country.
The second aspect concerning the patterns of formal relationship 
between the public enterprise system and political and governmental bodies 
can be observed by: (i) authorities of the bodies concerned as ascribed by
laws and regulations; (ii) the number of controlling agencies; and (iii) 
the existence of a special central public enterprise agency either in the 
forms of a ministerial department or council. The incorporating charters, 
the general public enterprise legislation (if any), the Companies Law, and 
other related statutes were consulted together with the government 
organisational charts. Then a typological framework for understanding
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these legal arrangements was developed for a case study on each 
country.
The list of public enterprises was also helpful in the classification 
of these enterprises into various legal categories as defined in Chapter 1 
(Figure 1.1). These legal categories were then analysed in relation to 
other factors and public enterprise policy of various periods: why public
enterprises were established in such forms, how such forms affect public 
enterprise policy, and how concerned agencies affect public enterprises in 
the policy process.
The last aspect, the inquiry into the profile of individuals and 
groups, and interactions amongst them, proved to be the most difficult part 
of the study. Public enterprises in the region (except in Singapore) 
seldom published annual reports and, if published, such reports were mostly 
unavailable for publis investigation. In addition, there was no useful 
resource book such as Who's Who (the last Asian edition was in the early 
1960s) which could provide personal background for individuals. Therefore, 
compiling a profile list of members of governing boards and top executives 
of public enterprises in each country, consumed a considerable period of 
time.
Members of the governing elite group (the military and bureaucracy, 
business, political) were then identified from such lists. Special 
attention was given to the presence of such individuals and groups on the 
governing board of an important public enterprise, or on several boards at 
the same period. The practice of interlocking directorships was also 
closely observed.
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An inquiry was also made to understand interactions among individuals 
and groups in he policy processes, particularly at the macro levels: who
from what groups are active particpants in the processes?
Another list of top executives in important public enterprises was 
made to help understand who actually ran the enterprises and what groups 
they belonged to.
These variables were analysed to determine the relationship amongst 
each of them and between each of them, and to public enterprise policy.
The results are presented for each country, along with an overview of the 
whole region, in Chapter 4. The case method was also employed to acquaint 
the readers with the actual practices and behaviour of the working public 
enterprise systems. Six cases signifying various aspects of public 
enterprises were studied and presented in Part III.
SOURCE OF DATA AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY
Public enterprise is a sensitive topic in the Third World because of 
its usual link with corruption, malpractice, mismanagement, and favourtism. 
Therefore, it is unlikely for a government or any public enterprise to 
extend to any researcher full cooperation. In fact, in many countries 
where a foreign researcher requires a research permit, a research proposal 
on the topic of public enterprise is difficult to get approved.
Most of the data used in this study was obtained from official 
documents, primarily government and public enterprises' reports and other 
publications, in addition to trade journals, business magazines, and 
newspapers. In Singapore, the visits to the Registrar of Companies was
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very useful because all state and semi-state companies are obligated by law 
to submit annual reports complete with financial statements and a list of 
directors. In other countries the situation was different, but data could 
be obtained from other sources such as the Annual Budgets, National 
Development Plans, the Auditor-General's reports and Parliamentary records. 
In addition some controlling agencies, such as the planning bodies or the 
Ministry of Finance in various countries, usually publish reports 
concerning public enterprises under their supervision, mainly for official 
use. The access to such reports, however, was rather limited because most 
of them were strictly classified.
Some publications of the United Nations’ Asian Centre for Development 
Administration and the Regional Institute of Higher Education were very 
useful. The Canadian International Development Research Centre and the 
Eastern Regional Organisation of Public Administration in the past few 
years organised a series of seminars on public enterprises but their 
preceedings have yet to be published.
This research project was carried out from January 1977 to July 1979 
and a field trip to each ASEAN country was made from September 1977 to 
April 1978. During his field trip, the writer was affiliated with 
educational institutions which offered undergraduate or training programmes 
or conducted research on public enterprises (Lembaga Mangement, Universiti 
Indonesia; Department of Economics and Administration, University of 
Malaya; College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines; 
Public Enterprises' Training Centre, Chulalongkorn University; and 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore). Such affiliation proved 
to be very fruitful. There had been some academic reports and articles 
written by scholars in these countries concerning public enterprises
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(mainly on economic aspects) and these became important sources of 
data.
With the arrangements with the institutions mentioned above, the 
writer was able to visit and meet a number of civil servants and officials 
of public enterprises in each country who provided very useful information. 
But on many occasions, he was hampered with government regulations which 
did not allow officials (and of course employees of these enterprises) to 
give interviews.
The reliability' and accuracy of many data obtained (even from official 
sources) were questionable. Attempts were made to cross-check data with 
other sources, but, admittedly, there were still some which should be 
carefully treated.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, this study attempts to show that public enterprises cannot 
be viewed in isolation from their national settings and from other variables 
(their legal framework and processes, and participants in the policy 
process) which are likely to shape their behaviour and influence the policy 
content. Such variables were identified and incorporated into a tentative 
model in this chapter as a research framework for the inquiry into public 
enterprise systems of the Third World (the ASEAN countries as a case study) 
in subsequent chapters. This chapter also stated the research design and 
methodology, and sources of information.
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CHAPTER A
THIRD WORLD PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE
Public enterprise, in one sense, is a type of governmental instrument­
ality created to engage in business-like activities which require 
flexibility and managerial expertise hardly found in traditional ministerial 
departments. In another sense, the term conveys a much wider meaning: it
is an economic development process, as described by Hanson, which forms one 
of the most important; parts of "political economy".^
Public enterprise policy issues include the government policy to 
participate in some, if not all, areas of the national economy, the option 
for managerial forms of such activities, the patterns of control and 
coordination, pricing policy, and the methods of evaluation of the 
performance, etc. These issues are interrelated and relate to other 
economic policy issues concerning economic development such as the role of 
private entrepreneurs, foreign capital inflow and investment, public 
spending, taxation, and distribution of wealth, etc.
The terms "political economy" implies that all economic policies are 
determined in the political context and that political factors cannot be 
treated as constants or parameters, as often considered by many orthodox 
economists in development studies. Rather, contextual elements are among 
the most important determinants of the outcomes of all economic policy 
issues, including those concerned with public enterprises.
Third World countries, as distinct from the Industralised West and 
Japan, and the Communist Bloc, differ among each other in terms of 
geography, tradition, history, politics, and economic systems. Still they
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have some similarities. Firstly, they all share common experiences as 
colonial export economies (producing raw materials for industrial markets in 
the West and Japan which ereate economic dualism - a sharp difference . 
between relatively modern commercial and industrial sections and traditional 
agricultural section) and a common commitment to convert such economies into 
developed economies. Secondly, power and participation in public policy 
making are limited almost entirely to a small number of the power elites, 
usually top militarymen, top bureaucrats, technocrats, and some politicians, 
who reside in the capital city. The stability of a government is much more 
dependent on the loyalty of the elites surrounding the ruling circle than on 
mass support. Thirdly, and closely related to the first two aspects, all 
Third World countries, regardless of their ideological commitment and their 
stage of political development, often employ public enterprises as a means 
for national development and, less overtly, for shifting economic power into 
the hands of the political elites in order to stabilize their political 
power.
The third common feature of Third World countries provides the basic 
orientation for public enterprises which in turn shapes the working 
behaviour of these enterprises. In effect, public enterprises are created 
mainly for political purposes and for the benefit of the ruling class 
rather than the masses. Only the degree the masses participate in public 
policy making indicates the share of their benefit from these public 
enterprises.
The ASEAN case presents a good illustration in point. The five 
countries are distinctive in their political systems. All except Thailand 
experienced Western domination and their administrative structures and 
processes were largely patterned after those of their former mother
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countries, although their political and administrative behaviours are much 
different from the adopted systems. Two of them, Thailand and Indonesia, 
are bureaucratic polities dominated by the military and civilian bureau­
crats; but Thailand is under monarchial constitutionism with the King as the
2ceremonial head, while Indonesia adopted the Presidential system. Two
others, Malaysia and Singapore, can be classified as dominant-party semi-
competitive systems, but the Malaysian system is oriented toward communal
politics and the Singaporean government is nothing more than a government of
3a city-state with one party controlling all seats in Parliament. The last, 
the Philippines, until the rule by decree imposed by the Marcos regime in 
1972, was a polyarchal competitive system dominated by wealthy political 
elites with similar ideological backgrounds. The "New Society" led to the 
emergence of new power elites - technocrats and militarymen - but political 
power has still remained solidly in the hands of Marcos and his close aides.
All five ASEAN countries publicly state their free enterprise policy 
but in practice they pursue "mixed market economies" with government parti­
cipation in most areas of the economies. The degree of such involvement 
varies from country to country, as indicated by the number of public 
enterprises and types of activities as in Table 4.3.
The ASEAN economies are similar in many respects: all except Singapore,
whose economy largely depends on entrepot trade and tourism, are agricul­
tural economies; all of them share a common approach to development based 
on foreign capital inflow and, as a consequence, have become reliant on 
international trade dominated by the Industralised West and Japan; and 
finally, Wes tern-trained technocrats occupy top positions in economic
4affairs and planning and their political positions are highly regarded.
Yet, their diversities are apparent in many respects: the stage of
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TABLE 4.1 MAIN SOCIOECONOMIC DATA IN ASEAN
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
2Area (km ) 1,904,345 329,749 300,000 588 514,000
Population
(in millions) 135.39 12.30 43.60 2.28 43.60
Per Capita GNP (US$)
1965 85 260 150 450 130
1970 80 360 210 920 200
1975 180 720 370 2,150 350
1977 240* (7) 970 410(7> 2,700 420
Annual Real Growth Räte
of Per Capita GNP 
1960-74 2.4 3.9 2.4 7.6 4.6
1965-74 4.1 3.8 2.7 10.0 4.3
1960-77 2.4 4.0 2.5 7.6 4.6
Total GNP 1977 (at
market prices) 
US$ billion
43.1 12.3 20.0 6.5 18.1
Life Expectancy 48(3) 67(4) 60 70(3) 62f3>
Person Per Hospital 
Bed 1,452(2) 344(3) 808 ^ 281(5) 774(4)
Person Per Physician 16,353(4) 4,809(4) 3,224(5) 1,387(6) 8,522 ^
Literacy Rate 60(2) 6 1 ^ 83(3) 76(5) 89(7)
Dairy Per Capita 
Calorie Supply 2,125.5 2,571.1 2.109.0(4) 2,701.4 2,370.6
1974 (Calorie)
Dairy Per Capita * ...
Protein Supply 43.8 * 56.1 54.4 74.6 48.5
1974 (gramme)
Source: IBRD, World Bank Atlas 1974; ADB, Key Indicators of Developing
Member Countries of ADB, Vol.VIII, No.l, April 1977, Far Eastern
Review Asia 1979 Yearbook.
Notes: (1) 1970, (2) 1971, (3) 1972, (4) 1973, (5) 1974, (6) 1975,
(7) 1976.
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FIGURE 4.1 THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN THE ASEAN REGION
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socio-economic development is much different with Singapore at the top of 
the Table with per capita GNP of about US$3,000, or ten times more than that 
of Indonesia; the stage of the economies is different; Indonesia has a popu­
lation of about 140 million while Singapore has only 2.3 million; two 
countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, are energy exporting countries while the 
other three depend almost solely on imported energy. Table 4.1 illustrates 
the similarities and diversities among these economies.
Figure 4.1 shows the significance of political factors: how the growth
of the public enterprise sector (whether it expands or reduces) is affected 
by various political events, such as wars, coup d'etat, changes of govern­
ment, etc. The Second World War multiplied the number of Thai public enter­
prises five times, from less than 20 to more than 100, partly because of 
nationalistic programmes resembling European and Japanese Fascism launched 
by the Pibul military dominated government, and partly because of the neces­
sity to produce goods which could not be imported during the War. The War, 
nevertheless, did not much affect the public enterprise sector in the other 
four countries, all under the Japanese Occupation Forces, because the 
Japanese tended to employ the regular departmental mechanism. After the 
War, public enterprises proliferated in Indonesia and the Philippines (both 
gained independence in 1945 but Indonesia transferred political sovereignty 
in 1949) but decreased in number in Thailand where a series of civilian cab­
inets replaced the military regime. The coup of 1948, with the consequent 
return to power of Pibul, led to a marked increase of public enterprises in 
Thailand, particularly those created by the War Veteran Organization and 
National Economic Development Company, until Sarit Dhanarat staged a success­
ful coup in 1957. Since then the expansion has become insignificant, even 
though some very important political events took place during the past two 
decades, such as the People's Revolution of October 1973 and the coup of 1976.
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Independence in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore 
resulted in expansion of the public enterprise sector in each country, but 
in different degrees, depending on many factors. The approach to national 
development in Indonesia in its first 15 years of independence was influ­
enced by political struggle among various groups which supported President 
Sukarno: the nationalists, Communists, and militarymen. The government set
up a large number of public enterprises in the early 1950s under the 
umbrella of three state Banks, Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Industri and Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia. The nationalisation of the Dutch properties in 1957 
increased the number'of public enterprises from about 60 to more than 600. 
The number was then reduced to 223 as the result of reorganisation under the 
new Public Enterprise Law of 1960. After the 30 September 1965 incidents, 
which led to the emergence of the New Order under the leadership of 
President Suharto, a further reduction was made, obviously because of 
recommendation by rising technocratic elites who now occupied the top 
economic portfolios. But with the rise of Pertamina and its President- 
Director, General Ibnu Sutowo, the public enterprise sector was again 
enlarged by the establishment of Pertamina’s subsidiaries and joint- 
ventures. The political position of the technocrats was strengthened after 
the fall of Ibnu and there has been a tendency for some public enterprises 
to be abolished or merged.
In the Philippines where the influential American concept of free 
enterprise dominated the economic policy process, the sharp numerical 
increase of public enterprises during the post-war period reflected the 
necessity to rehabilitate the war-torn country. The size of the public 
enterprise sector was afterwards steaily reduced until Macapagal and Marcos 
took over the presidency in the 1960s and established a nunber of regional 
development authorities (many of which were inactive). The New Society
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under Marcos led to the rapid expansion from about 60 to more than 150 
within a four-year period, 1972-1976.
This was similar to the development of public enterprises in Malaysia 
and Singapore. Under the premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman of over a decade, 
the number of public enterprises was hardly increased and public enterprise 
was restricted to provide some public utilities and facilities, probably 
because the Tunku did not wish to risk political repercussion from the 
British and Chinese minorities which dominated the national economy. Only 
after the racial riots of May 1969 and the announcement of withdrawal of 
British forces from the country, did the Tun Razak government, which took 
power afterwards, establish a large number of public enterprises to imple­
ment the New Economic Policy which aimed at redressing socio-economic 
imbalance and reducing racial tensions.
Singapore’s People’s Action Party came to ffice in 1959 under a 
socialist banner but the PAP government did not initiate any socialist 
programme during the period of self government and merger with Malaysia.
The threat by Malaysia to sever economic ties after separation from the 
Federation and the announcement of withdrawal of British forces in 1968 
prompted the Lee Kuan Yew government to expand the public enterprise sector 
through the establishment of the Development Bank of Singapore and a number 
of holding companies which later became large conglomerates.
It appears that neither political systems, ideologies, nor stages of 
socio-economic development are single determinants in the policy process.
It is true that it is much easier for an authoritarian regime (such as 
Marcos's, Pibul's, or Sukarno’s) to enlarge the public enterprise sector 
than for an elected government which is accountable to the public through 
political parties and interest groups. But there are also some limits of
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authoritarian power: intra-group fighting, foreign influences, and mass
support.^ In bureaucratic polities, civilian bureaucrats (the technocrats 
in particular) often compete with their military counterparts for control 
over public enterprises which are traditional sources of extra income and 
power. The technocrats tend to favour the free enterprise policy unless 
they are able to control these enterprises through bureaucratic channels.
The attempt by the so-called "BerkeleyMafia" technocrats to gain control 
over Pertamina during the Ibnu management is a clear example in point.
These technocrats always receive support from foreign sources, particularly 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, which generally favour the minimum government involvement in national 
economy.^ Since almost all Third World countries still need foreign aid and 
investment to realise their socio-economic development programmes, their 
recommendations greatly affect policy decisions. The Sarit regime, for 
example, abolished many public enterprises, partly because of the World 
Bank's recommendations (which were said to be the Thai technocrats' ideas). 
No less important is the mass support which any regime seeks to help 
stabilise its power: no regime can survive without public acceptance,
although the regime depends more on the support of power elites. Unpopular 
public enterprises, such as Ongkarn Sampaharn in Thailand, are most likely 
to be abolished or reorganised while those which seem to benefit the masses 
are likely to be promoted, provided such promotion would not much conflict 
with the ruling elites' interests.
Mass support is, of course, more influential in policy-making in the 
dominant-party semi-competitive systems. Public enterprises which were led 
up to implement the NEP in Malaysia gained wide support from the bumiputras 
who are traditional voters for the ruling National Front. Again, in 
Singapore the expansion of some public enterprises, especially the Post
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Office Savings Bank, seriously affect the commercial elites but the govern­
ment has never attempted to reduce their activities as long as they continue
g
to gain popularity among the masses.
The development of public enterprises in the Philippines presents an 
interesting case. Before the rule by decree, the country was labelled the 
show-case of democracy in the Third World because of its smooth succession 
of governments elected through legitimate means. Nevertheless, in practice, 
political and economic powers were concentrated in the hands of the three 
groups: land owners, exporters, and industrialists which comprised less
than 350 families. Elections were always corrupt and violent and election 
results depended on the candidates' peso and patronage rather than their 
policies and popularity. As a consequence, some bills concerning alloca­
tions for establishing new public enterprises or expanding the. existing ones 
were often blocked in Congress because they would conflict with the 
interests of the power elites. The free enterprise policy was widely 
praised in both Congress and mass media owned by powerful politicians who 
also owned other businesses which would be affected by any expansion of the 
public enterprise sector. Therefore, some development projects which could 
directly benefit the masses, such as land reform, agricultural credit and 
low-cost public housing, etc., could not be started or effectively imple­
mented. Under the emergency rule, the situation has not been changed: now
only political power has been shifted from local political elites to a few 
political elites in the capital city.
Ideological impact on public enterprise policy is of course significant 
in centrally-planned economies. But in other economic systems, as observed 
from the ASEAN experience, ideologies have become increasingly insignifi­
cant. The Philippine case shows that the support of free enterprise by
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politicians is nothing more than the protection of their interests. Pibul's 
nationalism or Suharto’s socialism was, in fact, also motivated by other 
political factors: Pibul who came from the non-property owning group was
continuously challenged by wealthy aristocrats who supported the monarch, 
and Sukarno sought support from the nationalists and communists who insisted 
on the takeover of foreign properties. Equally important, the declaration 
of the free enterprise policy of the ASEAN governments is also intended to 
reassure domestic and foreign investors and foreign lending organisations 
that these governments will not interrfere with their interests. But the 
actual implementaton 'of such policy is another matter.
Socio-economic development is often mentioned by many writers as an 
important reason for public enterprises. Nevertheless, it appears that, 
with some exceptions, no public enterprise is established for socio-economic 
reasons alone. The utilisation of public enterprises in the NEP in Malaysia 
and in industrialisation programmes in Singapore are clear evidences.
Similar examples exist in the Philippines under the Marcos rule.
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 indicate the correlation between per capita 
GNP and the number of public enterprises. During the period 1970-1975, per 
capital GNP of Malaysia was doubled and of Singapore was almost trebled, and 
the number of these enterprises was also sharply increased. But it is still 
arguable whether per capita GNP contributes to the rapid expansion of the 
public enterprise sector, and whether public enterprises bring about growth 
in per capita GNP. Indonesia and Thailand, which rank in the bottom of the 
ASEAN Table, operate many fewer public enterprises than Singapore and 
Malaysia, which top the table. Also, the proliferation of public enter­
prises during the Sukarno period did not stimulate economic growth very 
much, but rather contributed to the high inflation rate. More recently, the
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rapid growth of per capita GNP in Indonesia during 1970-1975 was due to the 
oil price increase, not the result of the expansion of Pertamina and its 
subsidiaries.
Table 4.2 illustrates that the percentage of government consumption of 
GDP in the ASEAN countries does not reflect the growth of the public enter­
prise sector. Such percentage in Thailand has not changed very much since 
1950, while that in the Philippines has steadily been increased from 7 to 10 
in the same period. In Malaysia the figure was increased from 12 to 15 
during the Tunku government rule, and further to 16 in the year the NEP was 
launched. During the Sukarno period government consumption dropped from 12 
in 1960 to 7 in 1965, but later increased in the New Order to 9 in 1970 and 
13 in 1975. In Singapore government consumption reached its peak in 1970, a 
few years after the government commenced its industrialisation programme, 
after which it gradually decreased.
Table 4.3 shows the number of public enterprises in each main type of 
activity. It appears that public enterprises in all five ASEAN countries 
concentrate their activities in the manufacturing and commercial sectors. 
There are 30 public manufacturing enterprises in Indonesia or T3.5 percent 
of the total number of public enterprises; 96 (or 28.7 percent) in 
Malaysia, 35 (or 20.5 percent) in the Philippines, 30 (or 22.5 percent) in 
Singapore, and 30 (or 30.1 percent) in Thailand. In contrast, a small 
number of public enterprises engage in the agricultural sector (55 in 
Indonesia - most are former Dutch plantations, 25 in Malaysia, 13 in the 
Philippines, and 7 in Thailand), and regional and land development (none in 
Indonesia and Thailand, 26 in Malaysia and 12 in the Philippines), despite 
the fact that all except Singapore are agricultural countries. It is true 
that some public enterprises engage in public utilities and
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telecommunications and transportation which directly benefit the masses, but 
it is also true that these services hardly reach the majority of the people 
who live in villages. These altogether indicate the degree the masses 
actually benefit from public enterprises, which is different from country to 
country according to the degree of public participation in public policy 
making in each country.
Political and economic elements also greatly affect the institutional 
forms and processes of public enterprises. Managerial reasons (flexibility, 
commercial type methods, enterprising, etc.) are often quoted for the option 
for this type of governmental agency, instead of the regular departmental 
form. But, from the ASEAN experience, the options for each form of public 
enterprise ("departmental" enterprise, public corporation, state company, 
semi-state company, etc.) and processes (control vs autonomy) are also the 
subject of political arrangements stemming from political struggle among 
various groups surrounding the ruling circle. The struggle of the 
Indonesian technocrats to exercise control over Pertamina, which led to the 
change of the corporation’s form in 1971 and after the fall of Ibnu in 1975, 
led to bureaucratic control, is a good example.
More importantly, the choice of the public enterprise form in many 
cases is made simply because this type of governmental agency better serves 
political purposes through unrestricted spending and personnel regulations. 
Public enterprises, thus, become deeply involved in the political process 
in terms of power distribution and balance (among struggling power elite 
groups and individuals), the electoral process (spending in "showcase" 
projects, "pork barrel" programmes, or direct uses of resources in election 
campaigns), and the spoils and reward system (appointment of political 
supporters and relatives to sit on governing boards or to other positions
in public enterprises).
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Table 4.3 indicates that there is no consensus among the five countries 
as to which specific form is used for a type of activity. The public corp­
oration form is commonly used in tfie areas of public utilities, telecommuni­
cations and transportation, and social services, while the state company is 
mostly used in manufacturing and commercial activities. But this is not 
always true. Thailand seems to prefer the public corporation to other forms 
and many public corporations engage in industrial and commercial activities, 
while Singapore and Malaysia tend to utilise the state and semi-state 
company and mixed enterprise for all activities other than public utilities 
and regulatory functions. There is also a tendency for the Philippines to 
follow the latter pattern and it is likely that most Indonesian public 
enterprises will be transformed into the P.T. Persero (state company) form. 
Such development, nevertheless, does not necessarily denote a trend towards 
decentralisation because politicians and bureaucrats still dominate the 
board of directors of all state and semi-state companies. In addition, the 
recent personnel legislations in the Philippines and Thailand impose more 
bureaucratic control over all public enterprises including state and semi­
state companies.
It is a common feature in Third World countries that the form and 
process are not necessarily the same as reality (in Riggs' term,
"formalism") enacting laws that cannot be enforced or adopting institutional 
forms and processes which cannot be practised. As a result, public policy 
outcomes are greatly influenced by personal factors, individual and groups 
in the policy process.
Policy actors in the public enterprise system in the Third World, as 
illustrated in the ASEAN case, are almost the same persons as those who run 
the country. In Thailand, until recently, the Prime Minister and his
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deputies served as Chairpersons in some important governing boards of public 
enterprises. Elsewhere the ministers usually chair the boards of the neter- 
prises under their supervision while representatives from governmental 
agencies concerned serve as board members. There are, of course, some 
outsiders, but most of them are related to the political leadership. The 
difference in the composition of these boards is signified by the political 
system of a particular country: it is likely for public enterprises in
bureaucratic polities to be governed by "all-official-affair" boards, while 
those in dominant-party semicompetitive systems are likely to have 
politician-bureaucrat dominated boards.
Similarly, at the micro level, militarymen and civilian bureaucrats are 
on secondment to serve in most public enterprises, as in the cases of 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The presence of militarymen 
in the first two countries is not uncommon because they are also assigned to 
some other regular ministerial departments, but the Indonesian dwi-funsi 
system is more obvious than the Thai case. In Singapore some top civilian 
bureaucrats also hold positions in public enterprises and many of them have 
been recruited to join the ruling PAP government. In Malaysia, the practice 
of secondment is widely accepted. It is estimated that about 60 percent of 
total staff of an agricultural public enterprise are seconded from the 
Ministry of Agriculture.
It is easy to explain the reason for such bureaucratic domination: 
apart from gaining loyalty from the top military and civilian bureaucrats, 
who consider such appointments as political rewards. It is easy to control 
them - "control by patronage".
The Philippine case is different from the other ASEAN countries because 
very few bureaucrats have been appointed to work in public enterprises.
108
Nevertheless, the top executives of public enterprises are usually politi­
cians under control of the political leadership or their close relatives. 
Thus, the practice of "control by patronage" also works well in this 
country.
It appears, at this stage, that the contextual elements, institutional 
framework and processes, and policy actors are interrelated and relate to 
public enterprise policy. There follows below a series of country studies 
of public enterprise systems in the ASEAN region. Each study includes a 
brief survey of the ecology of public enterprises that have shaped their 
working behaviour, followed by examination of the structure and processes 
and policy actors in each system.
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CHAPTER__5
COUNTRY STUDY: INDONESIA
Any scandal involving $10 billion, as in the case of Pertamina, 
definitely means the end of any given democratic government, but in 
Indonesia, it is a different story. As usual, except for the purge of some 
top executives, nothing much has happened.
Irregularities in Indonesian public enterprises are not uncommon 
practices: there have been many other cases in the past and many more are
to be revealed. However, to the Indonesian public, Pertamina is not an 
ordinary corporation,it is a national institution whose contribution to 
overall national development is incomparable. It is also a national dream 
of a large efficient enterprise solely owned and managed by the Indonesian 
nationals, that will end the traditional belief of the Indonesian handicap 
in entrepreneurship. The failure shocked the nation but the real reasons 
contributing to the failure continue to be in the dark.
The insignificant impact of the Pertamina affairs on the stability of 
the junta , and the reluctance to reform the system of public enterprises 
imply the deep involvement of the ruling elite in the management of public 
enterprises.
Coincidentally, public enterprises are strategically located in the 
bargaining process for power and wealth among the governing elite; this may 
make them more sensitive and vulnerable to political interference and mal­
practices. So often the advantages of flexibility and autonomy of public 
enterprise over other organisational forms, are abused in order to maintain 
political stability of the government. Advantages therefore become
Ill
disadvantages because the concept of public accountability known in the West 
is seldom in practice.
This Chapter inquires into political influences in the public policy 
making process of Indonesian public enterprises with the assumption that 
failures in the past partly derived from political interference in the 
management. In this country the military is the major force in politics and 
in public administration (through dwi-funsi). Thus a substantial part in 
this chapter involves the military’s role in the management of public 
enterprises.
THE BACKGROUND
Indonesian public enterprises have been victims of their own 
development. During the Dutch rule, the colonial administration attempted 
nothing that could lay the foundation for self-government, so that 
independent Indonesia had to start from scratch. Politics became involved 
in the management of national economy; and political considerations, rather 
than economic development, were important criteria for public policy-making. 
Public enterprises became political organisations or "public showcases" 
they were development orientated bodies and the resulting practices only 
benefited the ruling regime. Frequent changes in national policies, 
apparently aimed at stabilising the junta, despite the existence of 
Development Plans, brought about confusion and frustration in public policy 
implementation. At present, all public enterprises in this country are in 
the process of "transformation" and many of them seem unable to discover
their true position.
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During the colonial rule, there were of course some government 
business-like activities, such as railway, postal, and public utility 
services but these were mainly for the benefit of the Dutch themselves and 
their Chinese trading partners. One of the best known public enterprises in 
that period was the State Salt Administration which was set up to monopolise 
the nationalised salt production and distribution in 1911.^ More seriously, 
all public services were entirely managed by the Dutch (most of whom resided 
in the Netherlands) and not even one Indonesian had ever risen to the top.
During the brief fighting for independence, the Indonesian revolution­
ary government set up its official bank called Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 and 
a state trading company.whose main function was to supply military and other 
necessary equipment. The Bank is now the oldest state commercial bank and 
has the largest network of branches in the country.
The immediate problem confronting the Sukarno regime after the 
transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 was the rehabilitation of the near 
collapsed national economy. Unfortunately, in the first years of indepen­
dence, Indonesia experienced severe political instability and administrative 
chaos: there were nine cabinets in a span of nine years. As a result,
little progress was made in economic development. The Economic Urgency 
Programme, a form of economic planning was announced in 1951, only to be 
replaced by the first National Economic Plan in 1956. This Plan has, 
however, never been realised, nor was the Eight Year Plan of 1960 and the 
Economic Declaration (DEKON) of 1963. Therefore, they were only political 
gimmicks, and economic urgency was only to serve political ends.
The central bank, usually an important agent of change in the Third 
World, was established in 1953 after the nationalisation of the colonial
T i 2Java Bank. Nevertheless, Bank Indonesia moved in the wrong direction from
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its start. As a result of heated debates in Parliament, a compromise was 
made and the bank was entirely subordinated to the government and was 
nothing more than a government’s lending office. It also had no authority 
to control state commercial banks, often allied with powerful politicians, 
which offered credits to unprofitable gigantic projects. In effect, 
Indonesia suffered a large budget deficit and the cost of living index 
sky-rocketed to 96,030 in 1966 from a base of 100 in 1958.^ Not until 1968 
did policy changes bring about BI’s new role as a real central bank and all 
correlated activities were removed.
Much of the public investment through BI between 1950 and 1965, the 
year Sukarno was toppled, were in public enterprises. The number of public 
enterprises was increased to reach a peak of 223, a figure that excluded 
those operated by regional administrations and military units which to­
gether were estimated at several thousand.^ Among these were about 20 Dutch 
established Indische Bedrijuen Wet (IBW) enterprises, subsidiaries of three 
state banks, Bank Industri Negara, Bank Rakjat Indonesia, and BI, and a 
large number of formerly-Dutch owned companies which were nationalised in 
1957 in the course of the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over Irian Jaya.
The state enterprises established under the IBW Law of 1927 included 
the State Pawnshop Service, the State Agricultural Enterprise (about 30 
units), the State Electricity Enterprise (LPN), the Post, Telegraph and 
Telephone Service, the State Railways, the Port Operations (7 units), and a 
number of industries. Under the original IBW Law, these enterprises were 
given financial and personnel autonomy and worked just as private firms in 
the country. Nevertheless, during the Japanese occupation, they were 
reorganised to be a part of the Civil Service and were put under the 
supervision of the Welfare Ministries. Only after the independence were
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these IBW enterprises restored to their old status but with less autonomy. 
They were required to submit their annual budget to Parliament through the 
State budget, probably because all but the State Agricultural Enterprise 
needed subsidies from the State.
The second group nf Indonesian public enterprises were those 
established by BIN, BI, and BRI or those receiving capital from one of 
these banks and failing to repay their debts. The examples in this category 
were P.T. Iglas, P.T. Intirub, and P.T. Gaja Motor.
BIN was set up«as a result of the feeling that Indonesia needed an
organisation concerned solely with financing existing or newly-formed
5industries on a long-term basis. But, in practice, the bank with the 
authorised capital of Rp.500 million, not only provided loans for private 
firms but also acquired a large number of enterprises which became a major 
part of state business activities until the sixties. The principle 
industrial activities of the Bank were sugar milling, shipping, cement 
production, cotton spinning, automobile assembly, pulp and paper production, 
glass and glassware production, etc. These companies came into BIN's hands 
in various ways. For example, a plant set up with the aid of the UNICEF to 
produce soybean milk and a cement plant with the finance of the Export- 
Import Bank of the United States were put under the supervision of BIN 
because of its capital participation. BIN also took over a General Motors 
Corporation car assembly plant because the GMC wanted to close down its 
operation. A few British-owned estates were acquired in a similar way. 
Before BIN was replaced by its successor, Bank Pembangunan Indonesia 
(BAPINDO) or Development Bank of Indonesia, in 1961, its total loans and
share-capital investment was almost Rp.2 billion.
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The failure of BIN came from many factors. Without management plan­
ning, it started with no clear idea what form it should take, resulting in
a years delay in the operation. An earlier proposal to set up the bank as a 
banking corporation was rejected; being a state corporation, it was unable 
to accept deposits except from its subsidiaries.^5 An initial capital of 
Rp.500 million was to be supplied by the Treasury but only a half was paid 
in 1957.^ The sales of debentures were poorly subscribed and only Rp.520
g
million was obtained, mainly from blocked rupiah accounts of foreign firms. 
This shortage of capital, coupled with the rapidly rising inflation, 
limited the BIN's role to activating industrialisation. The management of 
loans and of direct investment was even worse.
The failure, comparable to that of Pertamina in the mid-seventies, 
essentially was due to unplanned investment, political involvement in the 
management, and lack of experience and qualified staff. The majority of the 
BIN's investment in the first five years went to agricultural estates but 
direction was suddenly switched to manufacturing and service industries.
This was probably due to the frequently changing political atmosphere. The 
existing National Plan was totally ignored and investment criteria were 
marred by political wishes. Many of its subsidiaries were established 
without economic feasibility studies and some others were "accidentally" 
joined the- group. Another shortcoming was personnel problems, arising from 
political favouritism and nepotism and the severe shortage of trained staff. 
Together with overexpansion and diversification, the BIN became an unwieldy 
organisation without proper control and coordination.
BAPINDO, best characterised as an industrial finance corporation, was 
to provide a source of development finance outside the budget for public 
enterprises in the new Eight-Year Development Plan. But unlike its 
predecessor, the bank was not to promote, initiate or manage any project;
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but it provided technical services to public enterprises which required its
9loans. Therefore, BAPINDO did not have any ownership in public enter­
prises. Nevertheless, during the first four years of its operation, the 
only accomplishment was the transfer of former BIN enterprises to minis­
tries and the settlement of loan and participation accounts with private 
and public enterprises.
The largest group of public enterprises in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s came from the nationalisation of foreign properties, mainly the 
Dutch. To some writers, the nationalisation was influenced by "economic 
nationalism", arising from Sukarno's synthesis of nationalism, islamism and 
marxism. Neverhteless, ideologies alone should not be counted. There 
is a socialistic kekeluargan economic policy under Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution that:
"(1) The economy shall be organised as a common endeavour 
based upon the principle of the kekeluargan system;
(2) Branches of production which are important for the 
State and which affect the life of most people shall 
be controlled by the State;
(3) Land and water and the natural riches contained 
therein shall be controlled by the State and shall 
be made use of for the people".^
However, the interpretation of the Article has never been free from 
controversy. During the Sukarno rule, it was always quoted as the legal 
recognition for socialism and nationalism as well as for the famous Guided 
Economy. Since 1966, it has been clarified by the New Order that economic 
development of Indonesia shall be under the principle of Economic 
Democracy. Therefore, many interpretations can be arrived at, depending on
political considerations.
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It was during the Sukarno Administration that nationalism and anti­
colonialism and socialism (or in Sukarno's term of marhaenism) reached a 
peak."*"^  The severe exploitation by the Dutch and Chinese collaborators 
during three and a half centuries of colonial rule left widespread 
anti-colonialism among the local people. Unlike other newly independent 
Asian countries where socio-economic problems were centered around the 
local landlords and the landless, Indonesia found herself in serious 
conflict between the Dutch plantation owners and local peasants. After 
the Dutch were driven out of the country by Japanese forces during the 
Second World War, squatters moved into the plantations, only to find
out that the lands were still owned by the returned foreign owners,
12according to the Round Table Conference that negotiated the peace. Many
incidents, including the Tandjund Morawa aroused strong nationalistic
emotions against the return of these plantations. In Parliament, several
attempts were made to nationalise foreign mining companies which resulted
in the passage of an Act in 1957. Indigenism was strongly advocated,
starting with the grant of bus franchises and then spreading to other
businesses. The national carrier, the Garuda International Airways, was
set up in an equal partnership with the Royal Dutch Airlines, KLM; but
this joint venture ended in 1954 when the government bought all shares in
this company. When the Dutch shipping companies, which dominated the
business in this 13,000 island state, failed to follow the government
policy they were then forced out of business, and the State Shipping
13Corporation was established.
The man behind the move was undoubtedly Sukarno. Throughout his 
career, without any power base except the mass support, Sukarno, a 
charismatic leader with inspiring speech, depended much on his ability to 
mobilise the public to secure his presidency, firstly as the figurehead and
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later the chief executive. Only with such a political manoeuvre’could he 
make a balance of power among essential political groups, i.e. the militant 
Islam Masjumi, the nationalist PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia), the army 
.and later the Communist PKI.
Equally remarkably, Sukarno's success owed much to his understanding 
of Indonesian philosophy and realities. He skillfully related anti­
colonial sentiments toward the return of foreign properties and the 
experience of past exploitation with the Irian Jaya issue. From time to 
time, he repeatedly affirmed that the revolution of Indonesian people would
be completed only a£ter the liberation of Irian Jaya and the realisation
14of economic independence. But, to him, the latter could be sacrificed 
for political priorities, especially in the case of the former. Since the 
liberation of Irian Jaya had become the matter of national pride, Sukarno 
easily won the stage. Therefore, this issue was not only a means for 
arousing a sense of much needed national identity, as often claimed by 
Sukarno, or a means of diverting attention from domestic discontents as 
understood by foreign writers, but also a means of strengthening his 
leadership.
In fact, no progress on the Irian Jaya issue was made until late 1957 
when the United Nations failed to secure the necessary vote for the Dutch- 
Indonesian negotiation and Sukarno became more politically unstable. Then 
regional military commanders particularly those in Sumatra, staged coups 
against the central civilian administration. In Jakarta, conflicts among 
political parties and between politicians and the military became serious 
and Sukarno's assassination was attempted. Employing the old tactic, 
Sukarno launched an angry campaign against the Dutch and all Dutch 
properties were seized. With strong support from the anti-Parliament army
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Chief-of-Staff Nasution, in July 1959, Sukarno dissolved the Constituent 
Assembly and became the Chief Executive under the famous Guided Democracy.
At this stage, the military gained prestige from its victory against a
Sumatran coup in 1958 and power/wealth from the declaration of the State of
War and Siege that led to dwi-funsi, or the military participation in the
government administration including nationalised industries. Sukarno also
firmly secured his position but still depended on his ability to preserve a
16balance between the army and the rapidly rising Communists.
The expropriation of Dutch properties would have been an economically 
viable policy had Indonesia possessed adequate skills to manage them. 
Politics, inexperience and widespread irregularities rendered them 
helpless. After an unsettled political situation and confusion, 
nationalised industries numbering over 500, were grouped into four 
categories, each group with its own managing board according to the main 
type of activity.^
(1) agricultural estates;
(2) manufacturing and mining;
(3) trading;
(4) pharmaceutical manufacturing.
The boards, consisting of representatives from responsible ministries and 
the army, were never able to control the operations of the nationalised 
industries because of the size and the scope of activities. The lack of 
control led to several scandals involving militarymen who in practice 
operated the enterprises.
Professor Mohammad Sadli, later a Cabinet Minister in the Suharto 
Administration, pointed out that the most serious problem confronting
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public enterprises during that period was the chronic and severe deficit in
' 2.8the government budget and the consequent imbalance of payments. The 
military operation in Sumatra and the high amount of spending on gigantic 
unprofitable projects in Jakarta added greatly to the strain. Meanwhile, 
other necessary capital expenditures less appealing to the general public 
had to be sacrificed. In effect, public enterprises were unable to raise 
capital not only for investing in new development projects but also for 
forming a sufficient stock of raw materials and production goods, and for 
recruiting qualified personnel who were inclined not to join public 
enterprises because>of their low salary scales. At the same time, public 
enterprises could not raise the prices of their products or services 
because of political and moral reasons.
Another problem was concerned with organisation, coordination, and 
public control of public enterprises. Sadli stated that there were many 
forms of public enterprise in the country and the public control through 
Parliament was insufficient. Thus he recommended that legislation should 
be enacted to reorganise public enterprises. In addition, in regard to the 
coordination of these enterprises and the channels of control, he raised a 
question whether there was a need for a separate ministry for state 
enterprises. ^
The year 1960 saw the enactment of the State Enterprise Law No.19/1960
as an attempt to streamline the existing state business activities of over
20two thousand agencies. However, only one tenth of the public enterprises 
actually fell under this legislation. They were uniformly converted to the 
Perusahaan Negara (PN) system, each with a board of managing directors that 
was responsible for the operation. At the top, there was general manage­
ment board (BPU) to supervise and coordinate a group of similar PN.
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BPU were under the supervision of the Central Agency for State Enterprise 
(BPKAN) which was established in 1963. The changes that promised better 
performance failed to succeed, partly because of the confused line of 
authority. BPU and BPKAN were later abolished in 1967.
Toward the end of Sukarno's career, all efforts to modernise the 
country, including the more realistic set of regulations of 26 May 1963, 
failed to materialise. The declining export, inflation and malpractices 
in bureaucracy became worse. The konfrontasi against the formation of 
Malaysia, yielded nothing but wasted effort and resources. After the 
30 September 1965 incident that led to a series of events, Sukarno was 
toppled by General Suharto.
The New Order changed the course of national economy. The People's 
Consultative Council (MPRS), the national supreme body, in its Decision 
XXIII of July 1966, issued the national policy guidelines (GBHN) that 
economic development of Indonesia should be under the principle of Economic 
Democracy. In its own words, this principle is characterised as follows:
"a. The economy shall be organised as a common endeavour
based upon the principles of the kekeluargaan (family) 
system.
b. The State's resources and finance shall be used with 
the approval of the institutions of the People's 
Representations, and the control if its policy shall 
be also exercised by the Institutions of the People's 
Representatives.
c. The Branches of production which are important for the 
State and which affect the life of most people shall be 
controlled by the State.
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d. Each citizen shall have the freedom to choose the job 
he prefers and shall be entitled to the job and a 
proper living.
e. Private property shall be acknowledged and its use 
may not be contradictory to the interests of the 
community.
f. The potential, initiative and creative power of each 
citizen shall be fully developed to such extent as not 
to harm public interest.
g. The poor and.the destitute children shall be entitled
21to social security."
The State, therefore, should avoid:
"a. The system of 'free fight liberalism' which creates 
exploitation of man by man and of one nation by 
another nation ....
b. The system of 'statism' wherein the state and the 
economic apparatus of the State have complete 
domination and exist pressure that kill the potentials 
and the creative power of economic units outside the 
public sector.
22c. Monopoly that harms the people...."
This policy has been supplemented by the First and Second Five Year 
Development Plans (Repelita I and II) commencing from 1 April 1969. Again, 
in the Foreign Investment Law No.11967 all businesses are open for foreign 
investment except nine activities which are classified "vital and 
strategic". As two activities had already been granted to private local 
entrepreneurs (mass media and shipping and air transport), the list was
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reduced to include only harbour operations, power generation/transmission/ 
distribution, telecommunications, water supply, railways and development of 
atomic energy. In brief, the government’s role in economic activities was 
to decrease drastically; only "vital and strategic” public enterprises were 
allowed to continue their businesses and the rest were to be for sale.
In practice, the number of public enterprises has instead been
23increased from 139 in 1969 to 217 in 1975. Their sizes and scope of
activities are also expanding, considering the number of employees
24totalling 894,794 in 1975. These figures excluded all but the central 
government's owned enterprises. Despite significant growth of military and 
regional enterprises in the past two decades, very little data is available 
about them.
,Sectorally, public enterprises dominate the areas of finance, public, 
utilities and heavy industries. In the financial sector, despite the 
larger number of "national" private (91) and foreign banks (11), the 
percentage of the total liquidity assets of the five state commercial banks 
in 1976 was 75.3 percent. In addition, these state banks had 671 branches 
throughout the country in comparison with the 279 of their counterparts. 
There are also many public enterprises dealing with insurance: 3 PERUMs
and 2 bureaus in social insurance, 2 reinsurance PT Persenos, and another 
two in both life and non-life insurance. Their activities cover a wide 
area and take the greater share in the market.
The bulk of public investment is in the area of public works and 
telecommunication. The State operates railways, air transport (one 
international and regional, one regional and domestic, and a few in the 
charter business) , sea transport (one international, and a few coastal), 
electricity generating/supplying, postal and telephone services. The
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a i r p o r t  management i s  unde r  a p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t i o n  w h i l e  t h e  p o r t  o p e r a t i o n s  
a r e  unde r  a d e p a r t m e n t a l  e n t e r p r i s e .  There  a r e  two s t a t e  bus companies  
(one i n  J a k a r t a  and the  o t h e r  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y )  b u t  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  t a k e  
■a much g r e a t e r  s h a r e .
The S t a t e  e n t i r e l y  c o n t r o l s  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  p e t r o l e u m  and p e t r o l e u m  
p r o d u c t s ,  f e r t i l i z e r ,  and i r o n  and s t e e l ,  and d o m ina te s  i n d u s t r i a l  g a s e s ,  
pu lp  and p a p e r ,  cement ,  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l ,  m a r c h i n e r y  and m e t a l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g .
The e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  such as  m in ing  and f o r e s t r y  i s  
c a r r i e d  o u t  by b o t h  t h e  S t a t e  and p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s .  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  
c o r p o r a t i o n s  have moved s t r o n g l y  to  e n t e r  " p r o d u c t i o n - s h a r i n g  c o n t r a c t s "  
w i t h  the  S t a t e ,  whereby t h e y  i n v e s t  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  and i n  r e t u r n  r e c e i v e  
an a g r e e d  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  o u t p u t .  In  t h e  r e c e n t  c o n t r a c t s  w i t h  Comoco 
I r i a n  J a y a  and T o t a l  I n d o n e s i a ,  PN P e r t a m i n a  s h a r e d  p o s s i b l e  r i s k s  i n  t h e  
u n d e r t a k i n g  on a 50-50 b a s i s .
In  r e g a r d  to  t h e i r  pe r f o r m a n c e ,  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  have had a v e r y  
bad image w i t h  the  p u b l i c .  The P e r t a m in a  a f f a i r  s e r v e d  to  c o n f i r m  such 
b e l i e f s .  PN P e r t a m i n a ,  a g i g a n t i c  c o r p o r a t i o n  w i t h  d i v e r s e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  
a d d i t i o n  to  i t s  o i l  b u s i n e s s ,  b e f o r e  t h e  r e v e l a t i o n  o f  s c a n d a l s ,  was a 
model  o f  modern b u s i n e s s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  f o r  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p u b l i c  to  be 
proud  o f .  I t  was a l s o  a l a r g e  p r o f i t - m a k e r  whose c o n t r i b u t i o n  formed a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  S t a t e  r e v e n u e .  Then-came a shock  when i t  
f a i l e d  to  r e p a y  d e b t s  i n  1975.  Th i s  was f o l l o w e d  by t h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  d e b t s  
o f  more th a n  $10 b i l l i o n ,  an amount l a r g e r  t h a n  f o r e i g n  d e b t s  a c c r u e d  
d u r i n g  S u k a r n o ’s r u l e .  But the  P e r t a m in a  c a s e  i s  n o t  t h e  on ly  one as  
s t i l l  more s c a n d a l s  were soon to be r e v e a l e d .  Some o t h e r  p u b l i c  
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  g i g a n t i c  r i c e  s t o c k p i l i n g  age ncy ,  BULOG and th e
S t a t e  t i n  m in ing  company, Timah, have  f r e q u e n t l y  been  a c c u s e d  o f  c o r r u p t i o n
25and m is u s e  of  power,
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On the other hand, not all public enterprises are full of scandal. 
Certainly, some enjoy monopoly and privileges but many others are not so 
fortunate and they still manage to compete efficiently with private 
companies and foreign firms. Public enterprises concurrently contribute a 
significant share of government revenue in the form of profits and dividends 
(classified as non-tax receipt together with forestry levies and depart­
mental enterprise income). For the financial year 1969/70 this item 
represented only 1.3 percent of the total government domestic revenue 
(including oil income), but it was increased to 5.8 percent in the 
financial year 1972/73.^ In the financial year 1977/78, this item was 
estimated at Rp.88.9 billion. Furthermore, the estimated corporate tax 
revenue for the same year was Rp.165 billion with almost a half (Rp.78 
billion) from public enterprises. Altogether, contributions from public
enterprises constituted Rp.166.9 billion or about 8 percent of the non-oil 
27revenue.
The Second Five Year Development Plan (1974/75 - 1978/79) emphasises 
the improvement of public enterprises in order to provide "better and 
equitable arrangement of public utilities" and to accumulate "incomes and 
profits which are beneficial to the State Development Fund". It also 
states that activities of all public enterprises should be financed by the 
enterprises themselves. Meanwhile, state companies should be able to 
function as a financial source of the State. In regard to the state 
financial institutions, the Plan specifies their major role in "developing 
higher ability in the mobilisation of people's funds and in providing 
better directives and service for their use by the people". Thus, these 
financial institutions are to improve "their management, liquidity, 
solvability, rentability, and bonafidity". Finally, the Plan calls for the 
enactment of an Act to replace Act No.1960 for the improvement of public
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enterprises of the central government and another Act for regional 
enterprises.^
In fact, since 1967 all public enterprises (in the PN form) have been 
transformed or in the process of being transformed into three categories, 
departmental enterprise (PERJAN), public corporation (PERUM), and state 
company (PERSERO), by Presidential Instruction No.17 of 1976 and its 
governing Law No.9 of 1969. Yet, after a decade, the implementation is yet 
to be finalised. The new legislations proposed by the Plan have also not 
been enacted.
It should be noted that the Plan reflects the thinking of some of the
technocrats recruited to work on President Suharto’s staff. This team of
Western educated economists, largely drawn from the University of Indonesia,
was appointed to replace politicians in top policy-making positions dealing
with economic affairs. The impact of this group on the New Orders leaders'
29thinking has been remarkable. For them, a model of modernisation is a 
materially based process rooted in economic development and political and 
social transformation is only a by-product. They convinced Suharto that 
only economic progress based on such quantitative indicators as the rate of 
inflation, of production, and of inflow of foreign investment, would 
impress the public and thus gain the mass support. Not surprisingly, the 
New Economic Policy stated in the Repelita I and II, the Foreign Investment 
Law, other presidential addresses and speeches, is essentially masterminded 
by this group. For example, the Plan states that: "National stability
will accelerate national development, and, in turn, national development 
will reinforce national stability". Thus, the main theme of the Suharto 
regime is focussed on modernisasi and stabilisasi . The policy is success­
ful to some extent: further economic deterioration has been halted and
"material" progress can be seen. But this concept of modernisasi has also
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become a justification for authoritarianism, political repression and 
corruption. Also, as stabilisasi is a top priority, it is doubtful whether 
economic development efforts which in many cases conflict with the regime's 
interest will be implemented.
The stability of the Suharto regime has depended on the loyalty of the 
Armed Forces officials, all potential political rivals being crushed 
since 1965. Learn from experience, Suharto allows military units and 
individual high ranking officials to operate fund-raising businesses to 
supplement an insufficient budget and in many cases to supplement their 
subordinates' income in order to secure loyalty from them. Therefore, 
there are several hundred military enterprises in the country, from the 
national command in Jakarta down to regions and provincial levels. High 
ranking ABRI officials are appointed to manage profitable public enterprises 
in dwi funsi capacities obviously to channel some "invisible" contributions 
to the Armed Forces (ABRI). The practice of "control over patronage" is of 
course a common feature in any military-dominated government, but in 
Indonesia its magnitude is incomparable. Perhaps this implies the reason 
why the Pertamina affairs are still in the dark.
It should be noted that apart from the involvement in public 
enterprises, top military men and bureaucrats now own a large number of 
private enterprises in the country. These companies known as Ali Baba 
or Baba Ali companies (owned by Indonesian Baba and operated by Chinese 
Ali, or owned and operated by Chinese Ali but with the protection of 
Indonesian Baba), become so influential that police or other state 
officials dare not interfere in cases of law-evading practices. This 
undesirable practice undoubtedly enriches the ruling elites, probably more 
than what they get from public enterprises, at the expense of the whole 
nation, and is worse than the state monopoly.
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Equally significant is the result from a recent study that the
economic policies and practices in the past decade which have been
emphasised on the rapid growth in GNP per capita, does not result in a
higher standard of living for the majority. Instead, there is an absolute
decline in the standard of living of the urban and rural poor. Above all,
"the pattern of corrupt and parasite behaviour which is found at the
national level is also found at the village level. Monopolisation of
facilities and opportunities by people in power and in the bureaucracy in
corraboration with a small group of people in the society prevails both at
30the national and at.the village level". With this growing satisfaction 
about modernisasi that enriches the few among the masses, it is doubtful 
whether the government can still maintain stabilisasi even with the support 
from the ABRI.
THE SYSTEM AND PROCESS
Public policy-making process in public enterprise issues has never 
been free from political complications, mainly because of their strategic 
location .in the bargain process for power and wealth among professional 
politicians and political militarymen. Nevertheless, the outcome of the 
political implementation process is also influenced by some other factors. 
Among them are the implementing organisation itself, the interactions 
between the organisation and other political units, and the leadership of 
that organisation. These factors are discussed in this part.
The Definition
Students of Indonesian public enterprises are amazed with the 
complicated and confused system of the public enterprise sector, if not the
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uncountable number of these enterprises. The main legislation, Law No.9 
of 1969, covers only a little over 200 enterprises, the rest are either 
under their own legislation or simply out of control of the central 
■government. In effect, no proper control and coordination system is in 
existence and each of the groups tends to build up its own empire competing 
with one another.
According to the above mentioned Law, public enterprises are
classified into three categories; departmental enterprise (PERJAN), public
corporation (PERUM), and state company (PESERO). However, after a decade
of implementation, still there are more than 30 enterprises yet to be
31transformed from the former PN System. Some problems are also derived 
from the legal definition that all of the government’s joint ventures with 
both local and foreign companies are PT Perseroan, even though the 
government's ownership may be less than half. In the past few years, this 
type of venture has been increasing in number and in size, but the 
amendment has not yet been finalised.
Public enterprises with their own governing legislation are Pertamina, 
eight State banks and a large number of regional public enterprises. Among 
them, Pertamina is the largest and the most important. It was incorporated 
into the present form of Perusahaan (corporation) by Law No.8 of 1971.
This legislation restructured PN Pertamina - an amalgamation of two State 
oil companies, after the controversial investigation of the "committee of 
Four" concerning irregularities in these enterprises.
The second group is composed of the State banks. A series of 
legislation in 1968 was enacted to reform the Indonesian banking structure 
and all state banks were reestablished with a separate business identity. 
There are eight in number: a central bank (Bank Indonesia), 5 commercial
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state banks (Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 ) Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Rakyat, Bank 
Ekspor-Impor and Bank Dagang Negara), one development bank (Bank 
Pembangunan Indonesia - BAPINDO), and a savings bank (Bank Tabungan Negara).
Regional enterprises form the largest group in the country. The
figure given by the Home Affairs Ministry in 1968 was 1,635, with 1,335 of
32these owned by districts and the rest by provinces. This number has been 
increased to a conservative estimate by the writer to over two thousand.
In the past, activities carried out by these enterprises were limited to 
public utilities or public services, such as water-supply, housing and 
market management. But more recently, these enterprises have expanded 
their businesses into unconventional areas. The Jakarta City Government 
(DKI) for instance, runs more than 100 companies and corporations, a large 
number of them in the "Jaya Group'' which operate a bank, transport 
companies, trading companies, a chain of cinema houses and movie 
production, real estates, manufacturing industries, construction, and 
sweepstake activities. Probably, this group of companies is the largest 
local government enterprise in the world.
One of the most controversial agencies, classified here as a public
enterprise, is the National Logistic Board (BULOG). BULOG is responsible
for the price stabilisation of essential commodities, particularly rice -
the main staple of Indonesian people. The present form of BULOG, as
installed by the Presidential Instruction No.11 of 1969, is a special
governmental agency directly under the President's supervision and is
33headed by a Chairman. The agency is not financed by the Annual
Government Budget but by Bank Indonesia in the form of revolving credits 
with a special interest rate guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance.
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Less in number but with a more significant role in the national
economy than regional enterprises is a large group of military enterprises
where direct governing legislation has never existed. The main objective
of these enterprises is to make profits for supplementing the insufficient
34defence budget, in some cases up to 60 percent of the total expenditure.
35A recent study distinguished military enterprises into four categories:
(1) military industrial enterprises which are directly attached 
to the command structure;
(2) civic mission operations (Operasi Bakti) ;
(3) regional military enterprises;
(4) military PT.
The first group includes factories manufacturing military supplies and some 
other products for sale to the public. These factories are under the Chief 
of Logistic in the army, the navy and the air forces. The second group is 
less important because it is only a by-product of civic mission operations 
which themselves are in a limited scope. Next comes regional military 
enterprise organised in the structure of territorial commands which 
generally respond to the civilian administration from the regional level 
down to districts. Activities undertaken vary from region to region and 
from unit to unit, depending on the commander's entrepreneurial skills and 
needs. Usually these enterprises cover the areas of transportation, 
construction, trading, logging, farming and rice milling. The last group, 
the most important of them all, is a large number of influential military 
PT operated by various units in the capital city under the names of 
foundations (such as Jayasan Darma Putra), cooperatives (such as PT 
Inkopad), the veteran federation, and the armed forces themselves. Each of 
these bodies is a holding corporation with 5-30 subsidiaries or associated
companies.
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Furthermore, readers should also be aware of some activities done by 
various institutes (Lembaga), agencies (Badan), foundation (Yayasan) and 
funds (Dana). The LEMIGAS (Oil and Gas Research and Training Institute), 
for example, operates several oil fields in Central Java for research and 
trading purpdses but earns a substantial income from its products.
In this dissertation, public enterprises under Law No. 19 of 1969, are 
the main concern but those under the banking legislation of 1968, regional 
enterprises, and Pertamina are also included, The military enterprises 
will also be discussed in a case study in the later part.
The Legal Aspect of Public Enterprises
The conversion of public enterprises from the PN form into three
categories, PERJAN, PERUM, and PERSERO, is in line with the MPRs policy on
the economy. It is also the work of the technocrats who recommended the
President to cut back government expenditures previously spent excessively
on development projects carried out by public enterprises, and to better
the performance of these enterprises which had been inefficiently operated.
Presidential Instruction No.17 of 1967 instructed all ministries concerned
to evaluate and classify public enterprises under their supervision.
Meanwhile, the President stated that his government sought to simplify the
organisation of these enterprises by reducing their members. In addition,
the government was not to subsidise any public enterprise except to provide
36loans for new investment. Thus the criterion in the classification have 
been mainly concerned with the financial aspect of the enterprises.
PERJANs are to conduct some monopolies and some other businesses in which 
government subsidies are needed, whereas PERSEROs are to make some profits. 
However, in practice, the classification which is in the hands of respective 
ministries and the Treasury, has been involved in bureaucratic politics and
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the criterion are often neglected. Then came Law No.9 of 1969 which 
enforced the conversion.
The PERJAN (Perusahaan Jawatan) of departmental enterprise, patterned 
after the Dutch established agencies under Indonesische Compatibiliteit Wet 
of 1864, aim to provide public services which are.monopolistic or which 
need government subsidies and various protective measures. The conversion 
into this form requires the Presidential approval before a Presidential 
Decree is issued for the liquidation of the PN and the establishment of a 
new PERJAN. At present, there are three PERJANs, the railways, the port 
department, and the pawn shops/auction management, each of which is 
attached to a government department and is headed by a public servant who 
has the same status as any other department head in that ministry.
The PERUM (Perusahaan Umum), or public corporation, is the direct 
successor to the PN system and the conversion into the PERUM status is 
usually regarded only as a formality (the conversion requires only a 
ministerial decree). So far less than twenty PNs have been converted to 
this new form. Their main type of activities are in public utilities, 
finance and large manufacturing industries. The examples of these PERUMs 
are Semen Tonasa (cement production), Petrokimia Gresik (petrochemical), 
Kertas Basuki Rachmat (pulp and paper), TASPEN (savings fund and civil 
service insurance), Telekommunikasi (telecommunications), and Sang Hyang 
Seri (seed farm). All of them are required to be self-financed, unless the 
government’s policy on pricing and tariff do not allow them to do so.
Since the new legislation proposed in the Second Plan has not yet been 
enacted, the basic law governing a PERUM is Law No.19 of 1960 which had 
been designed for the management of PN two decades ago.
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The main objective of Law No.19 of 1960 was to establish uniformity 
in the method of management and control of public enterprises, so that they 
could be effectively utilised for the implementation of economic programmes 
laid down in the Political Manifesto of 17 August 1959 which called for the 
Guided Economy. In brief, the Law is the general public corporation 
legislation that provides basic guidelines for incorporating Acts of PNs.
It states that a PN is a legal body whose responsibilities are (a) to 
supply services, (b) to serve public interest, and (c) to accumulate income 
for the State. In a wider sense, a PN is to participate in building up a 
national economy in.accordance with the Guided Economy and with giving 
priority to the needs of the people, to job security and satisfaction 
within the enterprise. The capital of a PN is wholly owned by the State, 
unless otherwise determined by appropriate legislation.
Each PN is governed by a Board of Managing Directors (Dewan Direksi) 
whose composition is determined by establishing legislation, but 
usually varies from three to five, including the President Director who 
chairs the Board and is the Chief Executive. Members of the board must be 
Indonesian citizens who are appointed and dismissed by the responsible 
Minister. The appointments are made for a period of not more than 5 years, 
and members are eligible for reappointment. A member of the board may not 
concurrently hold another office unless permitted to do so by their 
respective Minister. In addition, the Law states that it is not permissible 
for members of the board to be related to each other to the third remove, 
both in direct line of descent and within the same generation (including 
relatives by marriage), unless permitted by the responsible Minister.
The board regulates its own personnel and financial regulations as 
stipulated in the Law and its establishing decree. However, in regard to
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the personnel management, PN employees are governed by many legislations: 
Presidential Decree No.23 of 1967 separating employees into permanent and 
non-permanent, and fixing basic salary and allowances; Act No.l and No.2 of 
1951 on the enforcement of the basic provision respecting manpower; Act 
No.80 of 1957 on female workers; and Act No.l of 1970. Law No.9 of 1969 
states that there will be a separate law, regulating personnel management 
and labour-management relations in PERUMs, but so far such legislation has 
not yet existed.
Financially, the board must submit an annual budget for ministerial 
approval at least three months before the commencement of the financial 
year (corresponding to the calendar year). At the end of each financial 
year, a financial report which includes a Balance Sheet and a Profit/Loss 
Statement must be sent to the responsible Minister and the State Auditor 
(Badan Pengangs Kenangan - BPK). The net profit of PNs are distributed as 
follows:
(a) 55 percent to the Overall Development Fund (Dana Pembangunan 
Semesta - DPS);
(b) 45 percent to the general reserve of the enterprises for 
social and educational purposes, bonuses, pension funds, etc.
- as specified by the establishing Acts.
A PERSERO (Perusahaan Perseroan) is a state wholly-owned or partially 
owned company in the form of a limited liability company (Perseroan 
Terbalas - PT) under the Indonesian Commercial Law of 1947 (Article 36-56). 
As a profit-making enterprise, a PT Persero is managed in the same way as 
any private company with the Board of Commissioners (Dewan Komissaries) at 
the top and the Board of Directors (Dewan Direksi) at the lower level. The 
main function of the former is to supervise the daily activities of the
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directors. The consent of the Board of Commissioners is normally required 
for a loan agreement, on a payment exceeding a certain amount, or a 
transaction involving the immovable property of the company.
Government Regulation No.12 of 1969 sets forth the procedure for the 
establishment of PT Perseroan (state companies) or the participation of the 
government in joint ventures with private enterprises. According to this 
legislation, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for registering the PT 
Perseroan but the authority may be delegated to the responsible Minister 
as long as the draft articles of establishment have already been approved 
by the Minister of Finance. Since the issue of the notarial act it needs 
the presence of at least two parties, the Minister of Finance usually 
delegates authority to the sponsoring Minister to stand on side and a 
member of the Finance Ministry represents the other party. After the 
Articles of Association is approved by the Ministry of Justice, the PT 
Perseroan must be registered at the Secretariat Office of the State Court 
and becomes a legal person.
In the case of state wholly-owned PT Perseroan, all commissioners and 
directors are appointed by the Minister of Finance after consulting with 
the responsible Minister. If some shareholders are private individuals and 
enterprises, these commissioners and directors are elected at the general 
meeting, but the nominations are only made by the Minister of Finance as 
holder of the preferred shares.
The legislation does not specify the duties of the directors. 
Nevertheless, the Law obliges the directors to make a report to the 
District Court of Justice if the company suffers a loss of more than 50 
percent but less than 75 percent of the authorised capital. The directors 
are also obliged to submit an annual report of profit and loss to the
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general meeting of shareholders (it should be noted that the Law does not 
mention how often such meetings should be conducted).
On the basis of Presidential Instruction No.17 of 1967, there is 
basically no difference in the characteristics and status of employees of 
PT Perseroan from those of private enterprises. However, with the 
promulgation of Law No.9 of 1969, the management of PT Perseroan claimed 
that they were no longer subject to labour regulations and laws, particu­
larly Act No.22 of 1957 concerning the procedures to settle labour 
disputes, and Law No.12 of 1964 regarding severance of work relations, 
which applied to private enterprises. This was confirmed in a resolution 
of the Economic Stabilization.Board in 1974 that the private labour 
legislations are not applicable to all forms of public enterprises, 
including PT Perseroan.
Furthermore, all employees of public enterprises are obliged to join
the Workers Organization (Korps Pegawai Republic Indonesia - KORPRI).
Since this organisation is established by the government and their leaders
are functional managers, it hardly functions as a labour union. In
addition, employees of public enterprises have no right to form unions or
similar organisations, except field workers in state plantations in North
Sumatra. According to the Government Regulation No.6 of 1971, Perjans and
PT Perseros are exempt from company tax on liquidation of profits, sales
tax on deliveries of goods caused by transfer of stock, stamp fee or
capital stock and transfer tax on vehicles and fixed properties. They are,
however, required to pay some other corporation taxes which in practice
37many of them fail to do. They are also required to contribute 55 percent 
of their net profits to the Overall Development Fund.
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In regard to Pertamina, the single biggest enterprise in the country, 
Law No.8 of 1971 was especially enacted to govern this corporation, so that 
its legal status is unique and distinct from other public enterprises 
having the PERJAN, PERUM, PERSERO forms. Article 1 of the Law states that 
Pertamina is under the supervision of the Mining Minister who is also 
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners (Dewan Komisaris Pembrintah). The 
members of this board, consisting of three members, i.e. the Mining
Minister, the Finance Minister, and the Chairman of the National Planning
>
Board (BAPPENAS), are appointed by and responsible to the President. If 
necessary, the President can appoint two more Ministers as members. The 
board convenes at any time needed with a minimum of one a month. It has 
the right to ask for any information concerning the operation of the 
corporation. It also sets the general policies, supervises the activities, 
and suggests to the President measures for improving the corporation 
including changing the composition of the Board of Directors. Meanwhile, 
members of the Board of Directors are appointed by the President for five 
years but may be reappointed. The board consists of a President Director 
and 5 managing directors at the maximum.
The Board of Directors is obliged to submit an annual financial report 
consisting of a Balance Sheet and a Profit/Loss Statement to the Board of 
Commissioners within six months after the end of each financial year. The 
report should also be sent to the State Auditor, Minister of Mines and 
Minister of Finance. The report, after the ratification of the Board of 
Commission, must then be made public. An annual budget must also be 
submitted to the Board of Commissioners.
The last type of public enterprises to be discussed here is the 
regional enterprise (Perusahaan Daerah -  PD).
IAO
The legal basis and form of all regional enterprises is regulated by 
Law No.5 of 1962 which essentially resembles the defunct 1960 Law. A Board 
of Directors, appointed and dismissed by the Governor of the concerned 
region, is responsible for the operation in each enterprise. On the top, 
in some cases, there are Boards of Commissioners for Regional Enterprises - 
BAPPIPDA - which are similar to the former BPU in the 1960 Act, while the 
others are coordinated by a coordinating body such as the Office of 
Regional Enterprise Affairs - KUPERDA in the case of DKI. In fact, these 
enterprises are so diverse that they are hardly in uniformity. No serious 
attempt has been made to reform this group of enterprises, either in the 
uniformed legislation to replace the 1962 Act, nor in managerial systems 
in individual enterprises.
The Process
Since the People's Consultative Body (MPRS), the Supreme Organ in the
Constitution, is to determine only the national overall policy and to
appoint the President and Vice-President, the Legislative Council (DPRS) or
Parliament, is more concerned with the management of public enterprises.
Legally, Parliament is empowered to decide the main policies; the
establishment and the capital shifts of all enterprises must be done by
Laws or Government Regulations based on Law No. 9 of 1969, IBW 1927 and Law
No.19 of 1960. In addition, in the case of PERJANs and other public
enterprises which need government subsidies, Parliament is authorised to
scrutinise their appropriations which form a part in the Annual Budget.
However, in the last decade the legislature has been less active than before
38and becomes "a do-nothing body". It has been unable to exercise its
controlling power in a satisfactory manner, probably because of insecure
39feelings among the MPs that discourages them to take the initiative.
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The only effective control measure often utilised by the MPs is the
hearings in Parliamentary Commissions which are usually reported in
newspapers. So far, the questions prepared by members of the Commissions
40■are not impressive nor significant.
One of the top bodies in the nation which is empowered to control
public enterprises is the Supreme Audit Body (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan).
This agency conducts an independent external audit and reports the results
to both the Executive and Legislative Branches. Its work is supplemented
by. the service of the Directorate-General of Financial Audit in the
Ministry of Finance'. However, the post-audit system is still far from
41being an effective control measure against malpractices. As a result, 
very few annual financial reports of public enterprises are published and 
available for the public.
A common phenomena in the Third World societies is that decisions are 
made at the top and the officials at lower levels are reluctant to 
initiate. As a career military man, the President usually seeks advice 
from his top economic aids but, undoubtedly, his decisions are also 
influenced by the Army interests. Actually, the President himself directly 
controls the two largest public enterprises in the country, BULOG and 
Pertamina, both of them are politically sensitive enterprises.
Similar to other army-led governments in Asia, the Chief Executive 
here is well equipped with advisory committees comprising top technocrats, 
politicians and high ranking military officials. The most important of all 
are the Economic Stabilisation Board and the Political and Security 
Stabilisation Board. The former, chaired by the President himself, 
consists of ministers involved in economic affairs and the heads of some 
non-departmental agencies such as the central bank (Bank Indonesia), the
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National Economic Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) and the Central 
Statistical Office (BPS). The Board appoints three sub-committees 
specialising in monetary, production and distribution, which work hand-in- 
hand with the three mentioned agencies. The Board usually meets once a 
fortnight, discusses and formulates government policies to be executed by 
all ministerial departments and public enterprises.
It is worthwhile to mention here two of the informal advisory teams, 
the economic advisory team (Team Akli Ekonomi) and the controversial 
President assistant group (Lembaga Assisten Pribadi Presiden). During the 
student uprising in January 1974, these two influential groups were 
severely criticised and subsequently have never been reappointed.
Two of the President’s top economic aids are the Minister of Finance 
and the Minister for Economic, Financial and Industry Affairs. The latter 
is responsible for the coordination of all agencies dealing with economic 
activities. He is also the Chairman of the BAPPENAS whose main functions 
are to formulate economic development plans and to follow up their 
performance. Coincidentally, the Vice-Chairman of the BAPPENAS is 
concurrently Minister for Administrative Reforms who coordinates all 
efforts for the development of administration.
The Minister of Finance plays a very important role. Government 
Regulation No.12 of 1969 empowers him to give directions to all Boards of 
Commissioners of PT Perseroan as the sole shareholder representing the 
Indonesian government. In other words, the transformation of state 
companies from the PN status means the transfer of ownership from technical 
ministries to the Treasury. Therefore, the Minister of Finance is able to 
appoint his representatives to sit on the boards. He also technically 
delegates his authority to the responsible ministers to appoint their
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representatives on the boards under their supervision. The Office 
immediately concerned with the work of PT Perseroan is the Directorate- 
General of PERSERO and Financial Management of Public Enterprises in the 
Ministry of Finance. This Directorate-General also communicates with 
PERJANs and PERUMs in case of their application for financial subsidies but 
it has nothing to do with other types of public enterprises (such as 
military enterprises or state banks).
In the case of Pertamina and BULOG, the Minister of Mines, himself 
Chairman of the Board, and the Cabinet Secretary, respectively, handle 
immediate supervisory functions and report directly to the President. 
Meanwhile, all regional public enterprises are under the jurisdiction of the 
Minister of Home Affairs.
PERJANs, PERUMs and untransformed PNs are supervised by their 
respective technical ministries. At present, the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Communications, Public Works and Power, Trade and Industries, control the 
majority of them. The degree and nature of control differs from one type 
to another. In the case of PERJANs, their Directors are responsible to the 
Minister who directs general policy guidelines. In contrast, PERUMs are 
corporate bodies which are not part of any department. PERUMs’ boards of 
commissioners are responsible to the technical ministers specified in the 
Acts, who are supposed to give general policies to be implemented and are 
not directly concerned with day-to-day management. The Inspectorate- 
General in each ministry is authorised to exercise control on behalf of the 
Minister covering:^
(1) the general operation;
(2) planning and financial forecasting;
(3) any liability or obligation;
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(4) loan in excess to a certain amount; and
(5) purchasing or calling sale contracts over a certain amount.
In practice, the degree of control depends on how influential the chief 
executive of a given enterprise is and how important the enterprise is in 
terms of profit-making.
In personnel affairs, the Minister of Manpower, Transmigration,and 
Co-operatives is involved in the matters of the settlement of labour 
disputes, mass dismissals,.working conditions and wages. There has been 
confusion recently on the status of employees in PERUMs and PERSEROs 
because of vague interpretation of the Labour Law. As mentioned before, 
the resolution of the Economic Stabilisation Board in 1974, the Labour Laws 
no longer applicable to state enterprises and thus employees in PERUMs and 
PERSEROs have no right to strike or to form a union except the government- 
sponsored Public Employee Corps of Indonesia (KORPRI). However, in reality, 
employees in some PT Perseroan and PERUMs under the Ministries of 
Agriculture and Public Works and Power have already formed unions which are 
incorporated into the All Indonesian Labour Federation (FBSI). The 
Federation is at present headed by an influential army general who also 
heads a large military trading PT.
The Enrrepreneur
It is a proper management system that creates efficiency and 
effectiveness and reduces malpractices. If the system is well accepted and 
strictly followed, the human factor will become less significant and the 
success of the organisation will be less dependent on the leadership.
Attempts have recently been made in Indonesia in recent years to develop an 
effective public administration system but still with unsatisfactory results.
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In effect, personalities still dominate the rules of the game. From 
past experiences, the failures of public enterprises usually came from the 
top of the enterprise pyramid, if not the national leadership. In the 
past, it was believed that the severe shortage of qualified personnel at 
the lower level was the major personnel problem. This problem is no longer 
more serious than that in other ASEAN countries. Instead, the most 
important personnel problem at present, is concerned with the leadership of 
public enterprises which mostly comes from the ABRI and the ruling elite 
group. Indeed, any public enterprise, a public body with business-like 
activities, requires professional executives with entrepreneurial skills 
and business background, not amateurish bureaucrats nor militarymen on 
secondment.
The dual function of the ABRI or dwi funsi is remarkable in the scope 
and number of militarymen involved in civilian jobs. The ABRI is repre­
sented on major Boards of Commissioners of any type of public enterprises, 
particularly those considered "strategic" or "vital". Militarymen are also 
appointed President Directors, directors and other top positions in public 
enterprises of all areas from tourism to finance and heavy industries. The 
exact number of public enterprises under the directorship and commissioner- 
ship of militarymen is never made known, but an estimation of this writer 
is about one-third of all PERJAN, PERUM and PERSEROs. This number is 
dramatically increased if public enterprises with militarymen in lower 
echelons are included.
The ABRI claims to be an "army of the people" and its victories over
rebels and the Communists demonstrates its ibility to be the guardian of
43the nation’s integrity. Indoctrinated by economists-technocrats earlier 
mentioned, the New Order leaders often point to the ineffectiveness of the
FIGURE 5.2 BACKGROUND OF CHAIRMEN OF SELECTED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
PERUM Perhutani Sukiman Atmodudarjo Civil Servant
PERUM Percentakan Brig.Jen. Sudono Mantofani Militaryman
PERUM Listrik Negara Ir. Suryano Academic
Bank Indonesia Rachmat Saleh Civil Servant
P.N. Pertamina Lt.Jen. Piet Harjono Militaryman
P.T. Garuda Indonesian Airways Wiweko Soepono Militaryman
P.T. Semen Gresik Sotion Aranggi Civil Servant
P.T. Aneka Tambang Ir. Abdoel Raoef Soehard Civil Servant
P.T. Inhutani A. Handarin Wargahadibrata Civil Servant
P.T. Pupuk Sriwidjaja Dr. Julianto Moeliodihardjo Civil Servant
PERUM Asuransi Kerugian 
JASA RAHARJA Maj.Jen.(Pol.) Moe Soeprapto Policeman
PERUM ASBRI Brig.Jen. JNI Soeparnan Militaryman
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past civilian rule that failed to maintain political stability and initiate
modernisation. The ABRI claims that it can guarantee both, because it is
far more modern than any organisation in the country and because of its
discipline, unity, sense of purpose and technology. Further, the ABRI is
one among other social forces which "participate in the common endeavour to
defend and develop the Republic". In the words of the top leadership,
"Without the dual function, the ABRI will lose its character as a force of
44struggle: The ABRI will lose its character as fighter for idealism". To
them, the dwi funsi is not militarism but a necessity in the national
development strugglp. Its position has been constitutionally clarified by
both Sukarno and the New Order, the latter through the 1966 MPRS IVth
general session. The ABRI is not "the tool of Civil Power" commonly
practiced in the West but it also accepts that "the Constitution is the
45principle and policy of the army". Therefore, a more formal legislative
4 6backing is now being sought.
A typical board of commissioners comprises two to four members. In 
the case of a three-member board of PT Perseroan, one represents the 
Treasurer and the others are from the technical ministries and the ABRI.
In a "stratetic" PERUMs, representatives from the ABRI sit on the board of 
managing directors, if not to become the President Directors themselves. 
These ABRI men are usually in senior ranks and their voices reflect the 
ABRI’s policy in the management of the enterprises, which undoubtedly 
receive priority.
Higher public servants in Indonesia seem to be less active in the
making of public enterprise policies than their counterparts in other ASEAN
countries. The top public servants, classified in Division IV numbered
47only 5,299 or about 0.8 percent of the total service in 1973. A large
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number of them work in two larger ministries, Education and Culture and 
Religious Affairs which own very few enterprises. So it is likely that 
other high ranking officials, particularly those in the Finance Ministry, 
acquire one or more directorships. However, few are fortunate enough to be 
appointed; and many among these few officials have connections in one way 
or the other with the junta. Legally, the composition of boards of 
commissioners are not required to be filled only with public servants, 
since their composition is open for the consideration of the Treasurer and 
the technical Minister. In the past ten years, more outsiders have been 
appointed but again.their relationship with the ruling elite, not 
qualifications, is the main criterion. Not surprisingly, a good number of 
them are friends or relatives of the technocrats in power.
The implication of the political nature of appointments is obvious. A 
member of any board of commissioners is entitled to receive generous 
allowances and bonuses as regulated in the Acts and Regulations. But more 
significant are other beneficiaries both "visible" and "invisible" which 
are meaningful for the low paid officials. Furthermore, the representation 
also means the concentration of power as public ‘enterprises are among the 
largest establishments in the country, many with over 20,000 employees.
As expected, these employees form the backbone of the government party in 
Parliament, the Golkar. This can be described as "the control by 
patronage"; a reward system and centralisation of power.
In effect, decision-making at the top of public enterprises tend to be 
bureaucratic-like, irrational and politically oriented. The board members 
usually exercise controlling power rather than taking initiative and 
consider more details than broader innovative policies. In many cases, 
their presence becomes annoying and ineffective because they possess no
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knowledge in the trade of the enterprises. In some other cases, members of 
the boards obviously protect their political patron's interest and ignore 
public benefits. In brief, it is doubtful whether, under the present 
situation, the boards of commissioners contribute any useful guidance to 
their enterprise.
It is estimated that at least 5,000 militarymen fill positions at
lower levels of the enterprise pyramid, particularly in the profitable
"strategic and vital" ones. The military takeover at first seemed to be a
temporary arrangement but now it has become uncertain. President Suharto
repeatedly promised that, in the long run, less militarymen would hold
civilian posts but at the same time he asked the "younger generation of the
48ABRI" to prepare to be able to perform the dwi funsi.
Equally significant is the prevalence of political favouritism in the 
selection and promotion to the extent that a candidate without personal 
relations with influential militarymen and technocrats in the regime can 
hardly be given the job. The result is obvious: public enterprises become
overstaffed and full of deadwood.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Public enterprises in Indonesia have long been vicitimsed by political 
influence from the outset because of their strategic position in the 
bargaining process for power and wealth among politicians. Public policy­
making in regard to public enterprises is always predominantly politically- 
oriented which in effect directly benefits the elite group itself.
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The main features of Indonesian public enterprises, the dwi funsi of 
the militarymen who dominate the management and the strict control by top 
bureaucrats, implies the concentration of power of the junta and the 
"control by patronage" concept. The two are delicately interwoven for 
attaining the junta's political stability. Probably, this is the prime 
reason for the establishment of public enterprises which will now overtly 
be accepted.
Lack of public accountability worsened the situation. Malpractices 
are the results of ineffective control, particularly over influential 
military politicans who tend to consider themselves, not the public, the 
owner of the enterprises. Any improvement in the policy implementation 
process of public enterprises, therefore, depend on the wishes and 
sincerity of the national leadership. But the question is, how can they 
sacrifice their benefits which enable them to be maintained in power?
To any observer's surprise, public enterprises in Indonesia, even with 
serious political constraints, perform very well, if not better in 
comparison with other types of governmental agencies. Until recently, many 
public enterprises became a significant source of funds for the ministries 
they belong to. Meanwhile, they contribute almost a half of corporate 
taxes, despite the fact that not all have been able to do so. Since the 
profits of the private sector as a whole must be much larger than the 
profits of public enterprises, this reflects inefficiency in the tax 
collection system and the degree of influence private enterprises possess 
as well.
Not surprisingly, almost all major private companies in the country, 
apart from multi-national corporations, are either owned or backed by 
influential members of the governing elite in collaboration with local
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Chinese businessmen. The withdrawal of public enterprises from a role in 
the national economy, as stated in the New Economic Policy, can only mean 
the transfer of wealth to this privileged small group at the public's 
expense. Therefore, the presence of public enterprises, though still with 
unsatisfactory performance and occasional malpractices, at least guarantees 
the public ownership and public benefits.
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CHAPTER 6
COUNTRY STUDY: MALAYSIA
The racial socio-economic imbalance has become a popular theme among 
Malaysian politicians and economists in recent years. Almost all people in 
this multi-racial nation seem to believe that it is the real cause of 
conflict which turned into bloody riots in 1969. To rectify this racial 
socio-economic imbalance, public enterprise development has been adopted as 
an important governmental machinery for:
(1) providing bumiputras (literally sons of the soil but strictly 
applied to Malays and indigenous people only) more opportunity 
to have greater share in commerce and industry, and
(2) eradicating poverty regardless of race.
Within the past decade, over 300 public enterprises and their subsidiaries 
were set up to engage in a very wide range of activities covering almost 
all types of businesses.
Malaysian public enterprises are not only economically important; they 
are also politically sensitive in terms of communal politics and policy 
implementation. In view of rising Malay expectations and the commitment 
under the New Economic Plan to have a 30 percent Malay control of the 
economy by 1990, the government is forced to direct public enterprises to 
expand their activities so that the larger Malay share is ensured as 
planned and radical Malay politicians are satisfied. Meanwhile, the 
success of the New Economic Plan depends much on private sector investment 
in which Chinese entrepreneurs play a substantial role. Any nationalistic 
move seriously affects investment climate. Equally significant is the 
non-Malay voters which count no less than 40 percent and their swing to the 
opposition will definitely threaten the government’s stability.
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This chapter surveys the implementation of the NEP through public 
enterprises in which politicians and top civil servants have taken a 
great part. It also studies how public enterprises become a system of 
patronage and political reward which helps to stabilise the top leaders in 
the governing party, and at the same time, become a political strategy to 
receive the mass support that keeps the ruling elite in power.
THE BACKGROUND
The racial riots of 13th May 1969 signified dramatic changes in 
Malaysia in vain efforts to ease racial tensions and to build a much needed 
national unity. Politically, the Constitution was suspended and a State of 
Emergency declared. Tun Abdul Razek, then Deputy Prime Minister, took over 
the country and ruled by decree as Director of Operations. In September 
1970, the country returned to the Parliamentary system and Tun Razek 
succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman who was Prime Minister since the independence 
in 1957.'*' The Rukunegara, the national ideology, was declared to guide the 
efforts to build up a unified, secure, socially just and resilient nation. 
The ruling party, Alliance, which comprised of three communal.groups, UMNO 
(Malays), MCA (Chinese) and MIC (Indian), was also replaced by the more 
ambitious National Front (Barisan Nasional) including former opposition 
parties, apparently for reducing political conflicts in this multi-racial 
nation.
Economically, the New Economic Plan (NEP) ended the free enterprise 
system inherited since the colonial days and marked the beginning of the 
mixed economy. The NEP as indicated in the Second Malaysian Plan (SMP) 
1971-75, for the first time set in motion the government’s intention to 
participate more directly in the industrial and commercial sector 
previously dominated by foreigners and non-Malay Malaysians (mainly Chinese
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and Indian). The justification was that racial socio-economic imbalance 
was seen to' lead to racial conflict and that past development strategy 
which emphasised fast economic growth and the eradication of poverty was not 
adequate for improving social justice. The target of the NEP was set so 
that by 1990 the Malays and other indigenous people would ’manage' and 
’own’ at least 30 percent of the total industrial and commercial activities 
'in all categories and scales of operation' as against about 2 percent in 
1970. Meanwhile, other Malaysians would also gradually increase their 
share from 34.3 percent to 40 percent at the same period. To attain the 
target, the government resorted to utilise public enterprises, in addition 
to other measures, as an important instrument for change. In effect, the 
number of public enterprises has been rapidly increased from less than 10 
in the year of independence to more than 300 (Appendix I). In this period 
1969-72 alone, as many as 67 public enterprises were created, the majority 
of which concerned the NEP.
The problem of racial imbalance was not a new phenomenon. Under
British rule, the then Malayan national economy was characterised by racial
specialisation in economic activities and by regional imbalance. The rural
Malay primarily engaged in the traditional agricultural sector while the
Chinese and Indians predominantly controlled urban modem sectors of
commerce and industry as well as mining and rubber plantations. The
colonial administration, for obvious reasons, fostered the growth of the
latter and thus rapidly widened the already existing socio-economic gap 
2among the races.
All public enterprises set up during the colonial period except the 
Rural Industrial Development Administration (1953) and the Federal Land 
Development Authority (1956) were for providing infrastructure facilities 
and public utilities. These services, to some extent, benefitted British
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mercantile interests in the exploitation of Malaya's rich natural resources, 
partioularly tin and timber. They were also essentially aimed at 
countering communist insurgency which often attracted remote poor villagers. 
Thus, a fine network of infrastructure penetrated remote villages around 
the country.' Both RIDA and FELDA were in fact a part of this comprehensive 
plan of psychological warfare - to win the heart of the people by providing 
them land, trade and utilities and to separate them from the guerillas.
The independent Alliance government ".... suffered from the hangover
4
of traditional western ideologies". The emphasis in the first three- 
five-year plans was'strictly followed by the colonial pattern. About 50 
percent of the total development expenditure was allocated in the First 
Malayan Plan and the Second Malayan Plan (1956-1970) for transport, 
communications and public utilities and about 25 percent for agriculture 
and rural development (with the lower level in the Second Plan, of only 15 
percent). Meanwhile, the expenditure in the commercial and industrial 
sector was only 1.3 percent (1956-1960), 2.2 percent (1961-1965) and 3.3 
percent (1966-1970). The low public investment in the latter sector was 
justified by the belief that private enterprises, predominated by foreigners 
and non-Malays, could take care of themselves and needed no direct 
governmental assistance. This also implied the government's inadequate 
effort to bring about more Malay participation in the modern sector as it 
was not possible for the Malays to go into business unless there was direct 
public investment.^
The reluctance of the Tunku government was probably because of its 
desire not to undermine business confidence in the private sector which was 
linked with British interests. It seemed to believe that more foreign 
investment, particularly from the former mother country, would result in 
fast economic growth. Moreover, any aggressive economic policy would harm
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the good relationship with Britain and would, in turn, affect the national 
security in which British military assistance played an important role, 
especially in times of the first emergency (1948-60) and of Indonesia’s 
konfrontasi (1963-66). The British were also one of the largest trading 
partners whose imports included Malayan chief revenue earners, tin and 
rubber. Domestically, the Tunku realised the importance of the Chinese and 
Indian voters which formed a little less than 50 percent. If the Alliance 
government initiated policies directly against their business interests, 
not only the political stability of the ruling party but also national 
unity would be harmed.
In fact, the strategy of development during the Tunku rule was
g
considered favourably by many observers. The rate of growth was 
impressive at an average annual growth rate of 6-8 percent, which placed 
Malaysia on the top division of the Asian economic league. However, there 
was strong criticism from influential UMNO politicians and from Malay and 
foreign scholars who were dissatisfied with the growing racial socio­
economic imbalance and the slow progress in the eradication of poverty.
This was supported by a study of the change in the distribution of income 
between 1957 and 1970 which showed that the pattern of inequality had 
gradually increased.^ One study recommended the extensive use of public 
enterprises for the expansion of Malay ownership in the modern sector which
g
would eventually create a Malay middle class and Malay entrepreneurship.
The strong pressure from within UMNO resulted in the establishment in 
the latter part of the 1960s(of a number of public enterprises whose main 
task was to directly inject Malay participation in business activities.
The first among them was the Council of-Trust for Indigenous People (MARA) 
which replaced RIDA in 1965. MARA's objectives are so ambitious that its 
scope of activities varies from direct participation in various business
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and manufacturing activities, provision of loans and other assistance to 
bumiputras in setting up or in expanding business firms, and providing 
educational and training programmes from the junior college to the degree- 
granted levels, to any other activity it deems viable. Next came Bank 
Bumiputra, the first state commercial bank (1965) and presently the largest 
bank in the country, with the function of extending credit facilities to the 
Malays by accepting land from Malay Reservations as collateral (the land was 
legally non-transferable to non-Malays). Perhaps, the most significant 
development toward the final years of the Tunku government was the 
establishment of the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCS) whose 
scope of activities has been limitless. The State of Selangor became the 
pioneer by setting up the first SEDC in 1964 with initial function to 
develop an industrial-cum-urban satellite town of Petalling Jaya in the 
fringe of the Federal capital city of Kuala Lumpur. Its activities were 
rapidly expanded to become the commercial arm of the State government, 
involved in all types of businesses: natural resource exploitation,
industries, commerce, construction, real estate, land development, to name 
a few. At present, the Selangor SEDC wholly or partially owns no fewer than 
28 subsidiaries in various areas. Other states followed the pattern and by 
1972 all thirteen states had set up their own SEDCs. This group of public 
enterprises has emerged as one of the largest Malay owned business in the 
country: their subsidised and associated companies number over 200.
The late attempt proved to be too late. The Malays accused the Chinese 
of being unwilling to provide them a greater share in business, while the 
Chinese attacked the Malays over favouritism and quotas imposed in jobs, 
universities and the armed forces. Public enterprises whose task was to 
bridge the gap also yielded fruitless results. The tension worsened soon 
after the result of the May 1969 election turned out less Alliance and more 
Chinese opposition MPs. Then came the bloody violence.
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At least one writer suspected that the incident was a well planned
9political manoeuvre to topple Tunku Abdul Rahman by UMNO ultra-rightists. 
However, the government and the Malay public blamed social injustice 
arising from socio-economic imbalance and this topic has- since become a 
fact of popular political jargon.
In a socio-economic survey of 1967-1968, 61.6 percent of the rural
inhabitants were Malays, 25.4 percent Chinese and 11.8 percent Indians.
The Chinese, in contrast, dominated urban areas forming 57.2 percent of the
urban population. The Malays formed 27.6 percent and the Indians 13.4
percent. Incidentally, as in other Third World societies, rural economy in
Malaysia is associated with traditional small scale agriculture and poverty
in contrast with the more advanced urban sector which is highly productive
and capable of much faster development. Therefore, the exclusion of Malays
from the commerce and industry was almost absolute. This is illustrated by
figures on the ownership and control of share capital in companies in
Peninsular Malaysia. Of the total share capital amounting to M$4,617
million in 1969, 62.1 percent belonged to foreign interests while 32.8 were
owned by Chinese, 1.5 percent by Malays and 0.9 percent by Indians.^ If
the figures excluded the foreign ownership, 90.5 percent of the total
portions owned by Chinese, 6 percent by Malays and 3.5 percent by Indians.
In regard to the employment pattern, the share of Malay employment in
12manufacturing was only 28.9 percent and in commerce 23.5 percent. These 
figures illustrated the unchanged economic characteristics despite the fast 
rate of economic growth made during the first thirteen years of independence. 
These also confirmed the belief of Malay politicians that development 
strategy employed by the Tunku government failed to improve economic 
conditions of lower income groups mainly the Malays and indigenous people.
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The NEP announced in July 1969, was a blueprint for restructuring the
Malaysian society and eliminating racial identification with economic
functions. It was also claimed that the prime objective- of the NEP was to
achieve national unity in a plural society without resorting to extreme 
13measures. In regard to the implementation, the NEP specified the 
employment of public enterprises as an important investment for:
(1) improving the balance distribution of wealth, and
(2) improving the balanced distribution of employment.
Public enterprises set up during this period, therefore, were mainly for 
industrial and commercial purposes. S°me others were for acquiring 
corporate capital in existing private enterprises. Investments made by 
these public enterprises are to be held in trust with the ultimate objective 
of distributing the equity share capital to bumiputras. They also hoped to 
employ more bumiputras and train them to become skillful entrepreneurs. Tun 
Razak repeatedly indicated that the success of the NEP depended on these 
public enterprises.^
Among the most important public enterprises set up after the 1969 
incident were the National Corporation (PERNAS), the Urban Development 
Authority (UDA) and a number of regional development corporations. They 
have rapidly grown up to be large empires with a great number of subsidised 
companies. Together with MARA and SEDCs, these enterprises have branched 
out into almost all areas of business activity.
PERNAS was created in November 1969 by a suggestion of Tun Razaks.^
The Tun proposed the formation of a state corporation with the specific
purpose of ensuring that a large part of the national economy goes to 
the bumiputras. Within eight years of its operation, paid up capital 
grew from M$ll million in 1969 to M$116.2 million and together with its
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eight main wholly-owned subsidiaries, the total paid up capital reached 
M$300 million with an authorised capital of nearly M$3.1 billiön. Each 
of PERNAS itself has become a conglomerate of companies, for instance, the 
■PERNAS Securities Berhad owns three wholly-owned and 18 partially owned 
companies. The range of PERNAS’s activities is wide: including steel and
iron, shipping, property, finance, public relations, confectionery, : 
chemical electronics, cement, trading, warehousing, rubber, avaiation, tin, 
communications, etc. PERNAS is also in partnership with some well known 
multi-national corporations such as Sime Darby, GoodYear, Jardine,
Marubeni, Nippon Electric, to name a few. More significantly, PERNAS is 
largely managed by bumiputras. The first Chairman and Chief Executive was 
Tengku Tan Sri Razaleigh Hamzah, the present Finance Minister, who has been 
often mentioned as a promising candidate for premiership. In fact, during 
the rule of Tun Razak, the Chairman of PERNAS was regarded as a member of 
the Cabinet.^
Next came UDA which was set up in 1971. It is not only responsible 
for undertaking urban renewal, as its Singaporean counterpart, but also is 
responsible for carrying out other development programmes. The latter 
function is so ambitious that UDA has become an important public enterprise 
directly assisting Malays to operate businesses in urban commercial areas. 
From 1973, UDA has expanded its activities to all States by entering 
joint-ventures with the State SEDCs setting up Syarikat Peruda to engage in 
housing projects, commercial centres and other property activities. UDA 
provides financial assistance through its own merchant bank and financial 
companies and in many cases acquires some shares in bumiputra companies. 
Presently, UDA holds a majority interest in ten businesses and a minority 
interest in 34 companies, including hotel operations, brick manufacturing, 
department store, amusement centre, night club restaurant, real estate
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management, movie production and real estate management and consultant 
18services.
Before the sudden death of Tun Razak in 1976, the government also gave 
attention to regional development programmes and many regional development 
authorities (RDA) were set up. The Muda Agriculture Development Authority 
(MADA) and the Kemubu Agricultural Development Authority (KADA) are for 
developing already settled agricultural areas but which are economically 
backward. The two are responsible for building up an irrigation network 
for the double cropping of paddy. The others, Development Authority of 
Jahone Tenggara (LKJT), Development Authority of Pahang Tenggara (DARA), 
Central Trengganu Development Authority (LKTT) and Jenka Development 
Corporation (JDC) were initially responsible for transforming underdeveloped 
areas into productive ones, which was obviously duplicating the functions of 
FELDA and FELCRA. Therefore, these RDAs are presently concentrated in the 
coordination of the implementation of the regional development master plans, 
including construction of infrastructure logging, urban settlement and 
industralisation. In practice, they form a number of subsidiaries and 
participate in joint-ventures with other public enterprises or local 
bumiputras or foreigners. LKJT, for example, owned no fewer than 13 
companies engaging in cattle development, orchid plantation, logging, hotel 
operations, golf clubs, industries, etc.
The more recent set up was the Bumiputra Investment Foundation (1978) 
with main responsibility for acquiring shares reserved for the bumiputras. 
Established with government subscribed M$200 million, BIF operates its 
business through its subsidiary, Pemodalan Nasional Bhd., which buys shares 
in any profitable companies and eventually seels them to the bumiputra
community.
166
In addition to the development effort made by public enterprises, the
Razak government also utilised other measures to secure the NEP objectives
with the enactment of controversial legislation in 1975.- The Industrial
Coordination Act and the Petroleum Act was an important step in the
Malaysianisation, if not "the indirect nationalisation" so called by non-
19Malay businessmen. The former Act requires all except a few manufacturing 
companies to apply for a licence from the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(presently under Deputy Prime Minister Dr Mahatir Mohamed, often regarded as 
ultra-rightist and anti-Chinese) which can impose any condition on the 
licence as it deems fit. Therefore, it may become an instrument not only 
for compulsory acquiring equity in companies but also for stepping up 
bumiputra employment in such companies. The latter legislation requires all 
"downstream" oil companies to sell "management shares" to PETRONAS, the 
state oil company, so that PETRONAS is able to control them. This prompted 
protests from multi-national oil companies. Another attempt has been the 
establishment of Malay cooperatives, like the UMNO sponsored Kooperasi 
Usaha Bersatu Malaysia Berhad (Koop Bersatu), which will play a crucial role 
in purchasing shares in the stock market. The last but no less important 
effort was the establishment of the Ministry of Coordination of Public 
Corporations, the first of its kind in the ASEAN region. The Ministry, 
set up at the end of 1974, has been responsible for coordinating 
activities of some important public enterprises whose main task is for 
increasing bumiputra share in commerce and industry, including MARA, PERNAS, 
UDA, Bank Pembangunan (Development Bank), Bank Simpanan Nasional (Savings 
Bank), Rice and Padi Authority (LPN), Malaysian Investment Development 
Finance Corp. (MIDF), and 13 SEDCs. When Datuk Hussein Onn succeeded the 
premiership from Tun Razak, he also took over this ministry for about one 
year before releasing it to an influential UMNO politician, Tun Mohammed 
Yacoob, presently Mentri Besar (Chief Minister of State) of Trengganu.
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The establishment undoubtedly indicated the government's willingness to 
improve the performance of public enterprises, particularly those concerning 
the NEP.
The Third Malaysian Plan (TMP), 1976-30, the second phase of the NPE, 
was launched in July 1976 after almost a years delay, apparently reflect­
ing the growing dissatisfaction of the non-Malay community and a serious
20slackening in foreign investment. The TM? still followed the direction
stressed by its predecessor but there have been some modifications in the
priorities of the projects. Top priority is now given to the eradication
of poverty "regardldss of races" including the poor Chinese and Indian in
both urban and rural areas. In regard to the strategy to improve the
economic imbalance among the races, the Plan assures that it will be
carried out in "the context of rapid economic growth with no particular
21group experiencing any loss or feeling any sense of deprivation". The 
TMP calls for more private investment which is expected to account for 60 
percent of the total expenditure in contrast with the previous plan in 
which public investment played a more dynamic role. Nevertheless, the 
government still continues its direct involvement in business activities 
and will establish more public enterprises in these following areas:
"(1) in activities which have considerable potential for 
expanding the participation of the Malays and other 
indigenous people in commerce and industry;
(2) in the promotion of "the diversification of economic 
activity especially in new growth centres and in the 
less developed states;
(3) in the development of 'potentials for processing local 
raw materials'; and
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(4) in establishing 'industries which are of national 
interest'
The Plan expresses its hope for more "financial viability and social and
management accountability" from the operations of public enterprises and
that these enterprises will make a positive contribution toward "the growth
23of employment and incomes" in the country.
Out of M$18,554.9 million public development expenditure during the 
TMP, 44.9 percent is devoted to projects carried out by public enterprises. 
Public enterprises in agriculture and land development receive the largest 
share amounting to M$2,562.7 million, almost 80 percent of which is allocated 
for land refarming. FELDA alone receives M$985 million for land development 
projects and an additional allocation of M$84.1 million for local water- 
supply p'rojects, an amount that makes the Authority the largest single 
recipient of the budget. Meanwhile, public investment in commerce and 
industry has been increased from M$173.6 million in the FMP and M$l,056.9 
million in the SMP to M$l,716.4 million in the TMP, almost all of which 
goes to public enterprises. The thirteen SEDCs are allocated the largest 
amount of M$423.8 million, a 219 percent increase from the previous Plan 
MARA comes next with M$315.0 million (excluding an addition of M$109.3 
million for its educational activities). UDA, PERNAS, the newly formed BIF 
and Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Corporation (MARDEC) 
are allocated M$217.0 million, 200.0 million, 200.0 million and 132.8 
million respectively. In return, the Plan expects to receive about M$900 
million contribution from public enterprises, mainly from the profitable 
National Electricity Board and the Telecommunication Department.
It should be noted that public enterprises have also been largest 
recipients of government loans. At the end of March 1976, total public 
enterprise loans outstanding which were due to the Federal Government
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amounted to M$2,681.5 million compared to only M$653.9 million at the end 
of 1970. Public enterprises, in addition, borrow with Federal Government 
guarantee from international and domestic sources.
So far the returns on Federal Government investments on public
enterprises have not been substantial. Up to 1976, only seven declared
dividends including the NEB, Bank Negara (Central Bank), Malayawata Steel
Limited, Malayan Borneo Building Society Limited, the Malaysian Industrial
Development Finance Limited, Malayan Banking Limited, Commonwealth
Development Finance Company Limited (the latter three are semi-state 
24companies). In fact, a recent survey on the performance of selected
public enterprises showed that most of them were suffering losses, a
situation which had been prevalent for several years. The crude rate of
return after depreciation of an integrated steel mill was at 4.0 percent in
1976. Some others were even worse: the rate of return of a steel foundry,
an activated carbon plant, a plant for assembling agricultural machinery and
an integrated timber processing plant stood at 22.0 percent, 19.4 percent,
2526.5 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively. The Malaysian Airways System 
only recovered from losses to make a slim profit of M$0.6 million in 1976
7 Aand of M$l.l million in 1977. In 1973, only 24 out of 240 projects owned
27and operated by MARA suffered losses. It should also be noted that many
Malaysian public enterprises enjoyed the partial or complete monopolisation
of some activities that in many cases enabled them to make profits, but the
27surplus has been reinvested in their activities."
However, the majority of Malaysian public enterprises have social
28goals as well as commercial goals. PERNAS, for example, though motivated 
by profits insofar as it participates only in economic, viable projects, 
should be judged on its contribution to the NEP's main objectives - 
restructuring the society, eradicating poverty and increasing Malay shares
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in business. The use of financial measurement alone is not entirely 
appropriate for the assessment.
By the end of the SMP, the Malay interests in the share capital in 
limited companies in Peninsular Malaysia went up from about 2 percent in 
1969 to 7.8 percent, representing an average growth rate of 43.6 percent 
per year. In reality, only 2.3 percent was actually held by Malay 
individuals and investment funds and the rest being held by public 
enterprises i.e. PERNAS, MARA, SEDCs, Bank Bumiputra, UDA and Bank 
Pembangunan, which are to eventually sell these shares to individual 
bumiputras. If the‘target of 30 percent Malay ownership set by the NEP is 
to be attained by 1990, there should be an increase in Malay interests from 
M$125.6 million in 1976 to M$24,009.7 million in 1990 or an average annual 
growth rate of 25.8 percent. Therefore, one can expect the increasing role 
of public enterprises in the country since the private Malay entrepreneurs 
are still too weak.
Public enterprises have also become important instruments to improve
the balanced distribution of employment (other than the government’s
measure on quotas and restrictions in the civil service). PERNAS, for
instance, has a 50 percent ownership of the Kuala Lumpur Hilton Hotel where
19it required a 60 percent Malay employment at all levels. The contribution
of other enterprises has also been significant. UDA, MARA, SEDCs and PJ3As 
have encouraged bumiputras to enter unconventional business activities 
previously dominated by non-Malays. For example, bumiputras now enjoyed a 
large share in buoyant construction and property fields. MARA, in addition, 
runs an institute of technology, junior colleges, vocational colleges and 
managerial training programmes exclusively for bumiputras that enable them 
to acquire the necessary degree of entrepreneurship and managerial skills.
As a result, the Malay employment share increased enormously during the SMP
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from 28.9 percent in manufacturing to 31.1 percent and from 23.5 percent in 
commerce to 31.6 percent.
Public enterprises in the agricultural sector which are mainly for 
eradicating poverty and which enjoy the largest share of public
30investment seem to attract less attention from politicians and scholars.
FELDA's allocation alone is as much as the amount altogether budgeted to
PERNAS, MARA, UDA and SEDCs. After 21 years of its operation, FELDA
received direct government subsidies of M$334 million and M$995 million in
loans to transform 0.8 million acres of jungles into productive land
equipped with necessary utilities and infrastructure facilities for about 
3040,000 families. In 1976, the average net monthly family income after 
deduction of loan repayments was M$330.63 in rubber schemes and M$360.89 
for oil palm schemes, an impressive figure by average Malaysian standards. 
The IMP projects that during the plan one million acres will be opened up 
for agricultural development by the effort of FELDA and State land 
development enterprises.
On the negative side, Malaysian public enterprises have long been
criticised for then overlapping and duplication of functions, lack of
coordination, empire-building and over-expansion, poor management, nepotism
and economic inefficiency. The rapid proliferation of public enterprises
has led to the overlapping and duplication of functions in many areas. For
example, in the field of rural development in the State of Pahang there are
no less than six corporations competing against each other including the
Pahang SEDC, the State Agricultural Development Corporation (SADC), the
Jengka Development Corporation (JDC), the Pahang Tenggara Development
Corporation (DARA), the Pahang Investment and Industrial Co. Ltd and the
31Frasers Hill Development Corporation. This list does not include some
public enterprises that in one way or the other are involved in the business.
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Other managerial problems, which will be discussed later, are also 
serious.
All in all, the impact of public enterprises to the success of the NEP
is significant but how the NEP benefits politically and socially to the
country is another matter not to be discussed in this section. As far as
public enterprises are concerned, the good intention of the government has
turned out to benefit a small group of wealthy Malays, particularly the
Royal families, political leaders and higher civil servants, who enjoy
privileges and nepotism. In the words of the opposition leader, Lim Kit
Siang, "Almost without exception the new Malay rich have acquired their
wealth from opportunities afforded by their domination of politics and the 
32bureaucracy". From time to time, public enterprises, particularly those 
concerned with monpolistic practices or those with licensing, are criticised 
of their bias and favouritism. To quote former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the non-Malays now tend to consider themselves "second class 
citizens" because of the performance of over-zealous bureaucrats that often 
favour the Malays.  ^ Therefore, problems of racial conflicts and of
national unity are still far from being solved, if not becoming more 
serious.
THE SYSTEM AND PROCESS
The Definition
Malaysia until recently strictly followed the British pattern of 
public enterprise. Soon after the Second World War, statutory corporations 
were created to replace departments whose main tasks were for providing 
public utilities. During the rule of the Tunku, apart from the 
establishment of more statutory boards to deal with development programmes,
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the government for the first time entered joint ventures with private 
entrepreneurs for setting up new industries. Then came the riots of 1969 
that brought about the NEP and the proliferation of public enterprises in 
the form of either the traditional statutory corporation or the more 
fashionable state and semi-state company. Also the trend has moved towards 
the establishment of two or three-tiered organisations patterned after the 
holding company concept of the World famed IRI and ENI. Subsidised 
companies are either wholly-owned or partially-owned, the latter with 
capital participation from multi-national corporations, bumiputras or other 
Malaysians.
Legally, there are only two forms of public enterprises in Malaysia, 
public (or statutory) corporation and state company, because all 
"departmental" enterprises, such as the Telecommunications Department and 
the Postals Department, must follow all governmental regulations on 
personnel and financial matters without any exception. The recent 
introduction of a new form of public enterprise with a managerial contract 
such as in the case of the Far Eastern Hotels Development Bhd. which run 
the Kuala Lumpur Hilton, has still been on an experimental basis. However 
the company can be classified as a state company because the state owns 
more than 50 percent of its shares.
It appears that the forms of public enterprises here have been selected 
indiscriminantly. There has been no specific criteria for the transform­
ation of ministerial departments into public corporations. The financial 
yardstick that the public corporation form for non-profit and regulatory 
functions and that the company form for profit making, is hardly applicable 
for all cases. MARA, a public corporation, has repeatedly stated its 
intention to carry out only economically viable projects while many state 
companies are supposed to engage in social-oriented activities, many of
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which need to be - subsidised.
The multi-functional characteristics of public enterprises creates 
difficulties, not only in the selection of the form but also in the legal 
and managerial aspects. In fact, most public corporations have set up 
subsidiaries in the form of a company and these subsidised companies, among 
themselves, become conglomerates of companies.
The Legal Structure
Malaysia is the only federation in the ASEAN region. Both the Federal 
and State governments have established public enterprises in the two forms. 
Under the Incorporation (State Legislatures Competency) Act of 1962, the 
States are empowered to set up statutory corporations for the development 
of rural and .urban areas. A corporation set up by a State is deemed to be 
a corporate body throughout the Federation. This Act was revised in 1974 
to allow the State Corporations to undertake other activities provided 
there has been prior arrangement between the Federal and State governments. 
However, there is a constitutional issue whether the SEDCs which often 
operate activities literally interpreted beyond the State List under the 
Constitution such as the incorporation of subsidised companies and trading, 
are unconstitutional. In addition, the Federal government passed the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 87/1971, amongst other things, it 
requires all State corporations set up after the enactment to include three 
Federal representatives on the boards and to be under the directions given 
by the Prime Minister. This may be interpreted as an intrusion into 
domestic affairs of a State.
In Malaysia, there is no general legislation to enable the government 
to set up a public corporation without Parliament first passing an 
incorporating statute. All public corporations are therefore established
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by a separate Act of Parliament. Each of them is conferred as a corporate 
entity or as a separate legal personality, the exact extent to which varies 
from one statute to another. Most statutes specify in detail that the 
corporations are to have perpetual succession, sue or to be sued in its own 
name, enter into contracts, etc.; whereas, many others merely leave the 
legal consequences of such a status to be implied by law. As a result, in 
the case of the latter, they can only sue or be sued through their 
respective responsible Minister under the Government Proceedings Ordinance 
of 1956.
Public corporations are wholly-owned by the government. However, in 
some cases, such as Bank Uegara, Malayan Railways (a departmental 
enterprise), Bank Pertanian and Port Kelang Authority, the government 
pretends to have equity in the corporations. In the case of the NEB, the 
government technically owns the corporation by holding 5 percent ordinary 
stock.^
The incorporating statute always spells out the objectives, functions, 
and powers of a given public corporation, usually with a clause that 
empowers the corporation to operate any activity it deems desirable or 
expedient. These vague objectives and ambitious powers always justify 
public corporations to diversify their activities into areas not 
necessarily related to their main objectives.
With powers authorised by incorporating statutes, many public corpor­
ations enjoy monopolies, privileges and some regulatory functions. For 
example, LPN is empowered to license all trade dealing with rice which 
enables the Authority to enjoy profits through the auctioning of licences. 
UDA has powers to declare a certain urban area as urban development area 
where all bodies are required to conform to UDA's planning. However, it 
should be noted that some state companies also enjoy such privileges
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PERHAS, a state company, has been given monopoly over the profitable China 
import trade. Some subsidised companies of MARA, SEDCs and PERNAS have 
been granted exclusive rights to exploit some areas endowed with rich 
natural resources notably tin deposits and timber.
In regard to the company form, all state companies are under the 
Companies Act of 1965 (revised 1974). In the case of a wholly-owned state 
company, the government pretends not to be a single owner, as the Act 
prescribes that a limited company can only be formed by a number of 
shareholders, by parcelling out the shares amongst the state government 
and public enterprises. For example, PERNAS is owned by the Ministry of 
Finance Incorporated, Bank Negara, Pilgrims Management and Investment Board 
and SEDCs of Pahang, Selangor and Perak.
State companies are in both private and public forms. The government 
has repeatedly stated that the government intended to transfer part or all 
of the ownership in state companies to bumiputras at a suitable time. But, 
so far, few state companies are listed in the Kuala Lumpur stock market. 
The government also imposes restrictions on the transfer of shares. The 
Memorandum of Association of Bank Bumiputra, for instance, specifies that 
shares may only be issued to the Central or a State government, a public 
enterprise or any bundputra-controlled company. In the case of MIDF, 
shares are allowed to transfer freely but at the absolute discretion of the 
board of directors, which in practice yields the same effect.
Upon registration with the Registration of Companies, state companies 
acquire a separate legal personality with power to sue or be sued, a common 
seal and power to hold land.
At the top of public enterprises are governing boards in the case of 
public corporations and boards of directors in the case of state companies.
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Incorporating statutes provide for the composition of the corporations, 
normally representing various ministries concerned with their activities.
For example, the Governing Board of MARA comprises representatives from the 
Ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry, Agriculture and Rural Development. 
It is usual to find a representative of the Treasury and of the responsible 
Ministry on these boards. In some cases, incorporating statutes only 
specify that "qualified persons" to be appointed to sit on the boards, but 
in practice only a few boards do have representation from other sectors.
The Pilgrims Management and Investment Board, Tourist Development Authority 
and Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia are these 
exceptional cases. Their boards' composition are very large (28-29 
members) with representatives from the private sector and other concerned 
authorities. In other corporations, the size of the boards ranges from 5 
to 21 members but in most cases the number are below 15. Outsiders are 
also appointed to sit on these boards but almost all of them are politicians 
from the ruling party. On the other hand, the size of boards of state 
companies is normally smaller than those of public corporation but the 
composition is similar. It usually comprises a representative from the 
Treasury, another from the responsible Minister, a number of politicians 
and other shareholders in the case of joint ventures.
The incorporate statutes provide that members of governing boards 
including the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, the Director-General and the 
Director-General, are appointed by the Minister or by the Yang di Pertuan 
Agong. The Minister and the Agong also have the power to revoke any 
appointment at any time. In the case of state companies, the government, 
being the chief shareholder, can make appointments and dismiss its 
representatives on the boards of directors at the general meetings of the 
companies.
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In most statutes, the Chief Executive is the General Manager of the 
corporation who also sits on the board. In other cases, the Chairman of 
the board is the Chief Executive of the corporation, such as UDA and MARDI. 
.If the Chairmanship is a part-time job, the Chief Executive is likely to be 
appointed Deputy Chairman.
In the case of SEDCs, the Mentari Besan (Chief Minister of State) is 
always the Chairman while some senior State officials such as State 
Financial Official, State Engineer, State Chief Secretary, are ex-officio 
members. Other members are appointed from among top civil servants and 
politicians. The ddy-to-day operations of SEDCs are in the hands of the 
Chief Executive (the Secretary or the General Manager).
Most Malaysian public corporations are allowed to set up their 
subsidiaries. However, the statutes do not provide specific conditions for 
the relationship between the parent corporation and their subsidiaries. In 
practice, members of the boards are appointed to sit on these subsidiaries 
to ensure that the policy is implemented and that information flows to 
them for general policy-making. Nevertheless, the large number of their 
subsidiaries have increasingly posed serious problems for corporations and 
the government in terms of control and supervision.
In regard to personnel management, the incorporating statutes 
normally provide a personnel provision that enables the Boards to appoint 
and dismiss high ranking officials and to delegate the power to the Chief 
Executive to appoint and dismiss other officials. The Boards are also 
empowered to regulate their own personnel regulations including pay scales 
and conditions of work, after obtaining approval from the responsible 
Minister. However, after the adoption of the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Remunerations and Conditions of Services in Local Authorities and
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Statutory Authorities (known as the Harun Report) in 1975, public 
corporations have lost their personnel autonomy and have been forced to 
follow government regulations applicable to ministerial departments. State 
companies nevertheless are still left free to work out their own personnel 
policy. PERNAS and Bank Bumiputra, for example, set their own regulations 
almost resembling those of private enterprises.
Financially, the Federal and State Governments finance public 
enterprises in the forms of grants and loans for public corporations and 
only loans for state companies. Any money made available by the government 
must be charged to the Consolidated Fund or must be authorised by 
Parliament in the form of the Supply Act. Public corporations are 
empowered to borrow from any source subjected to the approval of the 
responsible minister and, in most cases, the Treasurer. They also may 
issue bonds or debentures. In addition, some public corporations receive 
special taxes or cesses. For example, there is a cess on rubber export to 
finance rubber replantation and rubber research which benefits RISDA,
MARDEC and Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia. Public corporations are 
required to obtain approval from their responsible Minister for their 
Annual Budget. And in the cases of those depending on government subsidies, 
the Annual Budget has to be submitted to the Treasury for the scrutiny and 
all government budget procedures are to be followed. Furthermore, the 
incorporating statutes required public corporations to keep proper accounts 
and to have their accounts audited by the Auditor-General or by authorised 
private auditors. In practice, many public corporations adopt the 
commercial type of accounting and engage private auditors.
For state companies, finance is mainly provided through share 
participation. They are also free to borrow, normally with the government 
guarantee. As state companies are outside the compass of Parliamentary
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supply, the government usually provides them very low interest rates or 
interest-free loans. During the TMP, M$200 million is earmarked to PERNAS, 
M$ll million to M1DC, M$16.7 million to MSE and M$2 million to Amanah Saham 
MARA.
Every company has to file an Annual Return, the audited Balance Sheet 
and Profit and Loss Account, with the Registrar of Companies. These 
documents, according to the Companies Act, are available for public 
inspection but in most cases the Registrar of Companies declines the access 
to them apparently at the government’s request.
The Process
Public policy-making process on the issues of public enterprises in 
Malaysia is often overshadowed by "politicking" among politicians within 
the ruling party and top bureaucrats. Like in other ASEAN countries, 
personality is more important than the formal structure and in many cases 
becomes a decisive factor in policy-making. Structurally, the process is 
very complicated and frequently changed. Not only is there an ever 
increasing number of public enterprises, there are also too many other 
governmental agencies dealing with these issues, not to mention political 
bodies and other interested groups. The problems are made more difficult 
by the federal-state system of government, particularly in the case of 
States with different ruling parties with the Federal government. 
Furthermore, there have been frequent changes in the management of public 
enterprises, resulting in confusion and uncertainty. Some public 
enterprises were frequently transferred from a supervising Ministry to 
another. Regulations governing public enterprises have also been revised 
again and again and in some cases conflict with each other.
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At the top of the structure is the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in
which all important decisions are made. Equally important is the National
Action Council consisting of all Cabinet members, the Army Chief of Staff
and the Inspector General of Police. The NAC, established in 1971, is to
supervise the implementation of the NEP. In practice, the NAC Executive
Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister himself, meets once a week to hear
briefings on the operations of all public agencies and to make final
decisions in matters referred to it. A writer states that not only the
decisions to establish public enterprises but also the selection of staff
35to man them, are made at this Committee.
It is common practice in Malaysia, where the system of public
administration is highly centralised, for the top political leadership to
36appear to make all decisions. Even in the ruling party, the Prime
Minister in his capacity as the President of UMNO, from time to time,
37personally hand-picked candidates in all constituencies. However, in 
recent years, there has been fierce intra-party infighting among various 
factions. The dissatisfaction with the slow progress made by the government 
for eradicating poverty among the Malays, becomes stronger among ultra­
rightists and at many times was strongly voiced in the party's conference, 
obviously as a means to challenge the leadership. Accordingly, pressures 
from within the party more or lqss influence the decisions of the Prime 
Minister.
Prior to 1971 the top planning body in the country was the National 
Development Planning Committee, with the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) in 
the Prime Minister's Department as its secretariat. The NDPC, established 
in 1961, consisted of the Governor of Bank Negara, representatives from the 
Ministries of Trade and Industry, National and Rural Development, the 
Treasury and EPU as members and the Chief Secretary to the Government (who
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is also the Head of the Civil Service and the Secretary to Cabinet) as the 
Chairman. The main function of this committee was to formulate, implement, 
evaluate and advise development plans for all public bodies including 
public enterprises. There was also the famous National Operations Room, 
initiated by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak, which kept progress 
reports of all agencies under his control. Top officials were called in to 
report and to air problems confronting them in the implementation of 
development programmes. This practice helped resolving problems and became 
an effective coordinating mechanism.
In 1969, the Federal government, unsatisfied with the performance of 
SEDCs, created the Committee for Coordination of State Economic Development 
Corporations. This Committee, chaired by the Director of Budget of the 
Treasury, was responsible for supervising loans granted to SEDCs. Its 
secretariat was the EPU. With the establishment of the NAC and its 
secretariat, the Implementation, Coordination and Development Administration 
Unit in the Prime Minister’s Department, the Committee was reshaped in 1971 
to be chaired by the Director-General of the ICDAU and was transferred to 
this Unit.
The Ministry of Coordination of public enterprises was set up in 
1974 to coordinate and to control public enterprises directly concerning 
the NEP. The vederal Committee for Coordination of the SEDCs was also 
transferred to this newly created Ministry. In fact, the name of this 
Ministry is misleading because other public enterprises are still attached 
to their respective Ministries and the ICDAU still coordinates, plans and 
controls these enterprises at the top level.
Most of the Ministry's activities centre on considering and approving 
the annual budgets of public enterprises under its control which require a
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subsidy from the government. In the case of SEDCs, their budgets do not 
come to the Ministry but to their respective State governments.
The Ministry was at first put under a relatively junior minister;
therefore, it did not receive cooperation from public enterprises under its
supervision whose chairman were powerful politicians and personally close
38to the Prime Minister. However, this situation was improved when the 
Director-General of LPN was replaced on the Ministry's advice, and when 
Prime Minister Hussein Onn took this portfolio before releasing it to
f
another powerful politician. In 1976, the passing of the Statutory Bodies 
(Amendment) Act of 1976 was also designed to strengthen ministerial control 
over UDA, LPN and MARA. Meanwhile, PERNAS was transferred to be under the 
Prime Minister's Department.
The case of PERNAS is worthwhile to be mentioned for it had long been
uncooperative with the Ministry. PERNAS had considered itself a public
company rather than a public enterprise so that it was not subjected to
direct government control. In the words of Tenku Razaleigh, PERNAS's first
Group Chairman and presently the Treasurer, "we are a commercial
organisation. We are left alone. There is no government interference,
39except that it wants us to help solve its objections." In practice, 
Malaysian state companies are technically an independent body legally 
outside the scope of control of the government and what Tenku Razaleigh has 
stated is the fact. However, the Chairman of FIMA is Deputy Prime Minister 
Dr Mahathir Mohammad but FIMA has never been in serious conflict with the 
Ministry.
All other public enterprises are grouped under the ministries which 
are responsible for the particular areas of specialisation. However, with 
the rapid expansion of activities and their increasingly multi-functional
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nature, public enterprises have been increasingly difficult to group in 
particular areas. MARA's activities, for example, cover a wide range 
including commerce, industries, agriculture, education and transport, etc. 
In the agricultural sector, 26 enterprises are grouped into four different 
ministries. Among them, some have duplicated functions and fiercely 
compete against each other.
Ministry of MARDA (research, FAMA (marketing), Bank
Agriculture: Pertanian (credit), MAJUIKAN (fisheries),
MAJUTERNAK (livestock development, FOA 
* (promotion and extension), MADA and KADA
(irrigation and extension);
Ministry of 
Public 
Enterprises:
LPN (rice stockpiling), Bank Bumiputra 
(credit), FIMA (agro-based industry, SEDCs, 
MARA, PERNAS (promotion, agro-based 
industry, plantation, marketing);
Ministry of 
Land and 
Regional 
Development:
FELDA, FELCRA (land development and 
promotion), LKJT, DARA, LKTT, JDC (regional 
development, promotion), Sabah State LDB 
and Sarawak LDB (land development);
Ministry of 
Primary 
Industries:
Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia, 
Malays’ia Rubber Research and Development 
Board (research) , RISDA (replantation and 
promotion), MARDEC (research, replantation, 
promotion).
In many cases, public enterprises are not allocated to the Ministry 
within whose sphere of jurisdiction they naturally lie, particularly those 
in the industrial sector. Also, some public enterprises are under the 
chairmanship of a Minister who has a different portfolio. FIMA is under 
the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister who is also the Minister of
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Trade and Industry but is attached to the Ministry of Public Enterprises.
In some cases, public enterprises have often changed their attachment from 
one Ministry to another. FELDA was under the Ministry of Agriculture from 
1956 to 1959, the Ministry of Rural Development from 1959 to 1974, the 
Ministry of Lands, Mines and Forestry from 1974 to 1976 and now the Ministry 
of Land and Regional Development. A writer comments that public enterprises 
prefer to be directly under control of the Prime Minister because they tend 
to enjoy more degrees of freedom from external controls.^
It should be noted that it is common for public enterprises here to be 
victimised by personal clashes among politicians in the ruling party itself. 
Many times rival politicians have abused each other for failures in public 
enterprises under one's control. The National Malay Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry under the chairmanship of Senator Kamarul who is also the 
chairman of Bank Bumiputra adopted a resolution of no-confidence in UDA's 
officials whose head is the Vice-President of UMNO's brother.
The incorporating statutes provide for the powers of the supervising 
Minister to control public enterprises in these aspects:
(a) powers of appointments and dismissals,
(b) powers to give general directions of a general character 
and to be provided information about their operations, and
(c) powers for the approval of annual budgets and rules and 
regulations.
In practice, in the first aspect, the Ministers are reluctant to make 
appointments or dismissals by themselves and often refer the matters to the 
NAC or Cabinet. The choices often come from the leadership itself.
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In the second aspect, the degree of control varies from public
enterprise to public enterprise depending on the style of the responsible
Minister, the relationship between the chairman of that particular
enterprise and the political elite and the degree of political sensitivity 
A 2of its functions. It should be noted that since the chairman or the 
chief executives of public enterprises usually give a brief at the NAC or 
Cabinet instead of providing information through the responsible Minister, 
it is possible for them to raise some matters in which the board has 
disagreement with the Minister. Therefore, ministerial control in many 
cases becomes loose.,
Ministerial control over financial matters is limited by the 
government s financial regulations which mostly apply to public 
corporations. Again, since the implementation of the Harun Report which 
led to public corporations losing their autonomy on personnel policy, the 
responsible Minister almost has nothing to do with the approval powers.
The approval of the annual budget is merely a rubber stamp.
The most effective control over public enterprise in Malaysia is 
probably the one exercised by the Treasury, because almost all public ent­
erprises depend largely on federal funds to finance their operations, the 
Treasury has been reluctant to give public corporations the financial 
freedom conferred to them by incorporating Acts. Apparently, the process 
in which public corporations apply for subsidies is as strict as that of 
appropriations for ministerial departments and the Treasury reviews the 
estimates in considerable detail. In the case of loans, the Treasury 
always carefully scrutinises all applications to ensure that the loans and 
interest are paid according to the conditions set out in the agreements.
The Treasurer also has powers to study loan proposals if public enterprises 
are to seek loans from outside sources and government guarantee is needed.
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In the past, some public enterprises failed to repay the loans and some 
state companies had to wind up. The Treasurer has therefore been given 
powers to inquire into financial difficulties of these public enterprises 
and to recommend the alternatives to improve the situation. In the cases 
of the Malayan Railways and a few other corporations, the Treasury has 
granted a moratorium on repayment and has allocated contributions to cover 
losses as equity capital. In the cases of state companies like PERNAS, the 
Treasury has converted the loans or part of it into share capital.
With representation in almost all boards at the federal level, the 
Treasurer is ensured to be informed of all financial matters that are 
brought to the board's meetings. However, it appears that a few high 
ranking officials in the Treasury hold ten or more directorships and it is 
doubtful if these officials are able to sit at all the meetings.
In Malaysia, the audit control over public enterprises is exercised by
the Auditor-General's Department, an independent body, whose reports are to
be submitted to the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament. However, many
incorporating Acts allow public corporations to engage private auditors
upon the approval of either the supervising Minister or the Treasurer. In
practice, only a few are audited by the Auditor-General. Due to the
shortage of qualified staff, the Audit performed by the Auditor-General is
the same as that for ministerial departments, involving a routine
examination of books and statements rather than an external efficiency
audit. Equally, important is the delay in submitting the report to
Parliament. For example, the Auditor-General's report for 1972 was
41submitted three years later. In many cases, the annual reports of some 
public corporations have never reached Parliament as required by law.
In more advanced countries, public accountability of public enterprises 
is provided through legislative control. However, parliamentary control in
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Malaysia is more theoretical than real. Parliament has powers to approve 
the Bills for the establishment of new public corporations, to approve the 
supply Bills that grant loans and subsidies and to question responsible 
Ministers on the affairs of public enterprises. In practice, these powers 
are limited by some factors. Firstly, the ruling National Front has a 
large parliamentary majority and thus there is little effective opposition 
to press for information. It is unlikely that the opposition will grow 
to pose a serious threat to the National Front government in the near 
future. Such a situation creates a general secrecy surrounding public 
bodies which prevents MPs and the public from knowing the actual state of
43 naffairs. Secondly, once the legislature passes the establishing
statutes, some public enterprises which are self-supporting are almost
beyond Parliamentary control because they become independent identities
under the Malaysian legal system. The responsible Minister may refuse to
answer any question in Parliament on the grounds that they are internal
44affairs and beyond his jurisdiction. Thirdly, Parliament normally has an 
opportunity to screen financial requests from public enterprises only once 
every five years coinciding with the National Plan. Even then the 
budget is presented in a package and Parliament has no chance to screen it 
in detail. Above all, Parliament seems to lack interest in the affairs of 
public enterprises so that government is not anxious to provide it with 
information or annual reports and financial statements. Indeed, there has 
been no serious discussion on this issue and if there is any, it is a 
rather day-to-day matter rather than a policy issue.
The Entrepreneur
Table 6.1 exhibits that out of 196 members of 22 boards of public 
enterprises in both public corporation and company forms, only 27 are 
outsiders and other ten are shareholders in joint ventures. Among the 27
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outsiders, many are officials who are appointed for their personal' 
qualifications. Furthermore, a majority of the items classified as 
"internal directors" are in fact chief executives and/or deputy chief- 
executives who are on secondment terms from the Civil Service. These 
figures illustrate the degree which public enterprises are dominated by the 
political-bureaucratic elites.
On one hand, the appointment of politicians to these boards is to
ensure political representation of the ruling party. On the other hand, it
is a system of patronage and political reward. It is a consolation for top
politicians who miss Cabinet ranks and other political positions which are
limited to a certain number. Positions in public enterprises are also
regarded as a "convenient way of giving them an additional source of 
45income". In some cases, political appointments are political power-plays 
and manoeuvres within the ruling party. For example, an MP was asked to 
vacate his seat to give way to a Federal Minister and subsequently he was 
appointed the Chairman of DARA. A former Mentari Besar of Trengganu was 
replaced but was given the chairmanship of MAJUIKAN. Tenku Razaleigh was 
appointed firstly as Chairman of PERNAS and later of PETRONAS and Bank 
Bumiputra not only because of his business acumen but also because of his 
powerful political influence.
It is also not uncommon for the appointment of top bureaucrats as 
chairmen of the boards. The term "secondment" means that senior civil 
servants are borrowed from the Civil Service for a certain period of time 
(for example, two or three years) but they can return to the Service at any 
time. They can also choose to stay in public enterprises until their 
retirement. In practice, these officials seldom return to their ministries 
because they enjoy more income and prestige. It is estimated that about 60 
percent of total MADA staff are seconded from the Agriculture Ministry and
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FIGURE 6.2 BACKGROUND OF CHAIRPERSONS OF SELECTED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
MARA Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Yeop Ex-Civil Servant
UDA Tan Sri Yacob Hitam Ex-Civil Servant
LPN Encik Mohd. Sopiel b.
Sheikh Ibrahim Politician
MIDF Tan Sri Ismail b. Mohamad Governor, Bank
Ali Negara
FIMA Dr. Mahathir b. Mohamad Politician
PERNAS 1
Malayawata Steel MillsJ
j- Tunku Datuk Shariman Ex-Civil Servant
FIDA Encik Jamil bin Moh. Jan Ex-Civil Servant
Kelang Port Authority Dato Sri Raja Azam bin
Raja Kamarahzaman Ex-Civil Servant
Bank Bumiputra Kamural Ariffin Politician
PETRONAS Tunku Razaleigh Politician
MAJUIKAN Dato Nik Hassan Politician
MAS 'j
MSE J
Raja Tan Sri Mohar bin 
Rajah Bodiozaman
Ex-Civil Servant
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FIGURE 6.3
UDA
Chairman 
Deputy Chairman
FIDA
Chairman
A TYPICAL COMPOSITION OF BOARDS
Tan Sri Datuk Haji Ya’cob bin Hitam (Ex-officio)
Encik Phang Kon Hee (Ex-officio)
Tan Sri Yaacob Abdul Latiff (Datuk Bandar-
Lord Mayor, Kuala Lumpur)
Encik Abdul Ghani (Secretary-General,
Ministry of Public Enterprise)
Haji Idris bin Haji Ibrahim (MP, Kuala Lumpur)
Dr. C.H. Cheah
Encik Jamil bin Moh. Jan (Ex-officio)
Director of FIDA 
Director-General of EPU 
Representative, the Treasury
Representative, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
General-Manager, MIDF
Representatives, the Sabah and Sarawak Treasuries 
Representative, MARY 
General-Manager, Selangor SEDC 
Representative, National Chamber of Commerce 
Representative, Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers
An outsider.
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the percentage is even larger at the top of the organisation. The
government favours this system probably because of their loyalty to
the government (that makes them easy to be controlled). The government is
also justified by the fact that there has been the severe shortage of
trained managerial personnel in the country, particularly among the Malay
group. Also, among other things, the Harun Report recommends that more
senior civil servants should be seconded to fill positions in public
enterprises because "... they provide a direct and effective link between
46government and its Statutory Authorities ...". A writer considers this
practice helps minimise the influence and pressures that result from the
47appointment of politicians. However, it appears that only top civil 
servants with close links with the politician elites have been appointed 
the posts in public enterprises. For example, the former Deputy Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Information was appointed as Director-General 
of the Port Kelang Authority. The former Director-General of the ICDAU is 
also the Chairman and Chief Executive of PERNAS and DARA. The Chairman of 
FIDA was holding the post of Deputy Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry until his full time secondment in 1973.
In addition, there has been an increasing tendency toward the 
appointment of retired senior officials, many of whom have close personal 
relations with the political leadership. UDA's Chairman and Chief Executive 
was personally handpicked by the late Prime Minister. He is also a brother 
of the powerful Minister of Education and Vice President of the UMNO.
MAS’s Chairman is a retired senior official who is also Economic Advisor to 
the Prime Minister. The General Manager of PERNAS Engineering Bhd. is the 
former Director-General of the Telecommunications Department. The Chairman 
of the Tourist Development Corporation and the Penang Port Commission are
both former ambassadors.
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The interlocking directorship widely practiced in Singapore is found 
here only to a limited extent. A few senior civil servants in the Treasury 
and other ministries sit on ten boards or more. However, it appears that 
politicians rather than bureaucrats are appointed to several boards at the 
same time. In addition to positions in public enterprises, Malaysian 
politicians also publicly engage in business activities. Senator Kamarul, 
the Chairman of Bank Bumiputra, runs a merchant bank, a discount house, an 
electronic plant and a law office. The Chairman of MADA and Bank Simpanan 
Nasional sits on the boards of numerous private companies.
The presence of politicians and bureaucrats in the management of 
public enterprises creates many problems. Politicians' decisions tend to 
base more on political criteria rather than on efficiency criteria, and are 
influenced by their political interest rather than that of the enterprise. 
Politicians may also influence policy-making on the boards in which civil 
servants are unlikely to disagree. Meanwhile, the appointment of civil 
servants on the boards and in managerial positions is likely to bring 
public enterprises back to the atmosphere of bureaucracy. These top 
bureaucrats with many years in the Service usually bring with them 
some governmental practices that are hardly applicable to the operations of 
public enterprises. Public enterprises, particularly those concerned with 
the NEP, require a new type of expertise in business management and this 
type of skill is not easily found among politicians and civil servants.
Above all, the entry to public enterprise has posed serious constraints 
upon the promotion of young and professional officials and greatly affected 
the morale of staff in many public enterprises.
The introduction of some parts of the Harun Report seemed to worsen the 
situation. It meant the end of the autonomy on personnel matters of all
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public corporations. All regulations with regard to the terras and 
conditions of service are now decided by the government. Employees are 
uniformly grouped into four categories depending on their academic 
qualifications and experiences. Salaries and other financial rewards are 
also standardised and the salary scales are subjected to review from 
time to time by the Cabinet Committee Report. Although a Service Committee 
headed by the chief executive of any public corporation still handles the 
recruitments and dismissals, it has to act accordingly to the regulations 
set by the government and has to be represented by a representative from 
the responsible Ministry. In addition, the disciplinary regulations for 
civil servants are now applicable to all employees of public corporations, 
and the Civil Service Commission is to receive any appeal against the 
decisions of the governing boards of public corporations. This rigidity 
created many serious unsolved problems. In many public enterprises, such 
as the Port Kelang Authority, the workers responded by work to rule because 
their overtime payment was cut and the conflicts were settled only after 
some allowances were instituted. In addition, according to the Harun 
Report, one must hold a degree or a certificate if he is to be promoted or 
to be recruited. Many experienced employees who have worked in the 
organisations for many years often do not possess academic qualifications 
specified in the regulations and therefore fail to be promoted. Last but 
not least, the salary scales fixed by the government for public corporations 
do not attract skilled people, particularly those of the middle level 
who are in short supply, to join or to stay in public corporations because 
the salaries are much lower than those offered by the private sector. It 
is also more prestigeous to be in the Civil Service than in public 
corporations.
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The Report is not applicable to state companies but there is no 
exception to public corporations involved in industrial and commercial 
activities and it appears that they are hardest hit by this uniformity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Malaysia is the only country in the ASEAN region that publicly 
expresses its intention to utilise public enterprises to solve the nation’s 
serious socio-economic problems. After nearly a decade of implementation, 
however, the overall performance of these public enterprises is still far 
from satisfactory. The proliferation of public enterprises and their 
ambitious and vague objectives led to the duplication of functions in areas 
of activities, inter-agency competition, lack of proper control and 
coordination. The shortage of qualified and experienced personnel together 
with the appointment of politicians and seconded civil servants to 
managerial positions also undermines the effectiveness of public enterprises 
in attaining their assigned objectives.
Interestingly, 21 years ago Parkinson’s "Law" was born on a Malaysian
beach and perhaps this famous concept can best be described by the present
49administrative system of the country where it was born. The proliferation 
of public enterprises was merely a part of power-play in the political 
process in the attempt to stabilise the Malay faction (UMNO) in the ruling 
party. Therefore, top UMNO politicians have been appointed to sit in the 
governing boards of all important public enterprises, obviously for 
directing their policies to go along with those of the party. The 
appointment has also become a political reward for politicians who miss 
Cabinet and other political ranks. Also, the appointments of top bureau­
crats with close connections with the political leadership implies the
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ruling elite's intention to strengthen its position and to secure more 
control. At the same time, intra-party infightings among individual and 
factions within UMNO has led to competition and rivalry. In effect, 
public enterprises under their control have branched out by setting up 
subsidiaries to manage activities other than their main functions and 
compete fiercely with each other. Many of them even go further to compete 
with private bumiputra entrepreneurs instead of promoting them. Datuk Onn, 
then Deputy Prime Minister realised these problems and once stated that 
activities of these public enterprises should be reviewed to ensure no 
overlapping and no building of empires.^ However, now he is the Prime 
Minister and once held the portfolio of Minister of Public Enterprise.
No constructive measure has yet been made in regard to them.
Since parliamentary control is more theoretical than actual, there is 
no public accountability as known in the West and the operations of public 
enterprises are almost unchecked. There have often been allegations that 
politicians and officials who manage some enterprises, such as PERNAS, UDA 
and MARA, are making their own fortunes but again no serious investigation 
is made. Thus, public enterprise becomes a sensitive and confidential 
issue in which no accurate data is publicly available.
The secrecy of public enterprises together with the unofficial but 
often interpretation of the NEP in favour of the Malays make the Chinese 
feel their position is unstable, if not suppressed. If this tendency is 
unchecked, then it is likely to undermine the success of the NEP and of the 
overall objectives of public enterprises.
Indeed, it seems to be illogical for a multi-commercial country badly 
in need of national unity to have prejudice practiced against the minority 
group who actually control only one-third of the national wealth.
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Meanwhile, all the people seem to forget the fact that more than half of 
the economy is in the hands of multi-national corporations, many of which 
exploit this nation with the cooperation of public enterprises.
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CHAPTER 7
COUNTRY STUDY; THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines was reputed to be the champion of free enterprise in 
this region because private enterprise had long dominated national economy 
even in such areas as public utilities which were often managed by the 
state in other countries. After the declaration of martial law in 1972, 
however, the Philippine government has become much more active in the 
economy and has taken over some activities previously undertaken by the 
private sector. As a result, the public enterprise sector, substantially 
expanded in number of bodies and in scope of activities, has emerged as one 
of the most important parts in the public administrative system which used 
to rely heavily on regular ministerial departments.
In comparison with other countries in the ASEAN region, the Philippines 
seemed to have a more modernized system of government and public administra­
tion. Yet, the country was unable to aspire to Western democracy 
and responsible administration in actual practice, and the government was 
transferred into a system for personal profits and advantage of the ruling 
elites. Because of their vulnerable nature, public enterprises were 
seriously affected by this political behaviour and were often used for 
attaining more wealth and political powers for politicians. All classical 
attempts, including the enactment of a law to bring all employees of 'public 
enterprises under the umbrella of the Civil Service, apparently failed to 
prevent political interference which was believed to be a major factor in 
increasing inefficiency.
It is interesting to learn why the new authoritarian regime has 
employed this type of governmental mechanism even with the unhappy 
experience in the past. Also, it is equally important to understand why
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such classical efforts to control public enterprises have been unsuccessful. 
This chapter is mainly to discuss such issues.
THE BACKGROUND
July 4, 1946 marked the end of three and a half centuries of continued 
foreign rule and the beginning of the experience of the imported American 
democracy in the Philippines. September 21, 1972, the day martial law was 
proclaimed, witnessed the end of the experiment and the beginning of the 
"new Society", an increasingly fashionable political pattern in the Third 
World where power is seized by a small group of the elite to carry out the 
promised political and economic "reform".
Like elsewhere, communist insurgency was blamed for the end of the 
constitutional rule, but the event could also be viewed as the only 
alternative to enable the ruling elites to preserve power in their hands. 
Toward the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, many progressive 
groups representing the underprivileged class had rapidly grown up to 
challenge the affluent ruling class which had taken turns governing the 
country since independence. There were events that made the ruling elites
believe that these pressure groups were choosing a bloody revolutionary
1
method to topple them. There was also serious infighting among factions 
within the ruling Nacionalista party. It was apparent that the 
incumbent President, Ferdinand E. Marcos, had to step down and anyone 
representing him on his party's ticket would lose the election fifteen 
months away.'*"
Before the rule by decree the country that was once labelled "the show 
window of democracy" in the Third World because of its smooth succession of 
representative governments elected through legitimate means, was being
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self-criticised. Scholars wrote a vast amount asking among themselves what
2had gone wrong in the society and the pattern of government. At the 
national level, a Constitutional Convention was elected to revise the 1935 
Constitution which for them seemed to be out of date. A popular issue 
widely discussed was whether the country would adopt the parliamentary 
system of government, a pattern which would allow President Marcos (who was 
about to finish his unrenewable term of office) to be able to continue to 
rule the country as the Prime Minister for an indefinite period. Another 
issue was concerned with social injustice in the society arising from 
increasing socio-economic imbalance which had been inherited from the 
colonial days.
Indeed, colonial rule greatly contributed to the unbalanced distribu­
tion of power and wealth in this country. About two-thirds of Filipinos 
farmers had long been exploited by large land-owners, many of whom 
inherited the land during the Spanish period. When the Americans came, 
little effort was made to rectify the situation because the Americans 
themselves had mutual interests with large sugar cane plantation-owners.
Therefore, tenancy steadily rose from 19.3 percent in 1903 to 50.6 
3percent in 1938. With the growth of the export of sugar and coconut to 
the unrestricted American market, the land-owners and exporters became even 
more powerful, only to be countered by a new industrialist class which 
rapidly emerged in the 1950s. The growth of the latter group was an 
obvious result of industrialisation programmes which equipped local elites 
with many privileges under a protectionist policy and with gigantic 
American capital.
Another important characteristic of the Philippine economic structure 
was the domination of American interests in foreign trade and industry. In 
return to the unrestricted American market of sugar and coconut under the
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Laurel-Langley Agreement, the Americans were given privileges enabling them
to own land, to exploit natural resources, and to operate public utilities
in the Philippines the same as the local people, until the end of 1975 . The
American share in the Philippine trade, which was only 24 percent during
the period 1899 to 1908 went up to 80 percent during the year 1939-1941 and
4slipped to around 25 percent in 1977. Of the total foreign investment 
during 1970-1977, 45 percent was American with the Japanese fat behind in 
second place with 24 percent.“* Again, out of the top 100 companies ranked
by net income in 1970, 45 were owned by American, 42 Filipino and 13 by
£other nationalities.
The result was that political and economic powers had been centralised 
by the three groups, land-owners, exporters and industrialists, which 
together comprised less than 350 families ("the Marcos" ranked the 
fourtieth). The former political structure, patterned after the U.S. 
Constitutional framework with some modifications to give the President more 
power, seemed to well serve this behavioral pattern. The participation of 
the masses in the political process was limited to elections which were 
always corrupt and violent. Political parties were irresponsible and 
were without discipline because they could not help their candidates to win 
the elections. Instead, these candidates depended much more on their own 
resources, pesos and patronage. Therefore, once elected, they were very 
independent and always bargained for their interests if asked to support 
Presidential policies in Congress.^ This has far-reaching implications on 
political and economic development as commented by a Filipino scholar that 
it "... resulted in the installing of legislative business, congressional 
emasculation of vital economic bills, legislative indifference and 
sometimes hostility to "must" administrative economic measures, and above 
all, a political climate highly charged with maneouverings and political
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motivations that hindered constructive dynamic economic thinking and
g
action." As a result, any attempt for reform had been objected to by the
dominant elite groups "who would stand to lose with the' change in the
gbalance of power in society." Land reform, for example, was blocked by 
politicians who were also land-owners or who depended on landlords for 
vote-gathering. It was not until 1955 that Congress passed the Land Tenure 
Bill under the strong pressure of President Ramon Magsaysay. But, with 
several revisions, the Act seemed to be more advantageous to landlords than 
to tenants. Again, a more radical legislation, the Agricultural Land 
Reform Code, was enacted in 1963 but its implementation was kept at a very 
slow pace. There were some types of economic planning but indeed only on 
paper not in implementation. There was economic nationalism only to 
embarrass Chinese small business owners, not big American businessmen."^
Last but no less important, there was the adopted concept of free 
enterprise obviously for the benefits of the power elite and of their 
American friends. Meanwhile, public enterprises were created, many of 
which were mainly for political purposes.
To any foreign observer’s surprise, in contrast to the strong influence 
of American economic ideology of free enterprise during the four decades of 
colonial rule, the 1935 Constitution authorised the government to intervene 
in the economic fields. "The promotion of social justice to ensure the 
well-being and economic security of all the people shall be concern of the 
State" (Art.II, sec.5). "The State, may, in the interest of national 
welfare and defence, establish and operate industries and means of transpor­
tation and communication, and upon payment of just compensation, transfer 
to public utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the 
Government" (Art.XIII, sec.6). "The Congress may determine by law the size 
of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or
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associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to the
enactment of such laws." (Art.II. sec.5). A writer explained that these
uncommon provisions were included because the Constitutional delegates
anticipated the tremendous economic responsibilities of the government
during the 10 year transition period and after independence. They also saw
the increasing role of the State during the Great Depression of the 1930s.^
More interestingly, another writer commented that "... many of the Filipino
leaders feel that unless the lot of the masses is improved by direct and
sweeping governmental action, the new state may sooner or later be faced
12with serious social .and political unrest..."
In fact, there were governmental "actions", particularly in the form
of public enterprise even during the American rule, which were indeed
contradictory with official policies. The Agricultural Bank, established
in 1908, became the first public enterprise in the country. Then, with the
passage of the Jones Act of 1916 which provided for the Philippines Senate
and with the appointment of Francis B. Harrison as the Governor-General,
Filipinisation in the government was rapid and many public enterprises were
created. Among them were Philippine National Bank (1916 to replace AB),
Manila Railroad Company (by acquisition, 1917), National Development
Company (NDC, organised by semi-governmental organisation, 1919) , National
Coal Company, 1917), Metropolitan Water District (by acquisition, 1919),
National Exchange Co. Inc., (1920), Manila Hotel Company (acquired by MRR,
1923), the Cebu Portland Cement Company (acquired by Government, 1924),
National Charity Sweepstakes (1932, superseded by Philippine Charity
13Sweepstakes, 1934). The justification of the proliferation of public 
enterprises in this period was stated as the effort to develop the country 
to be self-reliant. In a few cases, the financial problem was the main 
reason and the government had to take over the operation of some troubled
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companies. In other cases, the government was compelled to engage in
activities considered vital for national development because of the absence
2*/
of sufficient American or native finance. The government’s intervention
into these activities was not without severe criticism firom the American
Congress and the public as an interference "with opportunities for
investment. " ^  When Governor-General Leonard Wood took power in 1921, he
made some efforts "to get the government out of business", but not with 
16success.
The enactment of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 assured the country
of independence aftei a ten-year period of Commonwealth status and Manuel
L. Quezon became the first President of the Commonwealth. President Quezon
said that he did not believe in government "engaging directly in business
enterprise that could be left in the hands of private individuals, except
as to some public utilities. However, in addition to a score of public
enterprises set up before, the government established 24 more, many of which
were not in the area of public utilities but in banking, industry and
trading. The list included Agricultural and Industrial Bank (1939),
National Rice and Corn Corporation (1936), Philippine Tobacco Administration
(1940), Philippine Sugar Administration (1939). The most important of them
all was National Power Corporation (1936) which was responsible for the
development of water power resources previously discouraged by the American
1 ftAdministration under the pressure from big oil interests. Equally 
significant was the rapid expansion of NDC now a wholly-owned state 
corporation with 9 subsidiaries covering agriculture, warehousing, trading, 
real estate and a wide range of industries.
Throughout the post-war period, every administration repeatedly stated 
its commitment to develop private enterprise but, meanwhile, more and more 
public enterprises were created. The first President of the Republic,
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Manuel A. Roxas, said he "definitely opposed to government interference in
A
19the processes of production and distribution". But the Roxas administra­
tion, justified by the emergencies of war relief and rehabilitation, set up 
no less than 10 public enterprises within a few years in office. One of 
them was the Philippino Relief and Trade Rehabilitation Administration 
(1947) which was granted wide authority to engage in almost all activities
it deemed necessary to Filipinize retail trading previously dominated by 
20Chinese merchants. Roxas’ successor, President Elpidio Quirino,
maintained the same policy, "... the principal function of the Government
is to administer the affairs of the country, not develop industry with its
21own funds and enter into competition." However, his period witnessed the 
rapid growth of NDC which virtually assumed the role of industrial develop­
ment corporation with over ten subsidiaries engaging in the production of 
paper and pulp, ship-building and repairing, steel, rail, etc. It also 
controlled Philippine Airlines and Manile Gas Corporation. The Central 
Bank was also established in this period (1949).
It was President Ramon Magsaysay who during his short period initiated
the policy for the sale or disposal of public enterprises because he
believed that "our national economic development must and will take place
22within the basic framework of private enterprises." It was not until the
Macapagal Administration that some NDC's subsidiaries were actually sold to
23private firms but not without scandals. At the same time, however, 
public enterprises continued to proliferate, even to a greater extent, in 
the form of banks, regional development authorities and public utility 
corporations.
President Marcos, in his first State-of-the-Nation address noted that
24he firmly believed in free enterprise. He did what he said and only a 
few public enterprises were established during his constitutional rule.
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But after the proclamation of martial law in 1972 the number of public
enterprises has rapidly increased. By the end of 1977, there were 151
public enterprises in the Philippines which altogether employed more than
100,000 employees or about 10 percent of total governmental employees or
1.62 percent of total workforce. The total investment of the government in
public enterprises which was about P2,500 million in the period 1946-1971
went up to P8,579.49 million (paid in subscription) by the end of 1975 with
25the total commitment in 33 corporations of P21,901 million. In 1963-1964,
the total assets of 10 public enterprises in the Office of Economic
Co-ordination (OEC) tgroup was P2,884 million but a decade later the total
26assets of 69 public enterprises was well over P51 billion.
In the words of now President cum Prime Minister Marcos, "Now we are
trying to build a society in which economic activity promotes the interests
of the individual and welfare of the whole. Necessarily, the authority of
government must be exerted whenever these ends are not being served ... it
should be obvious that individual enterprise and initiative will play a
significant role in the economic society. The distinction between the
public and private sector is formal.... But this should not prevent the
27two sectors from joining together in a common cause." In effect, while 
foreign investment is promoted and restrictions over land ownership and 
operations of foreign corporations are relaxed, public enterprises have been 
expanding their activities into non-conventional areas. The Philippine Sugar 
Commission is authorised to monpolise the export of sugar which is the top 
export earner. The Philippine National Oil Corporation took over the 
production and distribution of petroleum previously operated by the 
privately owned Filoil and Esso. A few corporations were established to 
run steel and iron manufacturing, sugar refining and ship-building. Two 
first class hotels are now managed as public enterprises while another two
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are under close supervision. Government financial institutions compete 
fiercely with private banks and financial companies with the former control­
ling about 70 percent of financial resources. Of particular interest, some 
public enterprises have been building their empires and developing them­
selves into holding corporations with a number of subsidised companies 
engaging in diversed activities. These groups include Philippine National 
Bank, Government Service Insurance System, and Philippine National Oil 
Corporation, etc.
It is interesting to learn why the Marcos regime opts the form of
public enterprise for agencies as "catalysts for change" in the New Society
in a country where any governmental intervention into the economy has
been considered undesirable. In the past, they were essentially for
pioneering and promoting purposes and were offered for sale soon after
accomplishing their objectives. In addition, Philippine public enterprises
had a long history of inefficiency, widespread corruption, nepotism and
mis-management. As noted by a writer, with a few exceptions the government's
initiative and investment was "inept" and "wasteful" and entrepreneurial
28initiative was "retarded rather than promoted". They usually performed
badly in the terms of economic efficiency. In 1953, 16 public enterprises
under the OEC Group made net profit;only PI.5 million with the consolidated
29annual volume of business close to a quarter of a billion pesos. For the
four year period, 1970-1973, 69 public enterprises registered a profit of
39P273 million as against a loss of P39.5 million. In the Financial Year
1974-1975, out of 42 public enterprises, only 26 made some profits, many of
31which enjoyed some type of monopoly. Just before the proclamation of 
martial law, the Commission on Reorganisation suggested that the government 
should withdraw from ownership of corporations which were no longer
pioneering and whose spheres of activities were not governmental in nature. 32
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There were some significant events to be noted. The first was the
resolution known as the Magna Carta of Social Justice and Economic Freedom
which was jointly approved by the President and Congress' in 1969. The
resolution called for more economic development efforts through providing
more incentive to private entrepreneurs, abolishing monopolies, enlarging a
Filippino middle class, giving labour its fair share in economic reward,
and expanding public share and profit-sharing in private corporations. It
33also stressed on economic nationalism, social justice and anti-poverty.
Equally remarkable was the move of the Constitutional Convention delegates
to include some socialistic notions such as "social ownership of the means
of production, distribution and exchange". "The concept of economic
stewardship", and "an integrated nationalistic and socially oriented
34economic plan" in the drafted Constitution. These exhibited contemporary 
Filipino’s thinking which emphasised socio-economic justice and equality 
through peaceful means in which private enterprises have to be more 
socially oriented. Also the State has to intervene in economic activities 
in order to rectify the imbalance condition, particularly through central 
planning and economic stewardship. With growing conflicts with the 
Americans on some issues in the middle of this decade, public opinion 
seemed to move toward Filipinization of some types of businesses and the 
restriction of American privileges in the country.
Marcos has apparently been influenced by this trend. The goals of the
New Society, according to him, are to "eliminate the threat of a violent
overthrow of our Republic", to "reform the social, economic and political
institutions", and to "remove the inequalities of that society, the clean
up of government of its corruption and sterile elements, the liquidation of
the criminal syndicates, (and to encourage) the systematic development of our 
35country". The methods, through constitutional authoritarianism, are:
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(1) to remove the "anarchy" and maintain "law and order", 
and
(2) to restructure the society by more government participation 
in national economy, land reform, industrial and energy 
development and reorientation of the educational system.
The first step meant the elimination of rivals and potential rivals through 
detention, suppression, exile, and other means (including the expansion of 
public enterprises to minimise their economic power) whereas the second 
step involves a complete overhaul of the government machinery, central 
planning and land reform. This concept of development, similar to that of 
other authoritarian regimes in the ASEAN region, Taiwan, and South Korea, 
is based on the belief that no national development can be made without a 
strong and a highly centralised government.
The 1973 Constitution was, therefore, drafted along this line. It 
authorises the Prime Minister more power in almost all aspects. In regard 
to national economy, while retaining some provisions of the old one, the 
Constitution provides for the establishment of a National Economic 
Development Authority, probably the first of its kind to be established by 
the Constitution, and for the right to take over or direct the operations 
of businesses in times of emergencies.
Since independence, there have been at least 17 economic plans in this
country but except for the ones under martial law their goals have never 
3 6materialised. Problems confronting the effective implementation of these
plans are primarily concerned with politics and the weakness of the
37planning agency and its leadership. The most important factor was that 
political leaders themselves did not recognise the importance of central 
planning. Probably this was a result of the belief in free enterprise that
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makes them unable to accept any form of planning. It might also be 
conflicts of interests because any systematic planning would minimise 
public spending in such non-productive and politically oriented projects as 
in the "pork barrel" system which was one of decisive election strategies. 
The former planning authority, the National Economic Council, was not only 
able to convince the President to receive his support but it had to compete 
with his own economic aids, the Presidential Economic Staff, which also 
drafted some economic programmes.
The establishment of NEDA was not Marcos' own innovation as this idea
could be traced back to 1955 when the Commission On Reorganisation suggested
the proposal but it was turned down by President Garcia on the ground that
3 8NEDA would control the budgets of public enterprises. It had also long 
been supported by economists and technocrats who were recruited to serve the 
regime such as Gerardo Sicat (NEDA's Chief Executive), Cesar Virata 
(Secretary of Finance), Roman C. Cruz (GSIS's General Manager), Vincente 
T. Paterno (Secretary of Industry), and Armand Fabella (Presidential 
Commission on Reorganisation's Chairman). This rising technocrat group 
also brought with them, in addition to NEDA, proposals to reform the 
financial, monetary and budgetary systems which were subsequently 
implemented.
One of the technocrats recently mentioned that public enterprises have
never been "looked at as a separate type of organisation with its own
explicit advantages for certain purposes; rather, they have been formed as 
39the need arose". Meanwhile, the former Commissioner of Civil Service,
Abellardo Subido, said that the public enterprise form was opted for in the
belief that it could be more productive because of "its flexibility, its
40business-like, if not military, way of doing things". These statements, 
though contradictory in wording, seem to imply that public enterprises
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were set up during the rule-by-decree-period because of necessity for the 
implementation of the New Society which needed "more productive 
results". It is also a fact that many of them would never have been 
established had the country still been in the old constitutional framework 
because of their proprietary functions. Some of these functions are vital 
for development and proved to be ineffective in the hands of private 
entrepreneurs, such as the distribution of fertilisers and pesticides to 
farmers, international aviation services, and the operation of bus services 
in Metro Manila. With these business activities, there was no other 
choice for the regime to resort to other than the public enterprise form.
More significantly, the expansion of public enterprises and the choice
for this form was motivated by political reasons. In the words of a
Filipino scholar, "... some of the motivations are woven into the complex
fabric of politico-bureaucratic politics in terms of power distribution and
balancing, the electoral process, the spoils and reward system as well as
the current development strategies of governing elites ... particularly in
attaining increased control and influence over an important area of
41economic activity". Indeed, the expansion of public enterprises in some
areas already well established by private enterprises could be explained as
an attempt to transfer economic power previously controlled by political
rival groups to the hands of Marcos and his close aids. If the transfer of
wealth was sincerely carried out and more public share in the ownership of
private enterprises was realised, it would have benefited the public in the
long run. However, the recent NPC's atomic power plant scandal which
involved Marcos’ close friend, Hermino Disini, indicated what has has been
42happening in actual behaviour.
Meanwhile, public enterprises, as before, are used as a means to secure 
votes and to increase personal popularity for the Group. Soon after the
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declaration of martial law, the government established Cultural Centre of
the Philippines to be chaired by the First Lady, Madame Imelda Marcos. CCP
now manage a Folks Arts Theatre, a National Art Centre, a Centre for
International Trade and Exhibition and a first class hotel where foreign
government guests are to stay. As the Governor of Metro-Manila, Madame
Marcos initiated the Metro-Manila Transit Corporation which runs air
conditioned bus services known as the "love buses". These pet projects
have been highly publicised. In the recent interim National Assembly
election in which Madame Marcos ran as a Metro-Manila candidate, these
projects, among others, were claimed as personal credit and "signs of the
time" saying that "Improvement of ... A Project of Mrs Imelda Marcos, First
Lady and Governor of Metro-Manila" were erected elsewhere. Furthermore,
resources from public enterprises were available for the power elite to
wage the campaign. In the past, the use of goods from the National
Marketing Corporation and of industrial loans from GSIS, PNB and Development
43Bank of the Philippines were not uncommon practices. More recently, all 
employees were instructed to persuade their relatives to vote and to 
campaign for Madame Marcos and the New Society Movement (KBL) at the 
expense of their public enterprises.
At present, the five financial institutions (PNB, GSIS, DBP, Social 
Security System, and the Philippines Veteran Bank) are the largest financial 
resources in the country and their loans decisions have been strongly 
affected by personal influence of the leadership. In effect, loans to some 
public enterprises have been spent in unproductive but politically oriented 
projects such as the CCP's Philippine Plaza Hotel. Loans to private 
entrepreneurs have also been influenced by favouritism. As of January 30, 
1977, out of 10 companies which GSIS hold mortgage and debenture bonds, 
only two were able to pay interest, and out of 24 companies which GSIS hold
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44preferred shares, only three were able to pay dividends. Loans from
GSIS, PNB and DBP were used for the construction of many first class hotels
in 1975 but all of them were unable to repay debts and loans had to be 
45restructured.
Last but not least, Marcos’ men have been appointed to control 
important public enterprises as a political reward. The Head of GSIS who 
also controls Philippine Airlines and Manila Hotel, Roman A. Cruz, though 
undoubtedly qualified for his business ability, has been appointed because 
of his personal relations with Marcos and his family. There has also been 
a tendency that Marcos has attempted to expand his power base by appointing 
some influential military men to sit on several boards. The Chief of Staff 
of the Armed Forces sits on the governing board of GSIS while an Air Force 
General is the Chief Executive of Philippine Aerosystem Corporation. Juan 
Ponce Enrile, the Defence Secretary, is the Chairman of PNB. Some retired 
army men have also been appointed to head various corporations such as 
Eustaquio. S. Baelig Jn. of Philippine Port Authority, Teodoro Q. Pena of 
Export Processing Zone Authority and Pedro Pymbol of National Electrifi­
cation Authority.
The Chairman of Commission on Reorganisation said that one of the most
important reasons for the creation of public enterprises was the exemption
from the salary and position classification scheme applied to entitites of 
46the government. Thus, politicians holding board membership or the 
position of chief executives in those enterprises enjoy a very high 
salary. There has been a recent reform to include government "owned and 
controlled" corporations in the Civil Service but still exclude 
"policy-determining, highly technical or primarily confidential" positions,
and this is a loop hole.
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THE SYSTEM M D  PROCESS
The Definition
There has been confusion over the definition of the- term "public
enterprises" or "government-owned or controlled corporation" as known in
the Philippines because various public agencies have their own ways of
definition. Some include State universities and colleges while others
exclude subsidised companies of public corporations. In 1976 the
Presidential Commission to Study Government Corporations came up with its
"macro' list of some 140 corporate entities but a year later the number was 
47reduced to 76. The GSIS list meanwhile covered only 76 corporations
which were under its insurance scheme (including universities and some 
48statutory boards. The definition of the Investment Coordination Committee 
of NEDA is even more restricted and includes no more than 50 bodies.
In the words of the Commission on Reorganisation, which is not
accepted by the Department of Justice, "government-owned or controlled
corporations" are corporate bodies, stock or non-stock, owned or controlled
by the government and created by special law or under the Corporation Law
(Act No. 1459 of 1906 as amended) for the purpose of performing governmental
49or proprietary functions which are socio-economic in nature. The former 
function is defined as "... those that are essentially non-economic or 
being economic are deemed to be the prerogative of government because, while 
not attractive to the private sector, are destined primarily and directly 
to serve the public at large" whereas the latter "are those that are 
predominantly economic, and are believed to be particularly suited to the 
profit motive".According to this definition, public enterprises do not 
include some "departmental enterprises" such as the Bureau of Posts and its 
Philippine Postal Savings Bank which operates as any other regular
department.
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Interestingly, both "proprietary" and "governmental" enterprises are 
established by special legislation (Acts, Republic Acts, Commonwealth Acts, 
Presidential Decrees and Letters of Instruction). Only some subsidised 
companies of these corporations and "mixed enterprises" with private 
entrepreneurs are created under the Corporation Law. Also, it should be 
noted that until recently NDC was the only conglomerate of companies but 
there has been a tendency for other enterprises such as PNOC, PNB, NIDC,
DBP and GSIS to build up their own empires as mentioned earlier. Therefore, 
GSIS whose main function is to render insurance services to public 
servants, is no longer performing "governmental" activities because of its 
involvement in other "proprietary" functions. Meanwhile Land Bank of the 
Philippines is not only concerned with credits for land reform but also 
conducts commercial banking activities and owns subsidiaries involved in 
real estates and management consultancy. Thus, the distinction between two 
types of organisations in terms of establishing law and function, can 
hardly be made in practice.
There are some other organisations that are not included in this 
chapter. The first is a group of companies being leased to private 
enterprises. PAL, for example, was partially owned by NDC but NDC allowed 
private entrepreneurs to run it under a management contract in 1954-1964. 
The Manila Hotel, until recently, was leased to a private company and so 
were a few other resort hotels in Baguio and Taal. More recently, the 
government granted loans of about P2.4 million for private enterprises to 
construct first-class hotels in Metro-Manila but they failed to repay the 
debts. The government then provided two options for hotel-owners:
(1) a lease purchase arrangement over a period of not more
than 25 years;
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(2) restructuring of loans through either the extension 
of the total repayment or the conversion of unpaid 
interest due into shares.
A few hotels such as the Manila Hilton and the Hyatt Regency Hotel are now 
somewhat similar to the case of PAL during the post-war period. The second 
type is the temporary government controlled corporations. Soon after the 
declaration of martial law, the government briefly took over the management 
and operation of some 30 private enterprises such as Manila Electric 
Company, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company and Jacinto Iron and 
Steel Sheets Corporation. These eneterprises are not classified as public 
enterprises because the government's action has been on a temporary basis, 
though the government owns minority shares in some of these companies.
The Legal Structure
The legal problem concerning the definition of "government-owned and 
controlled corporations" arises from the inclusion of this clause in almost 
all legislation which involves public administration. And some public 
bodies still have conflicting views in the interpretation of the clause.
The 1973 Constitution states that the "Civil Service embraces every 
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, 
including every government-owned or controlled corporations" (Act XII B., 
Sec.1(1)). Meanwhile, the 1974 Labour Code of the Philippines provides: 
"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees 
including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, shall 
be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations..." (Act 316). 
This is supplemented by Presidential Decree No. 868 dated January 5, 1976 
that repeal all charters, laws or decrees exempting any branch, agency,
subdivision or instrumentality of the Government including Government-owned
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or controlled corporations" in these provisions contemplates only those
52created by special law. Other public enterprises, in the form of private 
companies under the Corporation Law (under the 1973 Constitution Art. XIV, 
Sec.4), organised by or later taken over by the government, are not 
subjected to the government regulations. This interpretation is based 
on Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution and Article XIV Section 
7 of the 1935 Constitution that state "The National Assembly (Congress) 
shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organisation, 
or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned 
or controlled by the government or any subdivision of instrumentality 
thereof." This provision implies the legal status of the two types of 
public enterprises in the Philippines. However, it is still doubtful 
whether organisations set up by the Executive Orders or Letters of 
Instruction as in the case of the Co-operative Development Fund (LOI No.23 
dated July 9, 1973) should be classified as public corporations. The case 
of PNOC, a corporation created by special law which specifies the exemption 
from the Civil Service Law and rules, is still unsettled and the corporation 
continues to use its own personnel regulations.
There was an unsuccessful attempt to bring all public corporations and 
state companies under a single uniform charter which provided common guide­
lines and status. In pursuance of the Reorganisation Act of 1950, President 
Quirino issued an executive order in which he promulgated the Uniform 
Government Corporate Charter of 1951 to govern all public enterprises 
except a few specified by the President. The Charter failed to convince 
Congress which continued to enact a charter for the new corporation. In 
general, however, the old and new special law creating public corporations 
more or less had some common features with the Univorm Charter’s
provisions.
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The establishing charters usually provide for public corporations to 
be established as "a corporate body" with a separate legal personality 
enabling them to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts, to acquire, hold 
or dispose of properties and to transact the business of the venture. Some 
legislation specifies thät, in addition to being a corporation, the 
corporation is a part of an administrative machinery. For instance, R.A. 
3844 creating Agricultural Credit Administration which states that ACA is 
under the National Land Reform Council. The charters entrust public 
corporations with objectives and powers, some of which are regulatory 
functions. Some corporations are fixed for their corporate life, for 
example that of LBP is 50 years. In the case of PVB, the charter states 
that the Bank is to be government-owned and controlled for the initial 
period of 5 years (but in practice, PVB has not yet been transferred to the 
private sector).
Corporate powers are vested in and exercised by a governing board 
referred to as a board of governors, administrators, directors or as a 
council as the case may be. There are some variations in the size, method 
of selection, qualification and jurisdiction of various boards. The 
average size of the board is 5-10 members, comprising a chairman and other 
members (Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3). Previously, members of the board were 
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on 
Appointments. Under the new Constitution, unless the charters provide 
for, the Prime Minister is to appoint members of the board or may delegate 
the power to a member of Cabinet. Most of the charters specify qualifica­
tions of members of the boards, for example Philippine Virginia Tobacco 
Authority, only natives of provinces growing Virginia tobacco are 
qualified for membership. However, in general, the composition of a board 
includes a number of ex-officio members representing the supervising
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department concerned authorities and the Chief Executive and/or his deputy
of the Corporation, and a number of outsiders mainly politicians. In some
cases, these outsiders representing consumers (NGA, CEDÄ), the minority
53political party (NACIDA and NIA) and trade unions (SSS) . In the past, it 
was a common practice to appoint politicians to sit on these boards. But 
the present Constitution states that "No elective official shall be eligible 
for appointment to any office or position during his term of office" and 
"No candidate who lost in an election shall be eligible for appointment or 
reappointment to any office in the Government, or in any government-owned 
or controlled corporation within one year following each election" (Art.XII, 
Sec .4(1) and (2)).
The statutory terms of office for board members are usually fixed 
ranging from one to seven years and in many cases are overlapping. Some 
charters specify that members of the boards cannot serve in other positions 
in their own corporations or other corporations. However, others do not 
mention this provision and some board members are allowed to serve more 
than one corporation. The legislation usually fixes allowances or per 
diem compensation for board members and the Chief Executive.
54The powers of the governing boards generally include:
(1) making policies and regulations;
(2) creating units, branches, or subsidiaries;
(3) appointing key and subordinate officials;
(4) fixing the compensation of personnel;
(5) removing, suspending, or disciplining; and
(6) approving budgets.
However, with the enactment of earlier mentioned legislation that put all 
"government-owned and controlled corporations" under the umbrella of a Civil
227
Service Commission, while the salary scales are to be standardised by the 
National Assembly. It should be noted that the legislation still leaves 
the appointments of personnel who "are policy determining, primarily 
confidential, or highly technical in nature" in the hands of the Prime 
Minister and his assistants.
There are some cases where the Chairman of the board is also the Chief 
Executive of that corporation while in other cases the Vice-Chairman is the 
Chief Executive. The examples of the former are Philippine Tobacco Board 
and Export Processing Zone Authority and Central Luzon-Cagayan Valley 
Authority represents the latter. In remaining cases, the Chief Executive 
or his deputy sits on the governing board as an ex-officio member.
The Uniform Charter empowers the boards to appoint the Chief 
Executives but, according to a study, a majority of the charters provide 
the President with the powers to appoint the Chief Executives with the 
consent of the Commission on Appointments. As the Commission On 
Appointments no longer exists, the Prime Minister is now given a free hand 
in picking the Chief Executives.
Some charters prescribe certain qualifications for those to be 
appointed the chief executives in addition to requirements for board 
members. But these requirements are usually stated in ambitious terms 
like the Administrator of SSS should be "... a person who has had previous 
experience in technical and administrative fields related to the purposes 
of this Act". They are to serve in the positions for a certain period of 
time, usually 3-6 years, but the term can be renewed.
In the matter of finance, almost all public corporations have an 
authorised capital fixed by their charters. For example, the NIA 
charter authorises the corporation to have a working capital of P300
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million until the entire capital is fully paid. In 1975 the total 
authorised capital is increased to P2,000 million which is to be paid by 
the government in 10 years at P200 million annually.
Some charters allow public corporations to issue bonds securities and 
debentures or to borrow from both domestic and international sources with 
or without government guarantee. In addition, some public corporations are 
authorised to collect service fees or to levy taxes. For instance, 
Philippine Sugar Institute is allowed to levy on the annual sugar producers 
a tax of ten centavos per picul of sugar for a period.
Public corporations in the Philippines are usually not exempted from 
taxes and duties imposed by the various levels of government (R.A. 104). 
Nevertheless, the charters of some newly established corporations allow 
them immunity from some kinds of t a x a t i o n . F o r  example, the issuance of 
bonds, the operations, as well as holdings, equipment, property, income and 
earnings of LBP are fully exempted from taxation.
In regard to the budgets, some corporations require the approval of 
the supervising Secretary whereas others simply submit their budgets to the 
Secretary for information purposes. The budgets are not submitted or 
approved by the Budget Commission but their brief financial statements form 
a part in the Annual Budget to be submitted to the National Assembly. With 
the creation of the Investment Co-ordination Committee in NEDA, all public 
corporations are required to submit to NEDA their proposed current 
operating expenditure and capital investment programme for the succeeding 
five fiscal years (LOI 300). The ICC has also to approve the borrowing 
programmes of public corporations.
The Commission on Audit has powers to examine, audit and settle all 
accounts pertaining to the revenues and expenditures of all public
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corporations. Within a period of time specified by law, the Commission 
submits an annual financial report to the President, the Prime Minister and 
the National Assembly.
In contrast to public corporations, state companies which are usually 
called "subsidiary corporations" because of their status, are normally 
created under the general Corporation Law. Only one subsidised corporation 
was set by a Presidential Decree, PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate Authority in 
the PHIVIDEC Group (P.D. 538) which becomes a part of the Civil Service. 
Apart from those set up by the government corporations, there are a number 
of private corporations acquired or taken over by some financial 
corporations such as the cases of PAL, Manila Hotel Corporation, Filoil 
Refining Corporation and Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. Many of these 
corporations are fully-owned by the government.
In general the structure and the management of these corporations is 
governed by the Corporation Law and their operations are the same as 
privately-owned corporations. The board of directors of a subsidised 
corporation comprises a number of government appointed directors, and in 
the case of a mixed enterprise, other share-holders. However, subsidised 
corporations wholly-owned by public corporations tend to adopt civil 
service practices similar to their parent organisations. For example, in 
personnel matters, regulations and rules of some subsidised corporations 
are patterned after those of the Civil Service and their employees are 
under the GSIS instead of the SSS scheme, the latter covers all 
private enterprises' employees.
The Process
The Philippines is among the first countries in Asia that attempted to 
subject public enterprises to some national system of co-ordination. As
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early as before the Second World War, the technique was the holding company
in the form of NDC to co-ordinate various manufacturing state or semi-state
companies. After the War, an Office of Economic Co-ordination was set up in
the Quirino Administration to be responsible for co-ordination of policies
and programmes of various public enterprises. This Office was given a high
status and its head held at cabinet rank. Its formidable powers included
supervision and control over public enterprises particularly "budgetary
controls, periodical checks and analysis of financial operations, passing
upon new development programmes and stockholders c o n t r o l " . B u t  this
attempt again failed and the Office was finally abolished in 1973.
Iglesias and Carolino commented that the weakness of the OEC derived from
its operation in a highly political environment and its powers were "blunted
or eroded by the influence network linking some corporations to the
5 8President, Congress and other influentials". Therefore, the number of
public enterprises under the OEC’s jurisdiction was decreased from 24 in
591948 to only 11 in 1960. The latest technique was contained in the 
Integrated Reorganisation Plan of 1972 which required all public enterprises 
to be attached to the Office of the President, NEDA or various departments 
likely to possess similar expertise. The IRP also recommended the estab­
lishment of a Corporate Management Board, comprising 5 Governors to sit in 
the governing boards of 10 corporations in the OEC Group, which has not yet
The concept of attachment is not uncommon in other countries. But in 
the Philippines, instead of being used for the delegation of authority, 
this pattern of co-ordination seems to strengthen the centralisation of 
power in fewer hands. The number of public enterprises and their 
subsidiaries under the NEDA's control is 49, among them, are all financial 
institutions except the Central Bank which is under the Office of the Prime
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Minister, and almost all regional development authorities. The OP comes 
next with 20 corporations. The Department of Public Works, Transportation 
and Communication ranks third with 18 corporations and departmental 
enterprises but, some of them were transferred to the newly established 
Department of Energy in 1977.
The President (now also Prime Minister) is of course the most powerful 
man in the country, particularly after declaring martial law. Until 
recently, with the absence of Congress (or the National Assembly), he also 
performed legislative powers without any checking mechanism. In the words 
of a scholar, the pattern of the Philippine government under martial law 
was that "the President is national Pangulo par excellence; and the Cabinet 
officials play the roles of eyes and ears of the President, arms of the 
President, recommenders of policies, and implementers of policies. The 
President as national Pangulo is Chief legislator, Chief Executive, Chief 
Administrator, Comraander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Martial Law Chief, 
Martial Law Judge, National Patron, and National Integrator of the Security, 
the economy and the policies. Last but not least, he is National Teacher 
of the idea of the New Society".^ Even with the election of members of 
the Interim National Assembly in April 1978 in which the New Society 
Movement won almost all seats, it is unlikely that the Legislation Branch 
will be active again in the near future. Though the Interim National 
Assembly has the same powers and its members have the same functions and 
responsibilities as the regular Assembly and its members according to the 
Constitution, the same Constitution clearly states that it "shall give 
priority to measures for the orderly transition from the presidential to the 
parliamentary system, the reorganisation of the Government, the eradication 
of graft and corruption, the effective maintenance of peace and order, the 
implementation of declared agrarian reforms, the standardisation of
232
compensation of government employees, and such other measures as shall 
bridge the gap between the rich and the poor" (Art.XVII, Sec.5). This 
means that members of the Interim National Assembly are not to be as active 
as their predecessors.
In contrast to the large and dispersive political elite of the pre­
mar tial law period, the political elite led by Marcos is a small and 
cohesive group of less than 40 people: 30 with Cabinet ranks or equivalent
and the rest in the Armed Forces or in public agencies. About one third of 
them are technocrats with good academic background and experience. Almost 
all of them are concerned with the operations of public enterprises in one 
way or another. Quite a large number of them have been involved in
central planning either in the Macapagal or Marcos Administrations. This 
group is so small that it enables Marcos to have effective span of control. 
It is also cohesive because of some factors explained by Professor Agpalo:
"... there is no serious factionalism that leads to weakness
or indecision of the body which exists, because ... all the
Cabinet officials were appointed and could be removed by the
President, for they have shared with him in forging the
strategies and tactics of carrying them out; they have no
solid political base, which was the principal attribute of
the well-known oligarchs of the pre-martial law political
system; and the incentives of working devotedly and faithfully
with the President do not only have fear of losing honor, life
and fortune were the martial law administration to fail but
also of the joy and pride of fathering the birth of a new 
61society."
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However, there has been considerable rift in the group. One of the most 
trusted aid of Marcos, former Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor, was 
sacked in 1976 apparently because of his conflicts with Defence Secretary 
Juan Ponce Enrille and Madame Marcos. Since then this powerful position 
has been left vacant.
Iglesias and Corolina stated that only one out of six public enter­
prises attached to OP in their study was placed there by its charter. The 
others came under its supervision simply because former Secretary Melchor
sat in their board or because their top executives were personally appointed
* 6 2by the Prime Minister. In fact, public enterprises are favoured to be 
under the OP umbrella not only because they enjoy more prestige and 
privileges but also because OP, without having expertise in the areas 
public enterprises operate, tends to exercise less control. Above all, 
their being under OP ensures the attention and support from the Prime 
Minister and Madame Marcos that makes their operations successful.
Usually the Office of the Executive Secretary through the Development 
Management Staff reviews board resolutions, annual reports and budgets of 
public enterprises. The Prime Minister is required to give final decisions 
only in matters involving a huge investment which in practice have to be 
referred to the ICC, NEDA and CB before reaching him. But there are 
exceptions if the matters are politically sensitive.
Probably the most effective control over public enterprises in the 
Philippines is financial control exercised by the ICC and NEDA. All 
financial public enterprises except CB are now under the supervision of 
NEDA and their top executives sit in the ICC. The ICC, composed of 10 
members (5 from GSIS, SSS, PNB, DBP and PVB which are under NEDA, LBP which 
is under the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Philippine Amanah Bank
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under the Department of Finance, the Secretary of Finance, and the Chairman
of the Board of Investment) with NEDA Director-General as Chairman, was
created in 1972 "to perform the functions of formulating and co-ordinating
the investment policies of the government financial institution ... serve
as a general clearing house of information on projects before member
institutions ... develop a co-ordinated and consistent budgeting system for
6 3the resources of government financial institutions ..." This Committee 
works through its Technical Board which is chaired by NEDA Deputy Director- 
General. The main task of the ICC, in practice, is to plan the use of 
resources from the financial public institutions which has come up in the 
form of a seven-year consolidated funds flow. Since these financial public 
enterprises have been the major financial sources for investment of other 
public enterprises, the ICC and NEDA have been among the most influential 
bodies in the policy-making process, particularly in the matters concerning 
fiscal and financial policies. The men who led to this control are of 
course technocrats who have been dealing with public enterprises for a 
decade or more. Finance Secretary Cesar Virata was the former Chairman and 
President of PNB and the Chairman of LBP while Professor Gerardo Secat,
NEDA's Director-General, used to sit on many boards. Moreover, many Chief 
Executives of these financial institutions sitting in the ICC were either 
academics or former top bureaucrats who used to be former colleagues of the 
two at NEC or President Economic Staff (PES).
It should be noted again that the work of the ICC and NEDA in the 
allocation of finance has often been disrupted by key politicians such as 
the Prime Minister and his wife, who press them to finance some unprofitable 
but more politically oriented projects.
The degree of control exercised by regular departments over their 
public enterprises varies from enterprise to enterprise essentially
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depending on personalities on the board and in the top management. The 
Secretary of the department is normally the Chairman of public enterprises 
under its supervision. In some cases, however, the Secretary of a 
department was appointed the Chairman of the board attached to another 
department such as the Defence Secretary chairs the PNB Board which is 
under NEDA. Equally important are the close relationships with top elites 
and personal interest of the Prime Minister and Madame Marcos which directly 
affected the policy-making process at the departmental level. In these 
cases, the relationship between the departments and their public enter­
prises is more consultative and the approval of board resolutions is 
somewhat of a rubber stamp. In actual practice, the Prime Minister often 
deals directly with top officials of public enterprises and this reduces 
the degree of departmental control.
Two other constitutional bodies directly concerned with the operations
of Philippine public enterprises are the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission On Audits. As mentioned earlier, the CSC has had a long struggle
with public enterprises over personnel matters but its victory is yet to be
realised. More than anything else, the success of the CSC in the
64implementation of its policy virtually depends on two factors:
(1) the support of the Prime Minister, and
(2) the strong leadership of the Chairman of the body.
In the period 1962-1971, Abelardo Subido was the Commissioner of Civil 
Service and was the one who actively waged the war against the appointment 
of politicians on the governing boards of public enterprises. In 1966 he 
opposed the appointment of Governor Manuel D. Barretto as Chairman of the 
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes. Later he bracketed the Mayor of Manila for 
accepting membership in the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and
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a member of a provincial board for accepting the position of general 
manager of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. In effect, 
President Marcos held all other appointments of politicians in the 
governing boards.
On the other hand, the Commission On Audit (formerly the Auditor-
General) has long played a very active role in financial control of public
enterprises. Probably the auditing system of the Philippines is more
advanced and more efficiently operated than those of other countries in the
ASEAN region. The General Auditing Office, patterned after the American
counterpart, used to perform the review and approval of revenue receipts,
the pre-audit and payment-audit of disbursements and the examination and
analysis of financial records. However, in the 1960s it dropped the
function of pre-auditing and adopted a new system so-called programme
auditing including a post-audit system, a comprehensive coverage and the
6 5use of selective methods. From time to time, the Auditor-General in his 
report to the President and Congress, voiced his views not only on the 
aspect of financial transactions or evaluation of financial conditions but 
also on the evaluation of public enterprises' performance.
The Entrepreneur
Public enterprises in the Philippines have often been known as
"convenient political tools which are overstaffed, inefficient and graft-
66ridden". As pointed out in the report of the Technical Committee on 
Government Corporations in 1965 some managerial problems facing Philippine 
public enterprises were as follows:
"(1) Internal Problems:
Management, e.g. inappropriate staffing, 
inefficiency, lack of qualified personnel.
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Labour, e.g. overstaffing, lack of permanence, 
unstable relations with management, lack of 
technical manpower.
All these indicated the poor quality of public enterprise employees at all 
levels, and has been highly policised, apparently as an effect of a 
political environment which recognised such appointments or political 
rewards as part of the system.
At the top of the structure, according to a study in 1962, the board
membership was dominated (45 percent) by either politicians or bureaucrats
6 8and businessmen who had become involved in partisan politics. The 
situation after the proclamation of martial law has not been changed.
Instead there is some evidence that the governing boards have increasingly 
become all bureaucrat-politician affair boards. Firstly, the composition 
stated in newer charters increases the number of representatives from 
ministerial departments and concerned authorities as well as those 
classified as qualified personnel who in practice come from the above 
groups. Secondly, the absence of the Commission on Appointments (which in 
the past was an efficient watchdog) has led to more patronage practices in 
these appointments. A survey of 18 corporations reveals that out of 148 
members of their boards, 51 are either politicians or top bureaucrats 
representing supervising departments or concerned authorities, whereas 
another 53 are in the "others" category which in fact are mainly in these 
same groups appointed on their other capacities (Table 7.1). More 
interestingly, representatives from the Office of the President and the 
Department of National Defence top the number of government representatives 
in these boards, despite the fact that a few of these boards are under the 
supervision of OP and DND. This implies the regime’s attempt to centralise 
power and to expand its power base. In addition, the OP representation on
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these boards indicates personal interest and concern of Marcos and his 
family. For example, Madame Marcos has been interested in the operation of 
bus services in Metro-Manila where she is the Governor and the OP 
representation ensures that her policy is properly implemented. The 
increasing number of bureaucrats in the boards also denotes the growing 
influence of technocrats in the Philippines in the policy-making process. 
These technocrats, mostly come from the public sector in which they usually 
have a rank not lower than a bureau director, are close to either Marcos or 
top technocrats who have since become politicians under Marcos.
In the past, many members of the boards, particularly politicians,
lacked the necessary background and qualifications for board membership but
they were appointed because the boards were considered as "the sources of
69pressure for patronage and other political considerations." At present, 
the pattern of politics has been changed and political powers are firmly in 
the hands of only one group but public enterprises are still one of the •
largest sources of political patronage. Marcos often personally hand­
picked chief executives as well as board members of public enterprises, 
particularly those with his personal concern and interest. It is also a 
common practice for each board member to recruit his own personal staff, 
ranging from 10 to 50, classified as "policy-determining", "confidential" 
or "highly technical". In most cases, the personnel are not required to 
report at the offices but receive salaries and allowances at the above 
average level.
A change has occurred in the security of tenure and continuance of 
service of board members. Before the rule of Marcos, despite the fixed 
statutory terms of office, the turnover rate was high and only a few in 
number of these board members had expired terms. This was a result of a
change of administration.
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With the absence of the Commission On Appointments, the 
appointments of chief executives at present are essentially patronage, In 
the past, the Chief Executives in a majority of the public enterprises were 
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission and only ten 
governing boards appointed their respective chief executive, subject to the 
approval of the President.^ However, there was a tendency in the 1960s for 
the increasing appointments of these chief executives with "high competence, 
experience, integrity and drive".  ^ The present situation is disappointing. 
While many highly qualified professional men have been appointed to the top 
positions in public .enterprises, there have also been quite a number of 
Chief Executives who fall short of the standards. The latter are appointed 
under political considerations and most of these head the more important 
corporations. Figure 7.2 exhibits the background of the Chief Executives 
in selected corporations.
A writer comments that the patronage system in public enterprises was
influenced by the Philippine political environment expressed in the terms
of the "padrino system", "the pakikisano" or the "utang na loob" (I scratch
72your back and you scratch mine). The President was not only the national 
leader but also the national pangulo (patron) who released funds to finance 
"pork barrel" projects and granted honours through appointments of various 
officials. The rule under the martial law is yet to see any change.
At the lower levels of the organisations are a number of staff members 
who are mainly in the head-offices in Manila. Only a few regional 
corporations have their headquarters outside Manila while quite a number 
branch out to cities and municipalities. This implies the degree of 
centralisation in the capital city. Until recently almost all activities 
of LBP including the provision of small loans to farmers in the land reform
programme was handled in the head office.
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FIGURE 7.3 THE TYPICAL COMPOSITION OF A BOARD
Board of Directors of the Philippine Airlines
Chairman and President 
Vice Chairman 
Vice Chairman *
Mr Roman A. Cruz, Jr. (GSIS)
Mr Placido Mapa, Jr. (Chairman, DBP) 
Mr Ricardo Cu Unjieng
Cesar A. Virata (Secretary of Finance)
Geronimo Z. Velasco (Secretary of Energy)
Estelito P. Mendoza (Solicitor-General)
Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi (retired)
(Publisher of the Bulletin Today)
Source: The PALiner (Special Issue November 1977) pp.1-2
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FIGURE 7.4 INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIP (as of 31 March 1978)
Mr Roman A. Cruz, Jr. - General-Manager, GSIS
- Chairman and President, Manila Hotel Corp.
- Chairman and President, Philippine Airlines
- Chairman and President, Hotel Enterprises 
of the Philippines, Inc. (Hyatt Regency)
- Member of the boards of directors of 
Philippine Aerotransport Inc., Philippine 
Aerospace Development Corp., Philippine 
Amanah Bank
- Member of the boards of directors of 
Philippine Bank of California and 
Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and 
Re-drying Corp. (Private Enterprises)
Secretary Cesar A. Virata - Chairman, Fertiliser Corporation of the
Philippines, Land Bank of the Philippines
- Member of the Boards of Directors, Filoil, 
Petrophil, Lusteveco, Philippine Aerospace 
Development Corp., Metro Manila Transit 
Corp., National Housing Authority
Secretary Geronimo Z. Velasco - Chairman and President, Philippine
National Oil Company, PNOC Energy 
Development Corp., PNOC Exploration Corp., 
Bataan Refining Corp., Filoil Refinery 
Corp., Petrophil Tanker Corp., Petron 
Tankers Corp., Petron TBA Corp., Filoil 
Industrial Estates, Inc.
- Chairman, Republic Glass Corp., Dole 
Philippines, Inc., Jabpract Mining and 
Industrial Corp., E. Razon, Inc., Rockland 
Marble, Inc. (Private Enterprises)
- President, Acacia Securities Corp. (Private 
Enterprises)
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For more than two decades there have been power struggles between CSC
and governing boards of public enterprises on personnel matters. With the
adoption of the Uniform Charter of 1951, all public enterprises except PNB,
CB, and the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, were to adopt the Civil
Service Law and rules. However, the exemption clause for the positions of
"policy-determining, primarily confidential or technical", have made it
possible for a number of the corporation to utilise their own methods of
selection and to pay salaries much higher than the average, resulting in a
disparity in salary ranges. In a recent survey of 14 corporations, all but
one (Metro Manila Transit Corporation) was covered by the Civil Service
rules and regulations but all were exempted from the Wage and Position
Classification Office. Hence, they had salary structure differences
73among themselves and regular departments. Also, employees of public 
enterprises primarily performing proprietary functions were recognised by 
courts of law and the Court of Industrial Relations to possess the right to 
form or join associations or labour organisations for purposes of 
collective bargaining as well as the right to strike. The inclusion of 
"government-owned and controlled corporations" employees in the Civil 
Service as stated in the 1973 Constitution and the new Labour Code seems to 
be a victory for the CSC. However, as stated before, there is still an 
exception clause in the Constitution and President Decree No.868. The 
Secretary of Justice's interpretation that separate public enterprises into 
public corporations established by special law and state companies under 
the Corporation Law, also provides a loophole. Therefore, one can see the 
proliferation of subsidised corporations which are not under the umbrella 
of the Civil Service and more political appointments are made under these
exceptions.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Philippines has a long history of public enterprises, perhaps the 
longest one among the ASEAN nations. But Philippine public enterprises 
have never been able to establish for themselves a solid place in the 
economy. Nor has their contribution to national development been 
substantial. Instead, they are widely known for their inefficiency, over- 
staffing, widespread corruption and patronage. Much discussion on this
subject has been on how these enterprises can be abolished or sold to 
private entrepreneurs. This is a disappointing experience because there 
are many areas that public enterprises should have been utilised to help 
accelerate national development.
Public enterprises, meanwhile, became an important mechanism to 
preserve political powers of the ruling elites. They were used as 
resources for political manoeuvre in gaining popular votes and in gaining 
loyalty from local politicans. Resources from public enterprises were 
channelled to unprofitable projects in the pork barrel system or to finance 
privately owned enterprises that would enrich powerful politicians. Public 
enterprises were also full of employees without prescribed eligibility but 
with strong political support such as compadres, ahijados, or proteges of 
influential politicians. This happened because political behaviour had 
deteriorated and had become corrupt and it became difficult to elect 
national leaders who sought the good of the nation and not their own 
personal profit and advantage.
With the declaration of martial law, Marcos promised to replace the 
oligarch-controlled Old Society with the New Society of reformed political 
and economic institutions. However, so far, one has not yet seen the
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departure of the former political behaviour which has long eroded the 
country. Only significant changes are that the stability of the ruling 
regime now depended more on the power elites (the military and civilian 
bureaucrats and wealthy businessmen) than former politicians, and that 
rivals of the regime were rid of their economic powers. Undoubtedly, 
public enterprises had been employed, among others, for these purposes.
Public enterprises, therefore, have become increasingly politicised 
and personalised for the benefit of fewer top elites. The growth of public 
enterprises can be explained as an attempt of the authoritarian government 
to broaden its power base by appointing its supporters to sit on the boards 
or to head these enterprises in return for their loyalty. At the same time, 
some newly created public enterprises have been assigned to take over some 
activities previously undertaken by private enterprises owned by political 
rivals, as in the case of PAL, so that the regime can effectively control 
the economy. In addition, some "pet" projects are carried out by public 
enterprises to impress the general public and may not seriously consider 
the long term effect.
It is true that the Marcos regime decreed in the 1973 Constitution and 
the 1974 Labour Code, that all public enterprises’ employees are a part of 
the Civil Service and that undesirable personnel are not allowed to be 
appointed. But it is also true that there is an exceptional clause in the 
legislations that enable politicians to be appointed. Indeed, this 
country is the first in the region to introduce legislation that embraced 
all employees of these enterprises under the umbrella of the Civil Service 
but with disappointing results. Therefore, such legislation is nothing 
more than a political gimmick and only repeats past failures.
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CHAPTER 8
COUNTRY STUDY: SINGAPORE
Singapore has established a worldwide reputation for her rapid 
economic growth. Within two decades after the ruling People’s Action Party 
(PAP) came into power, her per capita income increased five times to more 
than US$2,500 in 1975. On the basis of this figure, Singapore rates as a 
"developed" country.^ Within a decade chronic unemployment, which reached 
the peak in 1966 at 6 percent, was virtually eliminated. Urban problems 
were also resolved with vast government investment in urban renewal and 
housing projects. Now, more than 56 percent of the total population not 
only live in government built modern flats with full conveniences but also 
in a well planned "clean and green" environment. Singaporeans, in 
addition, enjoy other excellent services given by the State which are 
superior to other Asian standards.
To a great extent, this achievement owes much to the use of effective 
government machinery other than ministerial departments; the latter are 
mainly utilised for traditional functions. Since 1966, a large number of 
statutory boards and state companies have been set up to spearhead national 
development with concentration on industrialisation and public services in 
an attempt to solve pressing unemployment and urban problems as well as 
reducing the dependence of the national economy on traditional enterpot 
trading. With a total of more than 100 public enterprises in a small 
republic of two and a half million population, this type of governmental 
machinery becomes a crucial part of Singaporean public administration and 
of overall national economy.
Patterned after the British, and later other continental models, 
Singaporean public enterprises are not structually different from their
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counterparts in other ASEAN countries. Politicians and bureaucrats are 
very much involved in the management, as in other countries, but with few 
of the shortcomings. In fact, political involvement does not seem to 
affect very much the autonomy and flexibility of the day-to-day management. 
Public enterprises here are run the same as an ordinary private company but 
still with public accountability.
This Chapter examines how Singaporean public enterprises are able to 
secure aspects of efficiency such as economic profitability, social 
benefits and political efficiency. The first part provides a background 
profile while in later parts discusses the structure and process of public 
policy-making which affects the management and operations of these 
enterprises.
THE BACKGROUND
Despite the PAP's socialist banner that brought them into office after
the political independence in 1959, the government was initially reluctant
to take the initiative in economic activities during its first two terms.
Its role was restricted to some areas already performed by colonial
establishments. The much publicised Housing Development Board (1960), the
Public Utilities Board (1960), the Port of Singapore Authority (1964) and
the Economic Development Board (1961) were all established to replace their
2ineffective predecessors but were given wider responsibilities. The only 
new creation in that period was the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board 
(1964). Only after the separation from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 
and the announcement of the British Armed Forces' withdrawal in 1967 did 
the government seriously start taking part in unconventional economic
activities to counter the dependency on enterpot trading and rising
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unemployment problems. From then on, more than 100 statutory boards and 
state companies, classified here as public enterprises, were set up.
Strategically located in the centre of sea trading routes between the
Far East and Europe and Australia and Asia, within a century Singapore has
been developed as a world major port and one of the largest commercial
cities in Asia. Its main earnings, estimated to be about 20 percent of 
*
Gross National Product prior to the independence, came from enterpot trade
and related activities: collecting of the regional natural resources for
markets in industrial countries and in turn importing industrial products
. 3back for distribution in neighbouring countries. This practice made the 
national economy vulnerable to changes in external factors which were 
beyond the control of the government, particularly the frequent fluctuations 
in world prices of rubber and tin which were the main trading commodities. 
Technical improvements in transportation also encouraged direct shipment to 
and from neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, 
resulting in a loss of trade and income to Singapore. Moreover, these 
neighbouring countries, which previously relied on Singapore in import- 
export activities, started expanding their own ports in the attempt to 
by-pass Singapore.
Meanwhile, unemployment became a chronic and pressing problem due to 
the effects of the Second World War and the post-war baby boom. It was 
apparent that Singapore could no longer be dependent upon international 
trade activities to generate employment opportunities for a rapidly 
expanding young work force. The number of unemployed people in 1959 was 
estimated at 46,000 o'r 10 percent of the total workforce and it was 
estimated that 84,000 jobs had to be created during 1961-1964 and 214,000
4by 1970. In effect, an estimation of 19 percent of the total households 
lived near or at poverty levels in 1953.^ A great number of them lived in
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make-shift houses in slums and squatter settlements without proper
facilities and conveniences which were exposed to health and fire hazards.
Above all, this underprivileged group tended to support the rising
Communist United Front which endangered the stability of the ruling Lee
6Kuan Yew government.
The solution the government decided to counter these problems with, 
was to expand the manufacturing industry because other options did not 
appear promising. Singapore's limited land area with poor soil did not 
offer much prospect of expansion in agriculture. Nor did the tourist trade 
look very appealing at that time.
The industrial structure of Singapore then was characterised by a 
large number of small manufacturing establishments essentially engaged in 
food and beverage, textiles, wood and cork and footware industries in 
addition to rubber processing which was the main activity. The total 
industrial workforce in 1961 was only 47,500, one third of which were 
employed in larger establishments while the rest were in 2,300 factories,
g70 percent of which employed less than 10 workers.
Soon after taking over the office, the PAP government passed two major 
pieces of legislation, the Pioneer Industries Ordinance and the Industrial 
Expansion Ordinance, both of which were aimed at attracting foreign and 
local investment in manufacturing industries by offering substantial tax 
concessions.
The effort in inducing industrial investment was centralised in a 
single governmental agency. The Economic Development Board was established 
in 1961, with recommendations from the World Bank and the UNTAB missions, 
to handle all investment promotional works. It was the "one-stop-shop" in 
the sense that it assisted prospective investors in every phase of works,
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from helping them deal with various governmental agencies to providing 
factory sites and buildings, loan finance, market studies and labour 
recruitment. It also took some equity participation in some companies in 
order to encourage the establishment of new industries. One of the direct 
investments was the first iron and steel mill in Singapore, the National 
Iron and Steel Mills Company (1961). In fact, public investment in the 
industrial sector through EDB in its first year of operation was more than 
the subscribed capital of private enterprises granted the pioneer status 
during 1959-1962.9
In other Third World countries, the national economic development 
board, usually a product of the IBRD recommendations, tends to serve as the 
central planning body and has nothing to do with the implementation. 
However, Singapore's EDB never involved itself in the planning process and 
was rather an implementing unit. The first and only State Development Plan 
of 1961-1964 was prepared by the Ministry of Finance before the establish­
ment of EDB while the drafted second Plan was never realised. The first 
Plan allocated S$100 million to the EDB during the first five years and 
another S$90.5 million for industrial estate projects also under the 
jurisdiction of the EDB. The EDB's impressive growth led to the birth of 
six important public enterprises which were responsible for the success of 
economic development in the past decade. They were the Jurong Town 
Corporation (1968), Development Bank of Singapore (1968), International 
Trading Company - INTRACO (1968), National Productivity Board (1972), and 
National Engineering Services (Private) Company (1973).
The Plan primarily aimed at proving economic and facilities to attract 
foreign investors. Apart from 21.9 percent of the total S$870.92 million 
public expenditure in 1961-64 that allocated to EDB, 16.8 percent was for 
the improvement of public utilities and another 13.47 percent for
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transportation and communication. Furthermore, S$153.60 million of 17.64 
percent was earmarked for housing development which directly contributed to 
the expansion of the building industry and related activities.^
Despite the two years long unhappy merger with Malaysia in 1963-65 and 
the Indonesian confrontation during the same period, the average growth 
rate was 8.4 percent per annum. The percent of GNP accounted for by 
enterpot activities declined from 18.6 percent to 10.1 percent while that 
of industries (including quarrying) increased from 9.1 percent to 13.6 
percent. A total of 58,000 jobs was created, a majority of them in the 
manufacturing sector."*"^  Moreover, HDB constructed 58,748 housing units 
during the Plan, a remarkable performance in comparison with 23,019 units
12finished by its forerunner Singapore Improvement Trust from 1928 to 1959.
The man essentially responsible for the progress was Dr Goh Keng Swee, 
the Minister of Finance. In addition to fiscal and monetary responsibil­
ities, the Singaporean Minister of Finance handled trade, industry, 
development planning, economic development policy and even some areas of 
communications and transportation. The EDB was also directly under the 
supervision of this ministry.
However, to many believers, the economic progress during the 
1959-1965 period was owed to political stability as various political rival 
groups were crushed. In the 1963 election, the PAP won 37 of the 51 seats 
in the Legislative Assembly and returned to office. Since then the 
government has taken strong measures to stabilise the political situation 
by arresting left-wing party leaders, unionists and students on various 
charges. Most of them were either detained or deported. This led to the 
walk-out from the Assembly by the opposition Barisan Socialis which 
subsequently ended the pressure of political parties upon the government.
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From 1968 the PAP has overwhelmingly controlled all the 58 seats and thus 
become the "one dominant party".
The PAP is in fact not the only political party in the republic but it
13is the only party at the grass-roots. The party has branches (and sub­
branches and liaison stations) established in every constituency. Each 
branch is expected to be the link between the masses and the party leaders 
so that the Central Executive Committee of the party is well informed. At 
present, the most popular activities of these branches are Meet-the-People 
sessions (held once a week by local MPs) and kindergarten classes. It 
should be noted also that these branches have very close relationships with 
the government-sponsored Citizen's Consultative Committees and community 
centres which have been established throughout the island. The members of 
these grass-roots organisations are recruited from influential local leaders 
by local MPs and are appointed by the government. These local leaders are
not necessarily supporters or members of PAP but once they are recruited
14they tend to be absorbed by PAP mechanism.
Other factors contributing to the success was the development of an 
efficient economic and financial infrastructure and a dynamic and 
uncorrupted bureaucracy. With Dr Koh's initiation, Singapore adopted a 
conservative monetary policy in which domestic money supply was backed 100 
percent by foreign exchange r e s e r v e s . I n  effect, Singapore has retained 
the Currency Board System and never established the Central Bank. Dr Koh 
also chaired a party committee set up in 1960 to examine ways in which the 
bureaucracy could be improved. The Central Complaints Bureau (now Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau) was later established to exercise punitive 
measures against the bureaucrats for misconduct and to direct them to adopt 
a "corrective attitude" in discharging their duties.
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I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  S inga po re  i n h e r i t e d  an  e x p e r i e n c e d  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  f rom t h e  c o l o n i a l  government  when i t  became s e l f - g o v e r n e d  i n  
1959.  But i t  i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n v e s t e d  c o n s i d e r ­
a b l e  e f f o r t  to  change  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  who had been  
n u r t u r e d  by t h e  c o l o n i a l i s t .  C i v i l  s e r v a n t s  were enc ou ra ge d  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  
i n  c i v i c  p r o j e c t s  a l o n g s i d e  M i n i s t e r s  and PAP s u p p o r t e r s .  A P o l i t i c a l  
Study  C e n t r e  was a l s o  s e t  up to  i n d o c t r i n a t e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  who had 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  to  meet  the  Pr ime M i n i s t e r  and C a b i n e t  M i n i s t e r s .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a l a r g e  number o f  young b u r e a u c r a t s  were promoted  o r  r e c r u i t e d  
w i t h i n  t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  y e a r s  o f  t h e  PAP r u l e  and i t  i s  t h i s  group  o f  p e o p l e  
which a t  p r e s e n t  forms t h e  backbone  o f  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  which has  l o y a l l y  
s e r v e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p .
In  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  government  a c t i v i t i e s  
u s u a l l y  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  i c r e a s e  of  b u r e a u c r a t i c  power and t h e  c o u n t r y  
becomes an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t a t e  where p o l i t i c a l  power changes  hands  to  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a t s .  In  S i n g a p o r e ,  t h e  top  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  h a s  no t  y e t  been 
overshadowed  by t h e  b u r e a u c r a t s ,  p a r t y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  compact g e o g r a p h i c a l  
s i z e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  and p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  PAP p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t e g y  i n  
which top  b u r e a u c r a t s  a r e  r e c r u i t e d  to  t h e  r a n k s  i n  t h e  p a r t y  o r  a r e  
a s s i g n e d  to  c h a i r  s t a t u t o r y  b o a rd s  o r  to  s i t  on t h e  b o a r d s  o f  S t a t e  and 
S e m i - S t a t e  com p a n ie s .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  deve lopm en ts  i n  t h e  second  h a l f  o f  t h e  1960s 
c o n t r i b u t e d  to  more s e r i o u s  c r i s e s .  Thd s e p a r a t i o n  from M a la y s i a  i n  August  
1965 meant  l i t t l e  hope  f o r  a w ide r  m arke t  f o r  S i n g a p o r e ' s  goods and 
l e s s e n i n g  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  among f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s .  Th i s  was f o l l o w e d  by 
m easu res  and c o u n t e r - m e a s u r e s  employed by b o t h  governments  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  
m u tua l  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  m a n u f a c t u r in g  t a r i f f s  and q u o t a s ,  s t r i c t  i m m i g r a t i o n  
c o n t r o l  and t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  of  c u r r e n c y .  Then came th e  announcement  o f  t h e
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B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  i n t e n t i o n  to  move back  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  p r e s s u r e  E a s t  of  
Suez.  The c om ple te  w i th d ra w a l  s c h e d u l e d  i n  1971 t h r e a t e n e d  n o t  o n l y  t h e  
l o s s  o f  e s t i m a t e d  B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e  o f  S$550 m i l l i o n  p e r  y e a r  
b u t  a l s o  t h e  j o b s  l o s t  by a bou t  30 ,000  c i v i l i a n s  w ork ing  i n  t h e  b a s e s  and 
8 ,0 0 0  i n d i r e c t  e m p loye es . "^
The c r i s i s  prompted t h e  government  to  change  i t s  r o l e  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
economy; i t  no l o n g e r  c o n f i n e d  i t s e l f  to  economic s t i m u l a t i o n ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  
t h e  gove rnment  became an e n t r e p r e n e u r .  The g o v e r n m e n t ' s  d e c i s i o n  was 
j u s t i f i e d  by t h e  p u b l i c  mandate  which  gave PAP c o m p le te  c o n t r o l  i n  
P a r l i a m e n t  i n  t h e  September  1968 e l e c t i o n .  The new d i r e c t i o n s  i n i t i a t e d  by 
t h e  PAP gove rnment  a r e  as  f o l l o w s :
(1) i n c r e a s i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  to  b o t h  new and e x i s t i n g  
i n v e s t o r s  to  b u i l d  up o r  expand m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  e x p o r t - o r i e n t a t e d  o r  h i g h l y  t e c h n o l o g i c a l ;
(2) i n c r e a s e  i n  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  o f  some S$900 m i l l i o n  to  
o f f s e t  t h e  l o s s  o f  B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  and th u s  
p r e v e n t  a r e c e s s i o n ;
(3) p a s s a g e  o f  i m p o r t a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t h e  Employment Act and
t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  (Amendment) Act  o f  1968, e s s e n t i a l l y  
a imed a t  d i s c i p l i n i n g  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e ;
(4) a c c e l e r a t i o n  o f  the  deve lopmen t  o f  t e c h n i c a l  and v o c a t i o n a l  
t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  a t t e m p t  to  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  s k i l l e d
i n c r e a s e  t h e  r a t e  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i d e n t
Fund from 5 p e r c e n t  of  pay by employer  and employee by
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(6) acceleration of the defence forces build-up to occupy the 
former British bases in addition to the transformation of 
these bases into commercial use;
(7) restructuring EDB in the attempt to increase functional 
specialisation in the industrialisation process.
The last two are of particular importance to this study. The impact was 
not only the rapid increase in the number of public enterprises but also 
the widening scope of activities the government direct'ed. In 
other words, the strpcture of the economy was radically transformed from 
the long practiced laissez faire system to the mixed economy where the 
government permeated every sector of the economy from ship-building to 
supermarket operation and from land development to airline business.
The reason for the reorganisation of EDB was the obvious risk in 
combining investment promotion and financing activities in one organisation 
Therefore, the Industrial Facilities Division and the Finance Division were 
separated to form JTC and DBS respectively. The former took charge of all 
industrial estates in Jurong and elsewhere while the latter was to finance 
commercial and industrial projects. The two also created the International 
Trading Company in 1968 to promote exports and to supply raw materials for 
domestic industries. Therefore, the EDB was left with the basic task of 
industrial investment promotion.
The DBS, registered under the Companies Ordinance with a 50-50 equity 
participation between the government and commercial banks, had a dual 
function, commercial and development banking and development investment. 
After eight years of its operation, DBS's total financial commitments were 
S$l,195 million committed to 350 companies, out of which 72 were wholly or
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partially DBS owned. This forms the largest group of public enterprises 
and semi-state companies in Singapore.
The JTC, on the other hand, engaged in more promotional activities. 
Nevertheless, it owned not only factory buildings and sites but shop 
houses, housing units, social and recreational amenities and a port as 
well.
In regard to INTRACO, at present also a large group of companies, the
company initially promoted trade relations between Singapore and socialist
countries but later diversified to other activities with a turnover of
18S$90 million annually. The company has already gone public, a very 
exceptional case among public enterprises in Singapore, with the government 
still owning 25 percent of the equity.
The conversion of British bases into commercial use caused the 
establishment of several state companies; mostly concerned with ship­
building and repairing and aviation services.
The period 1968-1973 witnessed the rapid growth of public enterprise
in Singapore. In the manufacturing sector, 39 state companies were
established during 1968-1973 as against 18 during 1960-1967 and in the
service sector, 48 companies were established as against only 5 in 
191960-1967. This trend can be attributed to the increasing role of DBS
and INTRACO. In 1977, there are 23 statutory boards and 92 state companies
which are classified here as public enterprises, and a large number of
semi-state companies in which the government owns minority shares. The
aggregated government equity investment in state and semi-state companies
alone including the shareholding of DBS and INTRACO totalled S$373 million
20by the end of 1975. The amount of government investment in statutory 
boards is not available but the total accumulated loans to all public
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enterprises in FY 1975-1976 is S$l,138.6 million, an almost triple increase
21within four years.
To evaluate the performance of public enterprises, there are three 
criterion to be considered:
(i) economic efficiency employing commercial profitability, 
cost/benefit ratio and rate of return on capital 
investment,
(ii) social profitability comparing social benefit with 
social cost, and
(iii) political efficiency by considering the outcome of the 
political process and political target set by the 
government.
Commercial profitability can well be applicable to profit making state and 
semi-state companies, provided: (i) there are no privileges, (ii) market
demand is not unfavourable, (iii) pricing is not politically set. 
Non-profit state companies with educational reserach, recreational and 
other promotional activities and statutory boards which provide economic 
and social infrastructure, however, cannot rigidly apply this yardstick 
because their operations are supposed to be for public benefit. Again, it 
is difficult to quantify social profitability made by these enterprises.
Not all Singaporean public enterprises are successful. Many state
companies including Saber Air, Helicopter Services, Hotel Premises, Air
Chartered Enterprise, Eupoc Pulp and Paper Industries and Swiss Associated
Industries, suffered heavy losses and some of them have already been
liquidated. In the period of 1962-1970, only 10 firms declared dividends
and in 1971 five more declared their first dividends, together totalling 
22S$16.2 million. The amount increased tremendously in the past five years
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from S$ll.53 million in FY 1972-1973 to S$32.29 million in FY 1974-1975
23and to an estimated S$54.5 million in FY 1977-1978. However, the 
Singapore Airlines and the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore (TAS) 
proved to be the most profitable, contributing the largest proportion of 
these dividends.
It must be mentioned that Singapore public enterprises enjoy less tax 
exemption than their counterparts elsewhere. The JTC and HDB are estimated 
to pay property tax of $16 million and S$44 million in FY 1977-1978, the 
amount almost equalled to their annual government subsidies. In fact, except 
for EDB, Sentose Development Corporation, and HDB, all other statutory 
boards have earned an operating surplus. The net surplus of Public 
Utilities Board in 1975 was S$91.5 million, Port Authority of Singapore was 
S$97.2 million in 1976 and TAS was S$130.2 million in 1975.^
Contribution of public enterprises to the national economy can also be 
considered in terms of output, value-added and employment. A recent study 
reported that the gross output of 38 manufacturing public enterprises in 
1972 amounted to S$642 million comprising 20 percent of the gross output of 
the aggregated relevant industry groups and 11 percent was that of total 
manufacturing. The value-added of them amounted to $264 million, contri­
buting 23 percent of the value-added of the aggregated relevant industry 
groups and 15 percent of total manufacturing. Further, these enterprises 
employed 22,106 workers representing 16 percent of the total workers in
the aggregated relevant industry groups and 13 percent of the total
25manufacturing workforce. In comparison with the number of employees in
the Civil Service, the number of public enterprise employees increased
from about 27,000 in 1969 to 48,000 in 1972 or by 77.8 percent, while the
increase in the Civil Service at the same period was at 21 percent to about
2 663,000. By 1977 the total public enterprise employees was estimated at
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a b o u t  6 5 ,0 0 0 ,  t h e  number t h a t  a lm os t  e q u a l l e d  t h a t  o f  t h e  C i v i l  
S e r v i c e .
Not o n l y  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  among t h e  l a r g e s t  employers  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y ,  t h e i r  p r o m o t io n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  such a s  t h o s e  o f  EDB, JTC and HDB 
g r e a t l y  g e n e r a t e  employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  Unemployment h a s  been  v i r t u a l l y  
e l i m i n a t e d .  I n  f a c t ,  t h ousa nds  o f  M a la y s ia n  w o r k e r s  have  been  im por te d  to  
a l l e v i a t e  t h e  l a b o u r  s h o r t a g e .
The s u c c e s s  o f  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  S i n g a p o r e  i s  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  by 
s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c .  The number o f  p e o p l e  r e s i d i n g  i n  HDB 
h o u s i n g  p r o j e c t s  was 1 .3  m i l l i o n  o r  a b o u t  56 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
p o p u l a t i o n  by the  b e g in n i n g  o f  1977. I t  i s  a l s o  p r o j e c t e d  t h a t  a f t e r  t h e  
f o u r t h  f i v e  y e a r  b u i l d i n g  program i n  1980 an a p p ro x im a te d  373,000  u n i t s
27w i l l  be c o m p l e t e d ,  an i n c r e a s e  o f  a bou t  100,000  u n i t s  o f  t h e  1977 f i g u r e .
In  a d d i t i o n ,  Urban Renewal A u t h o r i t y  (1974)  has  implemented  s lum c l e a r a n c e  
and c o m p r e h e n s iv e  u rban  rene w a l  schemes w i t h  an enhanced env i ronm en t  f o r  
r e s i d e n c e  a s  w e l l  a s  b u s i n e s s .  E q u a l ly  r e m a r k a b l e  a c h ie ve m e n t  i s  found i n  
t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  PUB and TAS. Per  c a p i t a  consum pt ion  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  
w a t e r  s u p p l y ,  gas  and t e l e p h o n e  a r e  among t h e  h i g h e s t  i n  A s i a ,  i f  no t  t h e  
w o r l d .  Both PUB and TAS a l s o  en jo y  a l a r g e  s u r p l u s  a n n u a l l y  and become 
main c o n t r i b u t o r s  to  t h e  S t a t e  r e v e n u e .
S o c i o - p o l i t i c a l l y , the  o v e r a l l  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  S i n g a p o r e  p u b l i c  
e n t e r p r i s e s  h a s  drawn c o n t i n u o u s  s u b s t a n t i a l  p u b l i c  s u p p o r t  to  t h e  PAP 
gove rnm en t .  P u b l i c  h o u s in g  was one o f  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  on which 
PAP c o n t e s t e d  i n  t h e  1959 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  and t h i s  p rom ise  has  been  w e l l  
k e p t .  I t  h a s  a l s o  become an i m p o r t a n t  i n s t r u m e n t  employed by the  
government  to  b u i l d  up much needed  n a t i o n a l  g roups  to  l i v e  and u n de rs t a r id  
each  o t h e r  a s  S i n g a p o r e a n ,  n o t  Chinese  Malay o r  I n d i a n .  For  t h e  p a r t y
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itself, HDB residents form the backbone of the PAP supporters, and it is 
likely that the more people benefiting from the housing projects, the more 
votes PAP receives. Activities of the People’s Association, a public 
corporation, which embraces all social life in HDB flats and other 
neighbourhoods, obviously support this strategy.
THE SYSTEM AND PROCESS
The most controversial issue on the management of public enterprises 
is centred around the problem of balancing the autonomy and flexibility of 
public enterprises on the one hand and the control and public accountability 
on the other hand. To many scholars, the "equilibrium" in between the two 
extremes should bring about efficiency and effectiveness because there are 
both flexibility and autonomy in the management, and proper control over 
the enterprises. Further, some scholars theorise that ideal public 
enterprises are those "out of politics", otherwise, they cannot conduct 
their business-like activities efficiently and would become similar to the 
much more political based ministerial department type.
The achievement of Singaporean public enterprises seems to deny these 
statements because political interference in public enterprises here is as 
much as, if not much more than, that in ministerial departments; yet, still 
they enjoy flexibility and autonomy in their day-to-day operations. In 
fact, it is almost impossible to find "the equilibrium" because the 
exercise of political power can hardly be limited, particularly in the 
Third World environment, to the point that flexibility and autonomy of the 
management can be developed. Also, even with more flexibility and autonomy, 
no one can be assured of efficiency and effectiveness in the organisations. 
Instead, there are many conditions which contribute to the success of any
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given enterprise. In the Singaporean case these following factors need to 
be considered:
the clear-cut line of authority of the boards and 
the management which is strictly followed, 
the organisational design which follows the continental 
patterns,
the national leadership which effectively controls the 
behaviour of the boards and the management, 
the existence of public accountability despite the 
one-dominant-party politics, 
the proper bureaucratic control process, and 
the interlocking directorship and interdependence among 
public enterprises that creates favourable environment 
for coordination without national planning.
This part is devoted to discussing these factors.
The Definition
Confusion over the definition of public enterprise in Singapore arises
from the fact that there has never been any legislation directly governing
this type of governmental machinery. Ow Chin Hock, in his recent study,
accepts "those engaged in activities directly and indirectly related to
28economic growth" but excludes political and social agencies. Ow and
Linda Low include public corporations, state and semi-state companies while
29Lee Sheng Yi focuses more on the latter two. In this dissertation, all 
statutory boards are classified into three categories:
(i) regulatory board,
(ii) advisory board,
(iii) public corporation.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
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Only public corporations with either economic and social development 
functions are classified as public enterprises, and as are state 
companies. Nevertheless, semi-state companies (or those with less than 50 
percent government shareholding) are excluded because the government cannot 
fully control them. Meanwhile, the so-called "departmental enterprises" or 
ministerial departments with business-like activities, which are managed in 
the same way as other departments, are given less emphasis. Companies 
under the government’s supervision but without shareholding, as in the case 
of Singapore Bus Service Ltd., where a government team of officials (GTO) 
has been sent to manage at the top level since 1974, are not included in 
this study.
The Legal Structure
Legally, all public corporations in Singapore are structured along the 
line of their British counterparts. Each one is created by an 
Ordinance (before 1965) or an Act of Parliament. They are bodies 
corporated with perpetual succession and with power to sue and be sued, to 
acquire and dispose of property and to enter agreements and contracts in 
their corporate names. A corporation consists of a number of members of 
the board, varying from 6 to 17, with a chairperson, all of whom are 
appointed by the responsible minister. These members hold office for a 
period of time specified by the Act and are eligible for appointments. In 
rare cases, the chairpersons are also the chief executive of the 
corporation, but normally, the chief executives are appointed by the boards 
with the approval of the respective responsible minister. The boards 
create their own personnel regulations, usually patterned after Civil 
Service regulations, so that public enterprise employees are not civil 
servants. The Acts also empower public corporations to establish their own 
financial regulations and procedures, which normally are subjected to the
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Treasury's scrutiny. All expenses incurred in their operations are met 
from the funds of all but a few corporations since the government 
subsidises only some promotional bodies such as EDB, National Productivity 
Board and Singapore Sport Council. Those with operating surplus are 
allowed to invest funds not immediately required in any securities provided 
the responsible minister approves their proposals. The accounts of all 
corporations are audited by the Auditor-General or by any private auditor 
appointed annually by the responsible minister in consultation with the 
Auditor-General. In practice, less than a half are audited by the 
Auditor-General.
State companies are those in which the State contributes more than 50
percent of the paid up capital. These include their subsidiaries in which
the parent companies hold a majority of shares. In Ow's definition,
the term means only wholly owned state companies, and the term semi-state
30companies are those partially owned no matter the number of shares.
All but a few state companies are private companies, according to the 
Companies Act of 1967. Only DBS, INTRACO and Sembawang Shipyard have gone 
public, although many semi-state companies are listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Singapore.
State companies are established and managed in the same manner as 
private enterprises. They are formed and registered with the Registrar of 
Company under Part III of the Act. Their boards of directors are nominated 
by their respective responsible minister and other shareholders in the case 
of joint ventures. Financially, their accounts are audited by approved 
private auditors and in some exceptional cases by the Auditor-General.
They are also required to submit to the Registrar of Companies a copy of 
their annual reports and financial statements which are open for public
investigation.
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The last group of Singaporean public enterprises is the departmental
enterprises. A number of ministerial departments are concerned with
business-like functions and some of them together contribute to the
Treasury a substantial part of the State revenue other than taxes and
duties. Out of S$537.6 million of estimated revenue classified under Class
II (disposal of goods and services) which forms one sixth of the estimated
total revenue in the 1977-1978 Budget, almost a half comes from three
departments: Postal Services, Civil Aviation and Broadcasting
31Departments. Civil servants in these three departments together number
3,575 which is more' than 5 percent of the positions in the establishment 
32list.
It is interesting to analyse the evolution and the trend of 
Singaporean public enterprise because it has obviously become a popular 
pattern of economic and social development promoting institution in the 
ASEAN region.
Before Singapore was granted the status of a self-governing state, a 
number of statutory boards, i.e. Singapore Telephone Board (1955),
Singapore Improvement Trust (1.927), the Singapore Harbour Board (1913), 
Currency Board (1899), and Central Provident Fund (1953), were already in 
existence. When PAP took power in 1959, the structure of public enterprises 
still remained unchanged, strictly following the British model, but the 
scope of activities was expanded to counter existing unemployment problems 
and to restructure the economy. The government started participating in 
joint-ventures and held some shares in private companies through the 
"Ministry of Finance Incorporated". However, with the newly established 
EDB's aggressive effort to industrialise Singapore, the government gradually 
increased its shares in the private sector and more state companies were
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set up but still were under the umbrella of the Treasury. The British 
concept was modified soon after the establishment of DBS which functioned 
both investment finance and development corporation roles. The DBS 
directly managed its subsidised and associated companies which became a 
large group of state and semi-state companies. Statutory boards and other 
state companies followed this model as they established more and more 
subsidiaries. This resulted in structural changes to a more flexible group 
pattern resembled the famous Italian IRI and the Turkish Sommerbank.
With the incorporation of these holding companies, Temasek (1974), 
Sheng-Li (1974) and'MND Holdings (1976), now state and semi-state companies 
previously scattered under several ministerial departments are in the 
process of being grouped. Some state and semi-state companies also form 
their own groups which in some cases consist of ten or more subsidiaries. 
The Temasek Holding Company, the largest holding state enterprise in the 
country, owns 9 wholly-owned, 8 with majority shares, and 10 others with 
less than 50 percent interests. Among the wholly-owned subsidised 
companies the Keppel Shipyard Group comprising 22 companies and including 
some abroad.
Some statutory boards run a few subsidiaries. The Port Authority of 
Singapore owns seven while Post Office Savings Bank has two subsidised and 
one associated company. The Telecommunications Authority of Singapore has 
60 percent shares in a directory publishing company. Meanwhile, JTC and 
Sentosa Development Corporation hold the majority shares in golf clubs.
The chart below shows the relationship between the parent bodies, 
ministerial departments and statutory boards, and their subsidiaries.
With the exception of a few ministries, such as Foreign Affairs and Health 
and Environment, all ministries control some statutory boards, state and
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semi-state companies. However, public enterprises under these ministries, 
the Treasury, and Communication and Defence, form the majority.
The pendulum tends to swing toward the company type.. Since 19 75 only 
two newly created public enterprises are in the corporation form while many 
others are either state or semi-state companies. This implies that the 
government has continuously expanded its effort in the acceleration of 
industrialisation. Many of the new setups are joint-ventures with multi­
national corporations. It is also likely that the investment in these
profitable ventures is motivated by economic reasons: taking profits in
* 33some companies to pay for the loss of other companies. Nevertheless, as
a few public enterprises are money-losers, profits earned from the majority
of these would go to the State coffer. In addition, it seems that the
Parkinson's Law of empire-building is in practice here. As state and
semi-state companies can easily be formed, provided requirements in the
Company Act are met, this type of public enterprise has increasingly become
the main thrust for expansion to the point that the Auditor-General
recommended in 1972 that "no government-owned companies may be created
without the approval of the Minister of Finance, that the capital required
be voted by Parliament and the Articles and Memorandum of Association of the
34company be laid before Parliament, however the recommendation was not 
adopted.
Table 8.1 shows the types of activities and the forms of public 
enterprises. It is interesting to note that Singapore widely utilised 
state and semi-state companies in some areas normally operated by either 
public corporations or ministerial departments in other countries. The 
Applied Research Corporation, for example, is a state company whose main 
activity is to carry out research commissioned by both governmental and
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TABLE 8.1 TYPES OF STATE PARTICIPATION AND ITS FORM
Obj ectives Types of State Participation Form
1. Providing Basic Services 
and Infrastructure
Public Utilities Public Corporation 
Min. Department
2. Industrial Promotion Investment Promotion Public Corporation
Industrial Estates Public Corporation
Finance Development Bank
. Standardisation Public Corporation
Reserach and Public Corporation
Development and State Company
Industrial Training Public Corporation
Industrial Security Public Corporation
2. Industrial Pioneering, Estab. High Techno­ State/Semi-State
Job Creation logical and Capital Company
Ext. Industries Private Company
4. Export Promotion Export Credit State/Semi-State
Insurance/Marketing/ Company
Research/Promotion Min. Department
5. Tourist Promotion Publicity/Training Public Corporation
6. Cultural/Recreational Public Corporation
Promotion State/Semi-State
Company
SO
CI
OG
RA
MM
E 
OF
 T
HE
 B
OA
RD
S
275
CN
00
w
PipoHP
V-i -H
X M
p  o
O  Ct3
Q  O
c o
cd -H
M  Oi
ED
B 
K=-
--
--
- 
( N
TU
C
276
p r i v a t e  b o d i e s .  I t  i s  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  ARC and o t h e r  s t a t e  o r  s e r a i - s t a t e  
companies  a r e  t o  be s e l f - f i n a n c e d .
The most r e m a rk a b l e  f e a t u r e s  o f  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  h e r e  a r e  
f l e x i b i l i t y ,  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .  These a r e  d e r i v e d  
from t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e  which a r e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  c o n t i n e n t a l  forms of  
p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  as  w e l l  as  t h o s e  o f  TNCs. I t  h a s  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  
f a s h i o n a b l e  to  s e t  up s u b s i d i s e d  companies  to  c a r r y  o u t  r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  
which a r e  no t  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  main f u n c t i o n s  o f  any r e s p e c t i v e  p a r e n t  
o r g a n i s a t i o n .  The S in g a p o re  A i r l i n e s  Group,  f o r  example,  c o n s i s t s  o f  SIA 
i t s e l f  and s e v e n  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  While  SIA o p e r a t e s  a i r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  t h e  
o t h e r s  o p e r a t e  r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i . e .  g round s e r v i c e s  ( S in g a p o r e  A i r p o r t  
T e r m in a l  S e r v i c e s ) , d u t y - f r e e  shops  ( S i n g a p o r e  A i r p o r t  D u t y - F re e  Emporium), 
i n s u r a n c e  ( S in g a p o r e  A v i a t i o n  and G e n e r a l  I n s u r a n c e ) ,  a v i a t i o n  s e r v i c e s  
( S i n g a p o r e  A ero -E ng ine  O v e r h a u l ) , h o t e l s  (Tradewinds  and P h i l i p p i n e -  
S i n g a p o r e  H o t e l  C o r p o r a t i o n ) , baggage  h a n d l i n g  ( S in g a p o r e  A i r p o r t  B a g g a g e ) . 
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s  i s  somewhat a 
f l a t  pyram id  r a t h e r  t h a n  a t a l l  one ,  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .
The E n t r e p r e n e u r
D e s p i t e  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r a l  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  S in g a p o re  p u b l i c
e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  n o t e d  f o r  t h e  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  t h ro u g h  i m p r e s s i v e
i n t e r l o c k i n g  d i r e c t o r s h i p .  In  many cases ' ,  some p o l i t i c i a n s  and top
b u r e a u c r a t s  a r e  found t o  s i t  on s e v e r a l  b o a r d s .  A s tu d y  i n  1971 r e v e a l e d
t h a t  t h e r e  were 6 i n d i v i d u a l s ,  each  o f  whom h e l d  f i v e  o r  more d i r e c t o r s h i p s
35i n  s t a t e  and s e m i - s t a t e  companies .  The number was r a p i d l y  i n c r e a s e d  to  
t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  Pr ime M i n i s t e r  Lee Kuan Yew i n s t r u c t e d  m i n i s t r i e s  c onc e rne d  
to  b r i n g  t h i s  f i g u r e  down b u t  s t i l l  w i t h o u t  s u c c e s s .  On t h e  p o s i t i v e  s i d e ,
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the practice can ensure the government policies through control and 
coordination in the boards. Negatively, there have been many 
cases in other countries that this practice created inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness in the management of a given enterprise. The Singapore 
case is an exception only because of the composition of boards, personal 
ability of the directors and the leadership of the country.
The composition of 18 statutory boards shown in Table 8.2 reveals 
that more than half of their memberships (80 out of 155) come from 
professional/business/academic groups, 46 from ministerial departments and 
other statutory boards, 11 from the government-sponsored trade union 
federation, NTUC, and 7 politicians, either MPs or ministers. 
Representatives from the Minister of Finance form the largest single group 
sitting on almost all boards while politicians sit on more strategic 
corporations such as Monetary Authority of Singapore, POSB, PUB and URB. 
Unlike many of their counterparts in the ASEAN region, no Singaporean 
public enterprise is an all-civil servants board and only a few are civil 
servant dominated. This is also evident in the cases of state companies.
The representation from groups other than civil servants and 
politicians has two purposes. Positively, it creates a wider forum for 
policy-making process and thus, decisions are likely to be more innovative 
and logical than those of all civil-servant boards. Negatively, it 
is obvious that many businessmen, professionals, academics and trade union 
leaders are members or allies of the governing PAP and their appointment to 
directorships are merely a political reward. This also implies the PAP's 
attempt to widen its political base and to attain the political status-quo. 
When the PAP came to power in 1959, it received strong support from the 
long pressed labour union leaders. But their close co-operation was
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short-lived and the dissidents formed the main opposition party, the
Barisan Socialise and a left-wing labour federation. After the PAP
government returned to office in 1963, it excessively used its legal
machinery with excessive severity against opposing politicians and
unionists, many of whom were either detained without trail or deported.
Since then, the new political elite, comprising professional, intellectuals
right-wing unionists, and former top bureaucrats, has emerged as the most
36important elite group in the power structure.
However, with the strong leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
and with the fact that Singapore is so small that political control is 
easily exercised, the board members are well behaved and their decisions 
are well under the party's direction. The interdependence through inter­
locking directorship as demonstrated in Figure 8.2 allows the ruling PAP 
to completely control these enterprises as well as the national economy, 
even with the existence of national planning.
Equally significant is the existence of a distinctive line of 
authority between the boards and the management. Once the general policies 
are set, the board members seldom interfere in the day-to-day management 
and leave this solely to the chief executives of the corporations or the 
companies. But if the target set by the boards cannot be reached, it is 
likely that the chief executives will soon be purged. In turn, if the 
enterprises perform well, it is also likely that these chief executives 
will be recruited to the ranks in the PAP structure. In the past decade at 
least all chief executives have been appointed ministers in the Lee Cabinet. 
These include Hon Sui Sen (Treasurer - EDB), Goh Chok Tong (Finance - NOL) 
and Tan Eng Liang (Communication - SSC, URA, and ITB).
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TABLE 8.3 CAREER OF SELECTED BOARDS’ CHAIRPERSONS IN 1977
as of 31 October 1977
Public Utilities Board Lim Kim San Politician
Central Provident Fund Board William Cheng Businessman
National Productivity Board G.C. Thio Businessman
Housing Development Board Michael Fam Businessman
Urban Renewal Authority Tan Eng Liang Politician
Telecommunications Authority 
of Singapore Frank Yung Cheng Yung Businessman
Port Authority of Sihagpore Howe Yoon Chong Politician*
Science Council of Singapore Professor Choo Seok Cheon Academic
Sport Council of Singapore Tan Eng Liang Politician
Industrial Training Board Ahmad Mattar Politician
Board of Commissioners of 
Currency Hon Sui Sen Politician
Economic Development Board Ngiam Tong Dow *Civil Servant 
(on secondment)
Jurong Town Corporation W.S. Woon *
Monetary Authority of 
Singapore Hon Sui Sen Politician
Post Office Savings Bank Tan Chok Kian Civil Servant
Sentosa Development 
Corporation Howe Yoon Chong Politician*
Singapore Institute of 
Standard and Industrial 
Research Lee Kum Tatt Academic
Singapore Tourist Promotion 
Board vacant -
Source: Annual Reports of Respective Corporations
* Also Chief Executive of the Corporation
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A study of the available profiles of the chief executives of these 
public enterprises shows no surprise. They are indeed young and dynamic 
executives, many in their 30s and AOs, with good education and working 
experience. Usually, they are promoted within the organisations, but in 
some exceptional cases some are recruited from outside. The secondment 
from the Civil Service is another important feature of Singaporean public 
enterprises but there is indication that it will be less significant.
The PSA and the SIA Group are the largest public enterprises in terms 
of the number of employees which each comprise over 10,000 workers, 
the figure that outnumbers all ministerial departments except the 
three largest, Health, Education and Home Affairs Ministries. Many more 
are over 5,000 including the HDB, the Keppel Group, PUB and the Sembawang 
Shipyard Group. Indeed, the public enterprise sector is the fastest 
growing sector in terms of the number of employees.
The growth does not necessarily mean overstaffing. In comparison with
the performance in terms of revenue per employee with other ASEAN
colleagues, the Singaporean public enterprise employees fare much better
in many areas. In air transportation, for instance, each SIA employee
yields $127,095 while their Indonesian Garuda and Thai International
37counterparts acquire $119,700 and $86,930 respectively. Domestically,
POSB with only 200 employees secured 1,144,990 accounts and the depositors'
balances were one billion Singaporean dollars in 1976, a figure that is much
38better than that of many private commercial banks.
The Process
The "political bodies" dealing with public enterprise issues in the 
public policy making process in Singapore are the Cabinet, the Treasury, 
the responsible ministries, the Auditor-General and Parliament, However, as
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Singapore has become a one-party republic since 1968 and public policy­
making seems to be much influenced by party politics with constant 
pressures from interest groups and public feedback, it is important to 
study the increasing role of the power elite which governs the power 
structure in this country.
The power elite in Singapore is a small group of people of no more
than 100, comprising the political elite of the top core of PAP, top
bureaucrats and a number of professional elite and academics. Despite its
members’ different socio-economic background, this power elite group is
known for its strength, homogenity, cohesiveness and loyalty to the
political leadership. At the upper echelons of the political elite are the
founding fathers of the ruling party, some MPs who entered politics in 1959
and 1963 and a few newcomers including former top bureaucrats and academics
from the University of Singapore and Nanyang University. In fact, not all
MPs are included in the power elite group as only some of them, probably
about one-third, have real impact in the making of decisions. Among the
serious allegations made by PAP rebels that led to the split in 1960-1961
39were nepotism and lack of intra-party democracy. This situation is more 
or less existed, and in effect, policy-making is essentially monopolised at 
the top.
The public seems to be well informed of how dominant PAP is and how it 
maintains that dominance. Among the most striking PAP characteristics are 
its strong leadership under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his close aids, 
its development-minded strategies, which are highly responsive to public 
criticism, and its recruitment of highly qualified, prospective political 
leaders. The first and perhaps the most important is derived from the 
political charisma of Lee Kuan Yew whose strong personality, 
political skill and capability to rule are praised throughout the region.
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His close assistants, including Goh Keng Swee, Hon Sui Sen and Lim Kira San, 
are also well known for their talent, wide experience and exceptional 
skills in handling economic problems. This small group Of people, with 
the assistance of senior bureaucrats in the Treasury and Monetary Authority 
of Singapore, are the architects of the national economy. They also closely 
supervise the implementation of the economic policy through their capacities 
in the Cabinet and as Chairman of important statutory boards. Hon Sui Sen, 
the Treasurer, chairs two boards, MAS and Board of Commissioners of 
Currency, while Lim Kim San, Minister for National Development, chairs PUB 
which operates electricity, water and gas supply. The latter, in addition, 
has jurisdiction over the HDB which is under the chairmanship of a 
businessman, Michael Fam, whose connections with the national leaders is 
well known.
Singapore is one of the few countries in the Third World that has no 
central planning, with the exception of the first Plan of 1961-1965 which 
was obviously drafted in line with the World Bank loans. Nevertheless, the 
lack of central planning is justified by its small area and population, 
which eases problems of co-ordination and control of economic development 
projects, and its development-minded national leaders. After the 
separation from Malaysia and the announcement of the British Armed Forces 
withdrawal, economic problems became more pressing or, in the words of the 
PAP leaders, :'a matter of survival".^ Political strategies since then 
have been emphasised on rapid industrialisation for "economic survival" 
and on consistent and ruthless repression against political rivals for 
"political stability" and "political survival". The latter, somewhat 
achieved by 1968, seems to be overlooked by the public because of the 
economic success which resolved serious problems of the sixties. Indeed,
no one seems to bother about the planning which usually comes from the top 
as long as the public still benefits from its achievements.
This practice is likely to alienate the power elite from the masses 
unless there is an efficient coordinating mechanism at the middle level.
In the case of Singapore, the government’s utilisation of local community 
leaders, particularly through the People's Association, a statutory body 
which branches throughout the island, when dealing with sensitive and 
controversial issues, proves to be a success. Unpopular decisions are 
often modified in response to public opinions but only according to the 
government's own schedule and in many cases the government skillfully 
manages to eventually convince the dissidents over a period of time. This 
illustrates the strong command of the PAP over the rank and file which 
penetrate into all sectors of the community. A Singaporean scholar 
comments, "... the PAP government has established a system whereby it is 
constantly informed of pressure from the ground level. The examination 
of urban development issues and the settlement of other minor local issues 
has illustrated the calculated approach of the political leadership in its 
response to political pressures. The PAP government most certainly cannot 
be accused of being cut off from the grass-roots. If there is major 
dispute over any issue, the ruling party leadership is fully aware of it, 
but the settlement will take place only according to its own timetable".^
Lastly, the PAP is remarkable in its recruitment programme. As
expressed by the PAP chairman, "we owe the people a duty for providing
continuing political leadership and thereby ensuring political stability
for Singapore. For this reason we have to take stock from time to time of
the political manpower which can be dedicated to the service of the people 
A 2of Singapore". In fact, the PAP is no longer a party of the working
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class as it used to be and it has been forced to resign from the Socialist 
International. It has increasingly become a party of a small group of 
veteran politicians, retired bureaucrats and other elite who are sponsored 
and who share with them the same ideologies and interests. The recruitment 
and promotion to the party ladder is strictly handpicked by a few at the 
top. However, this practice is justified by high qualification and the 
integrity of the new recruits whose past success are widely recognised. On 
many occasions, less successful incumbent MPs were asked to give way to 
new talented and more dynamic newcomers.
Since the "matter of survival" is essentially handled by public 
enterprises, political control exercised personally at the top, is so re­
stricted and centralised that little room is left for bureaucratic control 
widely practiced overseas. At the ministerial level, the control exercised 
by responsible ministries differs from one to another, depending on the 
form and activities of the enterprises and personality of the minister 
himself. In general, the responsible minister is vested with authority to 
give general policy directions and to approve important financial matters 
as well as to appoint chairmen and members of the boards. However, in 
practice, the personality of the minister influences policy-making processes. 
I-Tjhih Tan illustrates how Dr Goh Keng Swee is still interested in the 
management of a state partly-owned giant textile mill even after his 
transfer from the Finance to the Defence portfolio, "... Dr Goh himself 
still remains the established contact for interaction. He personally 
demands and examines a number of reports, coordinates the interaction 
between this company and other quasi government bodies, and has appointed
him ministry’s director of Logistic Planning as his deputy to handle
43detailed discussions with the company’s General Manager". The Ministry 
of Defence under the leadership of Dr Goh has also rapidly expanded its
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business empire, including the establishment of the Shang-Li holding 
company which holds shares in at least ten companies, SAF Enterprise and an 
entertainment company. In another two cases, Lim Kim San, the National 
Development Minister, chairs PUB which is under the supervision of the 
Prime Minister’s Office. While Dr Tan Eng Liang, the Senior Minister in 
the same ministry chairs the Singapore Sport Council in the Ministry of 
Social Affairs.
Apart from the representation on the boards of some twenty top 
bureaucrats, the bureaucratic control is limited to only financial control 
exercised in accordance with provisions in the enterprises' establishing 
legislation. In the context of public corporations, the boards are 
required by law to prepare annual and supplementary expenditure estimates.
In some cases, the estimates are needed to receive prior ministerial 
approval while in other cases the estimates are simply sent to responsible 
ministers and, when the budget is approved, are published in the Gazette. 
This procedure is of course more complicated in the cases where they need 
government subsidies and loans. In contrast, state companies need only 
to comply to the Companies Act which requires all companies to keep 
accounts and other records of the transaction and financial position, and 
their balance sheet and profits and loss accounts are not required for the 
approval of the minister or Parliament.
Perhaps the Auditor-General is one of the most keen watchdogs. From
time to time, he has recommended changes in the management of public
enterprises which were seldom adopted. In 1972, he recommended that no
state company be created without the approval of the Treasurer, that the
capital required be voted by Parliament and the Articles and Memorandum of
44Association of the Company be laid before Parliament. This recommendation
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was turned down. Then, he requested the Treasurer to reconsider the need
to at least obtain the prior approval of the Treasurer before a state
A 5company was formed. Again, the proposal was not adopted. However, the 
Auditor-General succeeded in convincing the government to revise the audit 
provision of public corporation Acts which resulted in some amendments in 
the early seventies.
Except for the MAS and Currency Acts which specify that the Auditor- 
General is the auditor, not all public corporations and state companies are 
required to be audited by the Auditor-General. Their accounts are audited 
by an authorised auditor, who in cases of public corporations is nominated 
by the responsible minister, in the same manner as an ordinary private 
company. The Auditor's annual report, financial statement and annual 
report of all public corporations are to be presented to the minister and 
the Parliament.
Parliament in Singapore, similar to its counterparts in other ASEAN
countries, is not active in the affairs of public enterprises. At many
times, bills to create new public corporations are passed without
questions. Apart from the fact that Parliament has no right to scrutinise
annual appropriations to public enterprises except those requesting
subsidies or loans* there exists no government opposition in Parliament.
In addition, in 1975, out of 65 MPs, only 12 had neither
political appointment nor membership of statutory boards (including
regulatory, advisory boards and public corporations). In 1977, the number
4 6of MPs was increased to 69 and the number of such appointments was 47.
Their direct involvement in the management in public enterprises is one of 
the factors that make Singaporean enterprises distinctive from any of their 
counterparts in the region.
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This form of control may lead to a concentration of power in a few
hands and on an erosion of public accountability. Fortunately, Singapore
still has relatively free press and some pressure groups which are
occasionally outspoken on the issues of public enterprises. The Chamber of
Commerce often voiced their negative views toward the expansion of the
public sector and the lack of the distinctive line between the public and
private sectors, obviously for protecting their interests. Academics, on
the other hand, criticised the government as being an aggressive
entrepreneur, though many of them believed that the present mixed economy
system suited Singapore. The labour union federation, NTUC, itself a
conglomeration of trading empires, always plays a low profile, partly
because of its active participation in the government party, and partly
47because of its need for government loans and subsidies.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In comparison with their counterparts in the ASEAN region, Singapore 
public enterprises perform much better in terms of economic efficiency, 
social benefits and political output. In general, these public enterprises, 
as a mainthrust of public administration, not only succeeded in spear­
heading economic reform which resolved serious problems threatening 
national survival soon after the independence, but have also enjoyed a 
high rate of profitability and have become one of the major government 
revenue earners. Not only have they achieved in providing the masses 
remarkable public services of a standard seldom enjoyed by other ASEAN 
people, they also help build much needed Singaporean national identity and
integration in the countries of mixed nationalities. To a great extent,
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achievements directly affect political outcome which leads to political 
stability of both the republic and the ruling party.
Political interference in the management of public enterprises often 
results in managerial inflexibility and subsequently inefficiency and in­
effectiveness. However, this situation so far does not happen in Singapore. 
The exceptional pattern of interlocking directorship and interdependence of 
public enterprises, a form of centralisation of power of the power elite- 
group, proves to be effective in coordinating efforts toward national 
development without central planning. The distinctive line of authority 
between the board and the management is made and is strictly followed. The 
day-to-day operation is entirely entrusted to the qualified and experienced 
chief executives, many of whom are handpicked by the political leadership, 
who are equipped with a great degree of managerial flexibility and autonomy, 
and who are motivated by political reward. Should the enterprises reach 
the target set by the boards or, more precisely, the government, these 
successful executives are most likely to be recruited to join the ranks on 
the party ladder. Therefore, the matter of efficiency and effectiveness of 
enterprises lies heavily in the hands of the top executives rather than on 
the discretion of the boards whose control is surprisingly loose.
This practice may easily bring about malpractices unless a proper sys­
tem of public accountability is created. Despite the fact that Singapore 
has a one-dominant party, if not a one party republic, possibility of 
irregularities is ruled out mainly because of the strong measures exercised 
by the reputed efficient and honest political leadership which still seeks 
public mandate in future elections. The relatively free press, pressures 
from some interest groups, and the availability of information of public 
enterprises help lessen factors that may erode public accountability.
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CHAPTER 9
COUNTRY STUDY: THAILAND
Thailand shares some common political problems with many countries of 
the Third World. Its politics have long been dominated by a small number of 
members of the military and civilian bureaucratic elite group and political 
participation of the masses is limited. In effect, public accountability is 
virtually unknown because the stability of the government usually relies on 
strategies of power balancing among factions in the ruling group rather than 
of public elections,' Corruption is widespread and the practices of public 
administration seem to cater for personal gains of the bureaucrats than for 
public well-being.
Public enterprises become deeply involved in politics in such a 
bureaucratic polity because they are a main source for wealth and power. 
Although the number of Thai public enterprises is much smaller than that in 
other ASEAN countries, their impact on national politics and economy is 
significant because of their size, types and scope of activities, and the 
number of employees. Thus, despite the fact that the nature of this type 
of governmental mechanism is more economic than political, policy-making 
concerning public enterprises is highly politicised and the policy 
implementation has never been free from political influences.
This chapter surveys the excessive impact of political influences on 
the structure and processes of policy-making concerning public enterprises 
in Thailand. It concentrates on interactions in the political process in 
which factions of the military and civilian bureaucratic elites compromise 
their interests arising from their authorities over public enterprises.
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THE BACKGROUND
For centuries Thailand was under the monarchial absolutism influenced 
by the Hindu philosophy of divine kingship (deva-raja) that survived until 
1932. The 1932 coup d'etat replaced the traditional system with a 
constitutional monarchy but in practice, except for a few years under 
civilian rule, the real power has been in the hands of conservative military 
leaders. Political participation of the masses has been limited and changes 
of government were the results of coup d'etat rather than political 
manoeuvre in the elective parliament. Meanwhile, the military formed an 
alliance with the bureaucratic elite group which provided the expertise in 
various fields. This pattern of politics has remained unchanged for the 
past 47 years.
The concept of statism in Thailand owed much to the absolute monarchy. 
The Thai word for kingship conveyed the two meanings of both pra-chao-pan- 
din (Lord of Land) and pra-chao-yuo-huo (Lord of Life), signifying 
absolutism over all lives and wealth in the kingdom. All commoners, with a 
few exceptions, in exchange for Royal protection, paid heavy taxes and 
duties and contributed their labour six months annually in the corvee 
system.^- The King also monopolised foreign trade and warehousing to attain 
more income. This income, until the beginning of Bangkok period, formed a 
substantial part of the Royal revenue.
State expenditure was used mainly for the wars with neighbouring 
countries, an average of one every four years during the Ayudhya and early 
Bangkok era. Frequent wars therefore, enabled the King to impose more taxes 
as well as to capture more power because power and wealth implied the
survival of the monarch.
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Commoners and peasants, while accepting political authority that was 
rigidly controlled, expected little or nothing from the State in the form of 
services. Rather, they seemed to be more satisfied with less government 
interference in their lives because of fears of more suppression under an 
active government. Only after the great reform of King Chulalongkorn did 
the government become more public service oriented and for the first time 
the average people enjoyed some of the fruits of their taxes. Thus the bulk 
of the people who were farmers and lived scattered around the kingdom felt 
indifferent toward government activities in the national economy. Only 
aliens and a few wealthy people suffered and actively sought less government 
interference.
Thailand's ecomomic development was retarded for many decades partly
as the result of commercial treaties with European nations - the United
States and Japan. The impact of the so-called Bowing Treaty of 1855, the
first among them, was so great that Thailand began drastic changes
economically and socially. In brief, the Treaty forced Thailand to abolish
the Royal monopoly of warehousing and foreign trade, to severly cut import-
export duties and to yield the British of the extraterritoriality. As a
result the once proud commercial fleet was eventually destroyed and the
Treasury was nearly bankrupt. By the end of the 19th century, some
European companies with Chinese compradors were able to undertake a great
part of the national economy. A writer concluded that the once subsistence-
dominated and self-sufficient barter economy was finally converted into a
2monetary economy dominated by European traders.
To compensate for the loss in revenue, King Chulalongkorn centralised
taxation and monopolised opium trade and gambling dens usually controlled by
wealthy Chinese and high ranking Thai officials. The implementation was
successful but the responsible Financial Minister was later sacked. 3
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Major political and administrative changes occurred for the first time
in centuries in the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), coincidently
the same period of the Meiji's reform in Japan. The King launched an
impressive public finance reform to save the country from bankruptcy, an
effect of commercial treaties with European Powers that severely cut the
main State revenue. The traditional system of government called Jatusadom
(Two Chief Ministers, Civilian and Military, and four other ministers) was
replaced with twelve western-style ministerial departments. Also a more
4systematic and centralised provincial administration was introduced. On 
one hand, the reform.was the greatest ever attempt to modernise the country; 
but, on the other hand, it increasingly revealed the urgency that threatened 
the stability of the Monarch. Above all it was a prime necessity to prevent 
some areas inhabited by non-Thai being stripped by European colonialists as 
happened earlier. The King, moreover, faced the challenge of some rising 
young princes and officials who were westernised from their study abroad.
The expectation from the masses to have more share in the national wealth 
was also increasing. These led to a signed letter appealing for a written 
constitution and a Parliament in 1894 and the abortive coup of 1912.
The establishment of the Railways Department (1896) and the Post and 
Telegraph Department in this period and of the Bangkok Waterworks (1914), 
the Government Savings Bank (1913), the Bangkok Electricity Plant (1923) 
during King Vajiravudh's era (1910-1925), was obviously for political 
reasons mentioned above. But at the same time the Monarch’s monopoly of 
opium trade and gambling dens and later of liquor production, was to make 
profits for the Treasury.
Ironically, King Pachathipok (1925-1935) regulated the significant 
Security Trading Act of 1928 that would have limited the government
298
participation in business. This legislation classified business activities 
into three categories:
(i) activities reserved for the State monopoly, i.e., the 
production of ammunition and explosives, the manufacturing 
of cigarettes, and the operation of railways, ports, and 
domestic airlines;
(ii) restricted activities that required government approval, 
i.e., the production of alcohol, soft drinks and beer, the 
operation of passenger transportation, electricity, water 
supply, telegraph and telephone, mining and oil exploration, 
exploitation, and refining, and insurances;
(iii) other activities that allowed private investment without 
state interference.
It is important to note that by the time this Act was promulgated all 
larger manufacturing industries and some public utilities were in the hands 
of Europeans while smaller industries and retail trading were dominated by 
Chinese merchants. The Royal family and aristocrats owned a commercial 
bank, a cement factory, and a large part of irrigated farm land near 
Bangkok. Therefore, this Act was in fact to promote the two groups. 
Fortunately, it was not enforced because of the coup of 1932.
From the start the new regime of 1932, headed by an aristocrat, Phya 
Manoprakorn, did not bring about any major change promised under the "Six 
Point Principles". A rift among the coup leaders existed immediately after 
Predi Panomyong, a prominent civilian leader in the regime, initiated an 
economic development plan that promised full state employment and welfare 
after a step-by-step nationalisation of farm land and major industries 
except those owned by private concessionaries. Predi was expelled but
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r e t u r n e d  to  power a f t e r  a n o t h e r  coup i n  1933 t h a t  o v e r t h r e w  Mano and l e d  to  
t h e  r i s e  o f  m i l i t a r y  r u l e .  Co lone l  Pahon P o lp a y u h a s e n a  was t h e  Prime 
M i n i s t e r  f o r  a few y e a r s  and was s u c c e e d e d  by M a r s h a l l  P i b u l  Songkram who 
s t a r t e d  a s t r o n g  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  programme r e s e m b l i n g  t h e  European and 
J a p a n e s e  F a s c i s m .  Pubul  l e d  t h e  c o u n t r y  to  t h e  F r a n c o - T h a i  I n d o c h i n e s e  War 
i n  1941 and l a t e r  j o i n e d  t h e  J a p a n e s e  i n  t h e  Second World War.
I t  was P i b u l  who l e d  the  S t a t e  to  a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  b u s i n e s s  
u n d e r t a k i n g s .  I t  was a l s o  d u r i n g  h i s  r u l e  t h a t  t h e  army s t a r t e d  i t s  
b u s i n e s s  e m p i r e  by a c q u i r i n g  some i n d u s t r i e s  and commerc ial  a c t i v i t i e s .
P i b u l ,  j u s t i f y i n g  h i s  a c t i o n s  by th e  emergency o f  t h e  war ,  s e t  up a h u nd red  
p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s ;  some were n a t i o n a l i s e d  i n d u s t r i e s  and th e  o t h e r s  were  
S t a t e  m o n o p o l i e s .
The a c q u i s i t i o n  i n  1935 o f  the  n e a r - c o l l a p s e d  Siam P a p e r  Company, 
which p l a n n e d  to  p roduce  p a p e r  f rom bamboo p u l p ,  d e s e r v e s  a t t e n t i o n  h e r e  
b e c a u s e  i t  was t h e  f i r s t  t ime  the  Army had e n t e r e d  i n t o  a m ajo r  b u s i n e s s .
In  f a c t ,  tw e lv e  y e a r s  e a r l i e r ,  a s m a l l  p a p e r  m i l l  was e s t a b l i s h e d  and 
managed by t h e  Mapping D i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  Army b u t  i t  had  a l i m i t e d  c a p a c i t y  
o n ly  enough f o r  o f f i c i a l  u s e .  P i b u l  i n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  as  the  Army C h ie f  
i n s t r u c t e d  t h e  army to  c r e a t e  a l a r g e r  f a c t o r y  b u t  was r e f u s e d  f i n a n c i n g  by 
t h e  T r e a s u r y .  The Siam Pa pe r  Company was t h e n  formed,  w i t h  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
f rom t h e  army,  i n c l u d i n g  Pahon and P i b u l ,  and was l a t e r  g r a n t e d  a c o n c e s s i o n  
o v e r  h u n d re d s  o f  a c r e s  o f  bamboo f o r e s t .  Unable  to  c onv inc e  t h e  T r e a s u r y  
f o r  t h e  government  g u a r a n t e e  f o r  bank l o a n s  f o r  t h e  p l a n t  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and 
m a c h i n e s ,  the  company asked  the  government  to  buy a l l  s h a r e s  so t h a t  the  
company would n o t  b r e a k  the  ag reemen t  w i t h  a German company which had 
a l r e a d y  t r a n s p o r t e d  t h e  p l a n s  to  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  s i t e .  U n d o u b te d ly ,  Pr ime 
M i n i s t e r  P i b u l  a g r e e d  to buy t h e  company and made i t  a s t a t e  company unde r  
t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  Army. The Army t h e r e a f t e r  expanded  i t s  empi re  by
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acquiring a textile factory (1935), an abattoir (1937), and an oil refinery
(1940) .
Pibul then launched the Thaicification programme just before the War. 
He publicly accepted the necessities for nationalisation of some industries 
owned by aliens and for monopolies of some activities which were concerned 
with matter of "national survival".^ The implementation of this economic 
nationalistic programme received strong support from politicians and the 
public who were aroused by patriotic propaganda. There was a long list of 
nationalised industries during the period. When Chinese merchants boycotted 
the export of rice and agricultural products to Japan, Pibul founded Thai 
Rice and Thai Agricultural Products Companies to do the business. Then the 
enactment of the Vessel Act of 1939 forced the once monopolised British 
owned Siam Steam Packet Company out of business. Two state-owned shipping 
companies were subsequently formed, one for operating coastal services and 
the other for international services. In 1939 the Tobacco Act was passed 
and ended the flourishing business of British-American Tobacco Company. In 
the same year, the distribution of salt was nationalised under the 1939 Salt 
Act which provided that all salt had to be sold to the State owned Thai Salt 
Company. Nevertheless, Pibul failed to nationalise foreign oil companies, 
long considered the prime target of his regime. When the government decided 
to enact the 1939 Liquid Fuel Act that provided the government control over 
pricing and inventory of petroleum and petroleum products, Shell and 
Standard Vacuum Oil which completely monopolised the market, withdrew their 
activities.
The emergency of the Franco-Thai Indochinese War and the Second World 
War accelerated the industrialisation and Thaification programmes. The new 
public enterprises included Pisanuloke Textiles (1941), Uttaridit Sugar Mill
(1941) , Bank of Thailand (1942), Thai Niyom Trading (1940), Samakki Chai
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(1941), Bangkok Dock (1943), and a large number of provincial trading 
companies (1940-1942). A holding company, Thai Industrial Promotion 
Corporation, modelled from the famous Italian IRI, was created to build up 
manufacturing industries. Befor the abolition in 1945, after the collapse 
of the Pibul Government, TIPC operated the largest group of companies in the 
kingdom.
Only a few days before the end of the War, the political power was 
transferred to a series of unstable civilian cabinets, led by some civilian 
leaders of the 1932 coup. Advocating the laissez-faire economy, the 
government abolished many war-time public enterprises and started providing 
incentives for public investment. Nevertheless, the emergency of war 
rehabilitation forced the government to give birth to at least ten state 
owned enterprises within a few years. Among them were the most contro­
versial Ongkarn Sampaharn (Supply Organisation (1945)), Rice Bureau (1945), 
and War Veteran Organisation (1948).
The first, defamed for corrupt practices and inefficiency, was to 
supply some badly needed commodities at a below normal price in order to 
stabilise the market pricing. Political interference, patronage and 
irregularities led the organisation to destruction after a heated no­
confident motion over this issue in Parliament. It was made known that the 
scandals involved a number of Cabinet members and several MPs over an 
unauthorised loan of 50 million baht, the selling of farm equipment that 
never reached needy farmers, and political appointments (which were 
entitled to receive high salaries from the Organisation). Surprisingly, 
immediately after the fall of the Organisation, another similar enterprise 
called Ao-Cho-So (Purchasing Organisation) was created, only to repeat the 
same pattern ten years later.
302
Next to be created was Rice Bureau, the most important money-earner of 
the government for many years, which monopolised the rice export until the 
end of 1954. The compulsory contribution of rice to the Allies' Combined 
Food Board under the peace agreement, justified the governments take over of 
this important export. The monopoly, however, did not eliminate the Chinese 
merchants who previously dominated rice milling and exporting. Rather, they 
enjoyed even more thriving business because the government had to rely on 
them for filling the contracts. This practice of subcontracting known as 
yi-pua/sa-pua (literally meant second and third contractors respectively) of 
course was not a new innovation because Thai kings used this system in 
collecting taxes and duties and more recently in earning revenue from 
gambling dens. But the practice carried out by Rice Bureau was on a large 
scale and in the post-absolute monarchy era. The monopoly came to an end 
after severe criticism for its high administrative costs and corruption. It 
was also possible that Pibul was hardly pressed by some politicians who 
benefitted from the free trade.
The third was War Veteran Organisation set up after the November 1947 
coup. WVO was equipped with privileges, i.e. the monopoly over cattle and 
pork slaughtering in Bangkok, railway freight, wholesaling of liquor and 
cigarettes, and stevedoring at government installations such as ports and 
railway stations. A few years later, it managed to build up a large empire 
with 28 subsidised companies, and earned millions of baht without great 
efforts, again simply through sub-contracting the businesses to Chinese 
merchants. The profits from the operations did not only benefit the war 
veterans but also the leaders of the coup, particularly General Phin 
Choonhawan (later Marshall) whose wealthy family still has strong influences
in Thai politics.
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P i b u l  made a r e t u r n  t o  power i n  1948,  a p p a r e n t l y  w i t h  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  
f rom Ph in  and t h e  army. Meanwhile ,  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  c o n t i n u e d  to  p r o l i f e ­
r a t e  as  P i b u l  c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  he would c r e a t e  i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t e d  
i n d u s t r i e s  so  t h a t  T h a i l a n d  would be s e l f - r e l i a n t .  By 1950 th e  government  
owned a l a r g e  number o f  f a c t o r i e s  v a r y i n g  from t e x t i l e ,  s u g a r ,  r u b b e r ,  
t a n n e r y ,  p u l p  and p a p e r ,  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,  to  c o t t a g e  i n d u s t r i e s .  
I t  a l s o  r a n  commerc ia l  b a n k s ,  two a i r l i n e s ,  two s h i p p i n g  companies ,  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  com pan ies ,  and t r a d i n g  com pan ies ,  n o t  to m en t ion  a l l  main 
p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s .
In  t h e  e a r l y  f i f t i e s  two p rom inen t  f i g u r e s  p l a y e d  v i t a l  r o l e s  i n  Thai  
p o l i t i c s  and P i b u l  had to  keep  them i n  b a l a n c e  f o r  h i s  own s u r v i v a l .  Pao 
S r iy a n o n d ,  t h e  P o l i c e  C h ie f  and a s o n - i n - l a w  o f  P h i n ,  m a in ly  d e a l t  w i t h  
p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  (WV0 Group) and i l l e g a l  opium t r a d e ,  w h i l e  S a r i t  Dhana ra t  
who headed  t h e  army, b u i l t  h i s  b u s i n e s s  em p i re  w i t h  s u p p o r t  f rom Chinese  
f i n a n c i a l  s y n d i c a t e s .  In  1954 Pao formed N a t i o n a l  Economic Development 
Company, a h o l d i n g  company p a t t e r n e d  a f t e r  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s '  NDC, to  b u i l d  up 
p r i v a t e - o w n e d  i n d u s t r i e s .  With government  s u p p o r t ,  NEDC i n i t i a l l y  p u r c h a s e d  
a j u t e  m i l l  and a s u g a r  r e f i n i n g  p l a n t  f rom WVO, c o n s t r u c t e d  a p a p e r  m i l l  
and a m a r b l e  p l a n t ,  and formed a number o f  t r a d i n g  compan ies .  Then, 
r e p e a t e d  t h e  Siam Pa pe r  c a s e ,  NEDC f a i l e d  to  r e p a y  f o r e i g n  l o a n s  g u a r a n t e e d  
by t h e  gove rnment  and s u b s e q u e n t l y  f a c e d  b a n k r u p t c y ,  f o r c i n g  t h e  government  
to  s a l v a g e  t h e  company by a c q u i r i n g  a l l  s h a r e s .  I t  was l a t e r  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  
NEDC, i n c o r p o r a t e d  w i t h  a u t h o r i s e d  c a p i t a l  o f  50 m i l l i o n  b a h t s  b u t  o n l y  3 
m i l l i o n  b a h t s  a c t u a l l y  p a i d  up ,  was o p e r a t e d  s o l e l y  on l o a n s  i n  which l e s s  
t h a n  h a l f  was i n v e s t e d  i n  p l a n t s  and m a c h i n e r i e s .  The NEDC a f f a i r s  became 
one one o f  t h e  main r e a s o n s  f o r  the  1957 coup which o v e r t h r e w  P i b u l  and Pao .
The new j u n t a  l e d  by S a r i t  ad o p te d  a new economic s t r a t e g y  b a sed  on 
t h e  World Bank recommenda t ion  t h a t  errrohasised p r i v a t e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  i n d u s t r y
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and trade. This policy undoubtedly benefited Sarit and his followers who 
already owned a large share in the national economy.
Sarit repeatedly stated that no new public enterprises would be set up 
and the existing ones would not be expanded except for "national security" 
or "public benefits". During his rule, only a few public enterprises were 
set up, including Tourist Organisation of Thailand (1959) and Thai Airways 
International Company (1960). Many were abolished and sold or leased to 
private entrepreneurs, but not without scandalous practices. For example, 
fourteen state distilleries around the country were leased to private 
companies: the largest of them, the Bangyikhan Plant, the producer of the
famous Me Khong whisky, was leased to Sura Mahakun, Chinese-owned company 
with close links with Sarit and his deputy, Prapass Jarusathien.
When Sarit died in 1963, Bangkok newspapers reported his fortune of 
over 100 million bahts in cash, bank deposits, properties and shares. Much 
of these were confiscated to the Treasury by his successor, Marshall Thanom 
Kittikachorn.
Nevertheless, several attempts were made during the Sarit rule to 
improve the work of public enterprises. The National Economic Development 
Board (at present the National Economic and Social Development Committee - 
NESDC) Act of 1959 together with the Budgetary Procedure Act of the same 
year, gave the definition of public enterprises for the first time. They 
also authorised governmental control over financial management and invest­
ment of public enterprises that had never existed before. In addition, the 
Ministry of Finance issued the Accounting and Financial Regulation of 1961 
that required all public enterprises to be audited by the National Audit 
Council. Another remarkable endeavour was the establishment of the Advisory 
Committee on the State Organisations to enquire into the management and
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activities of public enterprises. The report of this Committee resulted in 
the abolition of many enterprises, particularly those belonging to the W O  
group. It should also be noted that Sarit utilised a latge group of 
technocrats and the attempts mentioned above were some of' their work.
Following his predecessor, Thanom advocated the private role in
national economy. He stated that the government would neither establish new
industrial or commercial state enterprises, nor expand the existing ones to
compete with private enterprises "except those which would be unquestionable
£
benefit to the public and national security". The terms "public benefits" 
and "national security" were so vague that many public enterprises were set 
up including Krung Thai Bank (1966), Thai Airways Aircraft Maintentance Co. 
Ltd. (1967), Pharmaceutical Organisation (1966), and Chemical Fertiliser Co. 
Ltd. (1966), etc.
Thanom was overthrown by the Revolution of October 1973. Sanya 
Thammasak, a respected Professor of law, succeeded him and confiscated his 
wealth. Sanya established Agricultural Marketing Organisation (1975) and 
the Off-shore Mining Organisation (1975) . The latter, apparently under the 
pressure of left wing students and labour movements, was to take over off­
shore tin mining previously operated by foreign owned Temco.  ^ Important 
legislation was also passed in 1975 to regulate personnel qualifications for 
members of the boards of directors and employees of public enterprises.
Krukrit Pramoj, the leader of the Social Action Party, formed a 
coalition government after the elected minority Democrat government was 
unable to convince Parliament in early 1975. The most significant move 
during the period was the policy initiated by the Ministry of Finance for 
the transformation of public enterprises into public companies whose name 
would be listed on the newly created Bangkok Security Market. However, this
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proposal came under heavy attack because the public was skeptical whether 
the strategy would really benefit the public or the governing elites. 
Obviously, both Prime Minister Krukrit and Finance Minister Boonchoo 
Rochanasathien were both former bankers and other members of the Cabinet 
were mostly from industries or trading, who only benefited from this 
initiative.
While vowing for the laissez-faire policy, however, Krukrit, 
apparently under public pressure for better service, nationalised the 
Bangkok bus services previously owned by 24 private companies.
The Democrats won the election in 1976 and formed another coalition 
government which lasted only six months. The Seni Pramoj government 
established Telecommunication Authority of Thailand (1976) to take over the 
92 years old Department of Post and Telegraph, signifying the end of the 
"departmental” enterprise form in the country.
The military took over the power after the coup of October 1976 and 
subsequently appointed Tanin Kraivixien Prime Minister. The Tanin 
government set up Natural Gas Authority of Thailand (1977), and Mass Media 
Organisation of Thailand (1977) which took over Thai TV Company. Tanin was 
toppled in another coup in October 1977 and was replaced by General 
Kriengsak Chamanand.
In Thailand, public enterprises have been heavily attacked for their 
"inefficiency", "corrupt practices" and "high administrative cost". 
Generally, lack of well-defined objectives, coupled with almost non-existant 
evaluation practices in the Civil Service, constitute many difficulties in 
attempting to judge the performance of Thai public enterprises. Again, 
there has never been a distinction between a public corporation (either 
those engaged in industries and commerce of public utilities and non-profit
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enterprises) and state companies. All enterprises are thus expected to make 
profit regardless of what activities they perform. The Treasury moreover 
requires all enterprises to contribute to the State a fixed percentage of 
their profits: 80% in the case of the monopolies, 50% for other businesses
and 30% for social and cultural enterprises. Therefore, any non-profit 
making body, like the Zoological Organisation which runs a Bangkok zoo, 
becomes a money-maker for the State. These misunderstandings derive from 
the past history of public enterprises which often equipped with privileges 
and profit orientation. Also, public enterprises have been a traditional 
source of extra-income for politicians, and because of this they are sus­
pected of irregularities.
In fact, the overall performance of public enterprises in Thailand has 
never been as deleterious as that criticism. If they are judged by their 
financial performance, the statement below would exhibit their success to 
some extent.
TABLE 9.1 THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THAI PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
Million Bahts
FY 1971 FY 1973 FY 1975 FY 1077 (est.)
Revenue 17,048.45 19,842.88 35,627.60 50,174.07
Expenditure 14,006.99 16,431.91 31,642.97 44,541.81
Profits/losses 3,041.46 3,410.97 3,984.63 5,632.41
Dividend 1,619.27 1,829.36 2,209.86 3,502.41
Percentage of 
divident to profits 53.90% 53.63% 55.45% 62.18%
Source: Budget Bureau
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However, readers should keep in mind that these figures include those 
of monopolised and revenue-earning businesses such as Thailand Tobacco 
Monopoly (TTM) and Government Lottery Bureau (SLB). Those engaged' in 
industrial and commercial activities perform reasonably well but not so 
successful as such.
Recently more progress has been made to employ other methods than that 
single economic "efficiency" criteria which is strongly opposed by top 
executives or public enterprises. For a public utility and some other 
enterprises to operate for social benefits instructed by the government, 
they should not be expected to make as much profit as private firms and, 
rather a criteria of social benefitability should be developed. The 
marginal-cost pricing concept also has not yet been fully utilised in this 
country so that public utilities are often forced by the government for 
political reasons to charge a minimum rate that is not only unprofitable but 
at losses. For decades, the Bangkok bus service could not charge more than 
.50 baht for a route of less than 15 kilometres. The State Railways of 
Thailand was forced to operate unprofitable routes and to charge a minimal 
rate but it managed to make a profit continuously with only a few 
exceptional years.
In regard to public benefits, however, it is curious whether the
existing public enterprises provide substantial services for the public
well-being. A writer found that a major economic development problem in
Thailand is the lack of effective institution mechanisms linking villages to
9the centralised bureaucracy in Bangkok. Regional development in the past 
failed to receive any serious attention from the ruling elites so that it 
made comparatively little success. Public enterprises, to a large extent, 
have concentrated their activities to serve only affluent urban Bangkok and 
leave the majority of the population who live in villages unattended.
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For example, only people in town benefit from electricity and other utili­
ties but not those in 40,000 villages (out of the total 50,000).
Prosperity of the Thai people depends much on the rice economy. In the 
past, Pibul set up the Thai Rice and the Thai Agricultural Products 
Companies to market rice and other agricultural products and later created 
the Rice Bureau to monopolise the rice export. More recently, a chemical 
fertiliser plant, an agricultural bank and a marketing organisation were set 
up. Yet these public enterprises yield little benefits for farmers. It 
seems that politicians pay more attention to problems that occur in urban 
rather than rural areas in which they acquire less interests.
Equally significant is the relationship between the National Economic 
and Social Development Plans and public enterprises. In theory the object­
ives of public enterprises, individually, sectorally and overall, must be 
specified according to the National Plan so that all efforts would be geared 
toward a coordinated objective in the national level. In Thailand, these 
objectives are seldom clearly defined, and even if defined it is unlikely 
whether they would be reached if they conflicted with political interests. 
Therefore, the growth of public enterprise has been unplanned and changes in 
public policies occurred from time to time. The most obvious example is 
that all the Plans state that private investment will be promoted and there 
will be no expansion of the public sector except in the area of energy and 
public utilities.^ In practice, however, such terms as "strategic", 
"national security", and "public benefits" have become an excuse for the 
creation of a new public enterprise or the expansion of an existing one. 
There are at present many state manufacturing and commercial establishments 
that perhaps should not be run as public enterprises as they compete 
fiercely with the private ones. However, politics have become involved 
because many of these enterprises, for example. Glass, Battery, Preserved
310
Food, Textile, and Tannery Organisations, all belong to the Defense Ministry 
that simply cites the "strategic" reasons for their continuation.
Often the National Plan has been violated by political manipulation. 
Confusion, conflicts and waste are the only results; private enterprise is 
reluctant to invest while public enterprise executives are uncertain of 
their future. Also it becomes debatable if the National Plan or any stated 
policy is worthwhile for Third World countries, such as Thailand, as 
contrasting political-oriented decisions are often made.
THE SYSTEM AND PROCESS
There are at present 78 public corporations and state companies in 
Thailand. In 1973 their paid-up capital totalled 32,270.42 million bahts or 
an equivalent of two years of the national budget. Their total asset was 
also well over 110,000 million bahts or about four-fifths of GDP. They 
employed more than 250,000 people which was about a half of the total 
civil servants, including those in the provincial administration.^ In 
addition, there are 35 semi-state companies, mostly provincial trading 
companies, in which the government holds minority shares.
The Definition
In Thailand, confusion over public enterprise issues begins with the 
definition. Those given by the three concerned Acts, the 1959 National 
Economic Development Board (now NESDC) Act, the 1959 Budgetary Procedure Act 
and the 1975 Personnel Qualifications of Public Enterprises’ mployees and 
Members of the Board, slightly differ from each other. The first two legal 
definitions include governmental corporations and business units fully owned
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by the government and/or partnerships in which government own more than 50 
percent of the equity capital and/or partnership in which governmental 
partnerships own the majority of the shares. The latter Act, nevertheless, 
excludes non-profit organisations. Confusion over the definition worsens 
when one considers business-like activities run by departments and the armed 
forces that would never have been classified as public enterprises. The 
army owns two Bangkok TV stations, about 200 broadcasting stations, a 
pharmaceutical plant, a canned food factory, etc. Some departments own more 
than 20 publishing houses. The Budget Bureau, with attempts to name these 
activities, 13 able to exist only 86 units called "revolving funds". These 
units engage in business very similar to those of public enterprises but 
mostly on a smaller scale. The largest among them are Small Industries 
Finance Bureau, Military Pharmaceutical Plant, Government House Printing 
Office, the Sugar Price Stabilisation Fund and the Chiengmai Lacquerware 
Plant; these are much larger than many public enterprises in terms of 
capital and number of employees. These "revolving funds" and other 
departmental business units are managed by civil servants, and are financed 
by annual appropriations from the Treasury.
12The Legal Aspects of Public Enterprises
Public enterprise (ratavisahakij) in Thailand, since 1976 when the Post 
and Telegraph Department (a rattapanij) was transformed to a public corpor­
ation, are legally in two forms: public corporation (Ongkarn-rattavisahakij)
and state (and semi-state) company. Public corporations under the title of
organisation, authority, office or bureau, (with exception of a few cases)
%are established by specific Acts of Parliament, the Royal Decrees issued 
under the 1953 Government Organisation Incorporated Act, and the 
Revolutionary Council's Decrees. The establishing legislation usually
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specify the corporation’s functions, duties, responsibilities and author­
ities, the composition of the governing board and the management, and 
relationship with its responsible minister and the Parliament. Public 
corporations acquire an autonomous and separate legal status: they are
excluded from the Civil Service and they can sue or can be sued. A few 
other corporations were established by the Cabinet Orders and therefore 
enjoy no legal status. These bodies include Thailand Tobacco Monopoly 
(1947), State Pawnshop Bureau (1955), and until recently, State Lottery 
Bureau (1937) .
In fact, public corporations set up under specific Acts of Parliament 
differ very little from their counterparts set up by Royal Decrees issued 
under the provisions of the 1953 Government Organisation Incorporated Act. 
The former seem to be larger enterprises which in many cases possess 
regulatory power. Examples of public enterprises of this type are State 
Railways of Thailand, Port Authority of Thailand, and Metropolitan 
Electricity Authority. Many of these were established before 1953. 
Furthermore, most of these are titled with "authority" (or karn in Thai) .
In contrast, public enterprises established under the 1953 Act seem to be 
smaller and less important. This is indicated by the fact that the 
issuance of a Royal Decree is not as complicated as legislating a bill by 
Parliament. Most of these public enterprises are titled "organisation" (or 
ongkarn). Examples of this type of enterprises include Zoological 
Organisation, Fuel Organisation and Express Transport Organisation.
It shoudld be noted that all state banks in Thailand were established 
under specific Acts of Parliament, except Krung Thai Bank which was set up 
under the Commercial Bank Act and was registered under the Civil and
Commercial Code.
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State and serai-state companies, on the other hand, are registered under 
the Civil and Commercial Code and are treated in a manner very similar to 
private enterprise.
The structure of a public enterprise consists of three levels: (i) a
governing board or a board of directors; (ii) a managerial team; and (iii) 
other staff including the middle management and the lower ranking officials. 
The incorporating Acts or Decrees usually provide for the composition of 
public corporations, representing various ministries concerned. For 
example, the governing board of the Battery Organisation consists of a 
minimum of three and a maximum of eleven members, including representatives 
from the Treasury, Budget Bureau, and NESDC. In some cases, incorporating 
statutes only specify that "qualified persons" to be appointed but in 
practice only a few outsiders are appointed. In the governing board of Port 
Authority of Thailand, only two outsiders, the Chairman of the Council of 
Chambers of Commerce of Thailand and a representative from the Ship Owners 
Association, sit on the board together with representatives from the Navy, 
Ministries of Finance, Communication and Commerce, Departments of 
Prosecutors and Harbour. The size of the boards in general range from 
three to sixteen members but in most cases are between seven and eleven.
On the other hand, the size of boards of directors of state and semi-state 
companies is usually smaller than those of public corporations but the 
composition is similar. All boards of directors must be represented by an 
official from the Treasury, according to the Accounting and Financial 
Regulations of Public Enterprises of 1961.
The incorporating statutes provide that members of governing boards of 
public corporations, including the Chairman and the Chief Executive, be 
appointed by responsible ministers or by the Cabinet. In a few cases, the 
King appoints the Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive (Bank of
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Thailand for instance). In regard to state and semi-state companies, the 
government nominates its representatives as members of boards of directors 
at the general meetings of the respective companies.
Most statutes provide that the Chief Executive, the Governor (in the 
cases of "authorities") or the Director (in the cases of "organisations", 
"offices" or "bureaus"), is a member of the governing board. In some cases, 
the Chief Executor is also the Secretary of the board while in other cases, 
he is an ex-officio member of the board. In rare cases, the Chief Executive 
chairs the board. In general, the Chairman of the board is appointed from 
among top politicians, bureaucrats or military men. The Chairman of SRT, 
for example, is a retired influential army general while the Chairman of PAT 
is a retired navy official. Many rainisters-in-charge also head some 
important public corporations.
In 1975 the appointed National Assembly passed the Personnel 
Qualifications for Public Enterprises’ Employees and Members of the Board 
Act, providing that in no case is a person allowed to hold membership of 
more than 3 boards.
In regard to authorities and responsibilities of the governing board 
and the Chief Executive of public corporations, the 1953 Act specifies that 
the incorporating Decree must clearly express:
"(6) Control and administration of the organisation
including the authorities of the Board, the Managing
Director or the Manager whichever the case may be ....
*
(7) Any other conditions necessary for the smooth 
operation of the organisation".
In practice, the establishing statutes usually state only that the governing 
board is responsible for policy-making and supervising general activities of
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the organisation; the board is also empowered to regulate general adminis­
trative and personnel regulations and procedures. It appoints and dismisses 
officials and fixes salary scales with the Cabinet approval. Meanwhile, the 
Chief Executive is responsible for day-to-day operations outlined by the 
boards and is the head of all employees in the organisation.
The major law that governs labour-management relationships in public 
enterprises is the same as the law that applies to private enterprises. The 
Labour Act of 1975 provides for the formation of labour unions, conditions 
of employment and the settlement of labour disputes. After the coup of 
1976, however, all undertakings by State enterprises are placed under 
section 23 of the Labour Act that prohibits the employees or employers from 
resorting to a lock-out or a strike when there is an unsettled labour 
dispute. All disputes must be submitted for compulsory arbitration by the 
Labour Relations Committee or a group of persons appointed by the Minister 
of Interior.
Financially, public corporations have their own equity capital which 
( comes from budget appropriation. In addition, capital can be raised through 
borrowings and through issuing bonds. In the case of state and semi-state 
companies, the capital comes from additional budget appropriation which 
requires Cabinet approval.
The Finance Ministry is authorised to control public enterprises by 
section 13 of the Treasury Cash Act of 1948 (second revision, 1952):
"Any governmental organisations ... employing capital 
or revolving funds shall fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Minister-in-charge. The Minister is authorised to 
lay down regulations regarding financial payment, safe­
keeping and transfer of capital or profits to the First 
Treasury Cash Account".
I
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The Minister-in-charge, according to this legislation, is the Minister 
of Finance. Therefore, he has a vast controlling power over public 
enterprises.
According to the NEDB (NESDC) Act of 1959, NESDC is empowered for 
controlling over investment budgets of public enterprises. It also 
considers requests from public enterprises for foreign technical, financial 
and loan assistance.
In regard to the relationship with Budget Bureau, the Budgetary 
Procedure Act of 1959 requires all public enterprises to prepare revenue and 
expenditure budgets in accordance with specifications laid down by Director 
of Budget Bureau. In addition, financial reports of public enterprises are 
treated as part of the Annual Budget.
All public corporations and state and semi-state companies are required 
to be audited by National Audit Council of Thailand.
THE PROCESS
One of the main features of Thai public enterprises is the excessive 
control exercised by various governmental agencies. In recent years more 
control has been imposed with the justification that the performance of 
public enterprises is poor and more control is needed to improve the 
performance and prevent malpractices. However, control does not necessarily 
help improve the performance of less successful enterprises, nor does it 
effectively erradicate irregularities. Control can instead be considered as 
a political process. To some extent, control means power. Therefore it is
I
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a process in which these governmental agencies compete or compromise each 
other for their interests arising from their authorities.
Thai politics can best be described as bureaucratic polity because it
is a system in which the military and civilian bureaucrats take turns at
13"scratching each other’s back". The overthrow of the absolute monarchy in
in 1932 left the power vaccum which could not be filled by any other groups
except the military and civilian bureaucrats which were the best organised
groups in the country. High ranking military officials since then have
taken turns holding political power but they have to seek an alliance with
civilian bureaucrats (or technocrats) who provide expertise in various
fields. This structure has remained unchanged for more than 40 years. Up
to 1975, Thailand had 37 Cabinets comprising 881 ministers, only 146 among
14whom were not the military or civilian bureaucrats. In addition, all Thai 
Prime Ministers came either from the military of civilian bureaucracy.
As public enterprises are main sources for both power and wealth, this 
type of governmental mechanism becomes deeply involved in the political 
process. In effect, both the military and civilian bureaucrats hold their 
positions firmly in the governing boards of these enterprises. In addition, 
the public enterprise policy-making process is highly politicised, often 
with the two groups or factions in each group attempting to pursue their 
interests.
Below are the governmental agencies involved in the policy-making 
process:
(1) the responsible Ministry;
(2) the Ministry of Finance;
(3) NESDC;
(4) the Budget Bureau (in the Prime Minister’s Office);
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(5) The Prime Minister and his Cabinet;
(6) the Advisory Committee to the Prime Minister,
(6.1) the Advisory Committee on Government Organisation,
(6.2) the Advisory Committee on Administrative Regulations;
(7) the Parliament;
(8) the National Audit Council of Thailand (NACT).
The powers and duties of the responsible ministry differ among 
different types of enterprises as well as provisions in establishing 
legislation. According to any establishing law, the responsible minister 
should onlv give more important directions as to the policy to be followed 
by the governing board as well as approving some personnel and financial 
matters. But in practice the minister has much more power than this 
because he is usually the ex-officio chairman of the board and also many 
members of the board are civil servants under his jurisdiction. The top 
management often refer to him less important matters regardless whether or 
not they are day-to-day operational problems. The board meeting is usually 
called once a month but in practice may meet much less frequently; 
consequently, the minister may take it for granted to make some urgent 
decisions rather than referring them to the board.
All ministers except Foreign Affairs and Justice have a number of 
public enterprises under their supervision. Ministries of Communication, 
Industry, and Commerce among these operate the largest group but the Finance 
Ministry controls more profitable enterprises such as TTM and SLB which earn 
a substantial part of the total revenue of public enterprises.
The Minister of Finance, as in other countries, plays an important 
role. His responsibilities do not only include the financial control but 
also other matters concerning expenditure. Such authorities stem from the
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Treasury Cash Act of 1948 (second revision 1952), that empowers the Finance 
Minister to lay down regulations on payment, safe-keeping, and transfer of 
capital or profits to the Treasury. Up to present, the Minister has issued 
at least 25 regulations that exert vast control, one of them even regulates 
a uniform salary scale that is applied to all enterprises. In addition, 
according to the Public Enterprises' Accounting and Financial Regulations of 
1961, a representative of the Ministry of Finance must be included in the 
board directorship of state and semi-state companies. More power is there­
fore obvious.
Since the Sarit reforms, the Budget Bureau (patterned after the 
American model) has been separated from the Ministry of Finance to be 
concerned mainly with the preparation of the annual budget. The 1959 
Budgetary Procedure Act gives this agency a wide financial control over 
public enterprises. The Budget Bureau is authorised to be provided with an 
annual revenue and expenditure budget by each enterprise so that the Bureau 
could include this financial report as a part of the Annual Budget. It has 
authority to approve any loan committeed by public enterprises and to lay 
down rules and regulations for spending expenditure items that appear in an 
enterprise's budget. The Budget Bureau also determines the amount of 
profits which public enterprises must contribute to the Treasury, and as a 
Consequence the release of funds for reinvestment is in the hands of the 
Bureau. In the case of public enterprises running social activities and 
public utilities that need a government subsidy, the Budget Bureau's role is 
very powerful.
Another governmental unit that is directly responsible for investment 
expenditure of public enterprises is NESDC. Under the 1959 NEDB (NESDC)
Act, this planning agency is empowered to approve any investment that is 
classified as a development project, or, in other words, a non-operation
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cost. In practice, NESDC becomes closely involved in the management of 
public enterprises as it is authorised in the Act to "give advice regardless 
acceleration, cancellation or revision of projects when deemed appropriate".
In Thailand, the National Audit Council is under the direction of the 
Parliament. The Council, equipped with power under the 1961 Accounting and 
Financial Regulations, conducts external auditing financial statements of 
all enterprises. It also reports irregularities found to the Parliament as 
well as the responsible minister.
Public enterprises have long complained about the strict regulations 
issued by these four financial agencies. Many regulations, particularly 
those issued by the Ministry of Finance cover details which can hardly be 
carried out by individual public enterprises. For example, commercial 
enterprises cannot set aside promotional expenditure for their new products 
or indust^i^l enterprises cannot provide incentive payment for workers (a 
popular practice among private owned manufacturers). Above all, almost all 
regulations cover the whole public enterprise sector regardless of their 
types of activities or size of organisation, while many others are designed 
for regular ministerial departments but are also applied to all public 
enterprises .
The four agencies run their own public enterprise controlling units, 
with the exception of the Treasury, in the divisional status. 
Representatives of Budget Bureau, NESDC and NACT are also included in some 
governing boards of public enterprises. The Heads of Budget Bureau and 
NESDC, the ranks equivalent to the Under Secretary, moreover, sit in the 
Cabinet’s meeting and voice their recommendations on public enterprise
issues.
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As the "buck" often stops at the top, a common phenomenon of Third 
World administrative systems, the Thai Prime Minister and his Cabinet are 
always kept busy. An Indian writer suggests three matters that must go up 
to the Prime Minister or the entire Cabinet for final approval: "(1) 
whenever an inter-ministerial committee cannot resolve a conflict or come to 
an unequivocal decision; (2) where the implications of decision are so 
fundamental as to impel the Cabinet to consider seriously the question of 
carrying parliament with it; and (3) where, in consonance with the general 
procedures of government business in the country, an item must go to cabinet 
for approval even if* formal".^  The latter is remarkable for in any country 
where the state power is centralised, all matters tend to be "fundamental" 
and required to be approved at the top.
It is a common practice for the Prime Minister personally to handpick 
the Chairman and Chief Executive of some important public enterprises. For 
less important enterprises, the responsible minister is the one who 
nominates suitable persons for the position at the Board meeting.
Advisory committees have been'widely utilised in Thailand since the 
late fifties. When Sarit took power after the coup, he realised his limited 
administrative capacity and many Wes tern-trained administrators and 
economists became his advisors. In 1959 Sarit set up the Advisory 
Committee on State Organization, one among many Advisory Committees to the 
Prime Minister, to enquire into activities and practices of public 
enterprises. It was empowered to give advice to the Prime Minister so as to 
recognise, establish, transform, transfer or dissolve any enterprise and its 
report resulted in the abolition of at least 20 public enterprises. Another 
committee that was given authority to deal with public enterprises, and 
subsequently appointed a sub-committee on public enterprise, was the
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Advisory Committee on Administrative Regulations. The former was provided a 
small secretariat in the Public Enterprise Division and the latter in the 
0 & M Division of the Budget Bureau. In the Thanom and Sanya governments, 
these types of Advisory Committees were also utilised but with less success.
In contrast with legislatures in many countries of the Third World, the
Thai Parliament tends to be not very active or important in the policy
process. After the enactment of the Government Organisation Incorporated
Act 1953, the executive branch has been able to establish any public
enterprise by simply issuing a Royal Decree under the provision of this Act.
Parliament again has less chance to scrutinise annual budget appropriations
for public enterprises except those requests for funds for investment from
the Treasury. The only effective control measure often used by the MPs is
the parliamentary question but again with not much effect. In fact, these
questions have so far been concerned with details rather than the principle.
For example, a question was raised about the number of employees in a state
15rubber plantation. During the short-lived experiment of democracy, 
1973-1976, some remarkable innovations were made to improve the management 
of public enterprise, including the Personnel Qualifications of Public 
Enterprises’ Employees and Members of the Board of 1975.
The Entrepreneurs
In a study of 66 public enterprises in 1976, out of 672 members of
governing boards and board of directors, 161 are military or retired
military officials, 34 policemen, and 477 government officials and 
16"others". The term "others" in the last category includes employees of 
public enterprises and "outsiders" (or those from the private sector) which 
together total less than 20. These figures indicate the degree public 
enterprises are dominated by the military and civilian bureaucrats.
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In fact, this tvne of board can best be described as "an all official-affair 
board".
Before the enactment of the 1975 Personnel Qualifications of Public 
Enterprises" Employees and Members of the Board Act. the situation was even 
worse because only less than 25 persons controlled almost one third of the 
total number of board membership. Figure 9.2 illustrates the list of top 
politicians, military or police officials, and civil servants who sat on 
more than three boards in 48 selected public enterprises in September 1973, 
only one month before the 1973 revolution. Prapass Charusathien, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, then the most powerful person in 
the country, topped the list with eight memberships, together with General 
Kris Srivara, another "strong man".
These top politicians normally hold the chairmanship of the most 
profitable enterprises, namely TTM, SLB, Fuel Organisation, and Thai 
International. Until recently, the Prime Minister himself was SLB Chairman.
A quick glance on the list of typical governing board memberships in 
Figure 9.3 will give a clear picture. One would wonder whether these 
politicians and high ranking officials have anything to do with the business 
of an electricity undertaking. In some other wealthy public enterprises, 
such as TTM, the majority of members of the board come from the armed forces 
and the police department.
The members of the boards earn an average of 1,000-5,000 baht a month 
for their service regardless whether or not they attend monthly board 
meetings. They are also entitled to be awarded an annual bonus of three 
percent of the enterprise’s net profits in most cases. In addition, they 
enjoy some fringe benefits that differ from enterprise to enterprise. For 
example, the family of a member of the Railways Board is provided free
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railway trips for life. Still, there are some "invisible" profits arising 
from the membership that have never been made known.^
To counter the political bodies concerned, it became fashionable for 
public enterprises to invite some influential politicians and for civil 
servants to be members of the boards. This practice works very well in the 
Thai environment.
The structure of the boards is complicated. Since many of the boards 
became almost an interdepartmental committee gathering from compromising 
among various departmental interests, they usually play the role of con­
trollers rather than policy-makers and the keepers of the status-quo rather 
than innovators. They also adhere to Civil Service regulations in which 
they have much bureaucratic experience rather than general business 
practices.
This pattern of interdepartmental committee and the interlocking 
membership should promise a smooth relationship between public enterprises 
and governmental agencies concerned. But, in reality, it is not. As the 
Minister-in-charge or senior official is also the Chairman of the Board, it 
is unlikely that other members, many of whom are his subrodinates, will 
go against the wishes of the Chairman. But the problems are surfaced in 
implementation, and the board has to meet again to solve that. In general, 
members of the board often lack interest in the affairs of their public 
enterprises and come to the meeting with empty hands. Many of them cannot 
devote themselves to the boards simply because they have already an over­
loaded burden of work.
According to establishing statutes members of the boards hold their 
positions for a certain period, normally 4 or 5 years. In practice, there
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FIGURE 9.2 PERSONS WITH MORE THAN THREE DIRECTORSHIPS IN 1973
No.
of
Boards
Name Position
8 Marshall Prapass Charusathien Deputy Prime Minister/Min. of Interior
8 General Kris Srivara Minister of Industry
8 Vijarn Nivasvong Under-Secretary of Commerce
8 Udomsak Pasavanich Director-General, Dept, of Factories
7 Tavisak Kridamara Director, Dept, of Comptroller-General
7 Boonnia Wongsavan Minister of Finance
6 Tavil Soonthornsaratoon Under-Secretary of Interior
6 Dr. Sirirak Chantarangsu Under-Secretary of Communication
6 Prida Karnasutr Under-Secretary of Agriculture
3 Pol. Gen. Prasert Ruchiravong Minister of Health
5 Lt. Gen. Chote Hiranthiti Army
5 Yos Boonnak Under-Secretary of Industry
5 Sa-ard Hongyond Deputy Minister of Industry
5 Lt. Gen. Charn Angsuchote Director, Budget Bureau
5 Lt. Gen. Samai Waewprasert Director, Dept, of Military Industry
4 Lt. Gen. Kosol Oonsuwan Advisor, Dept, of Military Industry
4 Col.. Kamchorn Pomyothi Deputy Director, Dept, of Military 
Industry
4 Gen. Champen Charusathien Royal A i d e - d e - c a m p
4 Air Chief Marshall Boonchoo 
Chantarubeksa Commander, Royal Thai Air Force
4 Vichien Mairieng Ministry of Finance
4 Boontham Tongkaimook Deputy Director, Budget Bureau
4 Damrong Cholvicharn Director, Department of Public Works
4 Lt. Gen. Larp Hasdin Director, Thai Tobacco Monopoly
4 Gen. Kris Poonnakan Director, Department of Public 
Relations
4 Puong Suvanarat Deputy Minister of Interior
18Source: NESDC, September 1973
FIGURE 9.3 TYPICAL BOARD MEMBERSHIPS
Provincial Electricity Authority
Minister of Interior
Deputy Minister of Interior
Under-Secretary of Interior
Director-General, Public Works Department
Director-General, Department of Local Administrator
Director, Budget Bureau
Representative, Ministry of Finance
Provincial Police Commissioner
Director, Bureau of Local Government
Governor, PGA
Chairman 
Deputy Chairman 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member
Textile Organisation
Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense Chairman
Representative, Department of Military Industry Deputy Chairman
Representative, Department of Military Prosecutor Member
Representative, the Army Member
Representative, the Navy Member
Representative, the Air Forces Member
Representative, Police Department Member
Representative, Ministry of Finance Member
Representative, Budget Bureau Member
Representative, NESDC Member
Director, TO Member
State Railways of Thailand
Deputy Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces Chairman 
Assistant Supreme Commander Member 
Representative, NESDC Member 
Deputy Under-Secretary, Ministry of Communication Member 
Director-General, Department of Taxation Member 
Governor, SRT Member
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have been frequent changes of government. For example, within 7 years there 
were 3 major changes in the governing board of Pharmaceutical Organisation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Lessons from Thailand clearly confirm that public enterprises primarily 
are originated, continued or terminated for political reasons and thus 
politics is entirely unavoidable. Without the existence of effective 
controlling bodies sqch as elected Parliament and free mass media that may 
help create public accountability, public enterprises become the means for 
political rewards and patronage.
The politics of public enterprises can be expressed as the processes of 
power distribution and balancing among the ruling political bureaucratic 
elites. Political rewards and patronage therefore are utilised to gain 
loyalty among supporters of the clique. The appointment to the governing 
boards or boards of directors obviously mean both power and economic rewards 
because the appointees gain control over large organisatiors whose impact on 
national economy is so significant and at the same time benefit from either 
"visible" and "invisible" incomes as well as privileges.
More significantly, political objectives carried out by public 
enterprises are often given a higher priority than socio-economic purposes 
set by the National Plan. The control imposed by various governmental 
bodies is not for attaining of targeted results, but for more power. 
Therefore, the degree of centralisation (or decentralisation) of public 
enterprises depends on how much influence these agencies or individual 
public enterprises possess. Meanwhile, the overall performance of Thai 
public enterprises is as deleterious as criticism and it seems that such
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control does not affect their performance very much. These findings thus 
contrast with earlier theories that stress the importance of the balance 
between the autonomy.of public enterprises and political control imposed by 
the tliree branches of the government.
Appointments of top executives are made for political purposes. Many 
of them are near to retirement civil servants or military, who have strong 
affiliation with the government leaders. Some work part-time on secondment 
from the service. A few top executives are promoted from within the 
organisation and only one or two have been acquired from the private sector 
But all of them have close relationships with the top government leaders.
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1. The term to serve the kingdom was gradually reduced to four and three 
months respectively.
2. James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand Since 1850 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1957), pp.33-36.
3. See Chattip Nartsupa in his introduction in Phya Suriyanuwat, Sapsat
(Bangkok: Pikanet, 3rd ed., 1974), p.33.
4. William J. Siffin devoted a whole chapter on administrative development
in this period. See his The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change
and Development (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1966), pp.64-88.
See also Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic
Polity (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1966), pp.113-119. However,
Siffin and Riggs based their findings on Prince Damrong Rajanubahb's 
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Monarch. Readers should also see Issara Suwanabol, Rajakarn Thai: 
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6. For policy statements of all cabinets, see Roongrit Syamanond (ed.) 
Nayobai Rattaban Thai (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University's Public 
Administration monograph series No.l, 1974).
7. The controversial Temco, an American mining giant corporation, was 
defamed for its close link with the Thanom-Prapass clique which 
illegally granted the company a concession over a large rich tin 
deposit. Pressed by the public, the Sanya Government withdrew that 
concession soon after the People's revolution of 1973 and set up the 
State owned Off Shore Mining Organisation to take over. After 1976 
coup, however, a Temco sister company, the Bellington, entered a 
profit-sharing contract with the 0M0.
8. Budget Bureau, Rai Rgan Karn Klang: Pee Goppraman 2519, Vol.5 (Bangkok:
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J. Rothwell (ed.),Administrative Issues in Developing Economies 
(Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1972), p.56.
10. The Second Plan states that:
"To operate state enterprises in the activities related 
to public utilities for the benefits of the economy and
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earning of income for the country. The Government shall 
not establish any new state enterprises except when 
genuinely necessary for the overall benefits, and it 
shall formulate policy in line with the Government 
policy of promoting private investment.
The establishment of new state enterprises if necessary 
shall be undertaken with caution based on the criteria 
that they shall not come into conflict with the declared 
Governmental policy statement of with the law promoting 
private investment. Consideration shall be given such 
that the newly established state enterprises shall 
genuinely benefit the overall economic and social 
development.
As for activities in the areas of industry and commerce 
which truly benefit the public as a whole and the 
Government wishes to accelerate their establishment, the 
Government>shall encourage private investment. It shall 
be permissible for the Government to participate with 
capital in the investment but the proportion of the 
Government capital shall not exceed fifty percent so as 
to prevent that business to become a state enterprise.
And when the business can operate satisfactorily, the 
Government shall sell or transfer it to private ownership 
at once”.
This is confirmed by the Third Plan:
”The Government will neither establish new industrial or 
commercial state enterprises, nor expand existing ones to 
compete with private enterprises except those which will 
be of unquestionable benefit to the public and national 
security".
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and The Third National Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-1976) 
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PART III: CASE STUDIES
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CASE A
THE ONE-NATIONAL-AIRLINE POLICY
A national airline is no longer a luxurious flag waving exercise a 
Third World country '’must" afford in order to maintain international 
status. Instead, it is a highly profitable business much sought after by 
private entrepreneurs. However, it also involves air traffic rights, 
considered to be one of the most precious national assets, that governments 
can use to justify their monopoly of this type of business. In most Third 
World countries, governments usually adopt the one national airline policy 
(in some cases, one domestic and one international airline) but a few 
countries like Thailand (until recently) have had two or more airlines, one 
owned by the State and others by private entrepreneurs. Two or more air­
lines may bring in more foreign currency than one airline, directly from 
the sale of services and indirectly from tourism. However, these countries 
risk losses from direct competition, and from overusing traffic rights 
which may provide retaliation from countries which suffer a deficit.
This case illustrates public policy-making on the airline policy in 
Thailand where for over a decade two airlines operated on international 
routes. It involved the conflict of interests among the power elite groups, 
the military, businessmen, top bureaucrats and politicians. It also 
involved scandals, corruption, abuse of political influence, and mud- 
slinging in the press for years, during a period covered by both civilian 
and military governments. This study therefore is directed at the style of 
these two types of government in an attempt to compare factors affecting the 
processes of policy making.
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Genesis
With brief exceptions, air transportation in Thailand has been 
considered by the government as a public utility to be solely operated as a 
state enterprise. However, from time to time, the government has been 
forced to accept a two airline-policy. As early as 1929 the Aerial 
Transport Company of Thailand was founded and became one of the first state 
owned companies in the kingdom. ATCT, later renamed Siam Airways Company 
(SAC), operated regular domestic passenger services throughout the country 
with profitable margins. After the Second World War, there were two more 
airlines set up to operate international flights: the first, Pacific
Overseas Airlines Services (POAS), owned by the Government (44 percent), 
the United States Government (26 percent) and other private shareholders.
The second, Trans Asia Aviation System (TAAS), was wholly-owned by private 
entrepreneurs. The fatal crashes of the two airlines in Hong Kong in 1949 
led the government to amalgamate the SAC and POAS to become Thai Airways 
Company and to terminate the license of TAAS. TAC operated both inter­
national and domestic services until 1958 when it suspended all inter­
national flights because of heavy losses. The failure of TAC was then 
severely criticised by the press, and by the leader of the 1957 coup, Sarit 
Dhanarat, for alleged scandals involving the purchase of three Lockheed 
Super G-Constellations. Sarit's friend, Chalermkiat Wattanangkul, who was 
also the new Commander of the Air Force, was subsequently appointed the 
Chairman of TAC, and since then it has become a tradition that such position 
is filled by the Air Force Chief.
Only two years later, Thai Airways International was set up, apparently 
influenced by the Air Force faction (which had long dominated commercial 
aviation) in the ruling junta, as a joint venture between TAC (70 percent)
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and Scandinavian Airlines System (30 percent) with an initial paid-up 
capital of 40 million baht. This state company has since become one of the 
most successful airlines in Asia with a record of 14 consecutive profitable 
years of operation. The total capital was increased to 200 million baht 
in 1976 and all SAS shares were transferred to TAC in March 1977.
Internally, Thai International is among the most successful enterprises in 
the country and is one of the largest employers with over 4,000 employees.^
The conflicts began as soon as Sarit's successor, Thanom Kittikachorn, 
allowed the newly established Air Siam (formerly Varanond Air-Siam Company), 
wholly owned by Prince Varanond, the King's uncle, and some members of the
Royal family, to operate an international non-scheduled cargo service in
21965. No actual flight operations, however, were undertaken until early 
in 1970 when it started the Bangkok-Hong Kong freight service with three 
DC-4s bought from Australia. Within a year it depleted its capital and 
faced considerable financial difficulty. To assist the company, the Thanom 
regime again in 1969 licensed the company to operate a twice weekly 
passenger-cargo service to Hong Kong-Tokyo-Honolulu-Los Angeles, using a 
DC-8 leased from an American charter carrier. This decision ignored Thai 
International's protest that it was supposed to be the country's sole 
international carrier. It also conflicted with the Revolutionary Council's 
Decree No.58 stating that air transportation is a public utility and no 
legal entity is allowed to operate without being granted a concession from 
the government. Air Siam's effort again failed to make any profit and, 
instead it faced bankruptcy as the result of heavy losses with debts of 
more than 119 million baht by the end of 1971. The flights to Los Angeles 
were therefore suspended.
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Then in March 1972 the shareholders of Air Siam decided to completely
overhaul the management of the company. Virachai Vannukul, who left Thai
International after an internal dispute, stepped in to take over the
management from Prince Varanond. Meanwhile, Associated Development Company
(Adco) owned by the then Director of Budget Bureau, Boontham Thongkaimook
and his friends, took 55 percent of the equity at the nominal sum of 1 baht
3per share (originally 100 baht per share). A few months later, Air Siam
recommenced the Hong Kong route using a BAC-111 leased from Singaporean
millionaire, Robin Loh, the purchasing agent for the Indonesian State Oil
4Company, Pertamina. * By the beginning of 1973, Air Siam operated a thrice 
weekly service from Bangkok to Tokyo via Hong Kong by a leased Boeing 707, 
and from September 1973 it was able to return to the Trans-Pacific route 
with a leased Boeing 747 and a DC-10.
1973 saw the end of the rule of Thanom-Prapass and the beginning of a 
brief interlude of civilian rule (Sanya, October 1973-February 1975; Seni, 
February-March 1975; Kukrit, March 1975-April 1976, Seni, May 1976-October 
1976). This was ended by another military takeover in October 1976. This 
brief period highlighted politicking by the two rival groups: Thai
International was supported by the Air Force and a group of top bureaucrats, 
while Air Siam received substantial support from businessmen and 
politicians. The two companies, in addition to widespread lobbying in 
Parliament, used the press to charge each other of doctored accounts, 
foreign domination (Air Siam by Singaporean capitalists and Thai 
International by SAS), and used other tricks aimed at blackening the rival’s 
name. This situation, as commented by a reporter, was "the result of a 
lack of any definitive Government policy on the civil aviation ..., 
corruption on the part of a long string of administrations and the 
continuing abuse of political influence in Thailand’’.^  In fact, there was
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compete with Thai International. Nonetheless, in July 1965, the Cabinet 
approved Air Siam's request to operate "international freight services".
In September 1965 Air Siam asked for permission to operate a 
passenger-cargo service on routes Thai International did not operate, as 
well as charter services. It took the Cabinet only a month to approve the 
request.
Then in January 1966 the company proposed to the Ministry of 
Communications that it would operate a twice weekly service in the Bangkok- 
Hong Kong-Tokyo-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Vancouver (Montreal) route. The 
Ministry of Communications subsequently equipped the Company with a five- 
year license commencing August 1966. Nevertheless, Air Siam asked the 
Ministry to confirm the company's rights to operate on the profitable 
Bangkok-Hong Kong-Tokyo route, which Thai International already flew. Thai 
International again protested on the same grounds as 1964, but without 
fruitful result: the Cabinet approved Air Siam's application in May 1969. 
In fact, apart from the application for operating on this route, Air Siam 
also requested permission to operate domestic charter services as well as 
helicopter services, but these were turned down.
Meanwhile, Air Siam was also granted generous privileges under the 
Industrial Investment Promotion Act in January 1967 enabling the company to 
be exempted from corporate tax and import tax for imported machineries and 
equipment. Particularly interesting, air transportation has never been 
classified in the list of industries to be promoted but the Board of 
Investment approved the application in a surprisingly short period.
The strong pressure from the Air Force forced the Cabinet to state a 
week later that Air Siam "should not transfer its traffic rights to any
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third party and should not utilise aircrafts owned by other companies^.
But this resolution was not strictly followed.
Air Siam commenced its first flight operation to Hong Kong in February 
1970 by its own DC-4, and to Los Angeles via Hong Kong, Tokyo, and 
Honolulu in March 1971 by a leased aircraft. Thus it remained a paper 
airline for five years after its inception due to lack of funds.^ With the 
relative inefficiency of the aircraft combined with low load factors and 
high operating costs, the airline during this period suffered considerable 
deficits. Indeed, by the end of 1970, Air Siam depleted its available 
capital (its paid up capital amounted to 100 million baht) and faced 
bankruptcy. Therefore all flight operations were suspended in January 1972.
However, Air Siam again requested the government to grant it for three 
new routes:
(a) Bangkok-Singapore-Jakarta;
(b) Bangkok-Karachi-Beirut-Rome-London;
(c) Bangkok-Kabul-Tel Aviv-Rome-London.
The government through the Civil Aviation Board, this time disapproved the 
proposal.
The takeover by Adco in March 1972 raised some controversial issues. 
Firstly, it violated the Cabinet’s resolution that the license could not be 
transferred to another party and the takeover according to the Thai law,
g
meant the transfer of the rights. Secondly, it was alleged that Air Siam
violated Article V of the Aviation Act of 1954 (as amendment, 1959) that at
least 70 percent of the equity should be owned by individual Thai citizens
or state companies, not a private legal entity (excluding between May 1972
9and May 1974 when Adco owned 55 percent of the shares) . Thirdly, it
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appeared that Adco signed a management contract with Singapore’s Air
Charter Enterprise (Pte.) Limited, a state enterprise which had close
relations with Singapore Airlines, Thai International's main competitor in
the region. It was claimed that the actual owners of Air Siam then were
some influential Singaporean businessmen (Robin Loh and M.T. Chang) with
the backing of the Singapore Government.^  It was also known that
financial transactions of Air Siam were usually made in Hong Kong through a
Singaporean bank owned by Mr Chang. Some Air Siam employees were arrested
on the charge of smuggling foreign currencies out of the country
Fourthly, the main nominees of Adco, Boontham Thongkaimoolc, then Director
of Budget Bureau, and Metta Poomchusri, then Deputy Director of Budget
Bureau, were high ranking officials whose decisions were likely to affect
the management of Thai International, a public enterprise. This violated
the Regulation of the Prime Minister's Office dated 30 August 1955,
12prohibiting civil servants to operate businesses. There was also an
allegation that Boontham advised the government to buy a piece of land
owned by Prince Varanond at an excessive price so that the Prince could pay
13off the debts incurred by Air Siam. Finally, by the end of 1972 the
company had accumulated losses of 219 million baht (or more than twice its
paid-up capital) and according to the Civil and Commercial Code the company
should have immediately been closed down. It also violated the conditions
set in the license that the licensee should not be in financial indebtedness
14and the services should not be halted for more than 15 days.
No attempt was made by the government to seriously investigate the 
affairs of Air Siam. Instead, with generous support from Singaporean 
establishments and with the brilliant managerial style of Virachai Vannukul, 
the new President, and members of top management who defected from Thai 
International Air Siam, went back to the air in September 1973 and
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FIGURE A . 1 MAIN :
1 . Prince Varanond
2. The King’s mother, Princess Srinakarin
3. Queen Rambhai (of King Rama VII)
4. The King’s sister, Princess Kalyaniwattana
5. Princess Sudasiri Sobha
6. Mr Choompoo Attachinda
7.- Capt. Ponglert Srisookanand
8. Mr Uthai Wongkamolasai
9. Princess Booncharathorn
10. Mr William McKintosh
11. Mr Kamthorn Chaturachinda
12. Mr William -Zentgraf
13. Associated Development Company
14. Mr Vichai Vorachart
15. Mr Metta Poomchusri
16. Mr Bootham Thongkaimook
17. Shell (Thailand)
SHAREHOLDERS OF AIR SIAM
Source: Department of Commercial Registration
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FIGURE A.2 AIR SIAM BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1973
Princess Sudasiri Sobha * Chairperson
Lt. Gen. M.C. Gustavus Chakrabandh Deputy Chairperson
Po. Lt. Gen. Ghana Wongcha-um Director
Lt. Gen. Chan Ansuchote^ Director
William L. Zentgraf Director
Craig Arndt Director
2Metta Poomchusri Director
Soradis Vinyaratn Director
Veraphan Teepsuwan Director
Norong Chulajata Director
Phahol Chindakul Director
Duncan Au Director
T. Piastunovich Director
Yuohaun Wu Director
Pol. Lt. Col. Krienggrai Karnasut Director
Virachai Vannuku President and Managing Director
Source: Air Siam Annual Report 1973 (Bangkok, 1973), p.26
Note: 1. Former Director of Budget Bureau
2. Deputy Director of Budget Bureau
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FIGURE A.3 THAI INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1976
Air Chief Marshall Kaviol Thejatunga 
(Commander-in-Chief, RTAF)
Chairman
Air Chief Marshall Pravat Jirasatitya 
(Deputy Commander-in-Chief, RTAF)
Director
Air Vice Marshall Surayute Nivasabute 
(Director, Directorate of Civil Aviation, RTAF)
Director
Mr Chanchai Leetavorn
(Director-General, Customs Department)
Director
Air Vice Marshall Thaveep Bunnag 
(Managing Director, TAC)
Director
Mr Kasem Chatikavanich
(Governor, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand)
Director
Air Marshall Choo Suthichoti President and Director
(President, Thai International)
Mr Neil Lumholdt Vice-President and Director
(Executive Vice-President, Thai International)
Mr Knut Hagrup Director
(President, SAS)
Mr Erik Norman Director
4
(Vice-President, SAS)
Source: Thai International Annual Report 1976 (Bangkok, 1977), p .31
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apparently gained some strength. Noted a reporter "... it is beginning to 
look as if the realities of the aviation business have caught up with Air 
Siam once again".^
Civilian Governments and Their Policies
It was Sarit who denounced the governmental intervention into business 
activities but it was also Sarit who set up Thai International, a public 
enterprise. Sarit's successor, Thanom, followed Sarit's policy and the 
free enterprise philosophy was widely emphasised. The People’s Revolution 
of 14 October 1973, however, created a different political environment with 
less military interference in policy making and policy implementation. It 
was a period of political conflicts and quarrels, arising mainly not from 
ideology but from personal greed and desire for wealth and power. It was 
also a period of serious malpractices by politicians in collaboration with 
some top bureaucrats and businessmen resulting in widespread irregularities. 
The case of Air Siam well reflected this situation.
Professor Sanya Dharmasakdi was appointed to head the caretaker 
government until the general election of January 1975 and during his period 
he commissioned the Economic Advisory Group to the Prime Minister, headed 
by Professor Puey Ungphakorn, to inquire into the Air Siam conflict. The 
Economic Advisory Group submitted its report on the very last day of Sanya's 
rule, advising the government to:
(a) implement a one airline policy by March 1977 when the 
TAC-SAS Agreement was to be terminated, by amalgamating 
Thai International and Air Siam;
(b) investigate whether Air Siam violated the Cabinet's 
Resolution of May 1969 that its traffic rights could
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not be transferred to a new owner;
(c) appoint a committee to inquire into financial and 
managerial practices of Air Siam;
(d) plan the take-over of Air Siam by Thai International 
in the event of terminating its license;
(e) plan for Thai International to terminate the TAC-SAS 
Agreement and to consider whether Thai International 
would be solely owned by the government; and
(f) appoint members of Civil Aviation Board from neutral 
people who havö no connections with the two airlines.
The Cabinet agreed with the EAG on many points, particularly (a), (b), (c), 
(e) and (f). It also passed a resolution that if Air Siam proposed new 
routes which did not affect Thai International and, if there was nothing 
relating to international agreements, CAB should approve the application 
within 45 days.
Immediately after his appointment, Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj 
announced his plan to amalgamate the two airlines. But the Communications 
Minister, General Siri Siriyothin, argued that there were problems in 
buying Air Siam's shares.^ The Kukrit government in June 1975 
appointed an inquiry committee to study financial and managerial practices 
of Air Siam initially headed by the Director-General of Civil Aviation but 
later, after an Air Siam protest, by the Deputy Under-Secretary of 
Communications with other members from universities, Audit Council of 
Thailand, CAB, and Ministry of Communications. Meanwhile, the government, 
in contrast to the resolution made by the Sanya Cabinet, approved the 
request from Air Siam to operate on the Bangkok-Singapore route, already 
severed by Thai International. Nevertheless, the Singaporean government
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denied traffic rights because Thailand would have two airlines operating to 
Singapore while Singapore had only one. Again, Air Siam requested CAB to 
approve its proposal to fly to:
(a) Amsterdam or Paris via Colombo, Athens, Zurich;
(b) Singapore;
(c) Guam via Hong Kong and Fukuoka;
(d) Duseldolf via Cairo and Athens’
(e) Los Angeles via Hong Kong, Japan, San Francisco; and
(f) Zurich via Colombo and Tel Aviv.
It also proposed that a division of zones of routes should be made and Air 
Siam should be awarded the highly profitable route to Hong Kong, Japan and 
the United States, while Thai International flew to Europe and Australia. 
Moreover, it announced that it would buy 30 percent of Thai International's 
shares from SAS.
In January 1976 the inquiry committee recommended that the government 
terminate Air Siam's license for its violation of the Aviation Act of 1954 
and other agreements, and for its deep financial indebtedness. However, 
the Kukrit government did not implement anything, apparently for several 
reasons to be mentioned later.
The controversial conflict was complicated by a British ban on Thai 
carriers on the rich Hong Kong-Tokyo route from January 1976. The British 
in June 1975 claimed that price-cutting by Air Siam and Thai International 
had led to overcapacity on the Bangkok-Hong Kong sector and was causing 
losses for British Airways and Cathay Pacific. In the last three quarters 
of 1971 Britain was L4.5 million in deficit on the route, and the potential 
value of services by Thai carriers to and from Hong Kong was 3.5 times that
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o f  s e r v i c e s  by B r i t i s h  c a r r i e r s  to  and from T h a i l a n d .  T h a i l a n d  r e p l i e d  
t h a t  i t  would be c o n t r a r y  to  t h e  1950 T h a i - U n i t e d  Kingdom a i r  a g re e m e n t  i f  
the  B r i t i s h  imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s  on Thai  t r a f f i c  r i g h t s .  They s h o u ld  n o t  be 
p e n a l i s e d  i f  t h e y  co u ld  o p e r a t e  p r o f i t a b l y  w h i l e  o t h e r s  were making l o s s e s .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  were a l l o w e d  to  f l y  w i t h o u t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t o  and 
from Bangkok f o r  more t h a n  two d e c a d e s ,  so i t  would be u n f a i r  f o r  t h e  Thai  
t o  be  r e s t r i c t e d  j u s t  when they  began  to  make money. F i n a l l y ,  T h a i l a n d  
p rom ised  to e l i m i n a t e  p r i c e - c u t t i n g  and to  v o l u n t a r i l y  r e d u c e  c a p a c i t y  on 
t h e  two c a r r i e r s .  The d i s p u t e  was n o t  s e t t l e d  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y .
The K u k r i t  C a b i n e t ,  i n  F e b r u a r y  1976, r e s o l v e d  t h a t  t h e  two c a r r i e r s  
s h o u ld  r e d u c e  t h e i r  s e a t s  on th e  Bangkok-Hong Kong and Hong K o n g - T a i p e i -  
Tokyo s e c t i o n s  and t h a t  a s p e c i a l  t a s k  f o r c e ,  c h a i r e d  by t h e  T r e a s u r e r  
Boonchu R o c h a n a s a t h i e n ,  was to  f i n d  a f o rm u la  to  r e d u c e  t h e  s e a t  c a p a c i t y  
to  7 ,4 68  a g re e d  upon by t h e  B r i t i s h .  The t a s k  f o r c e  f o r m u l a t e d  t h e  so 
c a l l e d  1 - 7 - 1  fo rm u la  i n  which A i r  Siam was to  o v e r f l y  Hong Kong 1 f l i g h t  a 
week w h i l e  Thai  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  was to  c a n c e l  7 f l i g h t s  a week to  Hong Kong 
and to  o v e r f l y  Hong Kong 1 f l i g h t  a week.  I t  a l s o  recommended t h a t  Tha i  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  buy A i r  Siam w i t h i n  60 d a y s .
The C a b i n e t  i n  March 1976 i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  d i d  no t  want  A i r  Siam to  be 
c l o s e d  down and t h e  s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  to  A i r  Siam s h o u ld  n o t  be r e d u c e d  so 
t h a t  i t  cou ld  make p r o f i t s .  On 9 March 1976 i t  p a s s e d  a r e s o l u t i o n  t h a t  
A i r  Siam was to  be a l l o c a t e d  3 ,772  s e a t s  and Tha i  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  3 ,696  s e a t s ,  
t h a t  t h e  am a lgam a tion  be c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h i n  90 days  and t h a t  Thai  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  was to  a c c e p t  A i r  S i a m 's  d e b t s  a r i s i n g  from i t s  f l i g h t  
o p e r a t i o n s .  T h i s  i m m e d ia te ly  s p a r k e d  a p r o t e s t  f rom Thai  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  
wh ich c la im e d  t h a t  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  i t s  f l i g h t s  to  Hong Kong from 21 t o  10 
a week would l o s e  218 m i l l i o n  b a h t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  and 400 m i l l i o n  b a h t
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a definite policy concerning air transportation in the country, the one 
national airline policy, but it had never been consistently applied because 
of political influence in the policy making processes. Interestingly, this 
case was complicated by an unusual external factor: the Hong Kong
restrictions that drastically reduced capacity on the two Thai carriers on 
the Bangkok-Hong Kong route.
A few months after the October 1976 coup, in which the Chairman of 
Thai International was listed second among the coup leaders, the new 
government nullified the license of Air Siam, and some top civil servants 
involved in this controversial conflict were either suspended or fined.
Policy Making During the Military Rule
As mentioned before, the powerful group behind Thai International was 
the Air Force officials, who obviously benefitted from the company’s 
operations. Top officials from the Air Force including the Commander-in- 
Chief and his deputies, were appointed to sit on the boards of TAC and its 
two subsidiaries, Thai International and Thai Airways Aircraft Maintenance 
Company (Thai Am). The positions of General Manager or President in 
these companies were also traditionally reserved for senior officials on 
secondment from the Air Force. Furthermore, a large number of retired 
officials, wives and children of Air Forces officials joined these three 
companies at all levels or had some connections with them in one way or the 
other. This practice is not uncommon in Thailand where the Army also 
operates some public enterprises in industries such as as textiles, 
batteries and glass, and the Navy runs the Thai Maritime Navigation Company 
and the Bangkok Dock Company. Equally important, the Air Force owned the 
Bangkok International Airport at Don Muang, and any attempt to move the 
civilian airport out has never succeeded. The Civil Aviation
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Department in the Ministry of Communication only operates airports outside 
Bangkok.
The Thanom Cabinet's decision to grant Air Siam a license to operate 
an international freight service in July 1965 indicated a rift within the 
Air Force. Air Chief Marshall Boonchu Chandrarubeksa was the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Air Force after the death of Chalermkiat in 1962 but was not 
as popular with the Thanom-Propass clique as Air Chief Marshall Dhavi 
Chullasap, the Chief of Staff. It has also been reported that Dhavi and
Thanom's eldest son, Narong, had collaborated with Prince Varanond in
6 *establishing Air Siam. However, the most influential pressure that led to
such a decision was the connection between the founder of Air Siam and the
Monarch. The list of main shareholders (38.5 percent) in 1976 included
Prince Varanond the King's Mother, Queen Rambhi (of the late King Rama VII),
the King's eldest sister, Princess Kalyaniwatana, the Chairperson, Princess
Sudasini Sobha, and M.L. Boonjirathorn. It is well known among students of
Thailand how influential the monarchy is: it is widely and highly
respected; it is one of the most important factors in the policy process;
despite the fact that it is constitutionally non-political, it is one of
the richest institutions in the country outside the public sector, owning
lands and estates around the country, through the Crown Property Bureau and
the Royal Purse Office.
It is interesting to not-e that it took the regime over twenty months 
to allow the establishment of Air Siam. Prince Varanond directly submitted 
his proposal to PM Thanom who forwarded the case to the Cabinet in February 
1964. The cabinet then returned the matter to the Ministry of Communications 
for investigations. TAC and Thai International immediately protested 
the proposal on the grounds that it would violate the TAC-SAS Agreement, 
which granted the government would not allow any other airline to
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in the second. In addition, Thai International claimed that Air Siam had 
nothing in the way of assets and was riddled with bad debts and therefore a 
merger was impossible. Much stronger protest, however, came from the 
Communications Minister who wrote to Prime Minister Kukrit three times 
within a week: in the first note he reminded the Prime Minister to
reconsider the recommendations made by the committee investigating 
financial and managerial practices of Air Siam; in his second note he 
claimed that the Cabinet's resolution in favour of Air Siam (10:3 on the 
Tokyo route) would violate the Criminal Code relating to corrupt practices; 
and in the last note he stated that it was impossible for the Ministry to 
implement the government’s policy. The Cabinet then modified its resolution 
on 23 March, that a merger should be made as soon as possible, and on 30 
March, the seats allocated to Thai International were increased from 3,696 
to 3,732. However, the general election of 1976 in April saw the Kukrit 
coalition government’s failure to return to power (Kukrit lost his 
Bangkok seat) and the resolution was again not implemented.
There were some significant events to be noted here. First, the 
Kukrit government announced the dissolution of Parliament on 15 January 
1976, and it was not appropriate (if not unconstitutional) to make such 
important policies. On one hand, it could be claimed that the conflict and 
the British threat was an urgent matter and needed immediate actions to 
solve the problems but on the other hand it could also mean that the govern­
ment was an opportunist out to enrich itself from the conflict or to find 
funds for the election campaign. Secondly, -ll was well known that both 
Kukrit and Boonchu were closely linked t.r banks (Kukrit had major shares in 
the Thai Commercial Bank and the Thai Metropolitan Bank while Boonchu was 
the Executive Vice President of the Bangkok Bank) which gave loans to Air 
Siam exceeding 36 million baht (of a total 80.7 million) in 1976, and the
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banks would receive nothing in return if Air Siam went bankrupt.
Thirdly, it was Boonchu who masterminded the Cabinet decision, as is 
evident from his memorandum to Kukrit in February 1976, that:
(a) the Communications Ministry should allocate seats 10:3 
in favour of Air Siam on the Hong Kong-Tokyo section;
(b) Air Siam should cooperate with Thai International in 
marketing, pricing and ticketing;
(c) Air Siam and Thai International should prepare for a 
merger by 1977; and
(d) a representative of the Treasury should be appointed 
to sit on the Board of Air Siam.
Boonchu also initiated the sale of profitable public enterprises including
19Thai International to the public. It was known that a Boonchu-owned
travel agency, Tour Royale, monopolised the wholesale tickets of Air Siam 
20in Bangkok. Fourthly, the Minister of Communications was always over­
shadowed by Boonchu because he was not an MP. On some occasions, other 
members of the Cabinet raised the Air Siam-Thai International issue in the 
meetings without his knowledge. On one occasion, the Deputy Minister 
Boonyong Watanapongse, sent an official note informing the Chairman of Air 
Siam that the Cabinet had approved the proposal to operate on the Bangkok- 
Colombo-Tel Aviv-Zurich route, without authority. In fact, Cabinet did not 
make any resolution on this matter, according to a statement issued later 
by the Cabinet Secretariat. This practice infringed the Criminal Code 
relating false presentation of official matters. Finally, Boontham and 
Metta of Budget Bureau, were alleged to use their authority in allocating 
a "pork barrel" budget to gain power over politicians. It was said that 
the two once recommended Kukrit to appoint some of their closest allies to
351
21the Cabinet seats. In addition, Boontham turned down Thai International's 
proposal to increase its capital in 1974 and therefore showed his bias 
against the state-owned company.
There were some other top bureaucrats collaborating with Boontham.
Soon after the Seni coalition government took power, Tavich Klinpratoom,
the Minister of Communications, who was known for his involvement in many
scandals in the past, appointed Dr Kanj Nakamdi, one of his closest aides,
as Under Secretary for Communications and as Chairman of Thai International,
replacing Air Chief Marshall Kamo1 Dejatunka, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force. At the same time, two other top Air Force officials were
replaced on the Board of the company by Tavich’s friends, Manij Srisakorn
22and Yos Denpaisal, who had close connections with Air Siam. By the end 
of July 1976 Dr Kanj stated the new policy that:
(a) Air Siam agreed to give up traffic rights on the 
Bangkok-Singapore section;
(b) Air Siam agreed to reduce its quota in the Hong Kong 
route to 3,444 seats;
(c) the Communications Ministry would license Air Siam to 
operate in the Bangkok-Colombo-Tel Aviv-Zurich route;
(d) the Ministry would direct the two carriers to exchange 
Board members - the President of Air Siam was to sit on 
the Board of Thai International and the President of 
Thai International was to sit on the Air Siam's Board; 
and
(e) the Ministry would agree to sell 30 percent of Thai 
International to Air Siam when TAC terminated its 
agreement with SAS in March 1977 and the Ministry would 
purchase shares of Air Siam amounting to 30 million baht.
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These solutions were very similar to Air Siam's requests to the government 
earlier.
Immediately after these policies were released, employees of Thai 
International, TAC, and Thai Am strongly reacted against Tavich and sent 
their Presidents to protest to Prime Minister Seni. They demanded that:
(a) Thai International should be the only flag carrier in 
the international operations while TAC should be the 
sole operator on domestic flights;
(b) Air Siam’s license should be immediately terminated as 
recommended by the inquiry committee;
(c) Thai International should be instructed to absorb all 
operations and staff of Air Siam so that traffic rights 
would not be damaged;
(d) the Communications Ministry should cancel all 
instructions that would damage Thai International and 
Air Siam;
(e) the government should appoint a committee to investigate 
corrupt practices relating to commercial avaiation and 
all persons found guilty should be severely punished; and
(f) the government should immediately suspend Tavich and Dr 
Kanj .
Consequently, on 3 August 1976 all employees of the three companies staged 
a one-day strike.
The situation was so serious that the Cabinet met on that day and made
a statement that:
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(a) the Communications Ministry would cancel all instructions 
that might affect Thai International and TAC;
(b) the Cabinet appoint the Deputy Prime Minister and two 
other senior ministers to consider the requests of the 
employees; and
(c) any change concerning traffic rights would be thoroughly 
considered by the Cabinet.
The Prime Minister also informed Thai International’s President that he had
instructed the Ministry of Communications to cancel the exchange of
directors between the two companies as proposed by Dr Kanj. Meanwhile, it
was reported in newspapers that there might be a Cabinet reshuffle in which
.Tavich would be removed, similar to the one in the Kukrit Cabinet when
23Tavich was fired from the Agriculture portfolio.
Interestingly, the rumour that the acquisition of two new DC-10s of
Thai International involved irregularities, prompted Tavich to authorise
T.A. Ryan, an American and a former Vice President of Air Siam, to
investigate the matter on behalf of the Communications Ministry. The Under
Secretary for Communications, Dr Kanj, also sent a telex to cancel the
purchase but McDonnell Douglas Corporation replied that the company would
seize a 60 million baht deposit in case of the cancellation. However, the
Cabinet on 9 September 1976, accepted the suggestion of a Cabinet Committee
that the acquisition of the aircrafts should be made and that a committee to
inquire into the claimed irregularities should be appointed by the Ministry
of Communications. It was later revealed that Mr Ryan worked for Guinness
Peat Aviation and Irish International, the aircraft leasing companies from
which Minister Tavich preferred Thai International to lease 
24aircrafts.
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Members of the Communications Committee of Parliament split into two
sides but the report of the Committee, reportedly drafted by only three out
25of 19 members, was biassed in favour of Air Siam. It called for the 
Communications Ministry to investigate irregularities concerning the 
acquisition of the DC-10s, for investigating the strike made by Thai 
International, TAC and Thai Am employees, and for a division of operating 
zones between the two carriers. The report was submitted to the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives on 10 September 1976.
Epilogue
On 6 October 1976, the military returned to power and appointed Tanin 
Kraivixhien as Prime Minister and Amporn Chandravichit, a former member of 
the Committee to investigate financial and managerial practices of Air Siam, 
as Deputy Prime Minister. From the outset, the new government announced its 
one-national-airline policy but it took four months to decide to terminate 
Air Siam’s licence. According to its statement, Air Siam had failed to 
operate efficiently and was facing bankruptcy; it failed to operate many 
flights during the Christmas-New Year period, stranding hundreds of passen­
gers becuase its only leased aircraft was seized by credit
violated air space of some countries and practiced some irregularities con­
cerning price-cutting tickets that damaged the national interest. The new 
President of Air Siam, Vivith Vichitvatakarn, stated that his company lost
some 350 million baht and was continuing to lose 50 million baht a month
26mainly because of the British ban. Meanwhile, Under Secretary Kanj was
relieved from the Service and Boontham and Metta of the Budget Bureau were
suspended. Prince Varanond, who set up Air Siam, however, returned to Thai
27International as a captain and seemed to be happy with the result.
Viracnai left the country to live in the United States and founded a
new airline in the South Pacific.
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CASE B 
THE FAL CASE
This case study illustrates how the Philippine Airlines, the National 
flag carrier of the Philippine Republic, changed its status from a private 
company to a semi-state company, from a semi-state company to a mixed 
enterprise, and then from a mixed enterprise to a state company.
This discussion focusses attention on factors influencing the policy 
making process in tfie allocation of resources (in this case, a type of 
business activity, the commercial aviation) to political supporters of the 
governing elites. It covers a period of more than three decades during 
which three major events, all involving the same pattern of scandals, 
attacks, counter-attacks, and changes, occurred. More than anything else, 
it shows the way the "influential private" sector, as the distinctive part 
in the private-public sectors, has been influencing events in the Third 
World.
BACKGROUND
Philippine Airlines was incorporated in February 1941 to operate on 
the franchise purchased from the defunct Philippine Aerial Taxi Company, 
the first scheduled airline in the Far East. One of PATCO’s shareholders, 
Colonel Andres Soriano, became first President and General Manager and held 
these positions until February 1961.
The outbreak of the Pacific War forced PAL to cease operations and all 
its aircraft were destroyed in combat. PAL started its post-war operations 
in February 1946 only to find itself in tough competition with a few
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domestic airlines owned by influential families. However, Soriano was able 
to enlist financial assistance from the government through the National 
Development Company, the state holding company. NDC's investment in PAL 
reached 53.4 percent in 1948 and 54 percent in 1955.
In 1948, PAL achieved ranking among the top five airlines in the world 
in unduplicated route-miles. It operated scheduled flights to five 
continents and to 41 domestic destinations. The success of the company, 
however, was largely credited to Soriano who ran PAL as his personal 
company.
As the biggest shareholder, the government was well represented in the 
PAL board of directors, but it did not intervene in the internal affairs of 
the company and gave Soriano an almost free hand in its management. In 
1951, a general management contract between PAL and A. Soriano y Cia, a 
management company owned by Soriano, was signed to confirm Soriano's full 
authority in writing. The provisions in this contract were little known to 
the public until the Senate Transportation and Public Services Committee 
exposed them in the beginning of 1961.
Soriano was also known for his close personal relationship with top
politicians and government officials, including all Philippine Presidents
from Manuel L. Quezon to Carlos P. Garcia. It was not unusual for him to
approach the President of the day seeking advice or assistance. A special
relationship with Congress was also noted. On many occasions, PAL succeeded
in getting advantageous concessions and privileges from Congress without
much difficulty.^- A Senate Committee later found that PAL's lobby in
Congress was in the form of issuing free airplane passes to influential
politicians, their wives, and secretaries’.2
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Two PAL plane crashes in November and December 1960 which claimed 61 
lives, sparked the controversy that subsequently ended Soriano’s involvement 
in PAL. President Garcia ordered the suspension of all night flights and 
Congress immediately launched a probe of PAL. On 13 February 1961 Soriano 
personally tendered his resignation to the President, the only person he 
considered his boss, and Eduardo Z. Romualdez, PAL board Chairman since 
1954, became the new President.
The new administration of President Diosdado Macapagal declared a 
policy of free enterprise and announced that all except a few public 
enterprises were to be sold or disposed of. PAL shares owned by NDC were 
transferred to the Government Service Insurance System. Then the government 
announced that it was selling these shares to Benigno P. Toda, Jr., then PAL 
Chairman, and a close firend of President Macapagal. But the sale of PAL 
was not without controversy. In September 1964 GSIS sold 5 percent of the 
capital stock of the airline to a private company owned by Todea's friend, 
reducing GSIS’s share to 49%. In January 1965, Rubicon Inc., a corporation 
headed by Toda, acquired the majority of stock holdings after the purchase 
at public bidding of the percentive rights of GSIS in additional shares in 
the company. Nevertheless, GSIS still owned about 24 percent of the 
capital. Toda, therefore, became both Chairman and President until 
November 1977 when he sold his shares back to GSIS.
The sale of these shares to the private sector was followed by the new 
aviation policy that allowed several domestic airlines to compete against 
each other. Among them were Filipinas Orient Airways and Air Manila - both 
owned by wealthy families. The competition obviously hurt PAL whose load 
factor drastically declined from 61.74 percent in 1965 to 48.64 percent in
31966. The two other main airlines did not make a profit either.
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By 1972, with all three main airlines in financial difficulty, it 
became questionable whether the Republic could afford to have more than one 
airline. Soon after the imposition of martial law, President Marcos placed 
all three airlines under direct supervision of the military. Then Air 
Manila and Filipinas Orient Airways were instructed to cease operations by 
1973. Therefore, PAL was again given a monopoly in commercial aviation.
Air Manila was later granted the right to use its two aircraft strictly for 
charters to Hong Kong, Japan and the United States. In 1974, the Marcos 
regime established two new airlines, Philippine Aero Transport (PATI) and 
Philippine Aero System, both wholly-owned by the state owned by Philippine 
Aerospace Development Corporation.
In October 1977, after a meeting with Marcos, Toda unwillingly decided
to sell all of his shares in PAL to GSIS (Toda owned 90 percent of Rubicon
Inc., which in turn owned 74.2 percent of PAL). It was reported that the
acquisition of the airline was the result of strongarm tactics used by
persons close to Marcos in order to oust business managers who were a
4potential challenge to the regime. So far, Toda has not yet received any 
payment from the government.
PAL UNDER SORIANO
The government became involved in the management of PAL for the first 
time in 1941 when President Manuel L. Quezon approved the NDC's proposal to 
buy 1,500 PAL shares valued at P150,000, on the condition that, as a matter 
of policy, the government should not be in the minority, that NDC be 
represented on the board of directors, and that NDC auditors be allowed to 
audit the PAL books at any time.^ This first NDC’s investment accounted for 
37 percent of the paid-up capital of P402,500. Other investors are listed
as follows:
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Ramon Fernandez 25 shares
Juan H. Elizalde 495 shares
John R. Schulz 250 shares
Andres Soriano 225 shares
Ernesto von Kauffman 5 shares
It needs to be explained why the government decided to participate in 
a company with substantial foreign shareholdings (Soriano was Spanish and 
Schulz American) while there were other airlines wholly-owned by Filipinos. 
Firstly, Soriano was already economically influential. He had been general 
manager of San Miguel Brewery, Inc., one of the largest companies in the 
Republic, since 1924, and owned a number of mining and finance companies. 
More than anything else, his relationship with President Quezon and top 
government officials, including those in NDC, was close. In 1941 when the 
Japanese invaded the Philippines, Soriano escorted President Quezon to 
Australia and then to the United States where he was made Secretary of 
Finance of the government-in-exile (1942-1943).
Secondly, it was known that PAL’s main competition, the Iloilo-Negros 
Air Express Company (later renamed Far Eastern Transport, Inc. - FEATI) was 
owned by rich families, namely the Aranetas, the Lopezes, and the Ledesmas, 
which were political rivals of the President.
Finally, Soriano’s reputation, his business acumen, and his experience 
in the airline business convinced the President and other officials. Only 
Soriano and Fernandez (PAL President) had actively participated in the 
business, and since Fernandez had other commitments, it was no surprise 
that Soriano was the only one who actually ran the company.
The post-war government of President Manuel A. Roxas continued to 
support PAL through NDC and other government financial institutions such
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as the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now Development Bank of the 
Philippines) and Philippine National Bank. At the time, there were several 
domestic airlines such as FEATI, the Commercial Airlines, Inc., and the 
Trans Asiatic Airlines. FEATI was then the largest company with 28 
converted C-47s, 5 DC-4s, 6 Nordyn Norseman, and 15 Piper Cubs, compared
8with 5 DC-3s, 2 chartered DC-4s and a number of Beechcrafts C-45s of PAL.
FEATI was already operating to 30 inter-island stations and to Hong Kong.
Shanghai, Bangkok and San Francisco, whereas PAL routes covered only 8
9domestic destinations and a few overseas stations. As the market was 
hardly able to suppqrt one carrier, and as the government could invest in 
only one carrier, the matter was left to the two main airlines to thrash it 
out. Again, PAL succeeded in forcing FEATI out of the airline business.
In 1947, PAL acquired the assets of FEATI and some other smaller airlines, 
giving PAL a monopoly.
In 1946, NDC invested P530,000 of stock in Pal. In July 1947, an 
additional investment of P350,000 was made. Additionally, in February 1942, 
NDC had extended a P2 million loan to PAL which was later converted into 
shares. In the same year, PAL borrowed PI million from PNB and another P4 
million from RFC. The investment and financial support was substantial 
considering that the Philippine government was then facing bankruptcy.
During the Quirino administration, PAL still enjoyed NDC’s financial
support which in 1950 totalled P7.3 million or 53.59 percent of the paid-up
capital. In 1951, the Bureau of Posts agreed to pay PAL from that year at
the rate of one peso per mile flown for mail carried irrespective of weight.
Under this agreement, the government was obliged to pay PAL even if no mail
was carried so long as the airline maintained its routes covered by the 
10contract.
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Only in the Magsaysay administration did PAL fail to enlist financial 
assistance from the government. Early in 1954, Soriano informed President 
Magsaysay that PAL was making losses in its international operations and it 
badly needed government assistance of P14 million to update its equipment.
As government financing could not be made available, the President suspended 
the international service in March and PAL sold its equipment which netted 
P15 million. However, it was President Magsaysay who in the same year 
instructed Soriano to study the possibility of PAL resuming its inter­
national operations. In 1958, Soriano placed an order for two DC-8s which 
was to cost P40 million, even before Congress had approved PAL’s resumption 
of international service. In July 1959, during the Garcia administration, 
Republic Act 2232 was passed, not only to reactivate the service, but also 
to appropriate funds for airmail compensation of P23.5 million as govern­
ment subsidy for such services.
The passage of Republic Act 2232 demonstrated the effectiveness of 
PAL’s lobby in Congress. Apart from the generous government subsidy to be 
paid over a period of five years, the Act stated that all governmental 
instrumentalities including the Central Bank should lend full support to 
PAL by making available loans and foreign exchange required for the purchase 
of aircraft. Furthermore, during the same session, Congress also passed 
Republic Act 2360, granting PAL a franchise for another 50 years ending in 
the year 2010, without the knowledge of the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 
This legislation, virtually giving PAL the right to the monopoly of both 
domestic and international operations, was sharply in contrast with the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines (Republic Act 776) which encouraged 
the competition of airlines and which specified the term of franchise for
only 25 years.
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In regard to PAL's internal management, there was a change in November
1946 when Pio Pedrosa, then Commissioner of the Budget, a government
representative, was elected Chairman of the PAL board. Still, Soriano was
given full authority to make important decisions and carry out company
activities, including decisions to acquire new aircraft and to get necessary
funds. Therefore, in practice, the board was only to confirm what Soriano
had already done.^ To the board of directors, it was Soriano "who got
things going and done" because of his exceptional managerial ability (he
12was named Businessman of the Year - 1947). In addition, frequent changes
in the chairmanship 'of the board as well as in its composition also worked
13in Soriano's favour. In 1947, Mariano Garchitorena replaced Pedrosa, 
Placido L. Mapa became Chairman a year later, Jose P. Bengson replaced Mapa 
in 1950, and Eduardo Z. Romualdez replaced Bengson in 1954. Therefore, 
Soriano was the only one who was well informed of PAL activities because of 
his continuity in the board.
Soriano reported in 1950 to the PAL board of directors that some 
executive of A. Soriano y Cia, a management company owned by his family, 
had helped manage PAL without being paid by the airline. The board then 
decided to have a contract between PAL and A. Soriano y Cia, in order to 
define the relationship. On 30 May 1951 the controversial general manage­
ment contract was signed by Soriano representing A. Soriano y Cia and 
Bengson representing PAL. This contract was later severely criticised by 
some members of CAA, CAB, and the Tanada Committee as giving Soriano
dictational power in the management of a public enterprise in which the
\Lgovernment had 54 percent of the shares. It was also found that the 
executives of A. Soriano y Cia who helped manage PAL were actually Soriano 
himself and his son whose many other businesses were intertwined with PAL. 
ANSOR (Andres Soriano) Corporation, for instance, was appointed the
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exclusive purchasing and sales agent in the United States, in addition to 
acting as building manager and cargo forwarder.^ A. Soriano y Cia was 
the general agent of the Commonwealth Insurance, Home Insurance Company of 
New York, and Union Insurance of Canton, Ltd., all of which benefitted from 
making insurance business with PAL.
Irregularities in the PAL management under Soriano began to be exposed 
even before the Magsaysay administration, but it appeared that no one dared 
to challenge him. After receiving a payment of P15 million from the sale 
of equipment made after the suspension of international operations, Soriano 
informed President Magsaysay that PAL actually made a profit of PI.4 
million in a five year period ending in 1953 from its international service 
and the service should be resumed. Particularly interesting, the board of 
directors also had resolved to reduce the capital contribution to P8 
million and the excess cash capital including P15 million from the sale of 
equipment was to be distributed among all stockholders on a pro rata basis. 
NDC, however, did not receive such a refund because the Cabinet decided to 
pay it back to PAL in payment for debts made by the Bureau of Posts from 
1950 to 1954. The move to reduce the capital contribution undoubtedly 
benefitted Soriano, then the largest stockholder next to the NDC.
The paid-up capital was reduced again in 1956 to P6 million in which 
NDC's contribution was 54.186 percent. However, just before Soriano’s 
resignation in February 1961, PAL capitalisation was increased to P25 mil­
lion. This illustrated the lack of long range planning: the decisions to
reduce or to increase the capital depended on Soriano's willingness alone.
Apart from the fatal crashes in 1960, which occurred within a month of 
each other, Soriano's decision to order two DC-8s to be used when PAL 
resumed its international flights, also became a controversy that put him
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under severe attacks from politicians and the press. They claimed that the 
financial obligation made by Soriano brought about difficulties to the 
airline and that decision was made prior to the Japanese and the American 
government’s approval of PAL's air traffic rights in their respective 
countries. Indeed, much of these unfortunate circumstances were beyond 
Soriano's control. The rate of exchange since the original data of 
purchase had increased by AO percent and it was difficult to get loans from 
any domestic financial institution during that period. Also, the failure 
to conclude air agreements with the two governments was not Soriano's fault 
because it was the Philippine government's responsibility to bargain for 
the rights.
Very few people realised that during the Soriano management from 1941
16to 1960, PAL recorded profits for all but two years (1947 and 1949). Out 
of the NDC's total investment of P7.3 million in PAL, NDC recovered P5.2 
million in capital refund and dividends, and the balance of P2.09 million 
still left in the capital contribution (or 54.186 percent) was valued then 
at P13,09 million on the basis of PAL's net worth of P24.14 million. More 
importantly, PAL under Soriano, had made its name far ahead of other 
national carriers in the Far East, gaining prestige for the Philippines and 
more income for its people.
TODA, GSIS AND PAL
When President Diosdado Macapagal came to power, Colonel Renato L. 
Barnetto was elected as Chairman and President of PAL in January 1962.
Only a few months later, Benigno P. Toda, Jr. replaced Barretto as Board 
Chairman. In August 1973, Barretto resigned from the presidency and Rafael 
Igoa, who served under Soriano as Vice-President, became President. On 18 
January 1965, when Rubicon, Inc., a corporation owned by Toda, acquired the
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majority stockholdings in PAL, Toda became both board Chairman and 
President, the positions he held until November 1977 when he was forced to 
sell his shares to the government.
It was reported that President Macapagal appointed Toda in return for 
the assistance that the wealthy Toda family had given relatively poor 
Macapagal in his presidential campaign in 1961.^ It was also President 
Macapagal who ordered the sale of PAL, as a part of his policy that public 
enterprises were to be sold "whenever private capital was willing and able 
to take over". However, the sale of PAL became a controversial issue, 
apparently directed to defame the President who was seeking re-election in 
1965.
In the early sixties, NDC decided to sell its unprofitable Manila 
Textile Mill and to lease the Ilocos Spinning Mill, but it had to find cash 
to pay over P4 million gratuities for over 2,000 employees who were to be 
laid off. Toda then offered to purchase NDC's shares in PAL. However, it 
was reported that Toda was buying these shares at an unreasonably low price 
and the press prominently played up the story. The sale was subsequently 
called off and the President instructed the Government Service Insurance 
System to purchase NDC’s shares so that NDC was able to raise the cash. At 
the end of August 1964 the government again proposed to sell privately its 
54 percent shares of PAL stock held by GSIS to Toda, but this decision 
stirred fierce controversy. Eventually, in September, 5 percent of the 
stock was sold to Anselmo Trinidad, President of the Manila Stock Exchange, 
who was known as Toda's close friend. Finally, in January 1965, Rubicon, 
Inc., purchased an additional 25 percent shares held by GSIS at public 
bidding to become the largest shareholder.
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Toda assumed full control of PAL early in 1965 only to find two new 
serious competitors, Filipinas Orient Airways and Air Manila, both owned by 
influential families. The competition directly affected PAL financially: 
its domestic services have incurred losses since then.
It should be noted that Toda kept his profile at a surprisingly low
level during the rule of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, a political rival
of his patron, Macapagal. Toda never asked for any assistance from the
government for he knew that it was useless. He knew very well that, under
the then democratic Marcos administration, a monopoly in the domestic air
services would never be given to any airline because of political pressures
from Congress and from the public. Therefore, he often stated that the
18competition did not contribute to the losses. He instead blamed the rise 
in the cost of operations, the failure of domestic operations to expand, 
and, above all, the dificulty in getting domestic air fares revised 
realistically. In fact, the other two airlines also sustained heavy losses 
from their services .
Therefore, PAL's mainstay had shifted to its international operations 
which earned handsome profits. During the fifteen years of Toda's manage­
ment, PAL performed reasonably well with losses in only two years (1970 and
1972), despite the fact that PAL made heavy losses from its domestic
19operations (in 1977 alone P22 million). The total assets grew 2,339
percent to PI,433.1 million in 1977 when the employee body rose 149 percent
20to 7,516, and the gross revenue soared 2,677 percent. In 1976, profits
21per share were P6 million while book value of one share reached P54.
There were 2.5 million shares prior to the takeover and Toda owned 1.78
million of them.
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It was known that President Marcos instructed Toda to increase PAL
capitalisation from P25 million to P250 million within a few months. When
Toda indicated his inability to do so, President Marcos then asked for the
transfer without having a guaranteed price. Meanwhile, a campaign against
Toda and PAL was made in the press controlled by Mrs Marcos' brother and 
22supporters. Then, on 3 November 1977, stockholders' meeting approved the 
increase of PAL's authorised capital ten-fold to P250 million of which GSIS, 
then a minority stockholder holding 24.58 percent, subscribed the entire 
increase of P225 million. As a result, Toda's holdings were reduced from a 
commanding 74 percent to a meagre 8 percent, not large enough to re-elect 
himself even as a director.
Most of the allegations against Toda and PAL were true. PAL's growth
under Toda took place under the most severe limitations of capital
resources. In other words, this phenominal growth was funded almost
entirely by debts. As mentioned by the new head, Roman Cruz, a close
Marcos aide, PAL's assets of over PI billion were based on a paid-up
capital of P25 million and a net worth of a little over P100 million, the
"company had as much stability as an inverted pyramid" and "this gave the
airline a reputation for tardiness (PAL earned the unenviable tag of 'Plane 
2 Aalways late')". Its aircraft were not well maintained because the spare
parts and engines inventory were severely understocked due to lack of 
25working capital. Moreover, Toda was charged with "syphoning" off company
funds through companies owned by himself: Rubicon, Inc., a management
company, collected 5 percent of PAL's after-tax profits from its managerial
services; Aeroben, a purchasing agent, charged 15 percent flat commission
on all PAL's purchases; Cibeles and a few others, monopolised insurance,
26catering, cleaning and ground transport services.
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that Rafael Igoa, the executive vice-
president who still retained his position under the new management,
predicted the government's takeover one month prior to the actual transfer 
27of power. It was reported that Mrs Marcos was a force behind the ousting
of Toda from PAL because Toda sent her a bill for P21 million for the use
28of PAL aircraft during the preceding year. It was also claimed that the
takeover of PAL was one of the tactics used by persons close to Marcos in
29order to oust business managers and to enrich themselves. This is not an 
unusual practice because Marcos' friends have already taken the television 
and radio netx^ork and. shares in the Manila Electric Company owned by the 
Lopez family, the main political rivals of Marcos.
DISCUSSION
This case study demonstrates how political influences affect public 
policy concerning commercial aviation in the Philippines. Within less than 
three decades PAL, the national airline, changed its status four times - 
from a private,enterprise to a semi-state company, then a mixed enterprise, 
and lastly a state company - obviously in response to changes in national 
politics. Soriano was known for his close connection with political 
leaders (except Magsaysay and Macapagal) in both the Administration and 
Congress who provided him with all the support he needed for the operation 
of the airline (finance and legislation, for instance). He lost control 
over PAL only when Macapagal assumed the presidency. Macapagal wanted his 
man, Toda, who had helped finance his election campaign, to take over. 
Macapagal later encouraged Toda to buy the majority of PAL shares, so that 
Toda was able to control the company completely. Toda was replaced by Cruz 
who had close links with Madame Marcos, the First Lady, in the new
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administration. Therefore, such changes were nothing more than the 
attempts of politicians in power to gain or to shift control over a sector 
of the national economy.
No less important was the way the government subsidised a private 
company owned by its supporters and for members of the ruling elite.
Soriano was able to enlist financial assistance from the government through 
the NDC shareholding and the Postal fee, while his main competitor, a far 
bigger airline, failed to do so. NDC gradually increased its shareholding 
in-PAL, but when it became the major shoareholder it did not seize the 
power from Soriano. Instead, Soriano managed to arrange a management 
contract with NDC which in practice gave him full authority over PAL.
It is true that PAL recorded profits for all but a few years under the 
Soriano management, but Soriano also enriched himself through his companies, 
A. Soriano y Cia and ANSOR Corporation, which had highly profitable 
business dealings with PAL. Such practices were also found during the Toda 
management. This raises doubt whether mixed enterprise will be successful 
in a country like the Philippines where it is not unusual for a mixed 
enterprise (a semi-state company or mixed enterprise with less than 50 
percent state capital participation) to face bankruptcy while the management 
is making money through various means.
The last point to comment on, is the sale of public enterprises as a 
part of the free enterprise policy usually vowed by the government. As in 
the case of PAL, the people who benefitted from the sale, which was offered 
at an unreasonably low price, happened to be members of the ruling elite 
who had already been among the richest people in the country. The free 
enterprise policy is therefore open to the question of: "free for whom?"
NOTES
1. P.C. ITorantte, "The PAL Story” in Raul P. De Guzman (ed.), Patterns in
Decision-Making (Honolulu: The East-West Centre Press, 1963), p.166.
2. ibid., p.168.
3. Far Eastern Economic Review (7 August 1969), p.354.
4. Insight (July 1978), p.53.
5. ibid , p.51.
6. Morattee, op.cit.y p.144.
7. ibid., p.141.
8. ibid., p.149-150, and ’’History of Philippine Airlines” (a PAL 
publication, 1966), pp.1-2.
9. ibid., pp.1-2.
10. Leandro A. Viloria, 'Transportation Services" in H.B. Jacobini and 
Associates (eds.), Governmental Services in the Philippines (Manila: 
University of the Philippines, 1957), p.530.
11. Morantee, op.cit., pp.147-148.
12. ibid., p .153.
13. ibid., p.148.
14. ibid., pp.162-163.
15. ibid., pp.164-165.
16. ibid., p .157.
17. Insight, op.cit., p.52.
18. Far Eastern Economic Review (8 June 1967), p.590.
19. Philippine Airlines, The 1977 Philippine Airlines Annual Report 
(Manila, 1978), pp.30-31, 18, 10.
20. ibid., pp.9-10.
21. Philippine Airlines, Philippine Airlines Annual Report, 1976 (Manila, 
1977), p.l.
4
22. Insight, op.cit., p.51.
23. Asiaweek (24 March 1978), p.38.
24. The PALiner (March 1978), p..2.
25. ibid. , pp.4-5.
26. Far Eastern Economic Review (4 November 1977), p.54
27. Insight, op.cit., p.52.
28. ibid., p.51.
29. ibid., p.53.
274
CASE C
THE PROFITABLE RAILWAYS:
THE CASES OF MALAYAN RAILWAY AND STATE RAILWAY IN THAILAND
Few railways have been profitable. But, to be sure, few railway 
systems have been closed down. The railways in any country have been a 
major public investment, and are among the largest employers in the country 
and the cheapest form of transport. They are particularly important to the 
Third World where road transport is still far from adequate, where main 
products are agricultural commodities which need the cheapest means of 
transport, and where the masses are farmers who cannot afford the luxury 
of passenger cars. With increasing road competition resulting from the 
improvement of the highway network, railways began to make financial losses 
and the losses were drastically accelerated with the increase in personnel 
and fuel costs. Meanwhile, many Third World governments have no longer 
been willing to subsidise their railways because the governments have 
already burdened themselves with more important developmental projects. 
Thus, the railways are compelled to find their own solutions to paying 
their way. Under conditions imposed by the state, the railways must 
maintain cheap fares and rates, provide good services, and must not close 
down unprofitable routes which are of social and strategic importance.
This comparative case study of Malayan Railway and State Railway of 
Thailand examines their struggle to return to profitable operations. The 
two have a similar approach to cutting deficits and eventually making a 
profit: cost-cutting, earning more revenue and managerial improvement.
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THE BACKGROUND
Malayan Railway (Keratapi Tenah Melayu - KTM) was established in June 
1885, operating its first route from Taiping to Port Weld in Western 
Malaysia. At present, KTM travels a 1,667km route from Singapore in the 
South to Padang Besar and Sungai Bolok on the Thai border in the North. 
There are also four branches serving Port Klang, Port Dickson, Port Weld 
and Telok Anson. In Sabah, Sabah State Railway (SSR), owned by the Sabah 
state government, operates a separate system of 96 miles from Kota Kinabalu 
to Melalap.
The management of KTM has long been in the "departmental" enterprise 
type under direct supervision of the Ministry of Transport. Under the 
Railways Ordinance of 1948, a Railway Board was established to function in 
an advisory capacity over administrative matters. The Board consisted of a 
Chairman (who is also the General Manager or the Chief Executive), the 
Director of Aviation, four appointed members, and not less than four non­
official members appointed by the Minister. Under the 1957 Constitution a 
Railway Service Commission was created to deal with all personnel matters. 
In practice, the Board of Directors is the top policy-making body, 
formulating policies and making decisions on issues classified important. 
Any tender that exceeds M$400,000, for example, must be submitted to the 
Board for inspection and approval. A member of the Board is a representa­
tive from the Treasury whose function is to ensure that there is no 
financial abuse and that financial disbursements are in line with the 
government policy.
State Railway of Thailand (SRT), on the other hand, was formed in 1890 
as a department, but became a public corporation as a result of the State 
Railway Act B.E. 1494 (1951). The formulation of policies and general
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supervision of the Railway are the responsibility of a Board of 
Commissioners made up of a chairman and six members, usually comprising 
representatives from the army and ministerial departments appointed by the 
Cabinet. The day-to-day operation is the responsibility of a Governor 
appointed by the Board with the approval of the Cabinet. The Governor is 
also a member of the Board. In practice, until recently, the Governor 
always came from the army.
SRT operates a 3,765km system in various principle lines: Northern 
Line to Chieng Mai (751km), Northeast Line to Nong Khai (624km) and Ukon 
(575km), Eastern Line to Aranyaprethet (2551cm), Southern Line to Padang 
Besar and Sungai Golok (1,159km) and Western Line to Mam Tok and to Supan 
Buri (157km). In addition, SRT operates the Meklong Line, a separate 
system of 65km from Bangkok to Meklong in the West.
SRT is a profitable operation, recording only a few years of deficits
in the early 1970s: its accumulated profits since its formation in 1951
until 1973 totalled 1,862 million baht.^ " In contrast, KTM's losses until
21974 totalled M$101.9 million.“ Table C.l shows financial results of the 
two railways.
THE CAUSES OF DEFICITS
The Malaysian Minister of Communications, Tan Sri Manickavasagam, stated 
that "The problem of the Railway is due to general inefficiency within 
the administration. Market methods, planning, general thinking on rates,
3administration and operation concepts are full of cobwebs". The SRT
Governor., in contrast, simply pointed to the rapid increase in wages and
fuel prices: the increase in the revenue of SRT was 9 percent but expendi-
4ture went up 29 percent in 1974. Both were right. The main cause of
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TABLE C.l SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL RESULTS
(M$ million)
1965 1962 1971 1974
KTM Revenue:
Passenger 19.4 18.2 21.0 33.3
Goods 38.3 36.8 36.4 40.8
Miscellaneous 11.1 10.1 10.8 11.9
68.8 65.2 68.4 86.1
Expenditure:
Wages 35.6 39.7 43.2 52.2
Pensions 6.1 6.8 7.5 7.6
Fuel, Materials, etc. 20.6 18.6 24.3 27.0
62.4 65.2 75.2 86.9
Depreciation 7.9 8.3 9.3 11.3
70.3 73.7 84.5 98.2
Profit (Loss): (1.4) (8.4) (16.1) (12.0)
(million baht)
1965 1968 1973 1974
SRT Revenue:
Passenger 545 627
Goods 411 401
Miscellaneous 51 72
672.2 n. a. 1,007 1,100
Expenditure:
Personnel 472 631
Material 186 206
Fuel 99 190
Depreciation
Reserve for track-renewal 138 139
Interest 36 39
572.0 n. a. 932 1,205
Profit (Loss): 99.7 145.8 25 (105)
Sources: Rot Fai (August, 1975), Keratapi (March-June, 1975).
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losses for the two Railways was due to increasing costs outstripping 
revenue. In the Malaysian case, while the costs went up, the demand in 
either passenger or freight traffic gradually decreased. At the same time, 
maladministration, inefficiency, and irregularities contributed to the 
losses. Corruption of officials at all levels was prevalent. The services 
were inefficient: delays, uncleaned coaches and stations, lack of
punctuality, and impolite manner of the officials. The marketing policy 
was also negative, particularly in the freight service in which the 
officials always "waited" for customers. These causes are summarised here 
into two basic factors: demand and costs, and management.
Demand and Costs
In the case of Malaysia, there was a sharp drop in both passenger and 
freight demand from 1961 to 1969: the drop in passenger traffic was about
32 percent. However, from 1970 passenger traffic showed an upward trend, 
increasing from 5.2 million passengers to 6.3 million in 1975. Neverthe­
less, in the same period, freight handling declined from 3.6 million tons 
to 219 million tons.^ Such decline, especially the latter, as pointed out 
in the Third Malaysian Plan, was partly due to active road competition. A 
writer shows that the number of lorries in Malaysia doubled from 36,600 in 
1963 to 72,200 in 1973.^ These lorries provide door-to-door services which 
trains cannot provide. Road transport is also more convenient and faster. 
Furthermore, it is public knowledge that many lorry-operators charge rates
which are barely adequate to cover out-of-pocket costs through
4 8overloading. Another writer also suggests that the pattern of freight 
demand indicates that KTM is unable to take advantage of the growing
9traffic which results from industralisation and economic development. This 
is indicated by the loss of high-rated traffic (like rubber, tin ore,
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vegetable oil, cement, etc.)*
Apart from revenue from passengers and goods, KTM earned about 10 
percent of the total revenue from rents, parcels and mails, and 
miscellaneous. These sources of revenue did not change during 1965-1974.
The revenue structure of SRT is similar to its counterpart. In 1969,
51 percent of the revenue was derived from passenger traffic and 45 percent 
from freight traffic. Nevertheless, both passenger and freight traffic 
were rapidly increased from 29.9 million passengers in 1961 to 45.9 million 
in 1969, and from 3.0 million ton to 4.9 in 1968 respectively.^^ The 
highway network in Thailand was also improved and the number of trucks and 
busses more than doubled. In a brief from the SRT Governor to the Minister 
of Communications in 1975, the road competition was mentioned as "unfair 
competition" because truck operators always made high profit from over­
loading and tax-evading, and private mini-bus operators illegally operated 
their business. Above all, SRT spent about 20-25 percent of its total 
expenditure on track maintenance while truck operators spent none.^
Expenditure of the two Railways was primarily in the area of staff 
salaries with pensions and other benefits, amounting to about 62.9 percent 
of the total expenditure in 1972 and 60.9 percent in 1974 in the Malaysian
t
case. Other forms of expenditure of KTM were in provision for renewals
(10.7 percent in 1972), stores (15.1 percent), contracts for services and
12supplies (4.8 percent), fuel (4.4 percent), and others (1.8 percent).
The personnel expenditure of SRT in 1974 was 52.3 percent but SRT paid more
for supplies (17.0 percent), fuel (15.7 percent, depreciation and reserve
for track maintenance (11.5 percent), and interests (3.2 percent). 13
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14The Rama Iyer Report (1969) criticised KTM for overstaffing. In
fact, the number of employees had already been reduced from 12,431 in 1963
to 10,894 in 1 9 6 9 . However a writer in 1976 found that KTM still had
about 1,000 redundent staff, mainly in the clerical class and below.^
Both the Rama Iyer and the Nathan Reports recommended further reduction.^
However, such a move was undesirable both from the employment situation and
from the view-point of the strong Railway Union of Malaya (RUM). Further,
the Rama Iyer Report found a significant increase in overtime payment and
recommended that malingering and absenteeism found in workshops be
18discouraged so that>a decrease in over time was possible.
Another problem confronting KTM was that they had to support
unprofitable services. In a 1964 survey, out of 144 stations only 30
served more than 85 percent of both total goods tonnage and passenger
19travel, and contributed about 85 percent of the total revenue. In 1972,
Canadian consultants recommended the closure of four routes: The Kuala
Lumpur-Port Klang route which incurred a loss of M$400,000 a year, the
Tapoh-Telok Akson line which incurred a loss of M$300,000 a year, and the
Butterworth-Hadyai (in Thailand) and Tumpat-Sungai Golok (in Thailand)
20lines. This resulted in the closing of the first route but the service 
was resumed a few years later, apparently because of political pressure.
The situation was worsened in the already unprofitable East Coast routes 
where passengers refused to buy tickets or collaborated with railway 
officials. To solve the problem, the management dispatched officials to 
give public speeches at the mosques during Friday prayers but only a slight 
improvement was reported.^
KTM in the past had presented a poor image. It was notorious for its 
frequent derailments, delays, and poor services. According to the Rama
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Iyer Report, there were 201 derailments in 1963, 260 in 1964 and 1966, and
22244 in 1967. A major derailment in 1974 alone cost KTM M$400,000. These
were the results of overloading, worn-out track, poor signalling, and
incompetent and negligent drivers. A write also reports the lack of
punctuality: in two extreme cases, a delay as long as two weeks for a
haulage of only 400km and a delay of four days for a distance of 94km were 
23recorded.
In addition, KTM had a great burden in paying rent to the state 
government for land and for the construction of railway tracks. Such rates 
contributed toward heavy operating costs.
While KTM utilised the service of consultants and inquiring committees, 
SRT set up a number of internal task-forces to study problems confronting 
its operation. Informally, a group of senior executives and middle 
management officials formed their own informal discussion group called Rot 
Fai 19 (literally, Railways 19). The Railways’ Worker Union also 
occasionally discussed the causes of deficits.
In June 1975 the SRT Board issued a statement announcing its first
ever losses (of 104 million baht). It blamed the rapid increase of
personnel cost and fuel prices. In July, the Parliamentary Committee on
Budget recommended that the government should allow SRT to increase the
fares and rates. In January 1976 the SRT Governor also warned against
corruption in the Railway. Interestingly, in a brief to the Minister of
Communications in that month he mentioned the practice that the SRT was
obliged to purchase oil and petroleum products from the Fuel Organisation,
another public enterprise, at the price about 5-10 percent higher than the
market one. If SRT was allowed to purchase freely, it would save at least
10-20 million baht a year. 24
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The Management
The SRT Board mentioned losses from mismanagement and irregularities.
It criticised poor services in the freight area in which delays, red-
tape, lost goods, and inconvenience were common. Moreover, the Board
accepted that there were corruptions both at the stations and on the trains.
This was confirmed by the Union but it stated that corruptions were also
found at the higher level. The Union then called for a strike in November
251975 demanding a wage increase of 450 baht a month.
THE SOLUTIONS
The objectives of the two Railways are very similar. First, railways 
must be the cheapest form of transport. Thus, any change in the price 
policy should not affect this situation. Second, the concept of national 
profitability should be the ultimate guideline. For social benefit or for 
strategic reasons the Railways must operate some services which are running 
at a loss. Third, it is not the policy of either the government or the 
management to retrench workers. Apart from moral obligations, the railway 
unions in both countries are strong and closely linked with other unions in 
public utility enterprises. Fourthly, public opinion holds that Railways 
should make a surplus and pay for their own development projects. In the 
past, the government had already invested a large amount of public money in 
the railways, M$400 million in Malaysia, and 8,000 million baht in Thailand.
Solutions for problems confronting the two Railways include increasing 
revenue and cutting costs. The services meanwhile, should be improved to 
lure more customers. Furthermore, management of the Railways should be 
reformed to enable implementation of the plan. Modernisation of the
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Railways, reform of the administration, and adoption of a new marketing 
policy are discussed below:
1. The Modernisation of Railways. A total amount of M$85.7 million was
spent under the Second Malaysian Plan (SMP) on the improvement of track,
signalling, rolling stocks, etc. The dieselisation programme was completed
while more than half of the improvement öf permanent way (track renewal,
replacement of worn-out sleepers, rehabilitation of bridges and the
strengthening of ballast) was completed in 1975. Under the Third Malaysian
Plan (TMP, 1976-1980), KTM is allocated M$200 million to improve the
quality of services. Forty percent of passenger coaches are to be
replaced (M$54 million), many of which are air-conditioned. The TMP
projects that passenger revenue will increase by 27.6 percent and freight
revenue by 44.9 percent in 1980. Feasibility studies for extention of the
network (Kuala Lumpur-Kuantan-Kuala Trengganu-Kota Bharu and Ipoh-Lumat)
2 6will also be undertaken.
One of the most important improvement programmes of SRT is to upgrade
the track to accommodate heavier wagons, produce better riding qualities,
and permit higher train speeds. Timber bridges are to be replaced with
steel and concrete structures. The dieselisation programme was completed
during the Third Plan (1972-1976). In addition, 62 diesel locomotives, 8
railcar units, 216 passenger coaches and 780 freight cars were supplemented
to the fleet during the Plan. Many new passenger coaches and wagons were
constructed at SRT workshops. Investment in the Third Plan amounted to
1,500 million baht and is expected to rise to 1,650 million baht in the
Fourth Plan (1977-1981), the latter funds coming from SRT itself or from 
27foreign loans.
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2. The New Marketing Policies. In 1975 KTM reviewed its pricing policy 
with the aim to improve its share of the market. This had been recommended 
by several reports: the Cameron Report (1964), the Report on the Malayan
Road/Railway Competition by Sir Henry Benson (1965), the Report of the 
Select Committee on the Malayan Railway (known as the Rama Iyer Report 
1969), and the Report of the Canadian Pacific consultants group (1972).
The introduction of a new tariff structure which became effective on 1 
January 1976 changed the 20 year-old fare and rate structure as follows:
Passenger fares: Previous rates were based on a three class system,
1st, 2nd and 3rd. KTM now offers sleeping accommodation for first class 
passengers in air-conditioned and non-air-conditioned coaches, sleeping 
accommodation for second class passengers, and reclining seats for third 
class passengers travelling at night. Total fares are charged according to 
distance and worked on a declining rate basis (M$0.147 per mile for first 
class, M$0i0705 per mile for second class, M$0.47 per mile for third class), 
plus additional charges for seats in air-conditioned coaches, express 
trains and sleeping accommodation.
Freight rates: Previous rates were charged according to a per picul
(133 1/3 pounds) basis and divided into 9 categories. Now special wagons 
are charged specific rates on a per mile basis. Special charges are also 
stated for additional services such as pick-up and delivery, use of special 
wagon equipment, the hire of tarpaulins for covering open loads, etc.
KTM preferred the Average Cost of Production Theory (AC) to the
28Marginal Cost Theory (MC) and the "No Profit and No Loss Principle". The 
MC pricing was unsuitable because KTM, like other railways, operated on 
decreasing costs, and unless production was to be optimum MC would be 
greater than AC, thus resulting in losses. It was estimated that 50
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percent of KTM’s rolling stocks was used in 1973. As stated earlier, the 
No Profit and No Loss Principle was also unacceptable because of political 
pressure and public opinion.
The present structure divides its passenger traffic system into three 
classes, De Luxe (air-conditioned), Executive Class, and Economy Class.
The new fares increased M$0.3 cents per mile for the Economy Class and 
M$2.3 cents per mile for the De Luxe Class passengers. Some services 
provide a two class system, e.g. Executive and Economy Class only (such as 
in the now popular Singapore-Butterworth Exspres Rakyat). With regard to* 
freight rates, the structure has also been revised upward with special 
rates and scrapped to discourage ad hoc and arbitrary fixing of rates.
SRT's passenger tariffs were last revised in 1955 before the change in 
20 November 1975. The previous structure was divided into 2 categories: 
"normal” passenger fares and "special" passenger fares. The first, 
normally applicable outside the Greater Bangkok area, charged first class 
passengers four times more than third class and twice more than second 
class passengers. Charges per kilometer were on a declining scale. The 
charges for first class per kilometer of travel were as follows: first
250km, or fraction thereof 0.40 baht, next 250km 0.36 baht and remaining 
travel over 500km 0.32 baht. The latter was built into all fares to and 
from Bangkok/Thonburi stations regardless of total distance. While the 
relationship between first, second and third class remained the same, the 
special fares constituted a 40 percent reduction of normal fares for travel 
solely within the designated areas. The new rates are an 0.45 baht per 
kilometer rise for the first class passenger, 0.30 baht for second class 
and 0.15 baht for third class. However, concessions for students and 
monthly commuters are greater. Passengers travelling to and from stations
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where SRT competes with the buses are given a special discount with 
specially-fixed rates.^
Previous freight rates were based on classification of goods into ten 
basic classes. In 1975 additional classes were designated for carload 
traffic handled under various special discount rates. The revision of 
freight rates was announced at the same time along with an approximate 50 
percent increase. Such pricing policy is in line with the one stated in 
the Fourth Plan that it "must be clearly stipulated in accordance with the 
current economic situation, the financial status of each enterprise,
. 31
government support policy and income distribution objectives".
3. The Administrative Reform: Reform in the two Railways involved
changes in the top management. The SRT Board was completely restructured 
in July 1975 and the Governor, an army general, was removed in May 1976. 
The Chairman of the Board, a law professor and now R.ector of the famous 
Thammasat University, was replaced by an influential army general who 
participated in the 1976 coup. The new KTM general manager was appointed 
in 1975. Then the Ministry of Communications was separated into two 
ministries with KTM placed under the Minister of Transport.
The SRT Board in July 1976 outlined the reform in essence as 
32follows:
(1) Cost-Cutting Programmes
(1.1) The appointment of task forces in sectoral areas 
to plan and evaluate performance.
(1.2) The completion of the dieselisation programme.
(1.3) The improvement and rescheduling of services.
(1.4) The improvement of purchasing and supply procedures.
(1.5) The consideration of the closing of some stations.
(1.6) The recruitment restriction: no new employee was
to be recruited except in necessary cases.
(2) Work Improvement Programmes
(2.1) Improvement of supervision and control: accidents
and derailments should be avoided.
(2.2) Abolishment of delays and red-tape practices.
(2.3) The encouragement to improve overall performance 
of employees.
(2.4) The improvement of services: all officials of SRT
should be polite to all customers.
(2.5) The improvement of recruitment and promotion 
procedures so that SRT attracts qualified workers.
(2.6) The elimination or reduction irregularities: 
corrupt officials should be drastically punished.
(3) Increase of Revenue
(3.1) The implementation of the new pricing policy.
(3.2) The establishment of a new division directly 
responsible for business activities. Thus, now
. SRT is divided into three divisions: Traffic,
Marketing and Administration.
(3.3) The improvement of services:
- rescheduling services for the convenience of 
passengers, cutting travelling time, the 
cleanliness of the coaches, the politness of 
officials, etc.
- making it more convenient for customers, applying 
more aggressive marketing methods, introducing 
new services such as the concept of train load, 
special cargo delivery, industrial plant branches, 
express cargo, etc.
(3.4) The improvement of public relations, public affairs 
and advertising.
(3.5) The elimination of delays.
(3.6) The disposal of unused material and supplies, such as 
removal of iron scrap from used track.
(3.7) The utilisation of SRT land and properties.
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Meanwhile, the new SRT Governor specified his cost-cutting programme 
as follows: ^
- No new employees were to be recruited and the number of 
existing employees were to be reduced (about 5 percent in 
the maintenance areas, 5 percent in the workshops, etc.)*
Some sections were to be abolished.
- Forms were to be redesigned to reduce paper work.
Official cars and petroleum were to be used only in 
necessary cases. Electricity, telephones and water supply 
should be economised.
- Contractors were to be employed in some areas to cut down 
the number of permanent employees. The contracts should 
be carefully managed to avoid irregularities.
- Full utilisation of locomotives, coaches, wagons and all 
equipment should be encouraged. SRT hotels and properties 
should earn more profits.
- Irregularities in the stations and on the trains should be 
avoided.
- The quality of personnel should be improved through better 
recruitment, promotion, transfer and training processes.
The strategies adopted by KTM since April 1976 have a twin objective:
maintaining and developing traffic. The administrative structure was
34revamped and the commercial department was "commercialised". Positive
steps were also taken in an effort to meet the target of M$114 million in 
35revenue in 1977. Emphasis was given on trading and cargo handling 
services which KTM anticipated would bring in a major portion of the 
expected income. All station managers were instructed to concentrate more 
on the trading services and were given a quota to fulfil. In addition they 
were to send to their superiors written reports on the movement of goods at 
their respective stations. Spot checks were made regularly. In January
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1977 the KTM launched "the clean year" with the objective to make 1977 a 
year free of accidents, derailments and other disasters that could be 
avoided. Intensive.measures including maintenance service and safety 
precautions were lined up.
The policy implementation in both countries has so far been satisfac­
tory. KTM made a profit of M$9 million in the first 11 months of 1976, its
37first profit in 14 years. The Thai counterpart made a smaller profit of
29 million baht in 1977 but the profit is expected to be much more in 
381978. But more significantly, the services of the two railways have been 
much improved and very few services have been affected from the cut-back.
DISCUSSION
The "Mo Profit - No Loss" principle widely practised among public 
utility enterprises in the West does not seem to be applied to their 
counterparts in many Third World countries, as demonstrated in this case 
study. The two railways, KTM and SRT, are compelled to provide services at 
minimum rates and to operate unprofitable routes for social benefits and 
for political and strategic reasons. But at the same time, their 
governments are no longer willing to subsidise them in case of deficit, and 
instead put pressure on them to pay their way, if not making a surplus.
This is because public utility enterprises in the Third World are 
traditionally main sources of state revenue, and because public opinion 
holds that these enterprises should make a surplus and pay for their own 
development projects.
The two railways in this study utilised a similar approach in their 
effort to solve these problem:, cost-cutting, earning more revenue and
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managerial improvement. The railways were modernised with the aim to 
provide faster and more reliable services in order to lure more customers. 
The new pricing policy was introduced to replace the fare and rate 
structure which had been used for more than two decades. More aggressive 
marketing methods were adopted: the railways were no longer "waiting for
customers". More significantly, the top management, board members and the 
Chief Executive, were replaced, and administrative reform at all levels was 
launched. Even with increasing competition from road transport and rising 
personnel and fuel costs, within a few years the two railways returned to 
profitable operations while cheap fares and rates and unprofitable routes 
were still maintained and services improved.
It appears, from this case study, that public enterprises can improve 
their performance if they are strongly pressed by the government and the 
public. In the past they considered themselves as part of the government, 
similar to other regular ministerial departments: if they made losses, the
government would subsidise them. Such attitudes also affected their 
services; there was no need for them to improve their performance.
Therefore, profits from these enterprises usually came from privileges 
granted by the government (monopoly or semi-monopoly for instance), not 
from their "effectiveness and efficiency".
As in the case of the two railways, the modernisation of public 
enterprise can be made through the adoption of some modern managerial and 
marketing techniques, such as cost-benefit ratio, management by objective, 
etc, in order to cut costs and earn more revenue. Public enterprises also 
need to be "commercialised" and their attitudes toward their work must be 
reoriented. Above all, as the personal factor appears to be the most 
important single determinant of the policy outcomes, the top management of
391
public enterprises should develop, if not be replaced by, more qualified 
people (regardless of their previous background - military or politician).
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CASE D
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES FOR THE MASSES: HOUSING
Most Third World governments have learnt that the provision of adequate 
housing for all people cannot be left in the hands of private enterprises 
alone. Whereas the more affluent families can afford to obtain comfortable 
homes built by private developers, the majority of families go without 
adequate shelter equipped with necessary facilities. Housing is a basic 
human need, along with food and clothing. Therefore, governments have found 
it necessary to intervene in the direct construction and supply of housing 
for their citizens, particularly the urban poor.
i
In the ASEAN region, public enterprises often are assigned to undertake 
the housing policy of their respective governments but with different 
degrees of success, depending on many factors. The Housing and Development 
Board of Singapore is reputed to be the most successful housing agency in 
the region, if not the World, whereas the others are still lagging far 
behind. In this case study, various factors that are crucial to the policy 
formulation and implementation of Singapore’s public housing policy are 
examined in comparison with those in the rest of the region. The discussion 
is divided into five parts: the problems; the early attempts of these
governments to solve the problems; various factors affecting public housing 
policy; the outcomes; and finally, the analysis and concluding remarks.
The Problems
The housing shortage usually originates from the explosive demographic 
growth and the influx of migrants in the cities, making housing demands 
higher than the supply from various sources.^ In the ASEAN region, 
from rural areas accounts for more than a half of urban expansion, mainly
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because of the concentration of excessive growth in only one or two cities 
that pull and push rural migrants toward the cities. Such primate cities 
are the centre for all activities: administrative, commercial, transport,
education, industrial, etc. For rural migrants, these cities offer them 
better life, better employment, better health facilities and better 
education for their children. Meanwhile, there are several push factors 
that push rural populations toward big cities, such as poor cropping, 
drought or flood, land tenure system, overcrowding of available cultivable 
land, misbehaviour of local government officials, etc. In Singapore, a 
substantial part of migration was from abroad, i.e. China, India, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia.
The bulk of these migrants have no alternative to living in slum areas, 
mainly because of their low incomes. As a result, the population in slums 
has rapidly expanded, often at a rate faster than that of the cities 
themselves. Table D.l shows that now there are 1.9 million people living in 
slums in Jakarta, 1.54 million in Manila, between 300,000-600,000 in 
Bangkok, 289,000 in Kuala Lumpur and 15,000 in Singapore.
Problems arising from migration form only a part of the crucial housing
problem in the ASEAN countries. Housing in cities in these countries are
already overcrowded, and large portions of it are substandard, without
necessary amenities such as toilets, piped water, and electricity.
According to ESCAP, countries in this region require to build about 10-13
dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants per year to meet the housing demands. Only
Singapore has reached an annual construction rate of 9.4. The others
2succeeded less than 2. Housing backlog in the Philippines as of the end of 
1977 totalled 981,000 units.3
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Deficiency of private real estate markets also helps to aggravate the 
problems. Private investors tend to build housing projects for the more 
affluent families who can afford the terms offered by private finance 
institutions. Those private investors who do build rental accommodation for 
the lower income bracket, demand unrealistic rents for it.
In comparison with the high and ever rising housing costs, people in
the region (except Singapore) have a very low level of per capital income.
For example, it cost a Thai 7.4 years of income to build or purchase a 30sqm
4house in 1965. One should also note the exceptional high rate of interest 
for private loans (often at 1.5-2 percent per month). Thus it is almost 
impossible for most of the people in the region to own a standard house.
The worsening housing shortage has far reaching effects in social, 
economic, and political aspects. Socio-economically, it creates unemploy­
ment, poverty, inequality of incomes, physical overcrowding, mushrooming of 
slums, increasing health risks and public hazards. Consequently, squatters 
may constitute a social danger.^ Politically, slums can be a stronghold for 
opposition to the government. In the extreme, squatters, as claimed by one 
writer, are "a potentially dangerous mass of political dynamite, for their 
economic and housing grievances offer a fertile ground for revolutionary 
propaganda which could turn the mass of city population against their
n 6present government .
The above reasons are justification for governments to intervene in the 
housing sector, but there are also many factors that prevent governments to 
fully engage in the business. In fact, many ASEAN governments began working 
on public housing for the lower income groups as early as the beginning of 
this century. But none of them took the problems seriously until they had 
become more and more acute as the housing backlog had been accumulated day
TA
BL
E 
D
.l
 
GR
OW
TH
 
O
F 
SL
UM
S 
AN
D 
SQ
U
A
TT
ER
 
SE
TT
LE
M
EN
TS
I
cö
N
•H
d
cd *H
rO 40
po
d
o  —I 
•H cd 
4-1 4-J
cd o
rH  4-J
P
PL M—I
o  o
CL
>s
4-1 W
•h  cd
o
1—t
a) 
> D 
I—I
a
o
•H
4- 1
Cd
i—i
P
CL
o
CL
d
cd
op
5- 4
P
d
d ml o
•H O *H
d BN 
O
•H
4-)
cd
4-1
cd 
1—1 
p 
CL
o
CL
d
o•H
4-1
cd
4—I
p
CL|
oCl,
d
o
•H
4-J
cdr—I
P
CL
o
P-4
t—I CO
P B
CL P >s 
O '—I 4-J 
CL CO *H U
cu
4-J
cd
Pd
>>
4-J
•H
CJ
-d
4- J
£ ^  
o  bn
5- 4 ^
d erf- 
d
CO r - 
4-J CO
d no
UO 00 
I—I 1—I
I I
rH O  
CN CN
uo no
CN CN
NO
NT
O  
CN CFr 
00 rH
Nf CN
in n  co
CN CN CN
I I I I—I CN 
CO CO
I I
I 4--1 co r-^ <nd 
i—l rH CN
I I CO CO 
CO CO
I I I uo  r". 
CN c o  c o
I I co uo
CO CO
I I I I
o
o
o
o  uo co 
o  oo 00
rH 4— I CN I I
00 o
co -cr
CN U0
O  P  uo
•  •  I
CO CO CN
CO O
I • I •
CO <t
00 o
I-'-. 00
I I
I UO
4— I
I I
00 
I CN 
CN
399
UO NO I 
rH rH
I 1 NO i—I
uo
I I
uo
I rH 
I
00
1 1 1 1
o
o
I I NO 
1
O
o
co
uo
o -
•H CO N> ao NO NO Nf -cf Oo 0 co CN ao co O 0 00 00 NO O'. ON 0rO P o 0 O CN rH CO 0 00 00 CN UO 0 UO rH UO 0 00 0
cd o 4--i co GO uo rH 00 O Nf ~d- r~~ CN rH NT < r uo CO NO CN 0
X  od r r> r r\ r r r r\ rs #4 rs rs C\ r\ r r
d  H Nf CN CN NT CN CN co r—1 CO co NT rH r—1 uo NO CN
H ■ 4--1 CN rH rH
5-4 4--1 CN 1—1 CN 1—1 CTs rH rH CO 4—1 CO CN 00 CN uo VO O NT O < r
cd NO 0 - cD vO NO cD NO NO NO r-- NO NO r-- r - !■'- r--
cu av CTv ao O', CTs Oo ao OO CJ4 a s O', Co CO O', Oo CTs OV av CTO CTO
>4 4H 4H 4—) rH rH rH 1—1 rH 1--1 rH rH 1—1 r—1 rH t—1 rH 4—1 rH 4—1 4—1
cd 5-4 cd Prf
40 P r—1 O
5-1 CL •H
cd B CO d 00
-rf p (U cd d
cd 4-1 d S cd
4-J *“ 3 •H pp
•H d d cd CL d d
U cd d cd d rH CL cd d cd d
cd P 0 X 0 cd •H X 0 0) X 0
to •H 5-4 •H cd 5-4 •H P r—i 5-4 •H 5-4 03 5-4 •H
5-1 CO Co 40 •H CO 40 Prf •H to 40 O d PO 40
4-1 <u cd CO cd X cd CL cd cd
d d rH rH to rH rH P4 rH rH cd t—1 rH rH
p o cd P cd cd P cd P 00 •H cd P
o TO 40 CL rH 40 PL QJ 40 CL d cd 4-J CL
c j d O O cd 0 O X O O •H X O O
w H CL S EH CL H H CL cn Eh EH CL
So
ur
ce
s:
 
Un
it
ed
 N
at
io
ns
, 
St
at
is
ti
ca
l 
Ye
ar
 
Bo
ok
; 
AD
B,
 K
ey
 
In
di
ca
to
rs
399a
KCh
•H
HHH
§
400
by day. Singapore was the first to implement mass housing construction in 
the 1960s, followed by some other countries in the region in the 1970s.
First Attempts at a Solution
In the past, the ASEAN governments concentrated their efforts on the 
construction of housing projects to be sold or tented with some forms of 
subsidies to government officials and the armed forces. Many also provided 
low interest loans to private developers, or set up government-owned 
mortgage banks or institutions. Most of them, however, often employed some 
negative approaches -* such as eviction of squatters or cutting-off all 
necessary amenities from the slum areas.
In the Philippines, the American colonial administration viewed the 
housing problem as a matter of public health and safety and its policy was 
merely a sanitation drive.'7 The administration relocated a number of 
dwellings (usually nipa huts) built in congested and low-laying areas, to 
"sanitary barrios" equipped with streets, drainage, fire hydrants and other 
facilities. Nevertheless, since the early 1920s the labour movement had 
pressed the administration to provide better housing for the lower income 
groups. This resulted in the replacement of "sanitary barrios" by "barrios 
obreros", or economic housing for labourers. In 1938 the Commonwealth 
government which took over the colonial administration, completed its first 
labourers’ tenement project which housed 162 families at Vitas. Suburban 
housing and subdivision were also carried out by the newly established 
People's Homesite Corporation, a subsidy of state-owned National Development 
Company. PRC was initially oriented toward the middle class, and its first 
projects in Diliman were primarily for government officials. Then in 1941 
the first national housing legislation (Commonwealth Act No.648), was 
enacted to create a National Housing Commission. The Commission was to
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undertake urban housing, subdivision, and slum clearance programmes. The
Act, often praised for its "social justice" orientation, however, was not
enforced until after the War. The People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
was created soon after the War as a merger of PHC and NHC. In its 25 years
of existence, PHHC built 13,000 dwelling units in 16 housing projects with a
8total investment of P150 million. For the period 1962-1972, it produced 
only 2,530 units, compared with 7,350 units for the period 1940-1955.^
The post-war housing programme was augmented by many other public 
enterprises and departments such as Government Service Insurance System, 
Social Security System, Development Bank of the Philippines, National 
Housing Corporation, and the Presidential Assistant on Housing and 
Resettlements (PAHRA - replaced the Slum Clearance Committee). NHC, for 
example, formed in 1968, with GSIS, DBP and SSS as principle shareholders, 
engaged in the mass construction of prefabricated housing units and other 
component parts. It also engaged in some housing projects, for example, in 
1971-1975, it built 1,700 units for GSIS and 608 units for its employees.
The Philippine government also engaged in resettlement programmes, but 
its early efforts, started in 1951, were unsuccessful because the relocation 
sites were too far away from the city and offered little or no economic 
opportunity for the evicted squatters. Therefore, many families 
relinquished the sites and resquatted in Manila. Only in 1968 did PAHRA 
start its project in Carmona with full infrastructure and with employment 
opportunities. Up to the end of 1975, about 13,000 lots were occupied 
(about 4,500 were available in the Financial Year 1974-1975 a l o n e ) A t  
present, the government is developing Tondo which has the largest 
concentration of squatters in the country (a very high density of 260 
families per hectare).
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The present housing agency in the Philippines is the National Housing 
Authority created on 3 July 1975 by virtue of Presidential Decree No.757.
In Thailand, the early attempt was made by the establishment of the 
Housing Bureau with divisional status in the newly created Department of 
Public Welfare in 1942. The Bureau, however, did not begin its activities 
until the end of the War, when it began building housing projects for both 
the middle and lower income groups: hire purchase housing for the former
and low rental housing for the latter. Its performance was extremely 
unsuccessful because of its limited budget and staff (of less than 30).
Until 1970, the government housed only 15,734 low income families in Bangkok 
as well as in rural areas (excluding housing for low ranking government 
officials)."^ Meanwhile, the Bangkok City Administration initiated its slum 
clearance projects and resettled squatters in newly built low rental 
apartments in various areas. Nevertheless, such projects were implemented 
in a narrow scope. In 1971, the National Housing Authority was set up by 
the National Executive Council's Decree after a coup d'etat. NHA is 
authorised to have sole power and responsibility over housing matters.
Meanwhile, in Malaysia, the then Malayan administration set up a
Federal Housing Trust, a statutory body responsible for developing land and
building housing projects. In practice, however, FHT built only housing
projects for middle class people who could apply for loans from the Federal
Building Society which had been set up by Colonial Development Corporation
12and the Federal government. The first ever low-cost housing project was 
undertaken in 1958, only after the Gombak Lane fire. Therefore, the efforts 
to solve the housing problem were left to private entrepreneurs, with the 
exception of slum clearance which was carried out by Datuk Bendar 
(Commissioner) of Kuala Lumpur and the Selangor State government. In 1971
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the Federal government set up the Urban Development Authority, to among
other functions, promote and implement housing projects in areas requiring
resettlement, redevelopment and public housing. Nevertheless, UDA has
become an active agency to carry out the New Economic Policy, i.e. the
building of shopping centres for bumiputras (see Chapter 6), and has thus
become less involved in solving the housing problem. In fact, it has also
formed joint venture companies with various State Economic Development
Corporations called PERUDA, whose main functions include building low-cost
housing projects. But, again PERUDAs have concentrated in building shopping
complexes and performed badly in the area of public housing. In 1975,
Selangor SEDC, the largest of them all, built only a total of 238 single-
13story houses, only 43 of which were sold to the general public. Between
1968 and 1974 the Kuala Lumpur Municipality and Selangor SEDC built only
148,500 units in the city and the Kelang Valley. Many more were built in 
rural areas by the Ministry of Housing and Village Development, Federal Land 
Authority (FELDA), and other public enterprises. The Armed Forces and the 
Police Department also built a number of housing projects for their 
personnel. It was estimated that by the end of the Second Malaysian Plan 
(1971-1975), the total number of low-cost housing units built in various 
areas in Peninsular Malaysia was 13,244.^ But such impressive numbers did 
not help very much in alleviating the housing problems of Kuala Lumpur, 
because only a few hundred squatters were resettled in these projects."^
The situation in Indonesia was even worse, because no serious attempt
was made until very recently. The Housing Law of 1964 was enacted to
authorise the Minister of Social Affairs to formulate and implement general
housing policy. In practice, the Minister deal mainly with housing
17^administration and rent regulation The Ministry of Public Works (DPW)
and PERUMNAS, a housing corporation, were instead assigned to build low-cost
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housing for low ranking officials and Armed Forces personnel. In addition, 
the Regional Administration including the Jakarta City Administration (DKI) 
also engaged in this area but housing units they built were mainly for their 
officials. In 1969, according to Presidential Decree No.18, the Minister of 
Public Works was appointed the Chairman of the "housing sector" and was 
responsible for coordination, integration and synchronisation of housing 
activities undertaken by various governmental agencies. In the early 1970s 
the only low-cost housing projects with a capacity of 5,000 units were built 
under the technical cooperation with the Belgian government.
It should be noted that both the Malaysian and Indonesian authorities 
also engaged in providing "sites and services" of urban housing. During 
1965-1971, nine of such schemes, comprising a total number of 7,630 plots, 
were launched around Kuala Lumpur by Selangor SEDC, but with unsuccessful 
results and more than half of these plots still left vacant. In Indonesian 
housing development projects, the main emphasis has been placed on the 
development of urban kampongs (villages) with all necessary amenities. 
However, it is too early to evaluate their success or failure.
In Singapore, the story is very different to that of the rest of the 
18ASEAN region. The first efforts to solve the problem were made as early 
as 1927, when the Singapore Improvement Trust was set up as a statutory body 
under the colonial administration. Before the War, SIT built only 2,112 
units and during the post-war period, SIT built an additional 2,907 units 
before the establishment of the Housing and Development Board in 1960. 
Meanwhile, however, the population trebled from 500,000 in 1927 to over 1.5 
million in 1959, and the housing situation then was very crucial. A writer 
commented that the construction of the post-war units was based on the 
British concept of "New Towns", with emphasis on small neighbourhoods and 
maximum privacy, which was hardly feasible within the Singapore urban
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19setting and the SIT's financial constraints. Since its inception in 1960, 
HDB has built 272,410 housing units as of 31 March 1977), 94,500 of which 
were sold to the public. At present more than 56 percent of Singapore's 
population live in HDB estates around the island.
Some Factors Affecting Public Housing Policy
The components of housing, including land, labour, financing, materials 
technology, management and households, are interrelated with among 
themselves and with socioeconomic and political environment. In this part, 
the main inputs of the housing system are discussed, i.e. environmental 
factors and the implementation bodies.
1. The Environmental Factors. These factors include government's policies, 
development plants, and contexual elements influencing such policies and the 
implementation bodies.
The early attempts in the Philippines were often viewed as a matter of
social responsibility, as stated in the 1935 Constitution. It can also be
viewed as "a political appeal for mass support against radical threats to
20the regime", i.e. Communism, or "vote-getting" rhetoric. But once the 
policy reached a point where the power elites (big landlords who happened to 
be influential politicians in power) did not wish to compromise, such policy 
as large scale housing projects on privately owned land (to be acquired by 
law) was strongly resisted and the legislation to fund such a project were 
not passed. It should be noted that private land ownership was concentrated 
in the hands of the influential Catholic Church and a few wealthy families. 
The past failures of land reform and low-cost housing projects owed much to
this factor.
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Malaysia and Thailand share the experience of the Philippines in this 
respect. But the big landowners in Malaysia are the various states and the 
Sultan families. Under the Malaysian Constitution, land and housing matters 
are in the State list (except for the Federal Capital Territory which has 
already transferred to the Federal Government). Only in 1965, with the 
enactment of the Federal Housing Act, has Datuk Bendar of Kuala Lumpur been 
able to undertake housing projects outside the limits of the municipality.
In fact, a large portion of land in Kuala Lumpur itself is owned by the 
Selangor State and the Sultan of Selangor. In Thailand, most of the land in 
Bangkok is owned by the general public but a substantial part of slum areas 
usually belongs to governmental agencies or autonomous bodies: Crown
Property Bureau, Royal Purse Office, Religious Properties (Department of 
Religions). For example, the largest slum area in Bangkok at Klong Tuey 
which houses over 100,000 squatters is the property of the Port Authority of 
Thailand. In effect, while there is often federal-state conflict over slum 
clearance and low-cost housing projects in Malaysia, there is interdepart­
mental conflict in Thailand.
Equally significantly, all ASEAN countries except Singapore have 
encouraged the private sector to take initiative in housing. The Tunku 
Abdul Rahman government (1957-1970) repeatedly stated that it would not be 
able to completely fulfil the housing needs, and that it would encourage 
private investment in housing. When Tunku Abdul Razak became the Prime 
Minister, the government began to take the housing problem more seriously, 
but it concentrated in, the areas of rural housing and housing for low 
ranking officials* This was similar to the housing policy of the Indonesian 
government. According to the National Economic Development Plans, Repelita 
I and II, the construction of houses in urban areas was to be undertaken by 
the community itself and the government efforts would be mainly directed at
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low-incom e g r o u p s ,  t h ro u g h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  " s i t e s  and s e r v i c e s "  and th e
21c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  no more t h a n  10,000  u n i t s  o f  l o w - c o s t  h o u s i n g .  In  
T h a i l a n d ;  t h e  t h i r d  National Economic and S o c i a l  Development P l a n  (1972-1976)  
s t a t e d  t h a t  h o u s in g  f o r  low income f a m i l i e s ,  which was t h e  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  o f  t h e  government ,  would be b u i l t  i n  v a r i o u s  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c i t y .  But  
t h e  p u b l i c  h o u s in g  c o n s t r u c t i o n  programme has  n o t  advanced  r a p i d l y ,  due 
m a in ly  to  f i n a n c i a l  c o n s t r a i n t s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  have 
dom ina ted  t h e  h o u s in g  s e c t o r  and w i l l  c o n t i n u e  to  domina te  i t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .
S ince  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  t h e r e  have  been  17 n a t i o n a l  deve lopment  p l a n s  i n
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  b u t  on ly  i n  t h e  1971-1974 P l a n  d i d  a p l a n  d e v o te  a whole
c h a p t e r  on h o u s i n g .  Th is  r e f l e c t e d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t ’s a t t i t u d e  toward  h o u s i n g .
I t  i s  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  dom ina te s  more t han  80 p e r  c e n t  o f
t h e  h o u s in g  i n d u s t r y .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  and i n  c o n t r a s t  to  o t h e r  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s ,
t h e  b u s i n e s s  e l i t e s  i n  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  have  long  p l a y e d  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n
p o l i c y  f o r m u l a t i o n  and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  p r o c e s s e s .  C.H. H o s k in s ,  a c i v i l
s e r v a n t  t u r n e d  r e a l t o r ,  made a number o f  recommendat ions  which were
im plem en ted  by th e  Commonwealth gove rnm en t .  More r e c e n t l y ,  S i x t o  K. R o x a s ,
a fo rm e r  N a t i o n a l  Economic C o u n c i l  Chai rman ,  who heads  Bancom Development
C o r p o r a t i o n  and s e v e r a l  f i n a n c i a l  com pan ies ,  p ro p o se d  a h o u s i n g  and u rban
deve lo pm en t  a c t  (known as  the  Bancom b i l l )  wh ich  was s e r i o u s l y  c o n s i d e r e d  by
22P r e s i d e n t  Marcos i n  the  e a r l y  1970s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h i s  b u s i n e s s  e l i t e  
group  formed j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  w i t h  t h e  government  to  u n d e r t a k e  some h o u s in g  
p r o j e c t s .  For  example ,  a group  o f  l a n d l o r d s ,  l a n d  d e v e l o p e r s ,  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
c o n t r a c t o r s ,  and SSS formed a c o n s o r t i u m  c a l l e d  Land and Hous ing Development  
C o r p o r a t i o n  (LHDC) i n  1968 w i t h  Bancom as  an i n c o r p o r a t o r .
In  t h e  p r e s e n t  F iv e  Year  P h i l i p p i n e  Development  P l a n  (1 9 7 8 -1 9 8 2 ) ,  t h e  
government  w i l l  c o n s t r u c t  72 ,137  u n i t s  f o r  t h e  lower income groups  and
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27,284 units for military personnel (by NHA and the Armed Forces). Joint
ventures with the private sector will be encouraged. Furthermore, private
entrepreneurs will be encouraged in terms of land contribution, financial
resources, and technical expertise, particularly in the fields of credit,
construction and management. Regulations governing building and loan
associations will also be liberalised to rejuvenate and encourage private
23participation in housing finance.
In contrast with most of the ASEAN region, Singapore has given top
priority to public housing since 1959 when it became self-governed. SIT was
immediately replaced by the more powerful HDB. In the First and Second Five
Year Building Programme (1960-1965 and 1966-1970), HDB planned to build
50,000 and 60,000 units respectively while the private sector was expected
to contribute only an additional 40,000 units for the higher income groups.
The government also heavily invested in housing, totalling over S$5000
million between 1960 and 1970 or about 26.5 percent of the total State 
24Development Fund. A writer points to the philosophy behind the 
government's allocation of high priority to public housing:
• "The development is at once social, economic, and political
and that the interactional relationships between all three
spheres are indeed profound and inseparable. Given this
recognition that development planning is not merely for
the economy but for the society and hence the necessity to
view many proposed measures in social, economic, and
political policies as a single whole, the provision of
low-cost housing to the low-income masses becomes a
measure which satisfies the demand from all three spheres 
25of development."
The main objective of the public housing programme is to satisfy social 
need. But such massive housing construction would directly assist in
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promoting national economy and generating employment (at that t'ime 
unemployment had reached 10 percent). Reduction in unemployment in turn 
would result in more income distribution. Consequently, the socioeconomic 
impacts would benefit the government in ensuring greater mass support and 
stability.
Singapore’s political system is, of course, under the one-dominant- 
party system, but the ruling party still needs the mass support in the 
elections. There are elections in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, 
but such elections do not1 much affect the power pattern. In fact, the 
incumbent governments (or their supporters) could hardly have won the 
majority of seats in the capital cities’ seats had the elections not been 
rigged. This is also true in Malaysia, where the National Front (or its 
predecessor, the Alliance) always concentrates its efforts outside Kuala 
Lumpur and other cities because its power base has been in the Muslim 
dominated rural areas.
2. The Implementation Bodies. Again, Singapore led the way in the 
establishment of a single housing agency solely responsible for all matters 
concerning housing and urban development. It was also a pioneer in the 
creation of an Urban Renewal Authority (URA-1974) to carry out urban renewal 
and development programme, so that Singaporeans can be assured that they 
live in a good environment.
HDB was established by the Housing and Development Ordinance which gave 
HDB wide powers. In addition, the Land Acquisition Act also authorises the 
government (or HDB) to acquire land for public purposes, including public 
housing, urban renewal or industrialisation programmes.
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At the top of HDB is a board consisting of a Chairman, a Deputy- 
Chairman, and at least three, but not more than five, additional members. 
Almost all former chairmen were either at the ministerial or Permanent 
Secretary level. The present Chairman, Michael Pam, comes from the private 
sector (he is the chairman of Haw Par, one of the largest regional TNCs, but 
is known to have close relationships with the political leadership. Further, 
the present Minister of National Development, Lim Kim San, who directly 
supervises HDB, is the first Chairman of HDB. The Permanent secretary of 
that Ministry also used to work as the Chief Executive Official of HDB. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that the relationship between the Minister-in- 
Charge and the responsible Ministry and HDB is cordial. More significantly, 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has long been interested in public housing and 
it is known that he personally hand-picks top positions in HDB so that he 
can be assured that his innovative policies are immediately carried out.
Thus, HDB Chairman and Chief Executive always enjoy full support form the 
top and are able to push through the housing policy and accomplish the 
projects within a short period.
Such full support from the top political leadership for the implemen­
tation of housing policy is hardly found in other ASEAN countries. Indeed, 
some of them had not had any policy at all until recently. In the 
Philippines, before the establishment of NHA, PHHC was also given wide 
powers under the Commonwealth Act No.648 and Executive Order 399 of 1951, 
more or less similar to the HDB Act. But from the start, PHHC did not enjoy 
support from political leaders and governmental agencies concerned. It had 
serious financial problems because it was expected to be self-supporting, 
and, at the same time, it had to carry out unprofitable projects which were 
insufficiently backed by financial sources. PHHC was often disappointed 
because Congress rejected proposed appropriations on the construction of low
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cost housing projects. It also failed to obtain loans from GSIS, SSS and 
DBP on several occasions because such governmental institutions also had 
their own housing projects.
With such financial constraints, PHHC had to modify its main objective,
which was to provide housing for the poor: PHHC regulations stated that a
family, in order to be awarded a dwelling in any of its projects, had to
meet a salary requirement. Such preserved maximum total earnings were
relatively high, and thus actual low income families became ineligible. In
effect, PHHC was often criticised of building low-cost housing for the 
27relatively rich.
The Malaysian FHT faced similar problems. But from the outset it
declared that its main objective was to demonstrate to private entrepreneurs
that housing was a good investment and to finance housing projects as
28distinct from building one house at a time. FHT never had to face the 
problems posed by squatters, because its business catered for the upper and 
middle income groups.
The most important administrative problem of the Philippines arrived 
from the fact that there were many governmental agencies concerned with 
housing and urban development, but none of them seemed to carry out the 
programme seriously:
PHHC (1941-1974) 
NHC (1968)
GSIS (1936)
SSS (1964)
- engaged in housing construction;
- the manufacture of prefabricated housing 
units and component parts;
- the main source of housing loans for 
civil servants;
- a counterpart of GSIS for private 
employees;
DBP (1968) - the successor of RFC. It grants housing
loans for individual borrowers and for 
fire and typhoon victims;
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HFC (1956) - a mortgage insurance system 
operator;
Presidential Assistant 
on Housing and Re­
settlement Agency 
(PAHRA) (1964)
- carrying out the relocation 
and resettlement of squatters 
in Manila.
This list does not include the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Department of Agrarian Reform which built a number of housing units for
their personnel in the case of the former, and for rural farm resettlement
in the case of the latter. In addition, there were a large number of
Presidential Committees dealing with housing, such as those appointed in
1962, 1963, 1964, 1968 and 1970. The most important one was the
Presidential Committee on Housing and Resettlements (PreCHUR) which replaced
the Presidential Coordinating Committee on Housing and Urban Development
(PreCCHUD) in 1970. It acted as advisor to the President in coordinating
and controlling the implementation of housing agencies of the government.
It was also to study, formulate and recommend guildelines for the proper
29implementation of some projects.
At the top of PHHC was the General Manager appointed by the President 
for an unspecific period. But with the change of the Administration once 
every four years, the General Manager was frequently changed, with the 
result that there was little continuity in the work of the agency. The 
General Manager was, of course, a President’s man, but of a lower status 
compared with the Chiefs of financial institutions or other agencies which 
competed with PHHC for funds and support.
Similarly, Thailand had not had an accepted government housing policy 
until the late 1960s. Also, there were too many agencies involved in 
housing activities with the result that no one agency was allocated adequate
budget and staff to perform their duties. When an influential politician
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became the Governor of Bangkok City, the budget for the city’s housing and 
relocation programmes was allocated far more than that for the projects 
initiated by HB, the agency responsible for housing of the whole country, 
which was headed by a civil servant. The City Administration was later 
found to be involved in the $207 million, real estate scandals.
HB was in fact a part of the Civil Service under the directives of the 
Department of Public Welfare in the Ministry of Interior. However, major 
policies of the Bureau were subject to examination by a high level inter­
ministry Housing Bureau Committee consisting of 17 members, including the 
Governor of Bangkok City (formerly Lord Mayor) and the representatives from 
the Treasury and Budget Bureau. The Board was supposed to be a coordinating 
body in housing matters, but it did not work so effectively.
The situation in housing agencies in Indonesia and Malaysia was better
than that in Thailand and the Philippines. The Replelita II, calls for an
institutional infrastructure for drawing a national housing policy for
implementing that policy and regulating the financial system for people’s 
30housing". In Malaysia, FHT is now replaced by several governmental 
agencies. The Ministry of Housing and Village Development is responsible 
for the formulation of national housing policies and the coordination and 
monitoring of housing activities in both the public and private sectors. 
Nevertheless, apart from the Ministry, there are several agencies involved 
in housing such as FELDA, Federal Land Consolidated and Rehabilitation 
Authority (FELCRA), Council of Trust for Indigenious People (MARA), UDA,
State Land Development Boards, SEDCs, State governments and Kuala Lumpur City 
Hall, not to mention several semi-state companies.
With the formation of NHAs in Thailand and the Philippines, it will be 
interesting to observe whether such formation can solve these administrative
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problems, and whether a single housing agency performs better than many 
agencies.
The Outputs
The outputs of the housing system consist of the number of housing 
units built in relation to the housing demands during a certain period, the 
quality of such housing units, and lastly, the impacts upon political, 
social and economic enthronements.
1. Quantity and Quality of Public Housing. The first item to discuss is 
concerned with the physical outputs of the public housing projects. In the 
past, planners generally stressed the importance of an increased supply of 
housing for the lower income groups, but now there is a growing awareness on 
the physical environment of settlements, tenancy issues, and problems of 
occupants concerning the new environment.
Quantitatively, Singapore is expected to finish almost 400,000 units at
the end of its Fourth Five Year Building Programme which is to house seven
in ten Singaporeans in HDB estates. In the financial year 1976-1977, HDB
built 30,344 units with the total capital expenditure of S$765 million (only
31S$59 million of which was government subsidy). It also established the 
Housing and Urban Development Co. (Pty.) Ltd. to meet the home ownership 
needs of the middle income group.
Qualitatively, the living standard of Singaporeans is greatly improved.
The reduction of average number of persons per room was cut by half from 4.8
32in 1954 to 2.5 in 1970 (the ASEAN average is over 4). According to a
recent HDB survey, the average number of persons per unit'declined from 6.4
33in 1966 to 5.3 at the end of 1976. It also found that nearly three- 
quarters of households living in HDB estates were satisfied with their
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neighbourhoold, block, floor, and flats, another 19 to 25 percent found them 
acceptable, leaving only 3 to 8 percent dissatisfied. In regard to living 
conditions, 47 percent of the households rated their present conditions 
(neighbourliness, light, noise, travelling time, shopping facilities, and 
the environment) to be either Mvery much better" or "somewhat better", than 
in the past. Significantly, they rated the cleanliness of the surroundings 
very high (48.4) .
In the Philippines, the government has, since 1968, greatly increased
its investment in housing, but has remained unable to meet the housing
demands. It is estimated that the present housing backlog (as of 1977) is
lamost 1 million, 656,000 of which are already sub-standard and need to be
34replaced immediately. According to the 1970 Census on Population and
Housing, 61.2 percent of dwelling units in Greater Manila (MBMR) were built
35from wood and 20.5 percent from nipa which lasted no more than 10 years. 
Only 31.3 percent had piped water supplied by Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sewerage System, 57.9 percent had electricity connected, and 31.1 percent 
had no toilet facility at all.
In Malaysia, as Table D.l indicates, the percentage of the city
population living in slum areas is among the highest in the region. It was
also found in a recent survey that an average of 7.7 persons live in a
3 6dwelling unit, which is also the highest. In comparison with the 
Philippines, the standard of housing and access to basic services in 
Malaysia is somewhat better: 89.6 percent of households in Metropolitan
areas are equipped with piped water, 85.6 percent with electricity, 95.6
37percent with adequate toilet facilities (42 percent with flush toilets).
The conditions in Thailand and Indonesia are perhaps worse than in 
Malaysia. In the 1961 census, it was stated that only 5.8 percent of the
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total housing stock in Indonesia could be considered as being permanent and
38that 55 percent of the dwelling units in urban areas had only one room.
Almost two decades after that census, there have been no serious efforts to 
overcome the housing problems and the situation seems to be deteriorating 
more because of the backlog and the rapidly increasing demands. In Bangkok 
alone, there are now more than 300 areas classified as slums. Though, 
according to a study, Thai squatters were better off than their counterparts 
in other countries in the terms of their earnings, the majority of them were 
still unable to own a standard dwelling unit offered for sale by private 
developers even at a .subsidised price. Indeed, the situation will get worse 
day by day unless the government takes some action.
2. Socioeconomic and Political Impacts. Singapore’s national economy has
greatly benefited from the mass construction of public housing. The ratio
of construction to GDP has been increased substantially and now construction
becomes a leading sector in the national economy, next only to manufacturing,
agricultural and wholesale and retail trade sectors. The average rate of
growth in the construction sector during 1960-1971 was 22.4 percent, which
39was a faster growth rate than that of GNP at 11.1 percent. In terms of 
value, the construction sector progressed from only S$187.0 million in 1966, 
to S$l.081.0 million in 1975 at current market prices.^ In addition, it is 
estimated that the construction of 10,000 housing units per annum will 
create 15,000 jobs. With a rate of constructing 30,000 units a year 
(excluding 2,500 built by private entrepreneurs) the building industry now 
creates at least 45,000 jobs. HDB also directly employs another 10,000 
employees, making HDB one of the largest employers in the country.
Equally significant is the performance of HDB which is now almost self- 
financed: it received a subsidy of S$59 million but paid a property tax of
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S$36 million. In other countries, housing agencies are usually exempted 
from taxes.
Good housing is recognised as having an important role to play in 
social development. It also creates the social climate necessary for the 
orderly development of society. In Singapore, HDB estates become centres 
for social and cultural activities organised by Community Centre Committees 
and People’s Associations, both of which are sponsored by the government and 
are closely related to the branch of the ruling People's Action Party.
Since 1968 the PAP has won all seats in Parliament. And there is no 
doubt that the successful public housing programme has contributed to 
political stability and to one-party dominance.
During the period 1965-1970, the annual average percentage rate of
growth of GDP of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand was 5.3, 5.3 and
429.5 but that of construction was 10.0, (3.6), and 8.4 respectively. These
figures indicate that the construction sector contributed insignificantly to
the growth of the economy. In the case of the Philippines, the construction
sector even decreased by 3.6 percent. During the Second Malaysian Plan, the
annual average percentage rate of growth of GDP was 7.4, but that of the
construction sector was 10.9. A better performance, but still far behind
43the Singaporean figure.
Little can be said about socio-political impacts of housing in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines because housing projects in these 
countries are of very small scale and benefit only a small portion of the 
city population. The strict measures over the press freedom and the 
negligence of the press itself, more or less hides the sufferings of the 
poor from the general public. Indeed, these poor people are often among the
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last group -to complain to the government or to the public. However, in the 
past five years, many community leaders in Tondo in Manila were arrested or 
went underground. One young teacher in Klong Tuey in Bangkok who was 
awarded the Magsaysay Award for her community services but at the same time 
her school was taken over by the City Administration. There has also been a 
tendency toward increased urban guerrila activities in Kuala Lumpur, where a 
few years ago a monument in front of the National Parliament was bombed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The past failures of public housing policy implementation of the ASEAN 
countries (except Singapore) derived from many reasons. The most important 
one was the lack of political willingness to overcome the housing shortage 
in these countries. In effect, there was no housing policy at all, or, if 
any, no real intention to implement such policy. The main activities of 
these governments were to relocate squatters in areas outside the cities, 
with or without necessary amenities, the result being that squatters 
eventually left the assigned areas and resettled in their former slum areas. 
Meanwhile, the limited low-cost housing projects in the cities were mainly 
for civil servants or military personnel, and in some cases, for the middle 
income group. This can be explained by the fact that the stability of the 
governments in this region did not so much depend on mass support, than on 
various factions in the ruling elite group itself (the military and civilian 
bureaucrats and wealthy businessmen). In Singapore, in contrast, the ruling 
PAP government still seeks mass support in order to be reelected, and the 
housing policy is one of the most important political strategies for gaining
such support.
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Nevertheless, the success of Singapore can hardly be repeated elsewhere 
in the region, because of various different inputs in the public housing 
system. The Republic is geographically compact, so that the population 
growth rate can be controlled effectively, and policy implementation is 
easily supervised by the top political leadership from the cabinet level to 
the ’’street bureaucrat" level. It is small enough for socioeconomic and 
political impacts of the implementation of the housing policy can be felt. 
Equally important, by the time Singapore started implementing its housing 
policy in 1960, the Republic had already been the richest country in the 
region and could afford to invest millions of dollars in housing projects.
In other countries, however, the annual budget had to be allocated to other 
areas which needed to be more immediately developed (such as, agriculture 
and manufacturing).
No less important, HDB inherited the work from its predecessor, SIT, 
which by that time was one of the most effective housing bodies in the 
region. In other ASEAN countries, there were too many implementing bodies 
which competed among themselves for funds and support from the government, 
resulting in no single agency being allocated adequate finance and staff to 
carry out full-scale housing projects.
All in all, it must be noted that the housing problem cannot be solved 
by merely constructing massive public housing for the urban poor and 
rehousing them from slum areas, because more and more rural migrants still 
come to the cities to seek a better life. Governments should encourage 
people to recognise the importance of population control and discourage them 
to have a large family unit. On the other hand, governments should 
encourage the development of regional centres in the countrysite, so that 
rural migrants may resettle there and stop coming to the "primate" cities
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(such as Bangkok which is already thirty times larger than the second 
largest city in the country). Above all, the top priority in national 
development should be given to rural development in order to improve rural 
outputs and living standards. All countries in the region have such 
policies but policy implementation seems to be in the opposite direction.
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CASE E
THE RISE AND FALL OF PERTAMINA
A discussion on ASEAN public enterprises cannot be finished without 
mentioning the case of Pertamina, the gigantic Indonesian oil empire with a 
large number of subsidiaries and joint ventures in oil and other sectors.
In the early 1970s it was reputed to be the best Indonesian enterprise in a 
country of administrative bottlenecks. Its rapid growth gained worldwide 
attention and in 1973 it became one of the world’s two largest companies 
outside the United States, and its story was published in the distinguished 
Fortune'magazine. Then in 1973 it shocked the world when it was unable to 
repay a relatively small loan to an American bank. The final figure of
debts seems to be more than US$10 billion.
So much has been written about Pertamina in the past few years, yet so 
little is known. Many writers blame dependency on foreign financing, 
overexpansion and mismanagement for the financial crash, while others 
criticise Ibnu Sutowo, the former President Director of Pertamina, for his 
managerial incompetence and corrupt practice. This case study attempts to 
examine causes that led to the rise and fall of the corporation.
THE RISE OF PERTAMINA
Indonesia is one of the earliest major oil producing areas of the 
world: as early as 1885 commercial production began in North Sumatra by an
entrepreneur; later it became part of the Shell group. Thereafter, oil 
exploration, production, and marketing, were completely in the hands of 
foreign companies known as the big three (Shell, Caltex, and Stanvac). In 
1940 Indonesia's total production ranked fifth in the world, totalling
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136,000 bohd, but when the Second World War broke out, the Big Three left 
the country and its oil fields.^
After the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the Big Three returned to 
Indonesia and rehabilitated their facilities which returned to them under 
the Round Table Agreement (except oil fields in North Sumatra). But the 
situation was now changed. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution stated that 
all resources of the land and water of Indonesia belonged to its people and 
only state enterprises were authorised to undertake the exploitation of 
such resources. Moreover, in 1951 Parliament passed a resolution 
prohibiting the granting of new concessions or exploration agreements with 
foreign companies until a new law was enacted to replace the 1899 East 
Indies Oil Mining Act. In the meantime the government was authorised to 
conclude provisional agreements with the Big Three similar to those adopted 
in other oil producing countries at that time. Under the agreements 
foreign oil companies were to undertake investment programmes from funds 
earned abroad and to implement Indonesianisation of staff while the 
government was to give tax concessions on capital imports. The proceeds 
from production, according to the agreements, were to be shared on a fifty- 
fifty basis.
The situation in North Sumatra oil fields was complicated by national
and regional politics. The government, under pressure of both nationalists
and communists in Parliament, decided not to return oil fields in that area
to the Shell group, and instead set up a state company called Perusahaan
Tambang Mingak Utara (TMSU) to operate these fields. TMSU did not produce
any substantial oil because their oil fields were surrounded by supporters
of the Durul Islam rebellion which broke out in 1953, and because the fund
2provided by the government was channelled for political purposes. Then in
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1958 a regional military commander in North Sumatra staged a coup against 
the Jakarta government which responded by assigning General Nasution, the 
army Chief of Staff, to lead a military operation. Nasution took over TMSU 
and changed its name to P.T. Permina and later P.T. Perusahaan Minyak 
Nasional (P.T. Permina). Nasution's deputy, Colonel Ibnu Sutowo, was 
appointed President-Director of the corporation.
At the same period, the government took over 50 percent ownership of 
the former Dutch East Indian Government in N.V. Nederlandsche Indische 
Aardalie Maatschappij (NIAM) and changed its name to P.T. Pertambangan 
Minyak Indonesia (P.T. permindo). Shell, another partner in Permindo, 
agreed to help train the Indonesian mangement team and to accelerate 
Indonesianisation of staff. This corporation produced oil from its fields 
in South Sumatra and Kalimantan and began establishing its domestic 
marketing network. When Permindo's license to distribute petroleum 
products expired a few years later, all of its activities were taken over 
by the newly established Perusahaan Negara Pertambangan Minyak Indonesia 
(P.N. Pertamin). Pertamin, now a wholly state owned corporation, was 
designated as the sole distributor of petroleum products in the domestic 
market (in 1965 it purchased all marketing facilities belonging to the Big 
Three) and sole supplier for the armed forces.
The government also established in 1961 a third state oil enterprise 
called P.N. Permigan, apparently as a counter to the army which controlled 
Permina, and as a concession to the influential Communist Party (P.K.I.). 
Permigan, operated by P.K.I. members and trade union leaders, took over 
small oil fields in Central Java.
However, Ibnu was appointed Chairman of the General Management Board 
of the Petroleum Sector (B.P.U.-minjak), set up under the Public Enterprise
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Law of 1960, whose responsibility was to coordinate all policies of the 
three state oil companies. In addition, in April 1965, Ibnu became the 
Minister of State attached to Third Deputy Prime Minister Chairul Saleh who 
was also Minister for Oil and Natural Gas.
The passage of new oil legislation - Law No.44 of 1960 - signified new 
development in the oil industry. Article 3 of the Law confirmed the 1945 
Constitution that mining of oil and gas should only be undertaken by public 
enterprises, but the Law also authorised the Minister-in-Charge to appoint 
"other parties" as contractors for the execution of operations which could 
not be executed by these public enterprises. Therefore, foreign oil 
companies could continue to operate in the country as contractors of the 
three state oil corporations under the contracts of work which would be 
effective only when ratified by law. In addition, Presidential Decree 
No.476 of 1961 stated that division of earnings under such contracts would 
be on a 60-40 basis in favour of the government and that all determinations 
of the selling price of crude oil and refined products would be undertaken 
by the government.
None but a few small independent oil companies signed the contracts of 
work with the government until the government threatened to liquidate their 
operations and the United States government came to intervene. An agree­
ment was reached in Tokyo in June 1963 and the Big Three signed their 
contracts of work with the three state corporations: Permina with Stanvac,
Pertamin with Caltex, and Permigan with Shell.
The 30 September 1965 event that eventually led to the emergence of 
the New Order marked the turning point of Permina: P.K.I., which
previously obstructed the expansion of Permina, was outlawed and the new 
regime extended all the support the corporation needed. Ibnu, who in his
A 30
capacity as Minister of State, was responsible for oil and gas, and 
abolished communist operated Permigan; all assets and production facilities 
of P.K.I. were transferred to Permina and the newly established training 
and research institute, Lemigas. Permina also purchased all Shell's assets 
in the country in January 1966, and took over all production facilities of 
the Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij in Irian Jaya. In 
effect, Permina became the largest oil corporation in the country: its
employees increased from 3,000 to over 14,000 within a year, and its 
activities expanded from those in North Sumatra to cover the whole 
country. It also established the first joint venture with Japanese 
entrepreneurs, Far East Oil Trading Company, which supplied Indonesian 
crude and heavy oil to the Japanese market and which became the major 
financial source of Permina in the middle 1960s.
Ibnu was re-appointed Minister of Oil and Gas in February 1966 but he 
stepped down from that portfolio in that year. He was replaced by 
Bratanata, an engineer, who had a long and remarkable service in the 
government.
Minister Bratanata and Ibnu held very different ideas on the develop­
ment of oil industry in the country. Firstly, Bratanata preferred the 
contract of work to the production sharing contract initiated by Ibnu 
because the former seemed to assure rapid exploitation by a large number of 
companies which would bring in more revenue to the state. Ibnu, in 
contrast, believed that the new system - production sharing - would 
maximise profits for the state because of the oil itself, not the 
financially earning which any contractor could easily make up. Secondly, 
Bratanata favoured two or more state oil companies as a means for 
maintaining competition and comparing performance of each corporation,
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while Ibnu wanted only one integrated national oil corporation. When he
was Minister in 1966, he had already ordered the consolidation of all
exploration and production activities which was to be solely placed under
Permina, but such consolidation was not implemented. Lastly, Ibnu wanted
full autonomy in the operations of his corporation, but Bratanata, who was
authorised by law to exercise control over all oil affairs, wanted to
3exercise his authority too.
The conflict reached a climax when Ibnu signed production sharing 
contracts with IIAPCO, Japex, and Refican, and Bratanata referred the 
matter to the President and the Cabinet. Not surprisingly, Ibnu won the 
fight: President Suharto informed Bratanata that he approved all the
contracts and asked the Minister to accommodate the proposals initiated by 
Ibnu. In January 1967 the Directorate General of Oil and Gas was trans­
ferred from the Ministry of Mines to the Presidium Cabinet. And then in 
October, when Bratanata was replaced by Professor Sumantri, the Directorate 
General of Oil and Gas was returned to the Ministry of Mines.
On 20 August 1968, Permina and Pertamin were integrated into 
Perusahaan Negara Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bund Nasional (P.N.
Pertamina), under Government Regulation No.27 of 1968. Ibnu was appointed 
President-Director and two militarymen, who had replaced civilian directors 
of Pertamin in 1967, became members of the board of directors.
THE CASE OF MEGALOMANIA
Since the amalgamation in 1968, Pertamina has been almost solely 
responsible for all oil activities: exploration, exploitation, refining,
and marketing. The only other national body engaged in oil activities is
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Lemigas which operates small oil fields in Central Java for research and 
training purposes.
Pertamina was assigned to manage contracts of work with Caltex and 
Stanvac and production sharing contracts with some 50 foreign companies. 
They also collected, on behalf of the government, the state's share of 
revenue from these contractors (the largest among them was Caltex which 
operated more than 20 fields). Most of Pertamina income came from these 
sources.
The corporation operated its own fields throughout the country but its 
crude oil production had dropped from 35.5 million barrels (about 16
V
percent of the total national production) in 1968 to 25.2 million barrels
(5.1 percent) in 1973, Nevertheless, Pertamina was the leading natural gas
producer: its production accounted for about one fourth of the total
4national production in 1976.
Pertamina owned and operated 8 refineries with a combined capacity of 
523,000 bpd: six were formally Shell refineries acquired in the 1960s, and
the others were built during the Ibnu period. Lemigas operated an old, 
small refinery in Central Java with a capacity of 4,000 bpd. Less than 
half of the refined products were for domestic consumption which were 
distributed through a string of more than 800 petrol and service stations. 
Production sharing contractors were obligated to supply 21 percent of their 
crude oil production to Pertamina to fulfil domestic requirements.
Japan imported most of Indonesia's crude and heavy oil and petroleum 
products (69 percent of the total oil exports in 1972 and 43 percent in 
1976) through the Far East Oil Trading Company and Pertamina's representa­
tive in Tokyo. In addition, Pertamina maintained representatives in New
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York and Frankfurt (until recently also in Singapore and Amsterdam) who 
negotiated with potential buyers and handled other business.
Related to the oil sector is transportation. Pertamina’s maritime 
activities began as early as 1959 and rapidly expanded in the early 1970s.
By the end of 1974, the corporation operated 86 tankers, owned or on hire- 
purchase, with a total capacity of almost 3 million deadweight tons, which 
was far more than that of the Indonesian navy.^ A further 28 ocean-going 
tankers in the 100,000 class with a total capacity of 3 million deadweight 
tons were also on lease and hire-purchase from Burmah Oil and some shipping 
companies. A subsidiary, Ocean Petrol Limited, with its headquarters in 
Hong Kong, handled a substantial part of transportation activities outside 
Indonesia. Another subsidiary, P.T. Pertamina Tongkan, operated a non­
tanker fleet including about 100 ships of various kinds from cargo ships, 
tug boats, supply vessels, to passenger ships, barges and mooring boats, 
etc. In addition Pertamina operated docks at Dumai, Pangkalan Susu and 
Pangkalan Brandon.
Equally gigantic were Pertamina's aviation activities. Its subsidiary 
P.T. Pelita Air Service, operated 38 fixed wing aircraft and 70 
helicopters,^ more than any airline in Asia except Japan Airlines and Air 
India.
By April 1974 Pertamina had formed 29 subsidiaries and joint ventures, 
most of them since 1972. It owned P.T. Electronika Nusantara (Elnusa) 
which operated a telecommunications network. It also held shares in Tugu 
Insurance Co. Ltd., a Hong Kong based company with subsidiaries in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Pertamina, at the request of the government, 
bought 60 percent of the shares in P.T. Krakatau steel which was to complete 
construction of a steel plant left unfinished by the Russians in the
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Sukarno era. Another joint venture was P.T. Pertamina Gulf Industrial 
Processing which operated a fertilizer packaging plant. In addition 
Pertamina became involved in some other activities such as a mechanised 
rice estate near Palembang, tourism, metal fabrication, beef ranching, real 
estate, etc. A subsidiary, P.T. Patra Djasa, which grew out of the former 
Shell owned company N.V. Puntjak, operated hotels, motels, rental cars, 
etc. in Jakarta and Bali. It also planned to built huge LNG plants, an oil 
base and transhipment centre on Batam Island near Singapore, two petro­
chemical plants in Arun and South Sumatra, and a number of fertlizer plants 
including a floating one off Kalimantan. These projects cost several 
billion dollars.
With such diversified activities, Pertamina became "a national 
development corporation" in Ibnu’s words. There are several explanations 
of such rapid expansion. In the first place, Pertamina was oriented toward 
growth rather than profits. Ibnu believed that Pertamina's growth would 
advance the whole economy and that oil revenue would help build Indonesia:
"Perhaps our goals could be summed up this way: In the
years ahead we hope to use oil God has given us - oil as 
a product and oil as an income - in the best possible
g
way to build the Indonesian Nationa."
Such a statement was justified by the fact that net oil exports had 
increased from US$55 million in 1966 to US$2,640 million in 1974 or about 
three-quarters of the value of total Indonesian exports. At the same time, 
oil receipts constituted 56 percent of the state budget in 1974/75, a sharp 
rise from 29 percent in 1970/71. Ibnu saw the oil boom as an opportunity 
to build up Pertamina’s (or his own) empire which in turn would effect the 
entire national economy. The word "development" (pembangunan) was the term 
of the time in the New Order, just as many political slogans and
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manifestations were produced in the Sukarno period. Such expansion would, 
therefore, serve the objective of the Suharto regime.
However, it is also the fact that Indonesia is known to have a
relatively small oil reserve (about 2 percent of the world total) and it
9has a high population of over 130 million. The share of the petroleum 
industry in GNP is small; it accounted for only 4 percent in 1966 and 20 
percent in 1976. Even with the oil price increase since 1973, GNP per 
capita has not been much improved and Indonesia is still rated near the 
bottom of the international table. It is also expected that the Indonesian 
oil reserve may dry up any time before 1990. Furthermore, the oil industry 
employs only 60,000 workers, a negligible figure in comparison with the 
unemployed workforce - about 6 million in 1970.
Equally important was that, having no equity capital from the start, 
Pertamina (then Permina) relied on foreign loans, usually short-term with 
high interest rates, to finance its projects. As a state corporation, 
Pertamina was exempted from restrictions on such borrowings until 1973 when 
the Government Board of Commissioners set a limit on medium and long term 
loans. This was an important factor that led to the financial crash in 
1974.
Secondly, and closely related to the first point, Ibnu believed that 
the provision of a necessary infrastructure for foreign contractors was 
important not only for improving the efficiency of these contractors which 
would directly benefit Pertamina, but also for generating secondary effects 
of the oil industry in the national economy. Unless Indonesia built up 
necessary facilities for these contractors, they would spend millions of 
dollars in Singapore which had a much better infrastructure. Ibnu listed 
(1) housing, (2) offices, (3) schools, (4) telecommunications, (5) medical,
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(6) recreation, and (7) utilities - water and electricity, all of which 
were far from adequate in Jakarta. This seemed to justify the rapid 
expansion of Pertamina's subsidiaries in these areas in the early 1970s.
Ibnu stated that Pertamina had to enter into these activities by
necessity because no other agency was prepared to do so.^ But he seemed
to neglect the role of indigeneous private entrepreneurs who were already
engaged in such areas as housing and real estate. Indeed, Pertamina’s
reckless spending in real estate (it had 16 offices, 2 hotels and motels,
hostels, and a three hundred bed hospital in Jakarta) led to land specula-
12tion that sent the price of land skyrocketing. It was also responsible
for the trebling of the pace of inflation from 9 percent in 1971/72 to 34
13percent in 1973/74. There were reports that people who had access to the
14corporation s plan for building projects became much richer overnight.
Thirdly, Pertamina appeared to be the only Indonesian enterprise 
capable of supplying capital investment for joint ventures with foreign 
companies. With dynamic Ibnu at the top, it was also the only corporation
15with entrepreneurial skills in a country of bureaucratic bottlenecks. 
Therefore, it was natural that foreign entrepreneurs would prefer partner­
ship with Pertamina to application to the government for privileges under 
the complicated Foreign Investment Law of 1967.
However, Ibnu was criticised for being too generous to foreign 
investors. It was found that production sharing contracts which Ibnu 
initiated allowed foreign contractors to make profits 4 to 17 times higher 
than those permitted in other OPEC countries.^ In addition the value of 
contribution per barrel from companies operating under such contracts was 
much less than that from Caltex and Stanvac which were under contracts of 
work signed during the Sukarno period. ^  Still, Caltex’s profits from its
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Indonesian fields, which accounted for less than half of its worldwide
1output, contributed as much as 90 percent of the company s total earnings. 
It was, for example, reported that a foreign captain who spent about 10 
years of faithful service with Pertamina was awarded on his retirement with 
his own tanker
Interestingly, a writer noted that' most foreign observers who tagged 
Pertamina as Indonesia's best business corporation mistook effectiveness
(the ability to accomplish organisational goals) for efficiency (the
.. . 20 ability to accomplish the ends with minimum costs). Indeed, cost over­
runs, the acceptance of excessively high bids from subcontractors, and its 
lack of concern for cost were the results of Pertamina's anxiety to get 
things done .
Fourthly, the drive into the non-oil sector was not always initiated
by Pertamina, but rather by the regime, often by President Suharto himself,
which wanted to undertake some development projects that would help in
stabilising the regime. A writer noted that the expansion of Pertamina in
some areas was partly the result of the government off-loading responsi-
21bility for many unviable projects onto Pertamina. For example, the 
President's suggestion for Pertamina's role in producing fertilizer led to 
the construction of several plants. The development of a rice estate, too, 
was initiated by President Suharto as a part of the transmigration scheme 
which had failed before. The Krakatau Steel Plant and the Batam Island 
projects were also Suharto's ideas, but it was Ibnu who convinced the 
President to increase the scale of such projects.
An additional explanation was the need to create more positions for 
the large number of senior executives nudging the ceiling and for military 
officials who preferred to work with Ibnu for much higher income. About
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half of Pertamina's top personnel were military officials of the rank of 
colonel or above. Many more worked in its subsidiaries and joint ventures.
Last, but not least, the growth of Pertamina was partly the response
to public expectations. Pertamina was not an ordinary corporation in the
eyes of the Indonesian public: it was a national dream of a large efficient
enterprise solely owned and managed by Indonesian nationals. As a group of
writers named it: "the General Motors of Indonesia"; the corporation was
22expected to set a model for other enterprises. In the words of Ibnu,
"one goal we have set for the company in the years ahead is to set an
example for other sectors of the economy: to demonstrate a good, disci-
23plined, modern and all-Indonesian company." There had been a tendency 
for TNCs and national corporations in the West and in the region (for 
example, DBS in Singapore, Pernas and Petronas in Malaysia, and PNOC in the 
Philippines - see the Country Study chapters) to expand into conglomerates, 
and there was no surprise for Pertamina to adopt such fashionable practice.
The expansion into a conglomerate of companies affected the management
of Pertamina. Pertamina was known to be a "one man show" but now it grew
too big to be controlled by the one man, Ibnu, who attempted to make all
decisions concerning his conglomerate. Ibnu admitted that "In the early
days, things were different. Then I knew the details of each machine down
to its screw. But now, with Pertamina as big as it is, I can't possibly
.24stay on top of every problem. I wish I could." Therefore, as reported
by a writer, if Ibnu himself did not have a complete picture of Pertamina's
operations, who else would: "The corporate juggernaut was out of control
25well before it was derailed ....
Managerial problems formed only minor factors causing the near 
collapse of the corporation. No one knew how much Pertamina spent for
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b uy ing  f a v o u r s  f rom th e  r u l i n g  e l i t e s ,  b u t  i t  seemed t h a t  such  amounts  
would be l a r g e  enough to  c a u se  a m ajo r  s e t b a c k  o f  b o t h  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  and 
the  n a t i o n .
PERTAMINA AND NATIONAL POLITICS
I n d o n e s i a  i s  a b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t y ,  a p o l i t i c a l  sy s te m  i n  which  power
and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s  a r e  i n  t h e  hands  o f  l e s s  t h a n
1 ,000  top  m i l i t a r y  men and t e c h n o c r a t s  i n  J a k a r t a .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  was
n a t u r a l  t h a t  P e r t a m i n a  was a c c o u n t a b l e  to  t h e s e  r u l i n g  e l i t e  g roups  r a t h e r
th a n  an e l e c t e d  P a r l i a m e n t  which was n o t h i n g  more t h a n  a d e m o c r a t i c  symbol .
Th is  c o n t r a d i c t e d  P r e s i d e n t  S u h a r t ’s s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  P e r t a m i n a  was a c c o u n t -
26a b l e  to  t h e  p u b l i c  " f o r  e v e ry  penny" i t  s p e n t .
There  was no doubt  a b o u t  t h e  s u p p o r t  f rom t h e  P r e s i d e n t  and top
m i l i t a r y  men which  P e r t a m i n a  and Ibnu  e n j o y e d .  S u h a r to  i n  1970 t o l d
P e r t a m i n a ’s employees  to  i g n o r e  newspaper  a t t a c k s  and th e n  e x p r e s s e d  h i s
27c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  management  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  He a l s o  ap p ro v e d  t h e  
e x p a n s i o n  o f  P e r t a m i n a  and s i d e d  w i t h  Ibnu  i n  h i s  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  t e c h n o ­
c r a t s .  More s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  Ibnu r e c e i v e d  an " h o n o u ra r y  d i s c h a r g e "  i n  1976 
when P e r t a m i n a  was on th e  v e r g e  o f  c o l l a p s i n g ,  and no o t h e r  pun i shm e n t  has  
been  t a k e n  a g a i n s t  him so f a r .
The r e a s o n s  a r e  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  to  f i n d .  P e r t a m in a  was t h e  main
f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t e r  to  t h e  army from t h e  b e g i n n i n g .  I t  was common know-
edge t h a t  P e r t a m i n a  and m i l i t a r y  e n t e r p r i s e s  c o n t r i b u t e d  a b o u t
30-60 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e  b e c a u s e  t h e  d e f e n s e  a l l o c a t i o n  i n
28a n n u a l  b u d g e t s  was f a r  f rom adequate .""  P e r t a m i n a  was a l s o  known a s  an
a c t i v e  a g e n t  which  s p o n s o r e d  th e  army to  t o p p l e  P r e s i d e n t  Sukarno i n  1965 
and became a main s o u r c e  o f  r e v e n u e  f o r  b o th  t h e  new reg im e  and members o f
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the ruling elites. Ibnu bought an executive jet for President Suharto 
and lent Madame Suharto a large amount of money for her enterprises. 
Pertamina built some buildings for the armed forces, such as the multi­
storey Veteran Building in Jakarta, and a new hall for the Staff College 
Firms under military control, such as P.T. Propelat of the powerful 
Siliwanggi Division, were often awarded subcontracts with unusually high 
bids.
Ibnu himself often insisted his loyalty to the President, despite the
rumour that he was the most powerful man in the Republic next to Suharto
and that he was challenging Suharto. He rendered his services for the
President's development projects, many of which were not viable as earlier
stated, which could hardly be implemented through bureaucratic channels.
Ibnu was also known as a neutral man who stood away from faction fighting
around Suharto: his political involvement was as a member of the executive
council of the Golkar, the regime sponsored party, which benefitted from
30Pertamina financial support. For President Suharto, Ibnu was a man "who 
got things done", a reputation he had earned since he worked with General 
Nasution. This was demonstrated by the fact that Ibnu had finished several 
long-delayed projects and was more than willing to take on others (such as 
the Krakatau Steel Plant).
Since the wage structure of Indonesia, until recently, was so low that
no state employee was able to live longer than a week on his own monthly
salary, many, if not the majority of them, therefore, sought to obtain more
income from various sources. Pertamina was one of them. It was reported
that Pertamina paid "extrabudgetary funds" to some highly placed persons
31(presumably powerful generals in the armed forces). Regional military 
commanders also benefitted from direct contribution and from being
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Pertamina's subcontractors. In addition it became common practice for 
military men of all ranks to take dwi funsi with Pertamina for a period of 
time and enrich themselves before returning to their previous positions.
Such trade-off practice in return for favours worked well with the 
military elite group, but appeared to be ineffective with technocrats who 
had no political base (except moral support from foreign missions such as 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia - IGGI). From time to time, Ibnu clashed with these technocrats, 
particularly those controlling the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Mines, 
and the planning body - BAPPENAS, apparently for control of the oil sector 
which was an important part of the national economy. As mentioned before, 
Minister Bratanata was the first civilian victim after the dispute with 
Ibnu over the policy issue, whether Pertamina was under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Mines. Professor Sumantri replaced Bratanata, but he had 
no practical control over Pertamina's affairs, neither did the Treasury or 
BAPPENAS. Pertamina's budget of 1968/69 was nothing more than a list of 
revenues and expenditures, rather than a budget specified under the Public 
Enterprise Law of 1960. Still, it was not implemented as it should have 
been after the approval of the Minister of Mines. More significantly, 
Pertamina was apparently outside the framework of the First Five Year 
Development Plan, Repelita X, implemented from April 1969. The Foreign 
Investment Law of 1967, drafted by the technocrats, also appeared to be 
ineffective because foreign entrepreneurs preferred to be Pertamina's 
partners rather than go through the bureaucratic apparatus under such 
legislation.
The two month long campaign against Pertamina launched by Jakarta 
newspapers, Indonesia Raya and Nusantara in November-December 1969, and
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fact not much different from the Public Enterprise Law which previously 
regulated the corporation (see Chapter 5). The only significant change was 
the establishment of a Government Board of Commissioners (Dewan Komisaris 
Pemerintah) to replace the Board of Commissioners (Dewan Komisaris). The 
new governing board, consisting of ex officio, the Minister of Mines 
(Chairman), Minister of Finance (Deputy Chairman), and Chairman of BAPPENAS, 
and two other appointees, was given wider powers, including approving 
annual reports, annual budgets, the establishment of subsidiaries and joint 
ventures (before referring to the President). Unsurprisingly, this legis­
lation was the work'of the technocrats mentioned above, but it was also 
modified to compromise the interests of the military elites.
The position of these technocrats was expected to be strengthened but
in practice it was not as it should be. The responsibilities of the Board,
according to the Act, were restricted to (1) ask for any information about
the operations of the enterprise from the Board of Managing Directors, and
(2) set the general policies, supervise the activities and suggest to the
government measures for improving the enterprise. Wijoyo Nitisastro,
Chairman of BAPPENAS, later accepted the Board could not properly suprvise
the corporation as stipulated in the Law. A writer remarked that Suharto
was often approached by Ibnu to compromise his and the commissioners'
stands. "As a result, even when the technocrats' recommendations were
33heeded, they could backfire." The Second Five Year Plan (Repelita II)
commencing in late 1973, only had a brief statement concerning Pertamina's
role in the next five years. In 1973 the World Bank mission in Jakarta
reported that only US$113 million out of the US$363 million borrowed by
35Pertamina in 1972/73 was borrowed for clearly identified projects. This 
prompted the Board to restrict Pertamina's borrowing power, but the Board 
could at best only set a ceiling on medium and long-term loans and Ibnu was
444
followed by demonstrations at Pertamina's head office, directed mainly on
the issues of corruption and malpractices in the management. The issue of
public accountability was also raised as the main cause of corruption and
mismanagement: Pertamina was claimed to be "a state within a state" and
went beyond bureaucratic control. By the end of January 1970, President
Suharto appointed a committee known as the Commission of Four, comprised of
four distinguished politicians, an advisor and a secretary, to advise him
on combatting corruption in Pertamina. In April and May, two reports were
32sent to the President with the following main elements:
- Pertamina did not succeed in preventing manipulation of 
foreign contractors to reduce prices of Indonesia’s crude 
oil, and was not able to exercise control over such con­
tractors as specified by the agreements.
- Pertamina’s operations covered vast areas which should not 
be vested entirely with a single person, the President 
Director, but should rather be under the entire board of 
directors comprised of respectable persons.
- The external control should be exercised by the Finance 
Ministry and the Financial Audit Board.
- Pertamina did not strictly follow financial practices 
imposed by the government.
- Pertamina should surrender to the government all earnings 
from work contracts and production sharing contracts, and 
pay a corporate tax and 55 percent of its profits to the 
State Development Fund.
- The Public Enterprise Law prohibited the establishment of 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. Therefore, there was a 
need for new Pertamina legislation.
Only the suggestion for new legislation was accepted. In September 
1971 the Pertamina Act, Law No.8 of 1971, was enacted. The new Act was in
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was still able to raise as much as he could on the short-term borrowings 
because of its inability to secure long-term funds, and also because it 
was confident that these short-term borrowings could be rolled over for 
several years. Ibnu also claimed that had he been granted greater freedom 
to arrange longer-term financing, the crisis could have been avoided.
The financial crisis in 1975 brought down Ibnu from the President 
Directorship, but his replacement was also a military man, Major General 
Piet Haryono. However, with the fall of Ibnu, who was without question the 
most powerful of the military-economic leaders, Pertamina appeared to be 
more accountable to the civilian technocrats who subscribed to the idea of 
centralised national planning.
The Indonesian Parliament (DPR) was dominated by government supporters
(232 Golkar members, 75 military men and 25 representatives of functional
groups). The Golkar was characterised by a writer as nothing more than "an
obedient puppet of the government" (dalang) or a "government department -
35the Social Participation Department". In 1976, the Chairman of DPR 
Committee on Industry, Mining and Investment, Jacob Tobing, stated that DPR 
had never seen a Pertamina budget and that Ibnu was able to avoid external 
accountability partly because of the weakness of Parliament. In his words, 
Parliament in the past "requested Ibnu Sutowo several times to speak to the 
DPR. He always came, explained his policies for Pertamina and answered the 
questions we put to him. When he asked whether the DPR was satisfied, we
would reply: 'we are' - perhaps because we, the people's representatives,
, , ,, 36are not yet adequate to our task .
It is important to note that Pertamina's contribution to communities 
near its installations has been significant. Millions of dollars were 
spent on roads, bridges, mosques, TV and radio stations, convention
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halls, etc. It sponsored Koran reading contests, paid to bring the heavy­
weight boxing champion to Jakarta, commissioned artists to produce 
paintings for Pertamina calendars, organised student study tours.
Pertamina advertising became a major source of newspaper revenue (in fact a 
writer reported that three government-linked newspapers were paid about 
US$2,500 per month). It is true that such activities were community ser­
vices or public relations exercises in the eyes of Westerners, but it is 
also true that public expectations in the Third World for direct benefits 
are high, particularly in the case of Indonesia, where there never before 
existed a rich and big corporation like Pertamina.
With these benefits, Ibnu won many supporters who contended that "he
was little more than unlucky to have been caught short". "Some even
suggested a plot in the failure of a high long-term refinancing loan to 
37materialise." To be sure, now Ibnu, a doctor, is still in the army. His 
replacement, Haryono, is a lifelong accountant who "will question every 
proposal, query every figure". But no one knows when he will be replaced. 
At least one technocrat who was Minister of Mines in 1971-1978, Professor 
Sadli, had stepped down from his portfolio for only one reason: he did not
want to be involved in the politics of Pertamina any more.
DISCUSSION
With the fall from grace of Ibnu, the most powerful military-economic 
leader in the early 1970s, the Indonesian economy is now fully in the hands 
of top technocrats who are responsible for economic affairs and planning. 
Pertamina has also been reorganised: the Government Board of Commissioners
was given more authority to supervise the corporation; the Board of 
Directors was restructured, and a new post of Inspector was created to
447
serve as a watchdog over all operations; and many of the ventures outside 
the oil sector were removed from Pertamina's umbrella. Above all, the 
government withdrew loan raising authority from the corporation and took 
over the management of its dept.
The Pertamina case well illustrates the actual behaviour of public 
enterprises in a bureaucratic polity where power and participation in the 
public policy process are restricted to the ruling elites comprising the 
military and civilian bureaucrats who often compete with each other 
for more power. The claim of the technocrats, with backup from several 
foreign commentators, that lack of accountability caused the near bank­
ruptcy of the corporation, was nothing more than an exercise to gain more 
power, since there was no public accountability (in the Western sense) in 
any bureaucratic polity. Indeed, public accountability is much different 
from bureaucratic control. There is also no gaurantee that bureaucratic 
control will stop malpractices in Pertamina: in the ASEAN experience, the
controllers are often the most corrupt officials - who will control the 
controllers?
There was no question about Pertamina's orientation that shaped their 
working behaviour. It was created for political purposes rather than 
economic reasons: it was to supply "more budgetary funds" to supplement
inadequate defense allocation in annual budgets and, less overtly, to help 
stabilise the New Order regime by any possible means, i.e. financing some 
unviable development projects, sponsoring the election campaign of the 
government party, etc. Thus, the rapid expansion of Pertamina was also to 
serve these purposes. It was true that the expansion increased corruption 
which in turn caused the near collapse of the corporation. But no one can 
deny that Pertamina is operating in an Indonesian society where corruption 
is a common phenomenon.
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The Pertamina case is not the only one, as still more scandals are 
soon to be revealed. Some other public enterprises, such as the rice stock 
piling agency, BULOG, and state- tin mining company, P.T. Timah, have 
already been accused of corruption; and the state Jatiroto sugar company 
was called "a Pertamina in miniature". Nevertheless, with more oil 
revenue, the government is reported to be able to provide more defense 
allocation and to revise the salary structure of state employees. Meanwhile 
the number of army men was substantially reduced in the past five years. 
These all seem to be positive signs.
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CHAPTER 10
THIRD WORLD PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Now that this dissertation has surveyed various aspects of public 
enterprise systems in the ASEAN region, what can be said about their 
patterns of behaviour and the underlying conditions that structure such 
behaviour and of their prospects for the future? This concluding chapter 
starts by providing a summary review which highlights some outstanding 
findings from this study, and then a brief prediction of the path public 
enterprises in the Third World are likely to follow. Finally, further study 
suggestions are made.
SUMMARY REVIEW
All public enterprise policy issues, particularly those traditionally 
debated by earlier writers (such as reasons for public enterprises, their 
institutional frameworks and processes, and their autonomy vs. control), 
cannot be viewed in isolation from their specific national and organisation­
al environments. The major weakness of previous concepts and theories of 
public enterprise, usually emphasising structural aspects, arise from their 
failure to recognise the significance of such variables and their impact on 
public enterprise policy content and outcomes. Therefore, in many respects, 
these concepts and theories are not very relevant to the Third World 
environment which sharply differs from that of the Industrialised West where 
such theories originated.
The Orientations: Public Enterprises For What and For Whom?
The most important variables: Political and socioeconomic contexts,
formal institutions and processes, and policy participants (both individuals
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and group) were identified and incorporated into a model of a public enter­
prise system in Figure 3.1. Each variable relates to the others and to 
public enterprise policy, as illustrated in Figure 10.1, but their type and 
degree of influences are different.
There seems to be a consensus among students of public enterprise that 
political and socio-economic factors greatly affect public policy issues, 
but in most studies they choose to limit analysis of these factors, except 
when assessing the reasons for the establishment of public enterprises.
From this study, it appears that these factors influence all policy issues 
and the whole policy process.
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF VARIOUS 
FIGURE 10.1 VARIABLES AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE POLICY
(modified from Figure 3.2)
/ (1) Socio-economic/Political Contexts v
C
L
/
(2) Formal Institutional 
Framework and Processes ^-------\
/
M
\
(3) Policy Participants
(1) including: political system, patterns of public participation,
ideologies, power structure, economic system, interest 
groups and political parties, stage of socio-economic 
development, national elites, etc.
(2) including: governmental form, bureaucratic system, public enterprise
form, public enterprise legislations, personnel and finan­
cial processes, etc.
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(3) i n c l u d i n g : c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  g o v e rn in g  b o a r d ,  b u r e a u c r a t i c  and 
p o l i t i c a l  i n v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  management ,  p a t t e r n s  o f  p a r t i ­
c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  p r o c e s s ,  e t c .
(4) i n c l u d i n g : l e v e l  o f  gove rnm e n ta l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  n a t i o n a l  economy, 
s i z e ,  type  and scope  of  a c t i v i t i e s , c o n t r o l  and autonomy,  
p r i c i n g  p o l i c y ,  p e r s o n n e l  p o l i c y ,  e t c .
L inkage  A: The e f f e c t  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  f a c t o r s  on l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
and p r o c e s s e s  o f  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s .
L inkage  C: The e f f e c t  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  f a c t o r s  on p o l i c y  p a r t i c p a n t s  
( i n d i v i d u a l s  and g r o u p s ) .
L inkage  E: The p f f e c t  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  f a c t o r s  on p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  
p o l i c i e s .
L inkage  L: The e f f e c t  o f  l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r o c e s s e s  on p u b l i c  
e n t e r p r i s e  p o l i c i e s .
L inkage  G: The e f f e c t  o f  l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r o c e s s e s  on p o l i c y  
p a r t i c i p a n t s .
L inka ge  I : The e f f e c t  o f  p o l i c y  p a r t i c i p a n t s '  b e h a v i o u r  on p u b l i c  
e n t e r p r i s e  p o l i c i e s .
L inka ge  H: The e f f e c t  o f  p o l i c y  p a r t i c i p a n t s '  b e h a v i o u r  on l e g a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r o c e s s e s .
L inkage  B, D, F: The f e e d b a c k  o f  l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r o c e s s e s ,  p o l i c y
L inkage  M, J :
p a r t i c i p a n t s '  b e h a v i o u r ,  and p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  p o l i c i e s  on 
e n v i ro n m en t  f o r c e s  and c o n d i t i o n s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
The f e e d b a c k  o f  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  p o l i c i e s  on l e g a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r o c e s s e s ,  and p o l i c y  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
There a r e  s e v e r a l  p u b l i c l y  s t a t e d  r e a s o n s  f o r  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e ,  m a in ly  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  s o c i a l  and economic  deve lopm en t ,  b u t  t h e  r e a l  m o t i v a t i o n s  a r e  
o f t e n  r e l a t e d  to  p o l i t i c s ,  i . e .  t h e  manoeuvre to  g a i n  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
c o n t r o l  o r  to  b a l a n c e  power.  I t  i s  u n d e n i a b l e  t h a t  i n  most  T h i rd  World
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countries those who control political power without economic support are 
vulnerable to challenge by the ones who control both. Therefore, to keep 
themselves in power, the ruling elites have no choice but to actively inter­
vene in the national economy by setting up their own empires or by expanding 
state intervention through regulations and /or public enterprises. This 
strategy varies from country to country and from time to time, depending on 
the challenge from political rival groups or individuals. The examples in 
point are the nationalisation of some important foreign owned firms in 
Thailand during the pre-Second World War period, the proliferation of public 
enterprises in Malaysia after the May 1969 riots and in the Philippines 
under the Marcos’ emergency rule.
Neither political nor economic factors alone are single determinants of 
public enterprise policy content and outcomes. Nationalism and socialism, 
to some extent, affected the proliferation of public enterprises in Thailand 
(during the Pibul regime) and Indonesia (during the Sukarno period) respec­
tively, but it seems that the impact of ideology has become increasingly 
insignificant. Many countries declare their free enterprise policy simply 
to please international financial institutions and foreign investors whose 
capital inflow is important for development programmes. In practice, as 
demonstrated by the ASEAN case, their economies are "mixed market economies" 
in which government participation has been increasing in most, if not all, 
sectors of the economy. Such government participation, often through 
public enterprises or mixed enterprises, steadily tended to be related
to a concept of national planning, though these countries do not have 
centrally planned socialist economies. Interestingly, none of the countries 
which profess what is called "Third World socialism" have actually attempted 
to completely control the "commanding heights" of the economy, i.e. all the 
means of production and distribution of goods and services. It seems that
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many accept socialism simply because socialism is more attractive than 
capitalism which implies materialism, "greedy", "selfish", and "self- 
serving", etc.
There are some similarities among Third World economies. They are 
former colonial export economies, producing raw materials for markets in 
Western countries and Japan, and thus depending on the international trade 
system dominated by these industrialised countries. As a consequence, the 
disparity between the relatively modern, foreign and alien-dominated, 
industrial, commercial, financial, and mining sectors and the traditional, 
technologically backward, subsistence-oriented, agricultural sector and 
between the urban and rural sectors. The most distinctive feature among 
these economies is the growth in the modern sectors of the economy.
Unsurprisingly, the first task of most Third World governments is to 
transform such colonial-type economies into national economies, but their 
approaches differ in each country. A straightforward method is the 
nationalisation of firms owned by non-nationals or the establishment of new 
public enterprises which acquire existing enterprises. Less direct is the 
promotion of indigenously owned enterprises through legislation, and through 
financial support, which enables them to take over activities previously in 
the hands of aliens. All five ASEAN countries have experimented with such 
strategies: the nationalisation of some foreign-owned companies and the
establishment of public enterprises to take over some activities previously 
run by aliens in the pre-war Pibul period in Thailand, and in the Sukarno 
period in Indonesia; the establishment of public enterprises and subsidised 
companies to reduce foreign control (particularly TNCs) of the economy in 
Singapore in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the establishment of public 
enterprises and subsidised companies to compete with alien-owned enterprises,
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the restriction of foreign activities through legislation, and the promotion 
of bumiputras by various means in Malaysia since the May 1969 racial riots; 
and the restriction of aliens' commercial activities and the promotion of 
Filipino retailers soon after the independence.
Such practices were severely condemned by most Western-trained 
economists. But now the use of public enterprises in the development 
process has become increasingly accepted. Indeed, public enterprises form 
part of a fashionable development model, usually known as "developmentalism", 
consisting of national planning undertaken by Western-trained technocrats, 
political stability for the smooth process of development, foreign capital 
inflow for financing development projects, and state intervention in some 
important economic activities. All ASEAN countries (except Singapore where 
there is no official national development plan) appear committed to the 
complete set.
Nevertheless, from the ASEAN case, socio-economic factors alone do not 
contribute to expansion in the public enterprise sector. The number of 
public enterprises is correlated with per capita GNP in the cases of 
Singapore and Malaysia, but not in the other three countries. It would be 
incorrect to state that low per capita income or low level of socio-economic 
development (as indicated by some socio-economic indicators) results in more 
public enterprise without additional qualifications. In fact, Singapore and 
Malaysia which top the ASEAN table of per capita GNP own and operate more 
public enterprises than Thailand and Indonesia (excluding regional enter­
prises and some other enterprises which are under reorganisation).
Instead, from the ASEAN case, the proliferation of public enterprises 
occurred during some important political events, such as wars, riots, coup 
d'etat, changes of government, etc. The nationalisation of Dutch properties
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in 1957, for instance, increased by ten times the number of Indonesian 
public enterprises to over 600. Under the Marcos’ emergency rule public 
enterprises proliferated from about 60 to over 150 within a four year 
period. After the racial riots and Tun Razak took over power in Malaysia, 
the number of public enterprises increased from less than 25 to more than 
300 during his unfinished term.
Political systems appear to be unrelated to the size of public 
enterprises (as indicated by number), though they greatly affect policy 
content and outcomes of almost all other public enterprise policies. Two of 
the ASEAN countries, Indonesia and Thailand, are bureaucratic polities 
dominated by the military and civilian bureaucrats. Another two, Malaysia 
and Singapore, are dominant-party semicompetitive systems. The last, the 
Philippines, was, until the rule by decree, a polyarchal competitive system. 
It was found in this study that public enterprises proliferated in any 
political system, democratic and authoritarian alike.
It is true that it is much easier for an authoritarian regime to create 
or extend public enterprises than an elected government which is accountable 
to the public tnrough political parties and interest groups. But there are 
also some limitations within the authoritarian model: intra-ruling elite
group fighting, foreign influences, and the problem of mass support. The 
struggle of Indonesian technocrats for control over Pertamina and the 
national economy presents a clear illustration. There is a tendency for 
these technocrats to restrict the growth of public enterprises, unless they 
are unable to exercise bureaucratic control over them. The technocrats 
usually have no power base other than support from foreign financial 
institutions, i.e. the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which 
have advocated free enterprise (the attitude has recently been changed to
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some extent). It is common knowledge that authoritarian regimes are often 
sensitive to foreign criticism, and thus international constraints substan­
tially affect policy decisions. It is also undeniable that no regime can 
survive without mass acceptance. Although any authoritarian regime depends 
more on the loyalty of the surrounding ruling elites, it still seeks mass 
support to stabilise political power. It is likely for unpopular public 
enterprises to be abolished and public enterprises which seemingly benefit 
the masses created instead, provided such establishment is not seriously 
conflicting with the interests of the*ruling elites. This has been 
demonstrated by the dase of the Land Bank of the Philippines which did not 
effectively function until recently because it conflicted with the interests 
of landlords who dominated national politics before the martial law.
Mass support is more significant for elected governments, such as the 
Singaporean and Malaysian ones. Public enterprises which implement the New 
Economic Policy in Malaysia obviously gain support from bumiputras who 
usually vote for the ruling National Front, although they have been severely 
criticised by the Chinese minority who traditionally vote for the opposition. 
In Singapore .some public enterprises fiercely compete with private firms, 
such as the Post Office Savings Bank, but the government has no incentive 
to scale down their activities as long as they benefit the majority of 
voters.
The types and scope of activities, to some extent, provide important 
clues for observing patterns of behaviour of public enterprises in both 
authoritarian and representative governmental systems. Public enterprises 
in most Third World countries concentrate activities in the modern sectors 
of the economy, i.e. manufacturing, finance, and commerce, but those in 
more democratic systems also explore other areas which directly benefit the
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majority of the people, including agricultural, regional and land develop­
ment. As demonstrated in the ASEAN case, only a handful of Thai public 
enterprises operate in the agricultural sector and none in regional and land 
development. Among these few agricultural enterprises, only the recently 
set up Agricultural Marketing Organization benefits the rice farmers (the 
others engage in fish markets, cold storages, the teak industry, and rubber 
plantations). In Indonesia most agricultural enterprises are former Dutch 
plantations which have nothing to do with agricultural development. In 
contrast, a large number of public enterprises in Malaysia are involved in 
rural and agriculturdl development, again, for the obvious reason that the 
rural area is the backbone of the National Front. The Philippine case also 
presents an interesting example. During the democratic rule of Macapagal 
and Marcos, many regional development authorities were set up, apparently to 
please local voters, but since the emergency rule most of these enterprises 
have become less active.
In the light of the scope of their activities, public enterprise in 
authoritarian systems tend to restrict their services to the capital city 
where public policy making is centralised. There are many obvious examples: 
the electricity enterprises supply almost -all of their power to cities and 
towns but not the villages through which the supply lines passes; the vast 
investment in large shopping centres and hotels, but not in housing projects 
for millions of squatters and farmers who live in temporary huts without 
necessary facilities. The case of ASEAN public housing in this dissertation 
well illustrates this situation.
Explaining such common phenomena is an easy task. Third World public 
enterprises are highly politicised from the start. This type of govern­
mental instrumentality is chosen, apart from managerial and expedient
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reasons (flexible, commercial type methods, enterprising, and so on), 
because it better serves political purposes through unrestricted spending 
and personnel regulations, than the regular departmental form. Therefore, 
it is not unusual for Third World public enterprises to become deeply 
involved in the political process (in terms of power distribution and 
balance), the electoral process, and the spoils and reward system.
This does not mean that public enterprises are not useful for the 
socio-economic development process in the Third World. Even with the 
mentioned constraints, public enterprises have become important forces in 
national development: providing necessary utility services to the public;
engaging in essential economic activities to combat anti-social business 
practices, to facilitate reorganisation of industries, and to create 
employment opportunities; curbing foreign control of the national economy 
(particularly the exploitation of natural resources). The difference in the 
performance of these enterprises, i.e. the degree the mass benefit from 
their activities, mainly derives from the degree of mass participation in 
the policy process, both in political systems at the macro level and in 
public systems at the micro level, which is the topic of discussion in later 
parts.
Institutions, Individuals and Politics of Control
Central to the classic theories of public enterprise are institutional 
forms and the degree of political and bureaucratic control: public enter­
prises are to be efficient and effective only if they are out of politics 
and if a balance between autonomy of these enterprises and control exercised 
by political and governmental bodies (which assures public accountability) 
is created. This statement implies two respects: (1) to attain the goals
of efficiency and effectiveness, the institutional form of public
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enterprises, which are to operate socio-economic activities, should be 
different from the orthodox ministerial departmental form, which is directly 
under the supervision of politicians, because of their functional nature; 
and (2) to attain such goals, there should be an equilibrium between 
autonomy (i.e. personnel and financial) of the enterprises, which is 
necessary to maintain the flexibility required for entrepreneurial functions, 
and political and bureaucratic control, which is necessary to assure public 
accountability, a main feature of democracy.
The evolution of various forms of public enterprises during the past 
century in the West reflected these two main features. Nevertheless, the 
evolution itself has been subject to political arrangements, not just a 
response to managerial or pragmatic problems. The departmental form 
was initially created for undertaking some business-like activities, but 
after more control was imposed by bupervising political and governmental 
bodies, many enterprises of this type were transformed into the public 
corporation form which was to have more autonomy. Then came the innovation 
of such newer forms as the state and semi-state companies, the mixed enter­
prise with less than 50 percent government shareholding, and more recently 
the COMSAT-type body. Therefore, the attempts to escape from the control 
net and the related problems of autonomy vs. control can be viewed as 
interactions or power plays among participants in the political process in 
which conflicting interests are compromised. When the Executive Branch is 
strong, the pendulum swings toward more control (or more centralisation) 
over public enterprises. In turn, when the Executive becomes weaker than 
other political elements, power tends to decentralise and more autonomy (or 
more delegation) is given to public enterprises.
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Legal structures and processes of Third World public enterprises are 
adopted from the West. But the option for a particular pattern is also much 
influenced by political considerations. The top management of public enter­
prises elsewhere generally seeks more autonomy while bureaucrats in the 
agencies concerned, such as the supervising ministry, the Treasury, the 
Auditor General's, the Civil Service Commission, and members of Parliament, 
tend to impose more control over its operations. However, in practice, such 
supervising bureaucratic apparatus are more powerful than their Western 
counterparts because they are under the control of influential technocrats 
who are actively involved in national politics. These technocrats struggle 
among themselves and form groups fighting or collaborating with other elite 
groups for control over public enterprises, which, for them, should be under 
their control because of the enterprises' economic nature. Since Parliaments 
in the Third World are not strong, the legal framework and processes of 
public enterprises are often the outcome of bureaucratic politics. This 
common phenomenon also occurs in countries with representative governments, 
such as Malaysia and Singapore, where politicians (excluding those with 
bureaucratic background) are overshadowed by the technocrats who claim their 
superior expertise.
Similar to public enterprises in the West, legal forms of Third World 
public enterprises are different in their degree of autonomy. Departmental 
enterprises form parts of regular ministerial departments, with or without 
personnel and financial autonomies, and are allocated annual budgets to 
subsidise their activities which are normally financial losses. Public 
corporations are also given some subsidies but are not parts of ministerial 
departments. In contrast, state and semi-state companies and mixed enter­
prises are operated the same as any private firm but are under government 
control through representation on the boards of directors. There are some
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o t h e r  forms o f  gove rnment  a c t i v i t i e s  which  a r e  n o t  d e f i n e d  as  p u b l i c  e n t e r ­
p r i s e s ,  such  as  " r e v o l v i n g  fu n d s"  i n  T h a i l a n d  o r  " m i l i t a r y  e n t e r p r i s e s "  i n  
I n d o n e s i a .  I n  f a c t ,  some r e v o l v i n g  funds  o r  m i l i t a r y  e n t e r p r i s e s  o p e r a t e  
w i t h  a w id e r  s c o p e  t h a n  s e v e r a l  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  b u t  t h e r e  has  n e v e r  been  
an a t t e m p t  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e s e  b o d ie s  i n  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
I t  h a s  a l s o  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  f a s h i o n a b l e  f o r  T h i rd  World gove rnm en ts  
t o  a dop t  m u l t i - t i e r  s u p e r v i s i n g  b o d i e s ,  such  as  h o l d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
p a t t e r n e d  a f t e r  t h e  famous I t a l i a n  IR I ,  and c o o r d i n a t i n g  b o d i e s  ( i n  t h e  
forms o f  m i n i s t r y ,  b u r e a u ,  o r  c o m m i t t e e ) . As e a r l y  as  t h e  p r e - w a r  p e r i o d ,  
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e ’s N a t i o n a l  Development Company s e t  up a l a r g e  number o f  s u b ­
s i d i s e d  and a s s o c i a t e d  companies  b u t  i t  had n e v e r  been  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  
a c c e l e r a t i n g  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  Development  
Bank o f  S i n g a p o r e  became t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  g o v e rn m e n ta l  agency  to  s p e a r h e a d  
economic d eve lopm en t  i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s and i t s  s u c c e s s  p rompted  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  to  a d o p t  i t s  m odel .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h e s e  m u l t i - t i e r  
s u p e r v i s i n g  b o d i e s  a r e  d e s ig n e d  i n  t h e  West to  p r o v i d e  more autonomy to  
p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  b u t  t h i s  has  n e v e r  m a t e r i a l i s e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  T h i r d  
W o r l d .
I t  i s  n o t  uncommon t h a t  l e g a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s t r i c t l y  
f o l l o w e d  by b o th  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  and t h e  a g e n c i e s  c o n c e r n e d .  The a c t u a l  
p r a c t i c e ,  i n s t e a d ,  t e n d s  to  depend on t h e  d e g r e e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  each  i n d i v i ­
d u a l  and group i n  t h e  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e  sy s te m  p o s s e s s e s  and e x e r c i s e s .
The P e r t a m i n a  c a s e  p r e s e n t s  a c l e a r  i l l u s t r a t i o n .  The t e c h n o c r a t s  and 
o t h e r  c i v i l i a n  b u r e a u c r a t s  had been  f i g h t i n g  w i t h  t h e  m i l i t a r y ,  P e r t a m i n a * s  
c h i e f  Ibnu Sutowo i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  f o r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  b u t  w i t h  
o n l y  m a r g i n a l  s u c c e s s .  The n e w s p a p e r s '  a t t a c k s  and s t u d e n t s ’ d e m o n s t r a ­
t i o n s  i n  e a r l y  1970 l e d  to  t h e  e n a c tm e n t  o f  a new P e r t a m i n a  law t h a t  made
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top technocrats members of the government board of commissioners. But they 
could not exercise control as ascribed by law until the near collapse of 
this corruption in 1975 when the technocrats were called in to salvage, but 
were still unable to take over, the corporation from the military. The work 
of the Ministry of Public Enterprise in Malaysia is another case of power 
play among various elite groups: the Ministry failed to control some enter­
prises under its supervision until the Prime Minister himself took the port­
folio and fired some board chairpersons and chief executives. The failure 
in the Philippines of the Uniform Government Corporation Charter of 1951, 
modelled from its equivalent American legislation, also exemplified the 
situation usually prevalent in the Third World.
Since the legal arrangements are not institutionalised, the personal 
factor seems to be one of the most important single determinant of public 
enterprise policy content and outcomes. But it must be noted also that 
behaviour of individuals and groups in the policy process is patterned by 
contextual and organisational elements. The growth of Pertamina from an 
abandoned oil field in 1957 to become one of the 200 largest corporations in 
the World in 1972 was often quoted as the personal success of Ibnu, but the 
corporation would not have rapidly built up had it not been involved in a 
highly profitable oil business and had it not received full support from 
national leaders. The charismatic leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
also greatly contributed to the success of the Housing and Development Board 
of Singapore, but it was made known that housing was a major part of the 
political strategy of the ruling People's Action Party.
The representation of the power elite groups on the boards and in the 
management of public enterprises is also an indication of power struggle 
among the various groups. In the countries where the military and civilian
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bureaucrats control national politics, members of these two groups dominate 
all the governing boards (somewhat "all official affair" boards) and are 
appointed to manage some important enterprises (through the secondment from 
the Services, i.e. dwi-funsi in Indonesia). Many of them are retired 
officials who still possess some powers. In political systems where bureau­
cratic elites are weaker than other elements, some "outsiders" (i.e. 
politicians and business elites) share the board membership with them, but 
these appointees usually have links with the political leadership in one way 
or another. Such practice can be called "control by patronage": the
appointees gain both .power and wealth while the ones who appoint them gain 
loyalty.
The spoils and patronage system in the Third World is not always as 
bad as claimed by many writers. At least one writer believes that such a 
system may help developing political parties which are essential for 
political development. In addition, not all the recruits in this system are 
corrupt or inefficient. The majority of Thai, Indonesian or Filipinos who 
were recruited under the spoils and patronage system have never enriched 
themselves from their portfolios and still live in the same conditions as 
before. There are many ASEAN people who have reputations for "getting 
things done" such as Ibnu Sutowo, Roman Cruz, or Tenku Razaleigh who has 
built PERNAS and PETRONAS into one of the largest conglomerates in the 
region. The main problem, as has happened elsewhere, is to control these 
people to work for the benefit of the masses, not for personal gains or for 
the benefit of the ruling elite group to whom they belong. Such a problem 
is more critical than it is in the West because political bodies (other than 
the Executive and the bureaucracy) have not yet been institutionalised and 
other controlling bodies themselves are inefficient, or even corrupt.
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Efficiency and Effectiveness: "National Profitability?"
In contradiction to popular theories of public enterprises, earlier 
mentioned, the performance of public enterprises in the ASEAN region is not 
as deleterious as claimed. Despite excessive political interference in the 
management of public enterprises, they still manage to maintain some degree 
of flexibility, profitability, and public accountability.
It is difficult to judge the performance of Third World public enter­
prises because, apart from their main activities, they are expected to 
provide some unprofitable services to the public (perhaps on a much larger 
scope than their Western counterparts) as illustrated in the case studies of 
the two railways in Thailand and Malaysia, and of Pertamina. Even with some 
constraints, the overall performance of the public enterprise sector and of 
most individual enterprises fare much better than previously believed. Only 
a small number of Thai public enterprises are unprofitable, almost all of 
which are public utility services which by their nature cannot break even. 
Public enterprises in Indonesia (excluding Pertamina) pay a substantial 
amount of corporate tax; half of the total state earnings come from such 
items. In Singapore public enterprises enjoy a high rate of profitability 
and are envied by their private counterparts. State airlines, such as 
Singapore Airlines or Thai International; fare somewhat better than several 
privately-owned airlines in Europe or in the United States either in the 
terms of service or financial profitability. The State Railways of Thailand 
has recorded profits since its establishment, except for a few years in the 
early 1970s, while maintaining minute fares and providing unprofitable 
services, whereas their European and Japanese counterparts suffer heavy
loss es.
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The above statement, however, does not reveal the complete story. 
Public enterprises in the Third World are often equipped with privileges, 
i.e. monopoly or semi-monopoly. The most profitable public enterprises in 
Thailand are the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly and the State Lottery Bureau 
whose earnings comprise about half of the total surplus of the whole public 
enterprise sector. In Malaysia, the National Electricity Board is the most 
important contributor to state revenue. In Indonesia, Pertamina, which 
monopolises oil production and distribution, contributes a substantial 
amount from oil receipts to the state but the corporation has often failed 
to pay corporate tax and dividends. The Singaporean Post Office Savings 
Bank is the most rapid growth domestic bank in the country, but it has been 
given privileges to operate outside normal banking hours.
Readers should note of unfair business practices in the private sector 
too. This writer remarked on the rapid growth of what he calls influential 
private enterprises, known as ali-baba, or baba-ali firms in the region, 
which form another sector of the economy other than the public and private 
sectors. Satisfying themselves that operating businesses in their own or 
families' name is not a corrupt practice, politicians and bureaucrats in 
power collaborate with business elites (normally aliens) to set up their 
business empires, which become highly profitable without much effort simply 
because of their influence. But no one can deny that the use of influence 
is a form of corruption. In addition, the growth of TNCs in the past few 
decades has threatened to dominate Third World economies because of their 
superior financial power and managerial skills. There is no doubt whether 
local entrepreneurs could be able to counter such expansion. Thus, only 
public enterprises are the countervailing forces against both influential 
private enterprises and TNCs. It is true that on many occasions public 
enterprises cooperate with these influential firms through arranging
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contracts or subcontracts which often result in more irregularities, and
l
that the attempts to check the growth of TNCs by setting up joint ventures 
with them ("if you can’t beat them, join them") usually increases the 
domination of such TNCs in the economy. However, it is still worthwhile to 
have public enterprises, considering at least some parts of their profits 
would return to the public.
The term "profitability" has several meanings: economic efficiency in
terms of cost-benefit ratio or rate of return; social profitability; and 
political profitability (i.e. stabilising political power of the ruling 
elites). It appears that the three cannot go together, and, in most cases, 
the former two are sacrificed for the latter. But "political profitability" 
is not necessarily the same as national profitability as claimed by some 
Third World authorities, because it mostly benefits the ruling elites, not 
the whole nation. National profitability should instead include all three 
meanings and should be the main objective of all Third World public enter­
prises, perhaps replacing the ambitious goals of efficiency and effectiveness.
The matter of how to attain national profitability in the environment 
when political interference is prominent in the management of public enter­
prise, is not easy to solve. From the ASEAN experience, some public enter­
prises are able to maintain some degrees of such profitability, not because 
of the equilibrium between autonomy and control which is most unlikely to 
exist in the Third World, but rather of some political arrangements 
mentioned below. First, the strict control of the bureaucrats (or techno­
crats) who are responsible for preparing annual budgets and who often 
emphasise economic efficiency, compel public enterprises to improve their 
performance and make some contributions to state revenue. In many Third 
World countries, contributions from public enterprises are traditional
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source of state income. In other countries, public enterprises have been
\
threatened with liquidation unless they can finance themselves or make some 
profits. So, economic efficiency is a matter of their survival (or the top 
management's survival). Secondly, some public enterprises depend on inter­
national finance institutions for capital investment for some development 
projects, and their financial performance is thoroughly examined by these 
authorities before the approval of loans. Thirdly, there is a degree of 
public accountability in the Third World (which is different from that in 
the sense of Westerners) through unconventional channels, such as mass media 
and elite groups. Th'e public may not participate in the formulation of 
public enterprise policies, but they often articulate their interests in the 
implementation phase of the policy process. With public criticism (particu­
larly newspapers, which are surprisingly free to attack the regime at the 
operational level, i.e. the case of Pertamina), Third World governments 
always promptly respond and change the course of their policies in order to 
seek popular support. This can be viewed as a type of public responsibility 
or public accountability, although such regimes may not be "answerable" to 
the public. Lastly, there is competition amongst various elite groups and 
individuals for political power, and it is likely that a regime will be 
toppled unless it can be "answerable" to its supporting groups or factions 
and maintain popularity in the public's eyes.
Public enterprise is still an essential type of governmental instrumen­
tality for the management of national economy, and can hardly be replaced by 
the regular ministerial department or other forms of government bodies. The 
most important issue is how to improve the performance of public enterprises 
in an environment, common to the Third World, in which public control over 
political and governmental bodies is not effective. At present, it appears 
that the success of a Third World public enterprise system depends heavily
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on the intention of the national leadership and individuals who make public 
enterprise policies. Therefore, there have been attempts to convince the 
political leadership that public enterprises are useful tools to help 
accelerate national development and upgrade standards of living of the 
masses, changes which would eventually benefit the ruling elites. Also, 
several educational institutions, at least two in the ASEAN region, have 
endeavoured to develop both managerial and technical skills of public 
enterprise personnel through their research and training programmes. Yet, 
such efforts cannot materialise unless the political leadership is fully 
cooperative.
NEW DIRECTIONS OF THIRD WORLD PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
It is indeed difficult to predict the future of public enterprises in 
unstable political systems which are greatly influenced by the rapidly 
changing Third World environment. There are, nevertheless, some trends 
which should be observed for further research.
Firstly, there is a worldwide tendency towards massive intervention of 
government in all phases of social and economic life. In economically 
advance countries, this trend can be viewed as the transformation from the 
managed economy into the new political economy as the result of the changing 
environment arising from the growth of consumerism, the emergence of TNCs, 
the growing shortage of World energy, and technological advancement. In the 
Third World the rising expectations of the masses for better living condi­
tions compel governments to take more active participation in national 
economy, particularly in the areas previously reserved for private enter­
prises and in new activities to cope with the changing environment. The 
government will no longer act as "stimulator" or "promoter" but rather
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"entrepreneur" and in some essential areas will replace private enter­
prises.
Secondly, there is a growing distrust of the "free enterprise system" 
because of overprofiteering and lack of sympathies for the people’s 
aspirations. This is particularly significant in the case of TNCs which 
have been branded as a form of neocolonialism in the Third World and as a 
form of super-government which escapes national government control. Third 
World governments, although still needing their capital investment, techno­
logical and managerial skills, will restrict their activities through 
regulations and increasing participation by forming joint-ventures which 
eventually become semi-state companies. Meanwhile, local entrepreneurs will 
be promoted in some areas which will supplement the public sector in national 
development, particularly in the areas of international trading, export- 
oriented industries, agro-industries, and construction. Mixed enterprises 
will proliferate in some areas but the government will demand more control 
in the management.
Thirdly, the public holding institution with three or more tiers will 
be the popular form of the next decade, mainly as a result of the increasing 
number of joint ventures with TNCs and domestic entrepreneurs. The public 
corporation form will be restricted to regulatory functions and to some 
public utilities and facilities, i.e. electricity, postal services, and 
telecommunications. These corporations will expand their activities.into 
related areas and become conglomerates. Some ad hoc activities traditionally 
undertaken by regular ministerial departments will be "hived off" to be 
performed by newly created public enterprises on a temporary basis, and 
later abolished when the objectives are reached. All state, semi-state 
companies and mixed enterprises will be grouped and attached to a
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number of holding companies according to their main types of activi­
ties,.
Fourthly, with the growth of holding institutions, there is a trend 
towards more delegation of authority: the existing supervising ministries
and agencies concerned will become more active in projecting the outputs of 
these enterprises and will be an important coordinator and watchdog. There 
is also likely to be a portfolio in the Cabinet for overseeing all the 
matters concerning public enterprises so that the governing regime can 
exercise some degree of control.
Fifthly, political control is likely to be increased through represen­
tation on the board of directors of both holding institutions and its 
subsidiaries. However, the pattern of control will develop according to the 
advancement of managerial methods, i.e. corporate planning, management by 
objective, management audit, and so on.
Sixthly, there will be more cooperation among Third World countries in 
the forms of transnational public corporations - domestic public and foreign 
public and composite enterprises (domestic public - domestic private - 
foreign public - foreign private), as initiated in the ASEAN, East African, 
and Andean Pact countries. Such cooperation will be mainly in the areas of 
telecommunications, transportation, energy, and manufacturing industries.
Finally, since the structural changes alone do not necessarily affect 
the policy content and outcomes, the performance of Third World public 
enterprises will not markedly improve unless there are significant changes 
in the socio-economic and political environment. But, on the positive side, 
from the ASEAN case, there has been more awareness among the ruling elites 
concerning the importance of this type of government instrumentality: the
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people who have been appointed to sit on the governing boards and to manage 
public enterprises are more qualified than before. There has also been a 
growing tendency for public enterprises to employ newly developed managerial 
methods with the aim to increase their productivity and to provide better 
services to the public. Human development programmes also practised through 
on-the-job training and cadetship. Public enterprises are gaining more 
qualified young people from various sources, apparently because these enter­
prises now offer more challenging jobs and more promising opportunities than 
the Civil Service which seems to be declining in popularity among young 
graduates. More importantly, the public has become more informed about 
public enterprises and their activities and has increasingly demanded better 
goods and services. All of these will not directly affect the public enter­
prise policy process, but they seem to be moves in the right direction.
FURTHER RESEARCH SUGGESTION
There is an urgent need for a general theory of public enterprise, con­
sidering the rapid proliferation and the expanding role of this type of 
governmental instrumentality in all parts of the world: there must not be
one theory for public enterprise in the more economically advanced countries 
and another one for the Third World.
The theories and concepts of public enterprises presently used among 
academics and practitioners are already a generation old. Thus, they have 
become irrelevant to the rapidly changing environment of both the more 
economically advanced societies where these theories originated and Third 
World nations of which almost all have become independent in the past few 
decades. It is true that some parts of such theories are not obsolete, but 
there is a need for students in this field to conduct more empirical
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research to supplement these theories and to advance the knowledge of public 
enterprise.
The main findings in this dissertation are nothing new but confirm the 
statements of many writers in public administration about the difference 
between the apparent and the actual behaviour of an administrative system 
(pseudomorphism or any term that describes the phenomenon).^ To be univer­
sally accepted, a theory of public enterprise should provide a framework for 
a better understanding of the realities within the workings of any public 
enterprise system. It should be de-emphasise parochialism in order to avoid
culture-bound assumptions: policy studies should not only stress "outputs"
2but "inputs" as well. It should also provide an appropriate unit of 
analysis, for the benefit of further theoretical building, which is broad 
enough to cover the whole area of public enterprise yet specific enough to 
enable an understanding of the actual phenomena of this type of governmental 
agency. Above all, a theory of public enterprise should not be too compli­
cated. Practitioners need to be able to apply the knowledge in order to 
improve the performance of public enterprises: such a theory should provide
guidelines for the actual implementation of any public enterprise system.
Perhaps the comparative policy approach will be the answer to some 
questions regarding the working behaviour of public enterprises, and will 
provide insights for further study. This approach has become increasingly 
popular among political scientists in the past decade, if one considers the 
growing abundance of literature and research in this area. However, as 
pointed out by Geoffrey Hawker et al, its growth has not yet been accompan­
ied by agreement about what should be studied and how the studies should be 
3
carried out. Even the term "public policy" conveys several meanings, 
depending on who defines it. Interestingly, one writer states that
475
comparative public policy is "a field of study that does not yet exist"; but
in 1975 the American Political Science'Association prize for the best
4publication was in this field. Arnold J. Heidenheimer et al, the prize 
winners, remarked that despite the fact that there are yet "few signposts 
and still fewer agreed destinations", comparative policy analysis is 
"becoming a busy crossroads in social sciences."^ The crossroads have been 
indeed busy.
Comparative policy analysis will broaden the research outlook and will 
provide a better understanding of political behaviour within any public 
enterprise system regardless of their political systems or their stage of 
socio-economic development. A policy analysis study usually equipped with 
policy input and output data provides a more accurate and complete basis 
for comparative purposes than traditional approaches which provides only a 
configuration of institutions and processes. It also avoids a cultural bias 
because it provides a wide range of political and socio-economic variables 
which have interactions with other components of the system. The comparative 
policy approach, in addition, considers a public enterprise as a complete 
entity in itself or a subsystem in a system, yet it is still small enough 
to become an appropriate unit of analysis for systematic empirical theory 
building. More than anything else, comparative policy analysis has the 
advantage of relevancy over other approaches: public policy enables
political scientists to be more "relevant" and "involved" in the major 
issues of the days. Academics have long looked at the problems of institu­
tions and processes, but it is about time for them to study what happens in 
the real world.
Figure 3,1 provides a tentative conceptual model of a public enterprise 
system used in this study but it can be extended to study public enterprises
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in other areas. It can be further developed for the purpose of comparative 
public enterprise policy analysis which will be useful not only for under­
standing actual behaviour of public enterprises in any political system, but 
also for the study of policy making in the Third World, something which has
ß
long been neglected.
This study, however, provides only a very brief and general description 
of the ASEAN public enterprise systems due to the limited availability of 
data: it is only concerned with factors influencing public enterprise
policy and leaves the matters concerning the consequences of such policy 
unexamined - something which could be studied if there were better access to 
additional data. In the West, the development of some socio-economic and 
political indicators (such as cross-polity time series data) helps facili­
tate comparison of such variables within each system and among different 
systems.'7 In the Third World, however, such useful indicators are not 
available and, if available, there is no guarantee of their accuracy and 
contemporary. But it is still worth attempting when these data become 
more accurate and available.
Public enterprise is a discipline relating to both public administra­
tion and business management. But now the line of distinction between 
public and private management has become increasingly blurred: management
is a "generic process with universal implications and with application in
g
any institutional setting". Is it still necessary for a theory of public 
enterprise? It is difficult to answer the question.
But this study, while noting similarities in the management approaches 
within private and public sectors, has found many dissimilarities, all of 
which suggest the need for theories that distinguish the two. Most 
important is the need for a theory specific to the problems of management
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in public enterprise, one which would encourage advancement of knowledge in 
the area. Once an acceptable theory is advanced, practical guidelines for 
policy implementation can be developed. Until the field developes such a 
theory, however, comparative analyses, such as this study, will be the most 
useful and accurate approach to the study of socio-economic development in 
the Third World.
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APPENDIX I PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND THEIR MAIN SUBSIDIARIES
(as of December 1977)
* ■»Jr' MAIN type of year ofNAMr ACTIVITIES ESTABLISHMENT
Indonesia*
1 . Perum Listrik Negara Electricity Generating 
and Supplying
n.a.
2 . P.N. Gas Gas Supplying n . a .
3. PERUMNAS Housing n.a.
4. P.N. Giro dan Pos Postal Services n.a.
5. Perum Telekomunikasi Telecommunication n. a.
6. Kerata Api Perusahaan Jawatan Railways n.a.
7 . P.N. Damri' Transport n.a.
8. P.N. P.P.D. Transport n. a.
9. P.T. Garuda Indonesian Airways Air Transport n.a.
10. P.T. Merpati Nusantara Airways Air Transport n.a.
11. P.T. Pelita Air Service Air Transport n.a.
12. P.T. Gatari Air Service Air Transport n.a.
13. P.T. Sempati Air Transport Air Transport n.a.
14. Perum Ankasa Pura Airport Management n.a.
15. Perjan Pelabunan Port Management n.a.
16. P.T. Pann Shipping Services n.a.
17. P.T. Pelni Sea Transport n.a.
18. P.T. Jakarta Lloyd Sea Transport n.a.
19. P.T. Bachtera Adijuna Sea Transport n.a.
20. Bank Indonesia Banking (Central) n.a.
21. Bank Bumi Dayn, Banking (Commercial) n.a.
22. Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 Banking (Commercial) n.a.
23. Bank Rakyat Indonesia Banking (Agricultural) n.a.
24. Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia Banking (Export-Import) n.a.
* Excluding Regional and Military Enterprises
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25. Bank Dagang Negara Banking (Commercial) n.a.
26. Bank Pembangunan Indonesia Banking (Developmental) n .a.
27. Bank Tabungunan Negara Banking (Savings) n.a.
28. Perum Taspen Insurance (Civil Servants) n.a.
29. Perum ASBRI Insurance n.a.
30. Perum Asuransi Kerugian Insurance n.a.
31. Perum Jasa Raharaja Insurance n . a .
32. Badan Penyclenggara Dana- 
Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Pusat Insurance (Health) n.a.
33. Dana Jaminan Sosial Insurance (Labour Benefits) n.a.
34. P.T. Asuransi Jasa Indonesia Insurance n.a.
35. P.T. Reasuransi Umum Indonesia Reinsurance n.a.
36. P.T. Asuransi Kredit Indonesia Reinsurance n.a.
37. P.T. Jiwasraya Insurance n.a.
38. P.T. Bahana Finance n.a.
39. Perum Peruri Finance n.a.
40. P.T. Indonesia Development 
Finance ^ Finance n.a.
41. P.T. Private Development 
Finance Finance n. a .
42. P.T. Indonesian Investment 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l ^ Finance n.a.
43. P.T. Merchant Investment 
Corporation Finance n.a.
44. P.T. Asian-Euro-American 
Capital Finance n.a.
45. P.T. Interpacific Financial 
Corp . ^ Finance n.a.
46. Perjan Pegadiian Pawn Shop/Auction Management n.a.
47. P.T. P.III Agriculture (Plantations) n.a.
48. P.T. P.VIII Plantations n.a.
49. P.T. P.IX Plantations n.a.
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50. P.T. P.XI Plantations n .a.
51. P.T. P.XII Plantations n .a.
52. P.T. P.XIII * Plantations n . a .
53. P.T. P.XV Plantations n .a.
54. P.T. P.XVII Plantations n . a.
55. P.T. P.XIX Plantations n .a.
56. P.T. P.XX Plantations n .a.
57. P.T. P.XXI dan XXII Plantations n .a.
58. P.T. P.XXIII Plantations n . a .
59. P.T. P.XXIVI dan XXV Plantations n .a.
60. P.T. P.XXVI Plantations n .a.
61. P.T. P.XXVII Plantations n.a.
62. P.T. P.XXVIII Plantations n .a.
63. P.T. P.XXIX Plantations n.a.
64. P.T. P.XXX Plantation n.a.
65. P.T. S o e f i n d o ^ ' Agriculture (Seed Farming) n.a.
66. P.T. Rajawali Nusindo n. a. n.a.
67. P.T. Tatan Anifar Indonesia n .a. n.a.
68. P.N. P.I Agriculture (Plantations) n.a.
69. P.N. P.II (Sawit Seberang) Plantations n.a.
70. P.T. P.IV Plantations n.a.
71. P.T. P.V Plantations n.a.
72. P.T. P.VI Plantations n.a.
73. P.T. P.VII Plantations n.a.
74. P.N. P.X (Tanjung Kareng) Plantations n.a.
75. P.N. P.XIV Plantations n.a.
76. P.N. P.XV Plantations n.a.
77. P.N. P.II (Tanjung Merawa Plantations n.a.
78. P.T. Inhutani I Forestry/Logging n.a.
79. P.T. Inhutani II Forestry/Logging n.a.
80. P.N. Perhutani Kalimantan Tengah Forestry/Logging n.a.
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81.  P . T .  B ina  Mulya Ternak
82.  Perum Sang Hyang S e r i
83.  Perum Kapas I n d o n e s i a
84. P .T .  Karya  Mina
85. P .T .  Usaha Mina
86. P .T .  T i n t a  Pv.aya Mina
87.  P . T .  P e r i k a n a n  Samodra B e sa i
88.  P.N.  P e r i k a n a n  Ai r  Tembaga
89. Perum P e l i k a n i  Maluku
90.  P .T .  P e r t a n i
91.  P.N.  P e rhew a n i
92.  Perum P e h u t a n i
93.  P.N.  O t o r i t a  D j a n t i h u r
94.  P .T .  A t m i n d o ^ ^
95.  P . T .  P . P .  Dwikor i
96.  P .T .  Pe rkabunan
97.  Perum K e r t a s  H a r t a p u r a
98.  Perum K e r t a s  Basuk i  Rachmat
99.  P.N.  K e r t a s  B labak
100.  P.N.  K e r t a s  Leces
101.  P.N.  K e r t a s  Gowa
102.  P.N .  K e r t a s  P a d a l a r a n g
103.  P .T .  K e r t a s  Pematang S i a n t a r
104.  P . T .  I n d u s t r i  Sandang
105.  P.N.  Sandang P a t a l  B a n ja n a r
106.  P . T .  P r im i s i m a
107.  P .T .  Kanebo Tomen Sandang 
S y n t h e t i c  M i l l s ^ ^
n . a . n . a .
A g r i c u l t u r e  (Seed Farming) n . a .
n . a . n . a .
n . a . n . a .
n . a . n . a .
n . a . n . a .
F i s h e r i e s n . a .
F i s h e r i e s n . a .
F i s h e r i e s n . a .
F e r t i l i z e r  & Seed
D i s t r i b u t i o n n . a .
n . a . n . a .
F o r e s t r y / L o g g i n g n . a .
I r r i g a t i o n n . a .
A g r i c u l t u r e  ( P l a n t a t i o n s /  
Farm M a c h i n e r i e s ) n . a .
n . a . n . a .
n . a . n . a .
P a p e r  & Pu lp  Mfg. n . a .
P a p e r  & Pu lp  Mfg. n . a .
P a p e r  & Pulp  Mfg. n . a .
P a p e r  & Pu lp  Mfg. n . a .
P a p e r  & Pulp Mfg. n . a .
P a p e r  & Pu lp  Mfg. n . a .
P a p e r  & Pu lp  Mfg. n . a .
T e x t i l e s n . a .
T e x t i l e s n . a .
T e x t i l e s n . a .
T e x t i l e s n . a .
T e x t i l e s n . a .108.  P .T .  I n b r i t e x
483
109. P.T. Semen Gresik Cement Mfg. n. a.
110. P.T. Eternit G r e s i k ^ Cement Mfg. n . a .
111. P.T. Semen Cibinong^^ Cement Mfg. n .a.
112. P.T. Semen Tonasa Cement Mfg. n.a.
113. P.T. Semen Padang Cement Mfg. n.a.
114. P.T. Refectory I n d o n e s i a ^ Refectory n.a.
115. P.N. Garam Salt n.a.
116. P . N . Soda Warn Chemical n.a.
117. P.T. Ajinomoto I n d o n e s i a ^ Chemical n. a.
118. P.T. Pupuk Sriwidjaya Chemical Fertilizer n . a .
119. P.T. Petro Kimia Gresik Petrochemical n.a.
120. P.N. Aspal Asphalt n.a.
121. P.T. Krakatau Steel Iron & Steel n.a.
122. P.T. Krakatau Ferosteel^^ Iron & Steel n.a.
123. P.T. Krakatau Hoogoven Inter­
national Pipe Industries'^ Steel Products n.a.
124. P.T. Wirawaja Indonesia Steel Products n.a.
125. P.T. Bono Bisma Machinery Mfg. n.a.
126. P.T. Bona S t o r k s ^ ^ Machinery Mfg. n.a.
127. P.T. Metrika Machinery Mfg. n.a.
128. P.T. Van Swaay I n d o n e s i a ^ Machinery Mfg. n. a.
129. P.T. Barata Metal Works & 
Engineering Metal Works n.a.
130. P.T. Aneka Gas Industri Industrial Gas n.a.
131. P.T. Industrial Gas 
I n d o n e s i a ^ ^ Industrial Gas n.a.
132. P.T. Intirub Ban Palembang Tyre Mfg. n.a.
133. P.T. Iglas Glass Mfg. n.a.
134. P.T. Tjat Utama Paint Mfg. n.a.
135. P.T. Ralin Electronic n.a.
136. P.T. Philips Ralin 
Electronics Electronic n.a.
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137. P.T. Pertamina Gulf Industri 
Processing Bag/'Box Mfg. n .a.
138. P.T. Pabrik Battery Ciawi Battery Mfg. n .a.
139. P.T. Gaya Motor Car Assembly n . a.
140. P.T. Toyota-Astra Motor^^ Car Assembly n. a.
141. P.T. Unindo Car Assembly n . a .
142. P.T. Kimia Farraa Pharmaceutical n. a.
143. P.N. Percetakan Negara n. a. n.a.
144. P.N. Bio Farma Pharmaceutical n .a.
145. Perum Pengeringan Tembakan 
Boj onegoro n .a. n.a.
146. P.T. Asahan Aluminium Indonesia Aluminium Mfg. n.a.
147. P.T. Industri Marmer Indonesia 
Tulung Agung n .a. n.a.
148. P.T. K.T.S.M. n . a. n.a.
149. P.T. Indonesia Motor Car Assembly n.a.
150. P.T. Dayaza n .a. n. a .
151. P.T. Industri Penelitian 
Perkapulan Pengangutan Ship Repairing n.a.
152. P.T. Dok Tanjung Priok Ship Repairing n.a.
153. P.T. Pakin Ship Repairing n.a.
154. IPPA Gajaguna Ship Repairing n.a.
155. P.T. Alin Mandjaja Ship Repairing n.a.
156. P.T. Dok Surabaya Ship Repairing n.a.
157. P.T. Nurtanio Aircraft Mfg. n.a.
158. Perusahaan Pertamina Oil & Gas n.a.
159. LEMIGAS Oil & Gas n.a.
160. P.T. Aneka Tambang Mining (Miscellaneous) n.a.
161. P.N. Tambang Batubara Coal Mining n.a.
162. P.T. Tambang Bauxsi Bauxite Mining n.a.
163. P.T. Tambang Timah Tin Mining n.a.
164. P.T. Virama Karya Construction n.a.
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165. P.T. Jodja Karya
166. P.T. Bina Karya
167. P.T. Wiskita Karya
168. P.T. India Karya
169. P.T. Amanta Karya
170. P.T. Indah Karya
171. P.T. Nindya Karya
172. P.T. Widjaja Karya
173. P.T. Pembangunan Perumahaan
174. P.T. Hutama Karya
175. P.T. Leppin Karya Yasa
176. P.T. Adhi Karya
177. P.T. Wisma Nusantara 
International
178. P.T. Jakarta Industrial 
Estate Pulogadang
179. P.T. Surabaya Industrial 
Estate Rungkut
180. P.T. Bonded Warehouse Indonesia
181. P.T. Dharma Niaga
182. P.T. Mega Electro
183. P.T. Aneka Niaga
184. P.T. Cipta Niaga
185. P.T. Aduma Niaga
186. P.T. Karya Nusantara
187. P.T. Panca Niaga
188. P.T. Pantja Motor
189. P.T. Trisari
190. P.T. Dinga Niaga
191. P.T. Satya Niaga
192. P.T. Kerta Niaga
Construction n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction - n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction n.a.
Construction (Small Scale 
Industry Plants) n.a.
Construction n.a.
Real Estate n.a.
Industrial Estates n.a.
Industrial Estates n.a.
Warehousing n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading/Printing n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
Trading n.a.
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193. P.T. Cat Utama Trading n.a.
194. P.T. Pembangunan Niaga Trading n.a.
195. Badan Urusan Logistik - BULOG Commodity Stockpiling n.a.
196. P.T. Kodja Warehousing n.a.
197. P.T. Warana Tinta Prakansa Warehousing - n.a.
198. P.T. Natur Tourism n.a.
199. P.T. Jakarta International 
Hotel Hotel operating n.a.
200. P.T. H.I.I. n . a. n.a.
201. P.T. Pengembangan Periwisata 
Bali Tourist Development n.a.
202. P.T. Sucofindo n . a. n.a.
203. P.T. Pelita Bahari n .a. n.a.
204. P.T. Inti n .a. n.a.
205. P.T. Bino Klasifikasi Indonesia Ship Classification n.a.
206. P.T. Belabuhan n.a. n.a.
207. P.T. Pengerukan n.a. n.a.
208. P.T. Pengembangan Pulau Batam Land development n.a.
209. P.T. Pradnya Paramita Printing n.a.
210. P.T. Pertjetakan Negara Printing n.a.
211. P.T. Gita Karya Printing n.a.
212. P.T. Dainippon - Gita Karya Printing/Box Mfg. n.a.
213. P.T. Perusahaan Film Negara Film Production n.a.
214. P.N. Lokananda Record Production n.a.
215. P.N. Balai Pus taka Educational Books Production n.a.
216. P.T. Aerial Survey Air Mapping n.a.
217. P.T. Perum Dahana Banknote Printing n.a.
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NAME
Malaysia*
1. National Electricity Board
2. - Syarikat Kerjasama
3. Sarawak Electricity Board
4. Sabah Electricity Board
5. Perak River Hydro-Electric 
Power Co. Ltd.
6. Malayan Railways(2)Administration
7. Telecommunication
(2)Department
(2)8. Civil Aviation Department
9. Jahore Port Authority
10. Sabah Port Authority
11. Kelang Port Authority
12. Penang Port Commission
13. Rajang Port Authority
(214. Postal Services Department
15. Malaysian Airline System 
Sdn. Bhd.
(3)16. - PTM Snd. Bhd. '
* J
17. Malaysian International 
Shipping Corporation
18. - MISC Coastal Services Sdn. 
Bhd. (51%)
MAIN TYPE OF YEAR OF
ACTIVITIES ESTABLISHMENT
Electricity Generating/
Supplying • n.a.
n.a. n.a.
Electricity Generating/
Supplying n.a.
Electricity Generating/
Supplying n.a.
Electricity Generating n.a.
Railways n.a.
Telecommunication n.a.
Airport Services n.a.
Port Management 1961
Tort Management 1968
Port Management 1963
Port Management 1955
Port Management 1970
Postal Services n.a.
Aviation 1971
•Advertising 1974
Sea Transport ' 1969
Sea Transport n.a.
* Excluding companies with less than 50% state shareholding 
and public enterprises owned by states (except SEDCS)
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19. - Malaysian Int’al Shipping
(Europe) Sea Transport n.a.
20. - Kapalintel Inc. (Panama) Sea Transport n.a.
21. - MISC Parocean Tankers Sdn. 
Bhd.(1) (51%) Sea Transport n.a.
22. - MISC Bulker Service Sdn. Bhd. Sea Transport n.a.
23. - PERNAS-MISC Shipping Agency 
(3)Snd. Bhd. ; Shipping n.a.
24. (3)- Kontena Nasional Sdn. Bhd. Transport n.a.
25. - MISC-Gaya Shipping^ (50%) Sea Transport n.a.
26. Malaysian Agricultural Research 
and Development Auth. Research 1969
27. Federal Agricultural Marketing 
Authority' Agricultural Marketing 1965
28. Farmers’ Organization Authority Agriculture 1973
29. National Fisheries Development 
Authority Fisheries 1971
30. - Syarikat Kilang Tepung Ikan 
(3)Mersing Sdn. Bhd. Fisheries/Processing n.a.
31. - Syarikat Permasaran Ikan
(3)Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. Fisheries/Processing n.a.
32. - Majuikan Mideast Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
33. National Livestock Development 
Authority Livestock Development 1972
34. - Syarikat Usahama Majutenak 
Dutch Baby^^ (n.a.) Dairy Products n.a.
35. Kemubu Agricultural 
Development Authority Agricultural Dev. 1973
36. Muda Agricultural Development 
Authority Agricultural Dev. 1970
37. Federal Land Development 
Au thority Land Development 1956
38. - Kilang Gula Felda Perlis
Sugar Mfg. 1971
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39. - Felda-Jahore Bulkers Sdn. 
Bhd.(3)
40. - Felda Oil Products Sdn. Bhd.
41. - Felda Latex Handling Corp.
42. Federal Land Rehabilitation 
and Consolidation Auth.
43. Development Authority for 
Jahore Tenggara
44. - Jahore Tenggara Palm Oil 
Sdn. Bhd.
45. - Jahore Tenggara Cattle 
Industries Sdn. Bhd.
46. - Ternakan Park Tenggara Sdn. 
Bhd.
47. - Jahore Tenggara Hotel Sdn. 
Bhd.
48. - S.B. Shokuhin Tenggara Sdn. 
Bhd.
49. - Protein Tenggara Sdn. Bhd.
50. - Perumahaan Tenggara Sdn.
Bhd.
51. - Sindora Sdn. B h d . ^  (n.a.)
52. - Vita Tenggara Sdn. Bhd.
53. - Desaree Sdn. Bhd.
54. - Ladang KEJORA Sdn. Bhd.
55. - KEJORA Golf Sdn. Bid.
56. - Jahore Tenggara Orchid Sdn.
Bhd. (n.a.)
57. Development Authority for 
Pahang Tenggara
58. - Dara Boey Brothers Gemstone 
Mill Sdn. Bhd.(1)
59. - Syarikat Ibam Bhd.^^ (n.a.)
60. - Tehdara Sdn. Bhd.^"^ (n.a.)
Palm Oil Storage n.a.
Palm Oil Mfg. n.a.1
Latex Exporting n.a.
Land Dev. 1966
Regional Development 1972
Plantations n.a.
Cattle Development n.a.
n.a. 1974
Hotel Operating n.a.
Spice Mfg. 1975
n.a. n.a.
n •. a . n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
Orchid Plantation 1975
Regional Development 1972
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
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61. - Dara La m  Soon Sdn. B h d . ^ ^  
( n . a . ) n.a.. n.a.
62. - Dara Abrif Sdn. B h d . ^  ^  
(n.a.) n.a. n.a.
63. - Dara Lo c k w o o d  (Pahang) Sdn. 
B h d . n.a. n.a.
64. Central T r engganu D e velopment
A u t h o r i t y Regional D e velopment 1975
65. Jen g k a  Dev e l o p m e n t  C o rporation Regional D e v e l opment 1971
66. S a bah State Land Development  
Board Land D evelopment 1967
67. S a r a w a k  Land Development Board Land D evelopment n.a.
68. M a l a y s i a n  Rubber Research & 
D e v e l o p m e n t  Board Resea r c h 1925
69. Rubb e r  Resea r c h  Institute of 
M a l a y s i a Research 1925
70. R u b b e r  Industry S mall-Holders  
Dev. Auth. Rubber Replan t a t i o n 1973
71. M a l a y s i a n  Rubber Development  
Cor p o r a t i o n Rub b e r  D e velopment 1972
72. M a l a y s i a n  P i n e a p p l e  Board P i n e a p p l e  D e velopment 1972
73. M a l a y s i a n  Timber Industry 
Board Timb e r  D e velopment 1966
74. Tin Industry Research & 
D e v e l o p m e n t  Board Resea r c h n.a.
75. B a n k  Negara B a n k i n g  (Central) 1959
76. Bank Simpanan B a nking (Savings) 1974
77. Ba n k  Bumiputra Ban k i n g  (Commercial) 1965
78. - B a n k  P e m b a n g u n a n B a n k i n g  (Developmental) 1974
79. - K e w a n g a n  B u m i p u r n a  Sdn. Bhd. H o l d i n g  Company n.a.
80. - R o t h p u t r a  Nominees Sdn. 
B h d . (1) (51%) F i n a n c e n.a.
81. - Rothp u t r a  Development Sdn. 
B h d . (1) (51%) Fi n a n c e n.a.
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83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
82 .
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99. 
100
101
102
- Malaysia General Investment 
Sdn. Bhd.
- Kuala Lumpur Portfolio 
Managers Sdn. Bhd.
- Bumiputra Merchant Bankers
(3)Sdn. Bhd. '
- Syarikat Nominee Bumiputra 
Sdn. Bhd.
Bumiputra Investment Fund
- Permodalan Nasional Bhd.
- Amanah Saham Nasional Bhd.
Muslim Pilgrim Savings and 
Management Authority
- Perbadahan Pengangkutan 
Tabung Haji Sdn. Bhd.
Employees Provident Fund Board
Malaysia Building Society Bhd.
- Malaya Borneo Building 
Society Bhd.
Planters Loan Fund Board
National Petroleum Corporation 
(PETRONAS)
Finance
Finance
Banking (Merchant)
Finance
Finance
Finance
Finance
Finance
Finance
Finance
Finance (Housing)
Finance (Housing) 
Finance
Oil & Gas Development
- subsidiaries not available
Malaysia Explosive Sdn. Bhd. Ammunition Mfg.
Malaysia Batik and Handicrafts
Sdn. Bhd. Batik Mfg.
Malayawata Steel Bld.^^ Iron & Steel
- Malayawata Charcoal Sdn. Bhd. Charcoal Mfg. 
National Productivity Centre Industrial Dev. 
Federal Industrial Development
Authority Industrial Promotion
Tourist Development Corporation Tourist Promotion 
National Padi and Rice
Authority Rice Stockpiling
n.a.
n. a.
n.a.
n.a.
1978
1973 
1978
1969
n.a.
1951
1972
n.a.
1915
1974
1969
1970 
n.a.
1960
1966
1965
1972
1971
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103. B a n k  Pert a i n i a n  Ma l a y s i a B a n k i n g  (Agricultural) 1969
104. - Syarikat K P M  H o l d i n g  Sdn. 
B h d . Finance n. a .
105. - Syarikat Perta n i a n  Bari n g  
S a n w a  M u l t i n a t i o n a l ^ ^ B a n k i n g  (Merchant) n . a.
106. Food Industries of M a l a y s i a
Sdn. Bhd. Food Pro c e s s i n g 1972
107. - K u m p u l a n  FIMA Sdn. Bhd. Ho l d i n g  Company n.a.
108. - M a l a y s i a n  Can Company Sdn. 
Bhd. Can Mfg. n.a.
109. - P i n e a p p l e  Cannery of 
M a l a y s i a  Sdn. Bhd. P i n e a p p l e  Cannery n.a.
110. - K o t a k  Ma l a y s i a  Sdn. Bhd. Carton Mfg. n.a.
111. - C a s h e w  Industry of M a l a y s i a  
Sdn. Bhd. Cash e w  P l a n t a t i o n n.a.
112. - FIMA-Mr. Juicy Sdn. B h d / 1 '* 
(n.a.) Soft d rink Mfg. n.a.
113. - A y a m  F I M A  Sdn. Bhd. P o ultry P r o c e s s i n g n.a.
114. - L a d a n g  F I M A  Sdn. Bhd. F r uit P l a n t a t i o n n . a .
115. - FI M A  Fraser's Hill Sdn. Bhd. V e g e t a b l e  Plan t a t i o n n.a.
116. - M a k a n  Timuran C a s h e w  Industry 
Sdn. Bhd. Cas h e w  Deco n t i c a s t i n g n.a.
117. - Gula Padang Terap Sdn. Bhd. n .a. n.a.
118. - FIMA Pasaraya Sdn. Bhd. n . a. n.a.
119. - FI M A  Jaya Foods Sdn. Bhd. Food P r o c e s s i n g n.a.
120. M a l a y s i a n  Shipyard & 
E n g i n e e r i n g  Sdn. Bhd. Ship Repa i r i n g 1973
121. M a l a y s i a n  Industrial  
D e v e l opment Finance Sdn. Bhd. Finance 1960
122. - M a l a y s i a n  Industrial Estate  
(3)Lim i t e d  Sdn. Bhd. Ind. Estates 1960
123. - M a l a y s i a n  Industrial 
D e v e l o p m e n t  F i nance Industrial 
Cons u l t a n t  Sdn. Bhd. Mgt. Con s u l t a n c y 1974
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124. -  Asian A p p ra i s a l  Sdn. Bhd. n . a .
125. Urban Development A u th o r i t y Urban Development
126. -  UDA Budaya Sdn. Bhd. n . a .
127. -  UDA Redikon Sdn. Bhd. n . a .
128. -  UDA Merchant Banking B h d . ^ ^
(56%) Banking (Merchant)
129. -  UDA Nominees Sdn. Bhd. n . a .
130. -  UDA SEA Park Development
Sdn. Bhd. n . a .
131. S tanda rds  & I n d u s t r i a l
Research I n s t ,  o f  Malays ia Research
132. Merdeka Stadium C orp o ra t io n Spor t  Promotion
133. N a t i o n a l  News Agency In fo rm a t io n
134. (2)B ro a d c a s t in g  Department C u l t u r a l
135. N a t io n a l  Co rpo ra t ion  (PERNAS) Trad ing
136. -  PEFJJAS C o n s t ru c t io n  Sdn. Bhd. C o n s t ru c t io n
137. -  Percon-Syabina  Sdn. Bhd.^3^
(51%) C o n s t r u c t io n
138. -  S y a r i k a t  Pembinan Jahore
Sdn. B h d / 3'* C o n s t r u c t io n
139. -  PERNAS Eng inee r ing  Sdn. Bhd. Telecom. Equipment Mfg
140. -  PERNAS-NEC M u l t ip le x  Sdn.
B h d . (1) (60%) E l e c t r o n i c  Mfg.
141. -  PERNAS-Plessey E l e c t r o n i c s
Sdn. B h d / 1  ^ (51%) E l e c t r o n i c  Mfg.
142. (1)-  J aho re  Cement Sdn. Bhd.
(75%)
-  Kontena Nas ional  Sdn.
Cement Mfg.
B h d . (3) T ra n s p o r t
143. -  M alays ia  I n t ’a l  Palm Oil
I n d u s t r i e s  Sdn. Bhd.^3  ^ (51%) Palm O i l  Mfg.
144. -  PERNAS Malayan Engineer
Sdn. Bhd. n . a .
n . a .
1971
n . a .
n . a .
1975
n . a .
n . a .
1970 
1963 
1967 
n . a .  
1969
1971
1974
n . a .
1971
1973
1972 
1971 
1971
1973 
n . a .
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145. - P E R N A S  M i n i n g  Sdn. Bhd. M i n i n g 1 9 7 3
146. - P E R N A S  O c e a n  I n c h c a p e  
L o g i s t i c s  ( S e b e h ) (65%) M i n i n g 1 9 7 4
1 47 . - M a l a y s i a  O f f s h o r e  M i n i n g  
Sdn. B h d . ( 1 ) ( 7 5 % 0 M i n i n g 1 9 7 3
148. - P E R N A S  O k a n a g a n  H e l i c o p t e r  
S e r v i c e s S e r v i c e s 1 9 7 1
149. - M a l a y s i a  O f f s h o r e  S u p p l i e s  
Sdn. Bhd. S e r v i c e s 1 9 7 1
150. - P E R N A S  P r o p e r t i e s  Sd n .  Bhd. R e a l  E s t a t e 1 9 7 1
151. - P E R N A S  S e c u r i t i e s  Sdn. Bhd. F i n a n c e 1 9 7 1
152. - P E R N A S  E d a r  Sdn. Bh d .  
(75%) n  . a . 1 9 7 4
153. - P E R N A S  I n s u r a n c e  B r o k e r s  
S d n .  B h d . (1) (75%) B r o k e r 1 9 7 4
154. - P E R N A S  S i m e  D a r b y  Sdn. 
B h d . (1) (51%) H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y 1 9 7 2
155. - P S D  T e c h n i c a l  S e r v i c e s  Sdn.  
Bh d . S e r v i c e s 1 9 7 4
156. - C a d b u r y  C o n f e c t i o n e r y  (M) 
(60%) F o o d  P r o c e s s i n g 1 9 7 4
157. - E l e c t r o l u x  M a l a y s i a ^ 1 ) (50%) E l e c t r i c a l  A p p . Mfg. 1 9 7 4
158. - H i l l s  H a t  M a l a y s i a ^  (60%) M f g . n . a.
159. - W a l l o c k  P a r t i t i o n s (60%) M f g . n.a.
160. - P & H  T i m b e r  P r e s e r v a t i o n Mfg. n.a.
161. - P S D  S h i p p i n g * ^  (60%) S h i p p i n g n.a.
162. - H i c k s o n  C h e m i c a l M f  g . n.a.
163. - C h e m a t i c s  M e g a M f g . n.a.
164. - F a r  E a s t  H o t e l  Dev. (M) H o t e l  O p e r a t i n g n.a.
165. - M a l a y s i a  N a t ' a l  R e i n s u r a n c e R e i n s u r a n c e 1 9 7 2
166. - PS  T r a d i n g T r a d i n g 1 9 7 1
(3)- P T M  Sd n .  Bhd. ' A d v e r t i s i n g 1 9 7 4
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167. - PTM Thomson Ad v e r t i s i n g ^ ^  
(75%) Advertising 1974
163. - PTM Communications^3  ^ (80%) Advertising 1974
169. - PERNAS Charter Management  ^ 3  ^
(50%) n . a. n.a.
170. - Tradewinds Sdn. Bhd. Holding Company n. a .
171. - Island 6 Peninsular Dev. n . a . n. a .
172. - New Tradewinds Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
173. - London Tin Malaysia Mining n.a.
174. - London Tin C o r p . Mining n.a.
175. - PERNAS Trading Sdn. Bhd. Trading 1971
176. - PERNAS Jardine Aviation 
S a l e s (60%) Trading 1975
177. (3)- PERNAS MRDC Sdn. B h d . ' Trading . 1974
178. - Malaysian Timber Exports'Sdn. 
Bhd. Trading 1974
- PERNAS-MISC Shipping 
Agencies Shipping 1975
179. - Malaysian National Insurance 
Sdn. Bhd. Insurance 1970
180. - PERNAS Wakil Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
1 8 1. Council of Trust for 
Indigeneous People (MAEA) Development 1965
182. (3)- Syarikat Jenka Sdn. Bhd. 
(88%) Timber Mfg. n.a.
183. - Komplex Kewangan Malaysia 
Sdn. B h d . (3) (97.2%) Holding Company 1973
184. - Amanah Saham Malaysia 
Sdn. Bhd. Finance 1967
185. - Amanah Saham MARA Nominees 
Sdn. Bhd. Finance n.a.
186. - Amanah-Arthur 
International^3 "^ (60%) Finance n.a.
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187. - Araanah C h a s e  M e r c h a n t  B a n k e r s F i n a n c e n.a.
188. - P e l a b o r a n  A m a n a h  N a s i o n a l  Sdn. 
B h d . F i n a n c e n. a.
189. - M a l a y s i a  D i s c o u n t s  Sdn. Bhd. F i n a n c e n.a.
190. - Syarilcat B r o k e r  S a h a m  Sdn. Bhd. F i n a n c e n.a.
191. - A m a n a h  B u t l e r  Sdn. B h d . ^ " ^ F i n a n c e n.a.
192. - B a t e x  M a l a y s i a  B h d . ^ ^  (99%) B a t i k  Mfg. n . a .
193. (1)- P a m a g r i m a  Sdn. Bhd. (71.6%) T o o l  Mfg. n.a.
194. - K a y u  S e d i a  Sdn. Bhd. T i m b e r  Mfg. n.a.
195. - S y a r i k a t  M a w a  Sdn. B h d . T r a d i n g n.a.
196. - S y a r i k a t  S e n a m a  Sdn. Bhd. T r a d i n g n.a.
197. - K i m a  Sdn. B h d . ^  (70%) T e x t i l e  Mfg. n.a.
198. - K u l i t k r a f  Sdn. Bh d . S h o e  Mfg. n.a.
199. - S y a r i k a t  U b i y u  Sdn. Bhd. F l o u r  Mfg. n.a.
200. - G u l a  P e r a k  B h d . ^ S u g a r  Mfg. n . a .
201. - M a s m a r a  T o u r s  & T r a v e l T r a v e l  A g e n c y n.a.
202. - U S M E T A  Sdn. Bhd. T r a n s p o r t n.a.
203. - L o r i  M a l a y s i a  Sdn. Bhd. T r a n s p o r t n.a.
204. - M E D  B u m i k a n  M A R A  Sdn. B h d . ^ " ^ T r a n s p o r t n.a.
(3)- K o n t e n a  N a s i o n a l  Sdn. B h d . v T r a n s p o r t n.a.
205. - K e n d e r a a n  S r i  K e d a k  Sd n .  B h d . ^ ^  
(83.7%) T r a n s p o r t n.a.
206. - K e n d e r a a n  Sg. M a n i k  S d n .  B h d . ^  
(91.4%) T r a n s p o r t n.a.
207. - K e n d e r a a n  K l a n g / B e n t i n g  Sdn. 
Bhd. T r a n s p o r t n.a.
208. - K e n d e r a a n  L a b u  S e n d a y a  Sdn. Bhd. T r a n s p o r t n.a.
209. - Tj K e n a m a t  T e m e r l o k  U t a r a  
O m n i b u s  (95.5%) T r a n s p o r t n.a.
210. - P e r u s a h a a n  & P e n g a n g k u t a n  J e h a i  
Sdn. B h d . (1) (86.1%) T r a n s p o r t n.a.
211. - S y a r i k a t  I k a t a n  S e t i a  B h d . ^  
(94.5%) T r a n s p o r t n.a.
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212. - S y a rikat K e n d e r a a n  M e l a y u  
K e l a n t a n  B h d . ^  (92.8%) T r a n s p o r t n . a .
213. - MARA. Ekspres Sdn. Bhd. T r a n s p o r t n.a.
214. - L i m b o n g a n  Timur Sdn. Bhd. Tran s p o r t n.a.
215. N e g a r a  Simbi l a n  State E c o n o m i c  
Dev e l o p m e n t D e v e l o p m e n t  C orporation 1969
216. - B a t i k  Negara Sdn. Bhd. B a t i k  Mfg. n.a.
217. - Ernas Sembilan Sdn. Bhd. n .a. n . a .
218. - Pernas Sdn. Bhd. Tra d i n g n.a.
219. - Per a b u t  Sdn. Bhd. n .a. n.a.
220. - K i l a n g  Mempo s e s  M e k a n a n  Sdn. 
Bhd. Food P r o c e s s i n g n.a.
221. - K a wal Sdn. Bhd. S e c u r i t y  Services n.a.
222. - NS C o n s t r u c t i o n  Sdn. Bhd. C o n s t r u c t i o n n.a.
223. - P e r k e m a j a  NS Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n . a .
224. - P e r u s a h a a n  Udang Nege r i  Sdn. 
Bhd. P r a w n  catching n.a.
225. - Gula NS Sdn. B h d . (1) (77.7%) Sugar Mfg. n.a.
226. - A y a m  NS Sdn. B h d . (1) (51%) P o u l t r y  Farming n.a.
227. - P e r k a p a l a n  Mane Sdn. B h d . ^ ^  
(52%) n.a. n . a .
228. - K l a n a  Sdn. B h d / 1 '* (67%) n.a. n.a.
229. - P e r u s a h a a n  Az a n  Sdn. B h d / 1  ^
(75%) n.a. n.a.
230. - Camlin Sdn. B h d . (1) (70%) Tra d i n g n.a.
231. - Neg e r i  Roads tone Sdn. B h d / 1  ^
(70%) Cem e n t  P r e m i x i n g n.a.
232. - I n d u strial Carbon Sdn. B h d / 1  ^
(51%) C a r b o n  Mfg. n.a.
233. - Manis Sdn. B h d . (1) (82%) n.a. n.a.
234. - Tanaga Baru Sdn. B h d / 1 '* (60%) n.a. n.a,
235. - Permas Negeri Sdn. B h d / 1  ^ (51%) n.a. n.a,
236. - Senaxi^ang Jaya Sdn. B h d / ^ n.a. n.a
237. Pena n g  D e v e l opment Corporation D e velopment C o r p o ration
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1969
238. - Atlas Electronics (M) Sdn. Bhd. Elect r i c  A p p l i a n c e  Mfg. n . a .
239. - H i t a c h i  S e miconductor (M) Sdn. 
B h d . (1) (50%) Electric A p p l i a n c e  Mfg. n.a.
240. - Kanebo M a l a y s i a  Spinning Mills 
Sdn. B h d . (1) (50%) Textile Mfg. n.a.
241. - Sika (M) Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
242. M e l a k a  State Development 
C o r p o r a t i o n Dev e l o p m e n t  C o rporation 1969
243. - Peru d a  N egri M e l a k a  Sdn. Bhd. n . a . n. a .
244. - Taman Perin g g i t  Jaya Sdn. 
B h d . (1) (51%) Real Estate n.a.
245. - P e r b a l i n g  Sdn. B h d . (1) (51%) Real Estate n.a.
246. - P e r d a g a n g a n  & P e r u sahaan Mel a k a  
Sdn. Bhd. Trading n.a.
247. - P e r l a b u h a n  & Perumahan Melaka 
Sdn. B h d . (1) (55%) n.a. ‘ n.a.
248. K e l a n t a n  State Economic  
D e v e l o p m e n t  Corpor a t i o n D e v e l o p m e n t  Cor p o r a t i o n 1968
249. - K S E D C  Co. Sdn. Bhd. Trading n.a.
250. - K e l a n t a n  Textile Mills Bhd. Textile n.a.
251. - P e b d a g a n g a n  P K I N K  Bhd. n.a. n.a.
252. - Gula K e l a n t a n  B h d . ^  (51%) Sugar Mfg. n.a.
253. - U saha M e g a  K e l a n t a n  Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
254. S a r a w a k  Ec o n o m i c  Development 
Cor p o r a t i o n Dev e l o p m e n t  C o rporation 1972
255. - Cement M a n u f a c t u r e r s  Sarawak 
Sdn. Bhd. Cement Mfg. n.a.
256. - P e r i m a t  Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
257. - S a r a w a k  Kimia Chemical n.a.
258. - S a r a w a k  M o t o r  Industries Sdn. 
Bhd.  ^ n.a. n.a.
259. - Ekepot U t ama Sdn. Bhd. Trading n.a.
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260. - P e r b e n a  Sdn. Bhd. n . a . n.a.
261. - P e r i n s u r a n  (Broker) Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
262. - K u c h i n g  Hotels Sdn. Bhd. H o t e l  O p erating n.a.
263. - Industries Cold Storage  
E n t e r p r i s e  Sdn. B h d . ^ Food Proc e s s i n g n.a.
264. - S e bor (Sarawak) Sdn. B h d . ^ ^ n.a. n.a.
265. - Hu m e  Industries (Sarawak) Sdn. 
B h d / 1 -* n.a. n.a.
266. - Borneo D e v e l opment Corpor a t i o n n.a. n.a.
267. - Sabah Flour & Feed Mill Sdn. 
Bhd. n.a. n.a.
268. - A s s o c i a t e d  M e tal W o rks Sdn. 
B h d . ^ n.a. n.a.
239. P a h a n g  State D e velopment 
C o r p o r a t i o n D e v e l o p m e n t  C o r p o r a t i o n 1965
270.
- not available -
Perlis State D e v e l opment  
C o r p o r a t i o n D e v e l o p m e n t  C o rporation 1973
271.
- not available -
Se l a n g o r  State Dev e l o p m e n t  
Cor p o r a t i o n Dev e l o p m e n t  C o rporation 1964
272. - K u m p u l a n  Pera n g s a n g  Selangor  
Bhd. H o l d i n g  Company n.a.
273. - P e r a n g s a n g  T r ading Sdn. Bhd. Trading n.a.
274. - Lori Se l a n g o r  Sdn. Bhd. T r ansport n.a.
275. - P e r a n g a n g  Jacks Sdn. B h d . ^ ^  
(50%) n.a. n.a.
276. - K e w a n g a n  Shah S l a m  Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
277 . - Timah Langat Bhd. n.a. n.a.
278. - Shah A l a m  Properties Sdn. Bhd. R.eal Estate n.a.
279. - N e g a r a  P r o p e r t i e s ^  (50%) Real Estate n.a.
280. - Sri A m p a n g  Sdn. B h d . ^ ^  (51%) n.a. n.a.
281. - Central Hol d i n g  B h d .^  (71.5%) n.a. n.a.
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282. - Jaya Jeewan Sdn. B h d / 1  ^ (61.7%)
283. Kedah State Development 
Corporation
284. - Syarikat Serba Sdn. Bhd.
285. - Syarikat Gula Padang Tetap Sdn. 
Bhd.(1) (68%)
286. - Syarikat Bina dan Kuari Sdn.
Bhd. (60%)
287. - Syarikat Kaya Kayan Sdn. Bhd. 
(51%)
288. - Syarikat Peruda Sdn. B h d / 1'* 
(50%)
289. - Syarikat Euromedical Industries 
(M)(1) (91%)
- Ladang Rakyat Lakatemin
Jahore State Economic Development 
Corporation
- Sergram Bhd.
- Jahore.Hotel & Catering & 
Management Services Sdn. Bhd.
- United Stainless Steel 
Industries ( M ) ^
- Kilang Ayer Batu Perintis Sdn. 
Bhd.
- Kilang Tepong Ikan (Jahore)
Sdn. B h d / 1'*
- Syarikat Pembinaan Jahore 
Bhd.(1)
- Syarikat Pengangkutan MAJU 
B h d / 1'*
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
- Ubi Jahore Sdn. Bhd.
- Sindora B h d / 1"*
(1)
n .a.
Development Corporation 
Trading
Sugar Mfg.
Construction
Const. Material Mfg.
Real Estate
Pharmaceutical Mfg. 
Rubber Plantation
Development Corporation 
Trading
Hotel Operating
n .a.
n .a.
n .a.
n .a.
n.a. 
n .a. 
n.a.
(1)
n.a.
1965
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a. 
n.a.
1968
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
301. - Ubi Jahore Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
302. - Syarikat Tenaga Utama
(Jahore)^ n.a. n.a.
303. - Palam Nenas Sdn. Bhd.^^ n.a. n.a.
304. - Jahore Toyo Sdn. Bhd.^^ n.a. n.a.
305. - JHC Sdn. Bhd/1^ n.a. n.a.
306. - Penner Traders CM) Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
307. - Harta Consult Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
308. - Jahore Estate Agency Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
309. Trengganie State Economic 
Development Corporation
- not available -
Development Corporation 1965
310. Sabah Economic Development
Corporation Development Corporation 1971
- not available -
311. Perak State Development
Corporation Development Corporation 1967
312. - Syarikat Batu Perak Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1974
313. - Syarikat Sri Gunung Korbu n.a. 1975
314. - Syarikat Permi Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1975
315. - Syarikat Serayu Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1976
316. - Syarikat Sri Sehna Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1976
317. - Syarikat Bumi Pernai Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1976
318. - Syarikat Seeham Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1976
319. - Syarikat Sri Kenering Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1976
320. - Syarikat Krambin Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1976
321. - Bagar Datoh Coconut Industries n.a. 1976
322. - Usahawan Agam Sdn. Bhd. n.a. 1976
323. - Ahrayu Enterprise n.a. 1977
324. - Syarikat Majukayu Sdn. Bhd. n.a. n.a.
325. - Kilang Memproses Kelapa 
Parut(1) (98%) n.a. 1975
326. - Projek Batu-Bata n.a. n.a.
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327. - Kilang Kayu n.a. n.a
328. - Peruda Perek Sdn. Bhd.^^
(50%) n.a. n.a
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MAIN TYPE OF YEAR OF
ACTIVITIES ESTABLISHMENT
The Philippines*
1 . National Power Corporation Electricity Generating/
2. Metropolitan Waterwork and
Supplying 
Water Supplying/
1936
Sewerage System Seweraging 1971
3. National Electrification 
Administration Electricity Supplying 1973
4. Local Water Utilities 
Adminis tration Water Supplying 1973
5. Central Luzon-Cagayan Valley 
Authority Electricity Supplying 1961
6. National Housing Authority Housing 1971
7. Philippine National Railways Railways 1964
8. Philippine Port Authority Port Management 1974
9. Philippine National Lines Sea Transport 1976
10. Marine Industry Board Promotion n.a.
11. (2)Bureau of Post Postal Services n .a.
12. Bureau of Telecommunication^^ Telecommunication n.a.
13. Communication and Electricity. 
Development Auth. Telecommunication n.a.
14. Phil. Communication Satellite 
(3)Corporation Telecommunication n.a.
15. Civil Aeronautics 
Administration^^ ' * Airport Management n.a.
16. Philippine Airlines Aviation 1977
17. Philippine Aerospace Development 
Corporation Aviation/Maintenance 1973
18. - Rotorcraft Philippine, Inc. Aviation 1974
19. - Phil. Aerotransport, Inc. Aviation 1974
* Excluding companies with less than 50% state shareholding
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20. - Phil. Aerosystem, Inc. Aviation 1974
21. - National Aero Manufacturing 
C o r p . Aircraft Maintenance 1974
22. Metro-Manila Transit Corporation Transport 1973
23. Central Bank of The Philippines Banking (Central) 1948
24. Development Bank of The
Philippines Banking (Developmental) 1958
25. (3)- Food Terminal, Inc. Food Marketing 1968
26. (3)- Philippine Amanah Bank Banking (Commercial) 1973
(3)- Philippine National Railways Railways 1964
- Philippine Aerospace Development 
Corp. Aviation/Maintenance 1973
27. - Consolicfated Textile Mills  ^ Textile 1966
28. - Midland Cement C o r p . ^ ^ Cement Mfg. 1963
29. (3)- National Housing Corp. Housing 1968
30. - National Steel C o r p . ^ ^ Iron & Steel 1974
31. Philippine Veteran Bank Banking (Commercial) 1952
32. - Wast-prn Palawan Timber Timber/Logging 1973
33. - Vetgroup Interest Projects, Inc. Finance 1973
34. Land Bank of the Philippines Banking (Land Dev.) 1963
35. - Masaganang Sakahan, Inc. Services 1974
36. - Lumang Bayan Realty 
Development Corp. Real Estate n . a .
Philippine National Bank Banking (Commercial) 1916
37. - National Investment & 
Development Corp. Holding Company 1958
38. - National Warehousing Corp. Warehousing 1976
39. - NIDC Oil Mills, Inc. Edible Oil Mfg. 1973
40. - Coco Chemical Philippines, Inc. n .a. 1965
41. - National Services Corp. n . a . 1975
42. - P h i l . Shipyard & Engineering 
Corp . Ship Repairing n.a.
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43. - P h i l .  E x c h a n g e  Corp. n. a . 1 9 2 0
(3)- N a t i o n a l  H o u s i n g  Corp. H o u s i n g 1 9 6 8
44. - P h i l .  S u g a r  D e v e l o p m e n t  Corp. S u g a r  M f g . 1 9 7 5
45. - P N B  Corp. . n . a . 1 9 7 2
46. • - B i c o l  S u g a r  D e v e l o p m e n t  Corp. S u g a r  Mf g . 1 9 7 2
47. - P h i l .  B a n k  of C a l i f o r n i a B a n k i n g n.a.
48. - N a t i o n a l  E x p o r t  T r a d i n g  
C o r p o r a t i o n n . a . 1 9 6 2
49. - P N B  H o n g k o n g  F i n a n c e  C o m p a n y n . a . n . a .
50. - S u b i c  N a t i o n a l  S h i p y a r d ,  Inc. S h i p  R e p a i r i n g 1 9 7 5
51. - P h i l .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c e  
L i m i t e d n.a. n . a .
52. - S u b i c  B a y  R e p a i r i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n S h i p  R e p a i r i n g n . a .
53. G o v e r n m e n t  S e r v i c e  I n s u r a n c e  
S y s t e m  (GSIS) I n s u r a n c e 1 9 3 6
(3)- P h i l i p p i n e  A i r l i n e s v A i r l i n e s 1 9 7 7
54. - M a n i l a  H o t e l  Corp. H o t e l  O p e r a t i n g n.a.
55. (3)M a r a w i  R e s o r t  C o r p . H o t e l  O p e r a t i n g 1 9 7 3
56. - M e a t  P a c k i n g  C o r p .  of  the 
P h i l i p p i n e s F o o d  P r o c e s s i n g n.a.
57. S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  S y s t e m  (SSS) I n s u r a n c e 1 9 5 7
58. P h i l i p p i n e  D e p o s i t  I n s u r a n c e I n s u r a n c e 1 9 6 3
59. (4)A s i a n  I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n s u r a n c e I n s u r a n c e  T r a i n i n g 1 9 7 4
60. P h i l .  E x p o r t  a n d  F o r e i g n  L o a n  
(4)G u a r a n t e e  C o r p . F i n a n c e 1 9 7 4
61. H o m e  F i n a n c e  C o m m i s s i o n F i n a n c e 1 9 5 5
62. N a t i o n a l  H o m e  M o r t g a g e  Corp. F i n a n c e n . a .
63. P h i l .  V e t e r a n s  I n v e s t m e n t *
D e v e l o p m e n t  Corp. H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y 1 9 7 3
64. - P H I V I D E C  I n d u s t r i a l  E s t a t e  
A u t h o r i t y I n d u s t r i a l  E s t a t e 1 9 7 4
65. - P H I V I D E C  R a i l w a y s  C o m p a n y R a i l w a y 1 9 7 5
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66. - Veteran Electronic
Communication, Inc.^^ (60%) Electronics
67. - Southern Tagalog Veteran
Agro-Industrial^  (80%) n.a.
(1)68. - Veterans Logistics Corp.
(55%) n.a.
69. - PHIVIDEC Construction &
Development Corp. Construction
70. PEFTOK Investment & Development
Corp. Holding Company
71. - PEFTOK Integrated Services, Inc. n.a.
72. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office Lottery Operating
(4)73. NACIDA Barlk Banking
74. Phil. Export Insurance and
(4)Guarantee Corp. Finance
75. Cooperative Development Loan Fund Finance
76. Agricultural Credit Administration Finance
77. Coconut Investment Company n.a.
Stockpiling 
Coconut Development 
Cotton Promotion 
Tobacco Promotion
Tobacco Promotion 
Cotton Promotion
n.a.
Fertilizer Mfg/ 
Distributing
Horse Breeding
Sugar Development
n.a.
78. National Grains Authority
79. Phil. Coconut Authority
80. Phil. Cotton Corporation
81. Phil. Tobacco Administration
82. Phil. Virginia Tobacco 
Administration
83. Phil. Cotton Authority
84. Planters Products, Inc.
85. National Fertilizer Corp. of the 
Philippines
(2)86. National Stud Farm
87. Philippine Sugar Commission
88. Fertilizer and Pesticides
(2)Authority
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1973
n.a.
1906
1963
1972
1973 
1952
1971
1972
1973 
1973 
1954
1959
1972
1962
1965
1977
1973
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89. Philippine Fish Marketing
Authority Fisheries Development n.a.
90. National Irrigation Administration Irrigation 1963
91. Farm Systems Development 
Corporation Farm Development 1975
92. National Cottage Industry
(2)Development Authority Indus. Development 1969
93. Cottage Industry Development 
(2)Enterprise Indus. Development n.a.
94. (2)Design Centre Philippines Indus. Development n.a.
95. Philippine National Oil Company Oil & Gas Development 1973
96. - Petrophil Corp. Oil & Gas Marketing 1966
97. - Bataan Refining Corp.^^ (60%) Refinery 1957
98. - Filoil Industrial Estate Industrial Estate 1957
99. - Filoil Refining Corp.^ (86.2%) Refinery n.a.
100. (3)- Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (70%) Transport n.a.
101. - Transport Contractors, Inc. Transport n.a.
102. - Consolidated Terminal, Inc. Warehousing 1960
103. - Cebre Stevedoring Corp. Inc. Transport n.a.
104. - Overseas Recruitment Co-op. n .a. n.a.
105. - Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. 
Inc. n. a. n.a.
106. - Visayan Stevedore Transport 
Co., Inc. n.a. n.a.
107. - Sta. Mesa Shipway & Engineering 
Co. Ship. Repairing n.a.
108. - PNOC Tankers Corp. Transport 1974
109. - Petrophil Tankers Corp. Transport 1974
110. - Petron TBA Corp. Transport 1974
111. - Petron Tankers Corp. Transport 1974
112. - PNOC Energy Development Corp. n.a. n.a.
113. - PNOC Exploration Corp. Oil & Gas Exploration n.a.
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114. Export Processing Zone Authority Industrial Estate 1972
115. National Development Company Holding Company 1937
116. - CEPOC Industries, I n c . ^ Cement Mfg. 1919
117. - Kamayan Real Estate Corp. n.a. n.a.
118. (3)- Manila Gas Corporationv (60%) Gas Distributing 1916
119. - G.Y. Real Estate Corp. Real Estate 1973
120. - Batangas Land Co. Real Estate 1971
121. - Pepsi Cola Realty, Inc. Real Estate n.a.
122. Kalinga Special Development 
Region Development Corporation 1975
123. Catanduan Development Authority Development Corporation 1965
124. (4)Sulu Development Authority Development Corporation 1977
125. Laguna Lake Development Authority Development Corporation 1966
126. Ilocos Sur Development 
(4)Authority Development Corporation 1967
127. (4)Mindono Development Board Development Corporation 1965
128. (4)Panay Development Authority Development Corporation 1964
129. Northern Samar Development 
(4)Authority Development Corporation 1964
130. Southern Samar Development 
Authority Development Corporation 1968
131. Southern Philippine Development 
Authority Development Corporation 1975
(3)- Marawi Resort, Inc. Hotel Operating 1973
132. - Mindeva Agro-Indus trial Dev. 
Corp. n.a. 1966
133. - Mindeva Refrigeration 
Industries Corp. n.a. 1967
134. - Palawan Cannery & Fisheries 
Dev. Corp. Fisheries/Processing 1965
135. Leyte Sub-A Basin Development 
Corp . Development Corporation 1974
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136. Metal Industrial Research &
Development Board Research 1972
137. National Research Council of the 
Philippines Research 1933
138. Science Foundation of the 
Philippines Research 1952
139. Cultural Centre of the Philippines Cultural Promotion 1972
140. - Folk Art Theatre Cultural Promotion n.a.
141. - National Art Centre Cultural Promotion n . a.
142. - Philippines Plaza Hotel Cultural Promotion n.a.
143. - Centre for International Trade 
& Exhibition Trade Promotion n.a.
144. Music Promotion Foundation of the 
Phil. Cultural Promotion 1955
145. (2)Cement Industry Authority Industrial Promotion 1973
146. Philippine Tourism Promotion Tourist Promotion 1975
147. (2)Philippine Convention Bureau 
(Phil. International Convention 
Centre) Tourist Promotion 1974
148. Philippine International Trade 
Corporation Trading 1973
149. Development Academy of the 
phu.(2) Training/Research 1973
150. Phil. Institute of Development 
S tudies Training/Research n.a.
151. Philippine Pilgrimage
a u • (3)Authority Pilgrimage Services 1977
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MAIN TYPE OF YEAR OF
ACTIVITIES ESTABLISHMENT
Singapore*
1. Public Utilities Board
2. - Development Resource Corp.
3. Housing Development Board
4. - Housing and Urban Development 
Co.
5. - Development and Construction 
Co.
6. - Housing Management Services
7. Urban Renewal Authority
8. Telecommunication Authority of 
Singapore
9. - General Telephone Directory 
Co.(1) (60%)
(2)10. Postal Services Department
11. Port Authority of Singapore
12. - Port & Marine Services Co.
13. - Sentosa Transportation Services 
Co.
14. - Singapore Cable C a r ^
15. - Regional Dredging Corporation
16. - Container Warehousing &
(3)Transportation
(3)17. - Sembawang Towing Co.
18. - GATX Terminals^
19. Board of Commissioners of 
Currency, Singapore
20. Monetary Authority of Singapore
Elec/Water/Gas Supplying 1963
Quarrying 1976
Housing 1960
Housing 1974
Construction n.a.
Services n.a.
Urban Development 1974
Telecommunication 1974
Directory Publishing 1975
Postal Services n.a.
Port Management 1963
Transport 1972
Transport
Tourist Promotion 1970
Dredging 1973
Trading/Warehousing n.a.
Transport n.a.
Warehousing n.a.
Finance 1967
Finance 1970
* Excluding companies with less than 50% state shareholding
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21. T e m a s e k  H o l d i n g H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y 1 9 7 4
22. - S i n g a p o r e  Z o o l o g i c a l  G a r d e n  Co. C u l t u r a l 1 9 7 1
23. - S i n g a p o r e  N a t i o n a l  P r i n t e r s  Co. P r i n t i n g 1 9 7 3
24. - N a t i o n a l  E n g i n e e r i n g  S e r v i c e s  
Co. S e r v i c e s 1 9 7 3
25. - Singaraanex H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y 1 9 6 6
26. (3)- S e m b a w a n g  S h i p y a r d v (76.8%) S h i p  B u i l d i n g / R e p a i r i n g 1 9 7 3
27. - S e m b a w a n g  H o l d i n g s H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y 1 9 7 3
(3)- S e m b a w a n g  S h i p y a r d S h i p  B u i l d i n g / R e p a i r i n g 1 9 6 8
28. (3)- S e m b a w a n g  T o w i n g T r a n s p o r t n.a.
29. - S e m b a w a n g  E n g i n e e r i n g n  . a . n . a .
30. - K e p p e l  S h i p y a r d S h i p  B u i l d i n g / R e p a i r i n g 1 9 6 8
31. - K e p m o u n t  S h i p y a r d S h i p  B u i l d i n g / R e p a i r i n g n . a .
32. - S i n g m a r i n e  S h i p y a r d ^ ^  (88%) S h i p  B u i l d i n g / R e p a i r i n g n.a.
33. - G o o d w i l l  N a v i g a t i o n ^ ^  (60%) T r a n s p o r t n . a .
34. - K e p p e l  M a r i n e  A g e n c i e s S e r v i c e s n.a.
35. - K e m p u s  S h i p p i n g  (HK) T r a n s p o r t n . a .
36. - K e p l i o n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t n . a .
37. - F a r  E a s t - L e v i n g t o n  
S h i p b u i l d i n g ^  (55.7%) S h i p  B u i l d i n g / R e p a i r i n g 1 9 7 3
38. - K e p p e l  M a n a g e m e n t (80%) S e r v i c e s n . a .
39. - K e p p e l  P h i l i p p i n e s  S h i p y a r d  
(92.5%) S h i p  R e p a i r i n g n . a .
40. - S l a g  I n d u s t r i e s n . a. n.a.
41. - S i n g a p o r e  S h i p w a y  & 
E n g i n e e r i n g E n g i n e e r i n g  S e r v i c e s n. a .
42. - G e e  F o o k  Y i n g  E n g i n e e r i n g ^ ^  
(50%) E n g i n e e r i n g  S e r v i c e s n. a .
43. (2,1)- S m g t o n  T r a n s p o r t T r a n s p o r t n . a .
44. - C e n t r a l  M a r i t i m e  S e r v i c e s  & 
E n g i n e e r s S e r v i c e s n . a .
45. - G o o d w i n  S h i p p i n g ^ ^  (50%) T r a n s p o r t n.a.
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46. - Neptune Orient Lines Sea Transport 1968
47. - Neptune Alpha Lines Sea Transport 1971
48. - Neptune Beta Lines Sea Transport 1971
49. - Neptune Associated Line Sea Transport 1971
50. - Neptune-Kawasaki T a n k e r s ^
(50%) Sea Transport 1872
51. - Neptune Agencies Services 1974
52. - Singapore Airlines Air Transport 1972
53. - Singapore Airport Terminal 
Services Airport Services n.a.
54. - Singapore Airport Duty-Free 
Emporium Duty Free Shops n.a.
55. - Singapore Treasury Building Real Estate 1976
56. - Jurong Bird Park Co. Recreational 1970
57. - Singapore General Aviation 
Services (51%) Aircraft Maintenance 1970
58. - Development Bank of 
Singapore(1,3) (52.4%) Banking (Development) 1968
59. - DBS Nominees Finance 1969
60. - DBS Finance Finance 1970
61. - DBS Trustee Finance 1975
62. - DBS Realty Finance 1969
63. - DBS Private Finance n . a .
64. - Raffles Centre Real Estate 1971
65. - Wan Tien Realty^3  ^ (51%) Real Estate 1974
66. - General Security Investment Finance 1974
67. - General Security Trading Finance 1977
68. - Singapore Tourist Industry Finance 1974
69. - Thomson Plaza^3  ^ (n.a.) Real Estate 1977
70. - Chin Swee Towu^3  ^ (n.a.) Real Estate 1977
71. - Western Eag l e v * ' (n.a.) Transport 1973
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72. - I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n  of 
S i n g a p o r e ^ ’ ^  (n.a.) I n s u r a n c e 1 9 6 9
73. - D e v e l o p m e n t  R e s o u r c e s S e r v i c e s 1 9 6 9
74. (1 3)- N a t i o n a l  G r a i n  E l e v a t o r  ’ 
(n.a.) S i l o 1 9 6 3
75. - M i t s u b i s h i  S i n g a p o r e  H e a v y
I n d u s  t r i e s ^ ^  (n.a.) I r o n  & S t e e l 1 9 7 3
76. - E x p o r t  C r e d i t  I n s u r a n c e  C o rp.  
o f  S i n g a p o r e ^  (50%) F i n a n c e n.a.
77. P o s t  O f f i c e  S a v i n g s  B a n k B a n k i n g  ( S a v i n g s ) 1 9 7 1
78. - C r e d i t  P O S B  Co. F i n a n c e 1 9 7 4
79. P O S B  I n v e s t m e n t  Co. F i n a n c e 1 9 7 2
80. (1 3)- Discount; Co. o f  S i n g a p o r e  *
(n . a .) F i n a n c e n . a .
81. S i n g a p o r e  P o o l s  Co. L o t t e r y 1 9 6 8
82. J u r o n g  A b b a t o i r  Co. A n i m a l  S l a u g h t e r i n g 1 9 7 2
83. S i n g a p o r e  S t e e l  S u p p l y  C e n t r e  Co. n.a. 1 9 7 0
84. T r a n s p o r t  S e r v i c e s  C o . T r a n s p o r t 1 9 7 1
85. S i n g a p o r e  O f f s h o r e  P e t r o l e u m  
S e r v i c e s S e r v i c e s 1 9 7 0
86. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  & 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  Corp. C o n s t r u c t i o n 1 9 7 2
87. A p p l i e d  R e s e a r c h  C o r p o r a t i o n R e s e a r c h 1 9 7 3
88. P e t r o c h e m i c a l  Corp. of 
S i n g a p o r e (1,3) (50%) P e t r o c h e m i c a l 1 9 7 7
89. S h e n g - L i  H o l d i n g s H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y 1 9 7 4
90. - C h a r t e r e d  I n d u s t r i e s  of 
S i n g a p o r e A m m u n i t i o n  Mf g . 1 9 6 7
91. - I n t e r a r m e  A s i a A m m u n i t i o n  Mf g . 1 9 7 2
92. - O r d i n a n c e  D e v e l o p m e n t  & 
E n g i n e e r i n g A m m u n i t i o n  Mfg. n. a .
93. - S i n g a p o r e  F o o d  I n d u s t r i e s F o o d  P r o c e s s i n g 1 9 7 3
94. - A l l i e d  O r d i n a n c e A m m u n i t i o n  M f g . 1 9 7 3
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95. - A l l i e d  Charter Enterprise n.a. 1969
96. - S i n g a p o r e  A u t o m a t i c  E n gineering A m m u n i t i o n  Ilfg. n.a.
97. SAF E n t e r p r i s e Trading 1972
98. M N D  H o l d i n g H o l d i n g  Company 1976
(3)- R e s o u r c e  Dev e l o p m e n t  Corp. Quarr y i n g n.a.
99. - P r i m a r y  Industries Enterprise Food P r o c e s s i n g 1970
- Singa p o r e  Food Proc e s s i n g Food P r o c e s s i n g 1973
100. Ec o n o m i c  Develo p m e n t  Board Ind. Investment P r o m o t i o n 1961
101. Jur o n g  Town C o rporation Industrial Estate 1968
102. - Jur o n g  Country Club R e c r eational 1975
(3)- GA T X  T e r m i n a l v ■ . W a r e h o u s i n g 1971
103. S e n t o s a  Dev e l o p m e n t  Corporation To u r i s t  P r o m o t i o n 1972
104. - Sen t o s a  Golf C l u b (66.7%) R e c reational n.a.
105. S i n g a p o r e  Tourist P romotion Board To u r i s t  P r omotion 1963
106. Na t i o n a l  Theatre Trust Cultural 1960
107. S i n g a p o r e  Sport Council Sport P r o m o t i o n 1973
108. I n d ustrial Train i n g  Board Ind. P r o m o t i o n 1972
109. E d u c a t i o n a l  P u b l i c a t i o n  Board E d u c a t i o n a l  Textb o o k
P r o d u c t i o n 1967
110. S c ience Centre Board E d ucational n . a .
111. S i n g a p o r e  Inst, of Standard &.
Industrial Research Re s e a r c h 1973
112. Central Provident Fund Board F i nance 1973
113. Na t i o n a l  Produc t i v i t y  Board Finance 1973
114. Comm e r c i a l  & Industrial Security
C o r p o r a t i o n Se c u r i t y  Services 1974
115. Sing a p o r e  Corpn. of
R e h a b i l i t a t i v e  Enterprise P r i s o n  Industries 1975
116. S i n g a p o r e  Labour Fund Fi n a n c e 1977
117. D e p a r t m e n t  of Civil Av i a t i o n A i r p o r t  Mana g e m e n t n . a .
118. D e p a r t m e n t  of Bro a d c a s t i n g TV and Radio n.a.
NAME MAIN TYPE OF ACTIVITIES
YEAR OF 
ESTABLISHMENT
Thailand*
Metropolitan Electricity Authority Electricity Supplying 1958
Provincial Electricity Authority Electricity Supplying 1960
Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand Electricity Supplying 1968
Metrooolitan Waterworks Authority Water Supplying 1967
Provincial Waterworks Organization Water Supplying 1954
Natural Gas Organization of Thailand Gas Supplying 1977
National Housing Authority Housing 1972
Telecommunication Authority of Thailand Postal Services 1976
Telephone Organization of Thailand Telecommunication 1954
State Railways of Thailand Railways 1951
Port Authority of Thailand Port Management 1951
Mass Transport Organization Transport 1976
Transport Co. Ltd. Transport 1930
Express Transport Organization Transport 1953
Thai Airways Co. Ltd. Air Transport 1951
Thai Airways International Co. Ltd. Air Transport 1960
Thai Airways Aircraft Maintenance Co. 
Ltd(1) (70%) Aircraft Maintenance 1967
Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Co. 
Ltd.(1) (91.4%) Aeronautical Radio 1948
Thai Navigation Co. Ltd. Sea Transport 1940
Thai Maritime Navigation Co. Ltd. Sea Transport 1940
Expres Way and Rapid Transit Authority 
of Thailand Mass Transport 1972
Bank of Thailand Banking (Central) 1942
Government Savings Bank Banking (Savings) 1953
* Excluding companies with less than 50% state shareholding
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Krung Thai Bank
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperations
Government Housing Bank
State Lottery Bureau
State Pawnshop Bureau
Rubber Estate Organization
Dairy Farm Promotion Org. of Thailand
Government Cold Storage Industry 
Organization
Forest Industry Organization
- Thai Plywood Co. Ltd.
Agricultural Matketing Organization
Fish Marketing Organization
Rubber Plantation Welfare Fund
Industrial Estate of Thailand
Thailand Tobacco Monopoly
Cholburi Sugar Co. Ltd.
Supan Buri, Lampang, and Uttaradi 
Sugar Mills
Preserved Food Organization
Lignow Organization
Textile Organization
Pharmaceutical Organization
Chemical Fertilizer Co. Ltd.^^ (88.6%)
Alum Factory
Bangkok Dock Co. Ltd.
Bang Pa In Paper Mills 
Sack Factory 
Gunny Bag Factory
Banking (Commercial) 1966
Banking (Agricultural) 1966
Banking (Housing) 1953
Lottery 1939
Pawnshops 1955
Plantation 1953
Cattle Development 1971
Cold Storage 1958
Logging/Reforestation 1953
Plywood Mfg. 1952
Agricultural Marketing 1974
Fish Marketing 1953
Finance 1960
Industrial Estate 1972
Tobacco Mfg. 1941
Sugar Mfg. 1953
Sugar Mfg. 1967
Food Processing 1955
Alcohol Mfg. 1963
Textile Mfg. 1955
Pharmaceutical 1966
Fertilizer Mfg. 1966
Alum Mfg. 1954
Ship Repairing 1943
Paper & Pulp 1968
Sack Mfg. 1952
Bag Mfg. 1965
Bag Mfg. 1953Northeast Jute Mill Co. Ltd.
Mining Industry Centre Mining (Tin)
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1939
Off Shore Mining Organization Mining (Tin) 1975
Playing Card Factory Card Mfg. 1939
Glass Organization Glass Mfg. 1955
Battery Organization Battery Mfg. 1955
Tannery Organization Tannery Mfg. 1955
(3)Thai Plywood Co. Ltd. Plywood Mfg. 1952
Marble Plant Co. Ltd. Marble Mfg. 1956
Tourist Organization of Thailand Tourist Promotion 1959
United Thai Hotel and Tourism Co. Ltd. Hotel Operating 1946
Sport Promotion Organization of Thailand Sport Promotion 1959
Zoological Organization Recreational 1954
Mass Communication Org. of Thailand TV & Radio 1977
Radio Rediffusion Co. Ltd.^^ (60%) Broadcasting 1954
Music & Fine Art Organization Cultural 1954
Fuel Organization Petroleum Distributing 1955
Government Warehouse Organization Warehousing 1955
(2)Rice Account Unit Finance 1960
(2)Bangkok Rice Reserve Project S tockpiling 1960
Marketing Organization Market Operating 1953
Thai Industry Shop Trading 1940
6 Provincial Trading Companies
Notes: (1) Joint venture with private enterprises
(2) 'Departmental' enterprises with separate budget
(3) Joint venture between/among public enterprises
(4) Not yet operated.
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APPENDIX II MAJOR SEMI-STATE COMPANIES
(as of December 1977)
NAME GOV’T MAIN TYPE OFHOLDING % ACTIVITIES
INDONESIA
- not available -
MALAYSIA '
PERNAS Engineering Sdn. Bhd.
1. - Burjakimia Industries Sdn. Bhd. 41% Chemical Mfg.
2. - BM Engineering 40% Elec. Hoist Mfg.
PERNAS Mining Stfn. Bhd.
3. - Malaysia Titanium Corporation 40% Mining
PERNAS Properties
4. - Austral Asia Development 20% Real Estate
5. - Australasia International
Development 30% Real Estate
PERNAS Securities Sdn. Bhd.
- PERNAS Sime Darby Sdn. Bhd.
6. - Far East Hotel Development (M) 48.97% Hotel Operation
7. - Galam Malaysia 15.7 % Salt Mfg.
8. - Goodyear Malaysia 39% Rubber/Tyre Mfg.
9. - Hong Leong-Lunssen Shipyard 12.5% Ship Repairing
10. - Malaysia Ind. Finance 0.66% Finance
11. - Keta Industries 10% n .a.
12. - Highlands & Lowlands 9%
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance
13. - Malaysian Int’al Merchant Bankers 30% Banking (Merchant)
14. - Arab Malaysian Development Bank 35% Banking (Development)
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Council of Trust for Indigeneous People MARA
15. Gula Perak 0.6% Sugar Mfg.
16. India Malaysia Textiles 4.4% Textile
17. Volvo Malaysia 4% Car Assembly
18. Ibam Sdn. Bhd. 10% n .a.
19. Raleigh Cycles (M) 17.4% Bicycle Mfg.
20. Oriental Metals 3.5% n .a.
21. Matronics 20% n .a.
22. Pulp & Paper Industries 48% Pulp & Paper
23. Malaysia Records 33.3% Record Mfg.
24. MED Bumikan MARA 40% Transport
25. Sri JenljLa 20% Transport
Negara Simbilan SEDC
26. Malaysian Poultry 33.3% Poultry Farming
27. Sprague Electronics 30% Electric Appliance Mfg
28. Senawang Edible Oil 20.5% Edible Oil Mfg.
29. Malaysia Pristons 26% Priston Mfg.
30. Sritanian Negeri 40% n .a.
31. Agro Industrial Training Complex 33.3% n.a.
Penang SEDC
32. Intron Industries 33.3% n. a.
33. IHC (Malaysia) 33.3% n.a.
34. Malaysia Foods 40% Food Processing
35. Nusantana P. Pinang 2% n.a.
36. Penang Commercial & Industrial
Development 10% n.a.
37. Schott Glass (M) 30.5% Glass Mfg.
Melaka SEDC
24% Carbon Paper Mfg.38. - Kotax Malaysia
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Selangor SEDC
- Perangsang Trading
39. - Perkuat Kuari 40% n .a.
40. - Stoody ASEAN (M) 33.3% n .a.
41. - UMW Recon 20% n .a.
42. - General Ceramics 19% Ceramic Mfg.
43. - Malaysian Sheet Glass 10% Sheet Glass Mfg.
- Timah Langat
44. - Gilian Peluper 30% n.a.
- Shah Alam Properties
45. - Sharidal 37.6 % n .a.
46. - Syarikat Delima Furniture 20% Furniture Mfg.
47. - Indo-Malaysia Engineering 16% 'n.a.
48. - Development & Commercial 10% n.a.
49. - Nulex Malaysia 10% n.a.
50. - United Lysaght 10% n.a.
51. - Perbadonon Nasional n .a. n.a.
52. - Genting Highland Hotel n .a. Hotel & Casino
53. - Hume Industries Malaysia n. a. n.a.
54. - Synthetic Resin (M) n .a. n. a.
Kedah SEDC
55. - Syarikat Persama 40% Ice Mfg.
56. - Syarikat Perkhidmatan Peri 
Lankawi 40% Transport
57. - Syarikat Thyer Rubber (M) 35% Rubber Processing
58. - Syarikat Permada (K) 33.3% Shoe Mfg.
59. - Syarikat Perusahaan Perikanan 
Majuikan Kedah/Peris 12.2% Food Processing
60. - Syarikat Kenderaan Kerala Kedah 12 h% Transport
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Perak SEDC
61. - Majuperak 30% n. a.
62. - Maju Penawat 20% n .a.
63. - Majutinah 20% n .a.
64. - Perumahaan Damai 15% n .a.
Bank Bumiputra
65. - Malayan Banking Berkad 20% Banking
THE PHILIPPINES
Government Service Insurance System 
1. - Bacnotan Consolidated Industry,
Inc. n. a. n.a.
2. - Delgado Brothers Hotel Corp. n.a. n.a.
3. - Del Rosario Bros. Marketing n . a. n.a.
4. - HI Motors, Inc. n.a. n.a.
5. - Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, 
Inc. n.a. Iron & Steel
6. - Industrial Finance Corp. n.a. Finance
7. - International Chemical 
Industries, Inc. n.a. Chemical Mfg.
8. - Laguna Coco By-Products, Inc. n.a. n .a.
9. - Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. n.a. Textile
10. - Luzon Cement Corp. n.a. Cement Mfg.
11. - Merchants Development Corp. n.a. n.a.
12. - Philippine Cellophane Film Corp. n.a. n.a.
13. - Philippine Long Distance 
Telephone Company n.a. Telephone Service
14. - Pioneer Glass Mfg. Corp. n.a. Glass Mfg.
15. - Republic Ceramic Mfg. Corp. n.a. Ceramic Mfg.
16. - Riverside Mills Corp. n.a. n.a.
17. - Royal Fishing Corp. n.a. n.a.
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18. - Superior Textile Mills, Inc. n .a. Textile
19. - Union Glass & Container Corp. n . a . Glass Mfg.
20. - Visayan Electric Company n . a . n.a.
21. - Acoje Mining Corp. n.a. Mining
22. - Andres Soriano Corp. n.a. n . a .
23. - Atlas Consolidated Mining &
Development Corp. n . a . Mining
24. - Atlas Fertilizer Corp. n.a. Fertilizer Mfg.
25. - G.A. Machineries, Inc. n . a . n.a.
26. - GAMI Agricultural Management 
C o r p . n.a. n.a.
27. - Masagana Motors, Inc. n . a . n.a.
28. - Phil. Trade International Corp. n.a. n . a .
29. - Hotel Enterprise of the Phil, 
Inc . n.a. Hotel Operation
30. - Inco Mining Corp. n.a. Mining
31. - Jardine Davis, Inc. n.a. n.a.
32. - Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. n.a. n.a.
33. - Marcopper Mining C o r p . n.a. Mining
34. - Marindugue Mining & Industrial 
C o r p . n.a. n.a.
35. - Meralco Securities Corp. n . a . Finance
36. - Philex Mining Corp. n.a. Mining
37. - Philippine Trust Co. n.a. Finance
38. - Reinsurance Co. of the Orient n.a. Insurance
39. - San Miguel Corp. n.a. Brewery
40. - Victan & Company, Inc. n . a . n . a .
Philippine Veterans Investment Development C o r p .
41. - Liquid Gas Phils. 30% n.a.
42. - Col. Nakar Mining Development 45% Mining
SINGAPORE
Singmanex Co.
1. - Chemical Industries (F.E.) 29.6 % Chemical
2. - Fraser & Neave/Subsidiaries 1.0% n.a.
3. - Inchcape/Subsidiaries 0.27% n.a.
4. - Malaysian Feedmills/Subsidiaries 0.03% Feedmills
5. - Metal Box 0.15% Tin Products
6. - Metal Box Singapore 1.78% Tin Products
7. - National Iron & Steel Mills n.a. Iron & Steel
8. - Eastern Industries n . a. n.a.
9. - Jurong Industries n.a. n.a.
10. - National Shop Breakers n.a. n.a.
11. - Eastern Wing Mfg. n.a. n.a.
12. - Overseas Chinese Banking Corp./ 
Subsidiaries 0.62% Banking
13. - Pan Electric Industries/ 
Subsidiaries 0.39% n.a.
14. - Pan Malaysia Industries/ 
Subsidiaries 2.31% n.a.
15. - Prima/Subsidiaries 35.61% Flour Mfg.
16. - Prima Lines n.a. Transport
17. - Prima Tower n.a. Real Estate
18. - P.T. Prima Indonesia n.a. Flour Mfg.
19. - Sime Darby Holdings/Subsidiaries n.a. Holding Company
20. - Singapore Growth Fund n.a. Finance
21. - Singapore Land/Subsidiaries 0.08% Real Estate
22. - Strait Steamship/Subsidiaries 14.5% Transport
23. - Straits Time Press 0.26% Newspaper
24. - Straits Trading/Subsidiaries 0.25% Trading
25. - Straits Publishing n.a. Publishing
26. - United Engineers/Subsidiaries 1.34% Services
27. - Yaohan Singapore n. a . Trading
28. - John White Footware n.a. Shoe Mfg.
29.
- Keppel Shipyard
- International Steel Rope 11.1% Steel Rope Mfg.
30. - Western Eagle 45% Transport
31. - Camnex Contractor (Singapore) 40% n.a.
32. - Seacare 40% n.a.
33. - Central Maritime Services & 
Engineering 24.5% n.a.
34. - Batangas Realty & Development 30% Real Estate
35. - Bangkok Shipbuilding & 
Engineering 30% Ship Repairing
Development Bank of Singapore 
36. - Straits Fisheries 15.7% Fisheries
37. - Singapore Nylon Corpn. 20.0% Nylon Mfg.
38. - Cedar Garment Factory 18.4% Garment Mfg.
39. - Starlight Timber Products 14% Timber Products
40. - Int'al Wood Products 21.7% Timber Products
41. - Jurong Plywood 35% Plywood Mfg.
42. - Toppan Printing (S) 40.4% Printing
43. - Singapore Polymer Corpn. 37% Textile
44. - Dyno Industries 35% n.a.
45. - Hytex 5% n.a.
46. - Singapore Petroleum 31.3% n.a.
47. - Sigma. Metal 11.7% n.a.
48. - Singapore Takanda Industries 16% n.a.
49. - Tata Precision Industries 20% Precision Mfg.
50. - Trans-Aire Electronics Industries 16.7% Electronics
51. - Singapore Fuji Elevator Corpn. 26.0% Elevator Mfg.
52. - Bethlehem (S) 30% Mfg.
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53. - Rollie Singapore 25%
54. - Starcrete 16.7%
55. - Colex (S) 25.7%
56. - Overseas Union Enterprise 9.7%
57. - Orient Leasing Singapore 25%
58. - Singapore Namura Merchant Banking 35%
59. - International Bank of Singapore 25%
60. - DBS Daiwa Securities
International n.a.
61. - Marine and Contracting Services 39.1%
62. - Asia Appraisal 25%
63. - DBS Chartered On-Line 33.3%
64. - Hotel Merlin Singapore 9.4%
65. - Shangri-la Hotel 7.1%
66. - Singapore Textile Industries 14.1%
Temasek Holding
67. - Cerabos (Singapore) 45%
68. - Jurong Holdings 44.5%
69. - Jurong Shipyard n.a.
70. - Dolphin Shipyard n.a.
71. - Jurong Shipbuilders 33.3%
72. - Jurong Engineering n.a.
73. - Sugar Industry of Singapore 40%
74. - INTRACO 27%
75. - Metalwood 80%
76. - Orient Construction 100%
77. - Seasonal Garment Mfg. > 70%
78. - Alpha Industries 100%
79. - Hexa Timber 75%
- Island Granite 100%
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a.
Finance
Finance
Banking
Banking
Finance
n.a.
n.a.
Services 
Hotel Operation 
Hotel Operation 
Textile
n.a.
Shipbuilding
Shipbuilding
Shipbuilding
Shipbuilding
n.a.
Sugar Mfg. 
Trading
n.a.
Construction 
Garment Mfg.
n.a.
Wood Products 
Quarrying80.
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8. - M e t r a c o 71% n.a.
82. - T r a n s p o r t  S e r v i c e s 5 0 % T r a n s p o r t
83. - G o o d w i l l  T i m b e r s 5 0 % W o o d  P r o d u c t s
84. - B e r w i n  T i m b e r s 2 3 . 6 % W o o d  P r o d u c t s
85. - P . T .  G o o d w i n 3 5 % W o o d  P r o d u c t s
86. - S i n g t o n g  T r a n s p o r t 2 5% T r a n s p o r t
87. - F o r e s t  D e v e l o p m e n t 3 0%
V
n.a.
88. - R o t r a c o  E x p o r t 4 0 % T r a d i n g
89. - P a r k l a n d  G o l f  D r i v i n g  R a n g 1 5 % R e c r e a t i o n
90. U n i t e d  I n d u s t r i a l  Corp. 1 6 . 5 % n. a .
91. U n i t e d  V e g e t a b l e  O i l 4 0 % E d i b l e  O i l  Mfg.
92. P a t i e n c e  ä n d  N i c h o l s o n 4 0 % n.a.
93. A c m a  E l e c t r i c a l  I n d u s t r i e s /  
S u b s i d i a r i e s 1 8 . 3 % E l e c t r i c a l  A p p . Mf g .
94. S i n g a p o r e  S h i p b u i l d i n g  & 
E n g i n e e r i n g 2 3 . 4 % S h i p b u i l d i n g  Mfg.
95. O f f s h o r e  S u p p l y  A s s o c i a t i o n  (SEA) 2 5 % S e r v i c e s
96. M i n g  C o u r t  H o t e l 1 6 . 5 % H o t e l  O p e r a t i o n
97. ' I n s t a n t  A s i a ’ C u l t u r a l  S h o w  Co. 9 . 3 % T o u r i s t  P r o m o t i o n
98. S i n g a p o r e  T e x t i l e n'. a . T e x t i l e
527
GOV’T MAIN TYPE OF
HOLDING % ACTIVITIES
THAILAND (as of 30th September 1976)
1. Bangkok Bank Ltd. 30% Banking
2. Siam Commercial Ltd. 19% Banking
3. Bank of Asia Ltd. 0.13% Banking
4. Cholpratan Cement Co. Ltd. 37.50% Cement Mfg.
5. Boonrawd Brewery Co. Ltd. 5.30% Brewery
6. Siam Cement Co. Ltd. 0.12% Cement Mfg.
7. Thai Rice Co. Ltd. 0.17% Trading
8. Auo Kam Tin Co. Ltd. 28.30% Mining
9. Agricultural Product Co. Ltd. 40% Trading
10. Sugar Industry of Thailand 48% Trading
11. 25 Provincial Trading Companies
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